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Indications of Political Instability in Key Countries



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April 1983

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GI IPI 83-001
April 1983

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Indications of Political Instability in Key Countries



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This quarterly was produced by and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and suggestions are welcome and may be addressed to

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[Redacted] Instability and
Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, [Redacted]

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*GI IPI 83-001
April 1983*

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
Indications of Political Instability in Key Countries



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Preface

This is the first issue of a quarterly publication designed to provide timely warning of significant instability in countries of key importance to US interests. The quarterly, which in this issue includes data from 1 January to 31 March 1983, examines events and processes that could lead to major regime or policy changes. It is not intended to supply short-term warning of revolution or collapse, but rather is designed to address the potential for instability during the next two years in a periodic, systematic, and thematic way through the consistent application of a set of indicators.



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The quarterly will include four parts:

- A brief overview of each country.
- A more detailed assessment of those countries in which there have been developments of concern.
- A chart summarizing the status of key indicators for each country and tables including more specific political and economic data.



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This first issue assesses 16 countries; subsequent issues will include a total of 26 countries that we have identified as particularly salient to US interests. The countries are selected because they are strategic choke points, major oil producers, key US friends or allies, or countries geographically close to the United States.



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Part 1. Major Developments at a Glance

Mexico¹

The political system remains basically sound, but austerity measures to resuscitate the deteriorating economy are eroding support for President de la Madrid, who will soon face further hard economic decisions. [Redacted]

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El Salvador¹

Dissatisfaction in the armed forces with the conduct of the war, increasing aggressiveness by the insurgents, and a stepped-up election timetable suggest greater turmoil ahead. [Redacted]

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Guatemala¹

The government's timing in executing six alleged terrorists, handling of the murder of three Guatemalan US Agency for International Development (USAID) employees, and ending of the state of siege have angered some senior and junior military officers. President Rios Montt has enacted new laws opening up the possibility of increased political participation. [Redacted]

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Honduras

Domestic terrorists, with major assistance from Salvadoran insurgents, Cuba, and Nicaragua, appear determined to continue their campaign of violence and subversion, but are not a serious immediate threat. [Redacted]

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Brazil¹

Recent progress toward a more democratic society should help counteract a moderate loss of confidence and unrest brought on by the deteriorating economy. [Redacted]

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Spain

Overall prospects for political stability have improved during the socialist government's first months in office, despite renewed terrorism in the Basque provinces and a controversial government abortion proposal. [Redacted]

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Greece

Prime Minister Papandreou is coping reasonably well with heightened economic difficulties, a vociferous public debate over defense relations with the United States, and some nascent dissatisfaction within the military. [Redacted]

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Turkey

Government legislation to streamline inefficient public enterprises and to stimulate capital investment is expected to strengthen economic and political stability. [Redacted]

¹ See part 2 for detailed discussion. [Redacted]

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Egypt¹

President Mubarak, having enhanced his domestic standing by some recent diplomatic activity, now faces a potential political backlash because of the need to make tough decisions on domestic spending cuts and import restraints owing to the decline in oil prices. [redacted]

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Saudi Arabia

The government has arrested more Shia dissidents in Eastern Province because of increasing concern over potential Iranian subversion; Shias are unlikely to respond by increased antiregime agitation for fear of losing their jobs in the oilfields and triggering reprisals by the security forces. [redacted]

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Pakistan¹

Serious communal rioting in Karachi has forced the government to deploy troops to restore order, but while tensions remain high, the opposition has been unable to capitalize on this or other issues. [redacted]

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Nigeria¹

President Shagari faces problems ahead because of a decline in oil earnings and what may be a difficult and violent election this summer; his opposition, though, remains fragmented and disorganized. [redacted]

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Kenya

Large, influential tribes are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with President Moi, but there are no signs yet that opponents of the regime are organizing effectively. [redacted]

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Zaire

Despite recent economic reforms, spontaneous urban demonstrations may result from food shortages and other economic hardships. [redacted]

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Philippines¹

Larger Communist insurgency operations, a poorly performing economy, and deteriorating Church-state relations augur a more perilous future but do not threaten short-term stability. [redacted]

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Indonesia

President Soeharto has been reelected without incident, and, notwithstanding societal tensions such as population pressures and unemployment, the security forces remain fully capable of maintaining domestic order. [redacted]

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¹ See part 2 for detailed discussion. [redacted]

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Part 2. Countries in Which There Have Been Developments of Concern

Mexico

- A drop in world oil prices cut heavily into export earnings while triple-digit inflation and austerity measures began to lower labor and middle class living standards. [redacted]
- Labor leaders have publicly accused the business sector of violating a December agreement aimed at limiting price hikes on recently decontrolled items in exchange for modest wage increases. [redacted]
- According to the Attorney General of Mexico City, a dramatic increase in crime there appears linked to rising unemployment and rampant inflation. [redacted]
- Despite the increased economic hardships, a rally called by leftist groups to oppose governmental policies attracted far fewer participants than expected. [redacted]

Comment

The deterioration of the economy remains the government's overriding concern. Critical import shortages continue to reduce industrial output, and bankruptcies and unemployment are growing. Weak world demand has slashed export earnings, further cutting import capacity. In mid-March the government lowered its oil price from an average \$28.75 to \$26 per barrel, retroactive to 1 February. We believe a further cut of \$1 to \$2 per barrel is necessary if Mexico is to maintain its share of the world oil market. We judge that a lower oil export volume or a reduction in oil prices will further cut export revenues and limit President de la Madrid's ability to keep the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization program on course. [redacted] even under optimum conditions the government will probably overshoot its budget and fail to meet IMF austerity targets. In these circumstances we believe that Mexico would be unlikely to obtain the further credits it needs and reverse the steep decline in the economy. [redacted]

Although political repercussions have been limited so far, the President will find it increasingly difficult to retain labor and middle class support as inflation and rising unemployment take their tolls. The traditional honeymoon granted to new presidents has already been cut short. We believe that de la Madrid's January "victory" in holding down the minimum wage was offset by labor-private-sector bickering and a lack of dramatic progress in his anticorruption campaign. The President will soon have to make further hard decisions between policies that promote short-term calm and the austerity measures needed to strengthen the economy. We believe that he will shift the balance away from austerity toward social and economic programs that have historically ensured domestic peace. He has already reversed commitments to cut food and public transport subsidies and launched a huge new public works program. [redacted]

We see few signs that Mexicans are becoming disenchanted with their political system. National pride in past stability and governmental institutions and hopes for economic recovery soon ballast the system and should continue to provide a cushion against economic shocks for some time. The leadership, moreover, is competent and flexible, and no strong alternative leader has emerged to organize a cohesive opposition. A breakdown in consensus would come about only slowly and would be easily detectable in Mexico's open, sophisticated society. [redacted]

Leftist groups have been unable to agree on a strategy to oppose the government's policies. They are currently attempting to organize antiregime rallies focusing on single issues [redacted]

[redacted] We believe the government would use force to suppress disorder if that became necessary. The President appears ready to deal quickly and decisively with violence and has already warned those planning protests to comply with the law. [redacted]

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El Salvador

- The January rebellion by Colonel Ochoa generated heavy pressure in the armed forces for the resignation of Defense Minister Garcia. [redacted]
- Encouraged by armed forces disunity, the guerrillas demonstrated an increasing ability to overrun small towns and isolated military garrisons, inflicting heavy losses. [redacted]
- The government's weapons and manpower superiority generally kept the guerrillas from advancing into new areas, but the armed forces still suffer from fundamental weaknesses. [redacted]
- The government moved up the election from March 1984 to December 1983 and created a peace commission to stimulate wider political participation. [redacted]

Comment

Defense Minister Garcia has been a major force for moderation, but his enforcement of agrarian and other reforms has angered extreme rightists. Several key military officers, including the commander of the Air Force, Colonel Bustillo, also have criticized his management of the war effort. Garcia retains a loyal coterie of senior staff officers, however, and through recent maneuvering appears to have strengthened his position. Nevertheless, pressure by some elements of the armed forces for his resignation continues, and President Magana may still decide that Garcia's continuing presence undermines institutional unity. [redacted]

The strategic balance in the war remains unchanged, with neither side having the capacity to inflict a decisive single blow. Recent guerrilla successes in the north, however, suggest they are making increasingly effective use of local militia to complement their 4,000 to 6,000 full-time armed regulars. We expect that insurgent activity throughout the country will intensify soon, with a corresponding increase in government casualties, which now average 275 killed or wounded per month. [redacted]

In our judgment, the shortcomings of the Salvadoran armed forces suggest that their prospects for conducting a more aggressive war strategy between now and the elections are poor. According to US defense attache reporting, during recent fighting the armed forces demonstrated improved field communications, greater willingness to conduct night operations, and a new ability to infiltrate guerrilla lines with long-range reconnaissance patrols. These improvements were offset, however, by continuing weaknesses in command and control, poor tactical discipline, and disregard for communications security—problems that are unlikely to be resolved soon. [redacted]

We believe the government's decision to establish a peace commission and hold elections in December is designed to regain the political and psychological initiative and undercut insurgent calls for negotiations that could lead to a power-sharing arrangement. Despite sharp ideological divisions, the major political parties remain united in rejecting the guerrillas' "peace proposals," which they view as attempts to buy time and increase international support. By offering security guarantees, the government also hopes to encourage electoral participation by more moderate elements in the insurgent alliance, thus undermining guerrilla unity and prestige. [redacted]

The stepped-up election timetable will intensify existing strains in the fragile provisional government. Spurred by fears the government may repeat its electoral success of March 1982, the guerrillas will undoubtedly try to undercut the perceived legitimacy of the electoral process by exposing governmental divisions and demonstrating their own political and military strength. Recent guerrilla troop movements and resupply operations suggest that plans for a spring offensive, including increased targeting of the already damaged economic infrastructure, are well advanced. [redacted]

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Guatemala

- Repercussions from the February execution of six alleged terrorists three days before the Pope's visit and the murders of three Guatemalan USAID employees may strain relations between Rios Montt and some of his senior military advisers and junior officers. [redacted]

[redacted]

- The state of siege has been ended and regulations for organizing political parties have been relaxed.

[redacted]

[redacted]

- The military plans a reorganization to improve counterinsurgency efforts, and the government has announced another amnesty for insurgents; but civic action programs could be hampered by the weakening economy and lack of foreign assistance. [redacted]

Comment

The renewal of political activity will lend credibility to Rios Montt's promise to eventually hold national elections. It is likely to involve participation by new groups and parties, including some representative of previously underrepresented sectors such as workers, Indians, and peasants. [redacted] at least 18 parties were being organized in February.

[redacted]

As many of the new groups will likely push hard for reforms, we believe Rios Montt must establish clear limits within which the groups can operate if the political liberalization process is to succeed. If guidelines are not established and accepted, the new political parties could be exploited and radicalized by the armed left—which in turn might lead to a new wave of repression from the right. Leaders of the new political groups may in any case become targets of ultrarightists, used to assassinating political rivals.

[redacted]

The February murders by the military of three Guatemalan USAID employees—together with the government's execution of six alleged terrorists only three days before the Pope's visit—could result in repercussions among some senior military advisers. On the other hand, the government's stated intention to punish a junior officer for the murders likely will create unhappiness in the junior officer corps, whose members probably believe the officer had correctly followed orders. Although Rios Montt's opponents may try to exploit this dissension by attempting a coup, we do not believe that they have sufficient support to remove him. [redacted]

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Insurgent activity was sporadic during the quarter, but large pockets of guerrillas remain. The planned armed forces reorganization will create smaller, more manageable operational zones, which should improve both command and control and the ability to respond to insurgent activities. While the amnesty should further deplete insurgent numbers, the guerrillas, who have been in tactical retreat for the past six months, may try to demonstrate their viability by stepping up terrorist attacks and ambushes. [redacted]

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Brazil

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- President Figueiredo's political liberalization program instituted last year has made demonstrable progress toward a more open and democratic system. [redacted]

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- The economy further deteriorated during the last quarter of 1982, capping a year of no growth and triple-digit inflation, and continued to decline this past quarter. [redacted]

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- The tough austerity measures being implemented to improve economic performance and qualify for IMF financial support are increasing domestic discontent and criticism of the government. [redacted]

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Comment

Public concern about governmental leadership, which increased in the wake of Brazil's publicized financial problems, has been offset by President Figueiredo's

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liberalization initiatives—particularly the 1982 nationwide elections—which have reinforced his personal popularity. The military remains solidly behind the President. [redacted]

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We are concerned, though, about the future political impact of the government's stringent austerity program. Although drawing few initial protests, the policies now being implemented will mean rising unemployment, lower living standards, the phasing out of subsidies, and reduced business profitability. Brazil's lowest income workers will be particularly hard hit. Strike activity has already increased, especially in Sao Paulo, and will heighten as austerity begins to take hold. We also expect some violent cost-of-living demonstrations, increased violent crime, and growing complaints by the business community. These types of protest, most of which have been frequent since 1979, should not seriously threaten the regime.² [redacted]

We believe that the political liberalization process will continue to ameliorate economic discontent, although opposition groups are scrutinizing the government's austerity program and criticizing it publicly. We doubt that any major opposition party would risk undermining the gains associated with liberalization by going beyond the bounds of official tolerance in its activities. We believe the opposition parties' recent gains in the nationwide elections will further encourage them to work within the system. [redacted]

The next several months will set the tone for government and opposition relations between now and the presidential election in 1984. In our view, one of the most serious potential challenges to the regime is that a charismatic leader, such as Rio de Janeiro governor-elect Brizola, might unify and effectively organize the opposition. [redacted]

Egypt

- Oil export prices were lowered three times during the quarter by a total of \$4.50 per barrel, down to the current price of \$26.75 per barrel for Gulf of

² We believe the violent labor protests that occurred in Sao Paulo in early April in reaction to the austerity measures may recur and even spread. [redacted]

Suez crude, contrasted with a \$40.50 peak only two years ago; government officials have privately disclosed lower economic growth targets to US Embassy officials. [redacted]

- The press highlighted the fraud trial of Sadat's brother, which also implicated three cabinet ministers and led to the dismissal of two. [redacted]
- Notwithstanding Libya's threat to Sudan, the government was embarrassed by the publicity given the US military deployments aimed at deterring Tripoli in mid-February. [redacted]
- President Mubarak's recent diplomatic activity has boosted his domestic standing. [redacted]

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Comment

The government is preparing the public for slower economic growth and tough budget decisions this spring by publicly discussing the potential adverse effects of anticipated oil revenue shortfalls. We believe that the oil price decline will probably require import restraints and could force spending cuts in politically sensitive government programs. [redacted]

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Mubarak continues to demonstrate his commitment to root out corruption. Further corruption charges against key members of the President's cabinet, though, could weaken Mubarak's position, despite his own apparent personal honesty. [redacted]

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Mubarak finds it difficult to justify overt displays of strategic cooperation with the United States, particularly while Israel keeps its troops in Lebanon. Unhappy with the mid-February press publicity, Mubarak is likely to try to protect his domestic and regional standing by maintaining a tough stance against permanent US basing rights in Egypt. He also may insist on stricter limits to future strategic cooperation with the United States as it concerns joint military exercises and other highly visible military-related activities. [redacted]

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Many Egyptian observers in and out of government believe that Mubarak's foreign policy performance—most recently on trips to the United States, Canada, and Europe—is helping him establish a positive, distinct presidential style that is strengthening his domestic position. The President has been given particularly high marks for clarifying Arab positions on Middle East issues while in Washington. His attendance at the New Delhi Nonaligned Summit in early March has further boosted his stock. The Palestine National Council's endorsement of Egyptian opposition groups will likely prove only a temporary setback to Mubarak's relationship with the moderate leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

[Redacted]

Pakistan

- Fighting in Karachi between Sunni and Shia mobs in February and again in March forced local authorities to call in the military and prompted President Zia to question the effectiveness of his intelligence services. [Redacted]
- Student demonstrations and fighting between leftists and rightists on campuses persisted, most seriously in Karachi and Rawalpindi. [Redacted]
- Lahore police routed an early February procession of prominent women lawyers protesting Zia's proposals to bring Pakistan's legal system in line with the Koran. [Redacted]
- Marri tribesmen opposing government highway construction in Baluchistan ambushed a military patrol in January, killing a local militia commander and four soldiers. [Redacted]
- Power reductions in January caused nationwide urban blackouts; throughout the quarter strikes and work stoppages occurred protesting price, tax, and tariff increases. [Redacted]

Comment

Although social, political, and economic tensions increased during the quarter, Zia maintained his image as a strong leader and remains firmly in control.

During both outbreaks of sectarian violence in Karachi, the military was able to restore order and prevent the strife from spreading to other cities. The March rioting had antipolice overtones, but religion remained the dominant issue. Student clashes, notwithstanding their challenge to public order, continue to relate primarily to campus issues and do not seriously threaten stability. Those protests arising out of economic grievances and the proposed reduction in legal protection for women so far have been easily contained. [Redacted]

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The danger to Zia in the event of further disorder is that the public or senior military officers will disparage his effectiveness or condemn him if he resorts to too brutal methods. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Over the long haul, any major increase in sectarian conflict in Pakistan's heterogeneous society could seriously threaten stability. Although no separatist movement is currently active, future threats could arise from several real and potential problems. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Sindhi campus radicals are trying to stir up anti-Punjabi sentiment; the government's fragile rule in rural Baluchistan was demonstrated by the recent ambush of the military there, although the authorities appear determined to continue the highway project; and we see signs that radicals in the Iranian Government may be trying to exploit Shia-Sunni enmity in Pakistan. [Redacted]

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
We do not believe that antiregime opposition has begun to coalesce effectively. So far, neither the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) nor the influential Jamiat-i-Islami has been able to capitalize on popular discontent. We are concerned, however, that the MRD is starting to condemn Zia's ties to the United States. This could strike a responsive chord if the benefits from the US relationship do not meet Pakistani expectations. [redacted]

Nigeria

- Continuing austerity measures resulted in sharp rises in consumer prices, increased plant closings, and growing unemployment. [redacted]
- A fall in oil production to under 500,000 barrels per day—one-fifth of capacity and about one-third of December's average—led Nigeria to cut oil prices by \$5.50 per barrel. [redacted]
- While foreign reserves dropped below \$1 billion, access to commercial credit has been severely curtailed because of approximately \$5 billion in overdue debts. [redacted]
- President Shagari was embarrassed in January by the protests following a rash of suspicious fires in government offices under investigation for corruption. [redacted]
- Student protests led to the closing of universities in Ibadan and Maiduguri. [redacted]
- Shagari's expulsion of over 2 million foreign workers, although heavily criticized in the international media, enhanced his popular standing. [redacted]

Comment

The government is preoccupied with the decline in oil production, a consequent drop in urban living standards, and preparations for upcoming summer elections. The level of political violence has not risen appreciably, however. Increased student protests in opposition-controlled states have focused chiefly on local issues and campus conditions and, while remaining a constant irritant, show no sign of getting out of



hand. Nevertheless, public confidence in the government is being undermined by the continuing economic deterioration, Shagari's low-key leadership style, and the increased visibility of governmental corruption. [redacted]


Allegations of economic mismanagement, corruption, and fiscal irresponsibility rose sharply following the formal launching of the election campaign in January. The opposition parties, nevertheless, have been unable to put aside ethnic, personal, and political differences, agree on a common presidential candidate and strategy, or otherwise capitalize on the government's economic and political difficulties. [redacted]

We believe Shagari faces a difficult period ahead as he tries to balance the continuing need for economic austerity with his desire for reelection. Nigerian election campaigns, traditionally raucous and often violent, are characterized by wild accusations and promises, political intimidation, and extensive fraud. Should politically motivated violence escalate and spread, Shagari will have little choice but to call on the Army to assist the poorly trained and badly undermined police in restoring order, thus further undermining the legitimacy of the civilian government. [redacted]

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Philippines: Protests and Insurgent Activities




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extremely limited and local. Some Filipino army generals now fear a more active and effective NPA-Muslim insurgent alliance. [redacted]

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Philippines

- Communist New People's Army (NPA) insurgents, in numbers up to 200 strong, staged raids and ambushes throughout eastern Mindanao. [redacted]

The continued deterioration of Church-state relations, exemplified by the Catholic bishops' dissolution of the Church-Military Liaison Committee, is of major concern to us. The government's crackdown on radical church workers as well as its continuing campaign to muzzle the opposition press has resulted in strains that will be slow to mend. Additional strains may arise if Marcos fails to loosen his control over domestic political activity before next year's scheduled legislative elections. Marcos himself is now working hard to broaden existing mechanisms for a dialogue between the Church and the government. [redacted]

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- [redacted] the NPA received assistance from Muslim rebels in a raid on the coastal town of Mabini in January. [redacted]

- Roman Catholic church bishops published a pastoral letter strongly criticizing the government's economic, political, and human rights policies. [redacted]

Although the new IMF loans will improve the nation's balance-of-payments position, they require the adoption of unpopular measures—tightened credit, a reduced budget, and a devalued currency—that in the short run will slow growth, contribute to inflation, and increase unemployment. Continuing low export commodity prices will keep the economy in low gear in 1983, which is likely to add further fuel to the Communist insurgency. [redacted]

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- The \$3.35 billion current account deficit estimated by the Central Bank for 1982 was much worse than most analysts had anticipated and led the government to implement new austerity measures. [redacted]

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- The government completed negotiations with the IMF for nearly \$600 million in balance-of-payments loans, thus paving the way for an additional, delayed \$300 million loan from the World Bank. [redacted]

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Comment

NPA activity, which saw a marked increase from previous squad-size operations, compelled the government to redeploy troops from Muslim areas in the southern Philippines. This could leave the military vulnerable to renewed attacks from Muslim rebels in southwestern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Military force levels in Muslim areas are at their lowest since 1979. [redacted]

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[redacted] Muslim rebel leaders, weapons, and supplies have been infiltrating into the Muslim areas from Sabah, Malaysia, since late last year, possibly in preparation for renewed fighting. [redacted] cooperation between NPA and Muslim insurgents, if true, is a significant new development; previously, such cooperation was

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Part 3. Graphic Indicators

Data utilized for the quantitative political indicators (pages 15-30) are derived from open source press as well as classified materials. In some instances, they represent only rough estimates. [redacted]

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These charts, therefore, should be viewed not as definitive but as complementary to data presented in the text and Status of Key Indicators table. [redacted]

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Definitions of quantitative political indicators used in charts

Government sanctions against the opposition.

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Actions taken by the government to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate perceived threats to the security of the regime. The actions may or may not involve the use of force. [redacted]

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Armed attacks by the opposition. Acts of political violence carried out by an organized group seeking to weaken or destroy the power of the government or another organized group. Spontaneous and criminal violence is excluded. [redacted]

Riots. Violent demonstrations or disturbances involving large numbers of people. Riots are distinguished from armed attacks by the degree of spontaneity. [redacted]

Demonstrations. These include both protest and regime support demonstrations. They involve nonviolent gatherings of people organized for a specific political purpose. [redacted]

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Deaths from armed attacks and riots. Deaths of government personnel, opposition supporters, and civilian bystanders that occur chiefly in conjunction with armed attacks and riots. [redacted]

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Status of Key Indicators

Legend		Mexico	El Salvador	Honduras	Guatemala	Brazil	Spain	Greece	Turkey	Egypt	Saudi Arabia	Pakistan	Nigeria	Kenya	Zaire	Philippines	Indonesia
Social change/ conflict	Increased demonstrations and riots	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●
	Increased terrorism/sabotage	●	○	●	○	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Increased strikes	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Increased ethnic/religious discontent	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●
Economic factors	General deterioration	●	○	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●
	Decreased foreign aid/investment	●	○	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Food/energy shortages	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Consumer price increase	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●
	Key export price index change	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	○
	Per capita imports decrease	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●
Opposition activities	Increased organizational capabilities	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Increased attraction for public	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
External factors	Changes in external support for government	●	○	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Changes in external support for opposition	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Increased government hostility/attacks on US	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Increased opposition hostility/attacks on US	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Regime actions and capabilities	Increased repression/brutality	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Decreased unity/loss of confidence	●	○	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●
	Decreased security capabilities	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Decreased respect for ruler	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	●	●	●	●

Note: Judgments presented in this chart pertain to individual countries and should not be used for cross-national comparisons with reference to individual indicators.

[Redacted]

Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Mexico: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Note scale change




Political

- denotes a normal number of instances
- denotes a moderately above-normal number of instances
- denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○			
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			

Population (millions)^b 67.9 69.6 71.3 73.6^c

Economic



^a Base year is 1975.
^b Population figures based on mid-year census.
^c Estimated.

589310 4-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

El Salvador: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Note scale change




Political

- denotes a normal number of instances
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- ⊙ denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances


	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	○	⊙	⊙	○	⊙	○	●	●	○	●	●	●	○			
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	○	○	⊙	●	○	●	⊙	●	⊙	⊙	○			
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	○	○	○	○	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	○	●	●	●	○			

Population (millions)^b 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.5^c

Economic



^a Base year is 1975.
^b Population figures based on mid-year census.
^c Estimated.



Secret

25X1

Secret


Honduras: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Note scale change

Political

- denotes a normal number of instances
- denotes a moderately above-normal number of instances
- denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	●			
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Population (millions) ^b	3.8				3.9				4.1				4.2 ^c			



^a Base year is 1975.
^b Population figures based on mid-year census.
^c Estimated.

[Redacted box]

25X1

Secret

Guatemala: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a


Note scale change

Political


- denotes a normal number of instances
- denotes a moderately above-normal number of instances
- denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	○			
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	●	●	○	○	○	●	●		
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	●			
Population (millions) ^b	7.1				7.3				7.5				7.7 ^c			

Economic



^a Base year is 1975.
^b Population figures based on mid-year census.
^c Estimated.



25X1

Secret

Secret

Brazil: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a


Note scale change

Political

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- ⊙ denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○			
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			

Population (millions)^b 122.0 124.8 127.7 130.6^c



^a Base year is 1975.
^b Population figures based on mid-year census.
^c Estimated.



589314 4-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

Spain: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a



Note scale change

Political

- denotes a normal number of instances
- denotes a moderately above-normal number of instances
- ◐ denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	●	●	●	●	◐	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	○	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○			
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	○	●	○	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	○			
Population (millions) ^b	37.4				37.6				37.9				38.2 ^c			

Economic



Key Exports Price Index	Not available.															
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^a Base year is 1975.

^b Population figures based on mid-year census.

^c Estimated.



589315 4-83
Secret

Greece: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a



Note scale change

Political

- denotes a normal number of instances
- denotes a moderately above-normal number of instances
- denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

Population (millions)^b 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.8^c



^a Base year is 1975.
^b Population figures based on mid-year census.
^c Estimated.

589316 4-83

25X1

Secret

Turkey: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a


Note scale change

Political

- denotes a normal number of instances
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- denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983				
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	
Government sanctions against opposition	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●				
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●				
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●				
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●				
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	○	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●				
Population (millions) ^b	44.9				46.9				48.1				49.2 ^c				

Economic



^a Base year is 1975.

^b Population figures based on mid-year census.

^c Estimated.



589317 4-83

Secret

25X1

Egypt: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Note scale change

Political

- denotes a normal number of instances
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- denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●			
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●			
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Demonstrations	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	○	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●			
Population (millions) ^b	42.2				43.4				44.7				45.6 ^c			

Economic

Real per Capita Imports
US \$


	Not available.			

Dashed lines indicate
estimated data.

Consumer Price Increase
Percent



Key Exports Price Index
— Crude petroleum



^a Base year is 1975.

^b Population figures based on mid-year census.

^c Estimated.



Secret

Saudi Arabia: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Note scale change

Political



- denotes a normal number of instances
- ◐ denotes a moderately above-normal number of instances
- ◑ denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	◐	◐			
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			

Population (millions)^b

9.3 9.5 9.8 10.1^c

Economic



^a Base year is 1975.

^b Population figures based on mid-year census.

^c Estimated. Saudi population includes approximately 3 million foreign laborers.



589319 4-83

Secret

Pakistan: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Note scale change

Political


- denotes a normal number of instances
- denotes a moderately above-normal number of instances
- denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	○	●	○	○	○			
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	○			
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○			
Demonstrations	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○			
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	○	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	○			
Population (millions) ^b	87.2				90.4				93.1				95.6 ^c			


Economic

Real per Capita Imports
US \$


Dashed lines indicate
estimated data.



Consumer Price Increase
Percent



Key Exports Price Index
— Cotton



^a Base year is 1975.

^b Population figures based on mid-year census.

^c Estimated.



589320 4-83

Secret

Nigeria: Selected Political and Economic Indicators ^a




Note scale change

Political

- denotes a normal number of instances
- denotes a moderately above-normal number of instances
- denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Riots	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●			
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Population (millions) ^b	77.1				79.7				82.4				84.8 ^c			

Economic



^a Base year is 1975.

^b Population figures based on mid-year census.

^c Estimated.



Secret

25X1


Kenya: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Note scale change

Political

- denotes a normal number of instances
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	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	⊙	●	●	●		
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	⊙	●	●	●		
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●		
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	⊙	●	●	●		
Population (millions) ^b	16.4				17.1				17.8				18.4 ^c			



^a Base year is 1975.
^b Population figures based on mid-year census.
^c Estimated.

589322 4-83

Secret

Zaire: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Note scale change



Political

- denotes a normal number of instances
- denotes a moderately above-normal number of instances
- ⊙ denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	○	⊙	○	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Riots	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		

Population (millions)^b 28.6 29.4 30.3 31.2^c

Economic



^a Base year is 1975.
^b Population figures based on mid-year census.
^c Estimated.

589323 4-83

Secret


Philippines: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Note scale change

Political

- denotes a normal number of instances
- denotes a moderately above-normal number of instances
- denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○			
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○			
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●			
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○			
Population (millions) ^b	49.0				50.3				51.6				53.0 ^c			



^a Base year is 1975.
^b Population figures based on mid-year census.
^c Estimated.



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Indonesia: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a


Note scale change

Political

- denotes a normal number of instances
- denotes a moderately above-normal number of instances
- ⊙ denotes a substantially above-normal number of instances

	1980				1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Government sanctions against opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Armed attacks by opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Riots	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●			
Demonstrations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Deaths from armed attacks and riots	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●			
Population (millions) ^b	151.2				154.3				157.6				161.1 ^c			

Economic



^a Base year is 1975.

^b Population figures based on mid-year census.

^c Estimated.



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