



Directorate of
Intelligence

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Terrorism Review



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1 March 1984

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GI TR 84-005
1 March 1984

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**Terrorism
Review** [Redacted]

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1 March 1984

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**Terrorism
Review**

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1 March 1984

Perspective

Prospects for Palestinian Terrorism

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Palestinian terrorism, in the near future at least, will depend on the degree of support or acquiescence of Arab host states. The PLO's ability to act autonomously has all but disappeared since the 1982 Israeli incursion into Lebanon. PLO fighters—even the putative terrorists—are now constrained by, and answerable to their Arab hosts. Radical PLO groups and the renegade Black June Organization (BJO) are currently relying on support from Damascus and operating in line with overall Syrian interests. Iran and Libya are also attempting to exert some influence on these groups. Although [Redacted] PLO Chief Yasir Arafat may resort to international terrorism if his political initiatives fail, the PLO as a whole continues to refrain from such acts. We believe that a return to international terrorism by the PLO may only become a real factor if the survival of the PLO as an organization or Arafat's continued leadership depends on it. [Redacted]

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The PLO

The constituent groups of the PLO continued to adhere to Arafat's decade-long ban on international terrorism last year, although they carried out terrorist attacks against Jewish interests both in Israel and the occupied territories. Arafat's conviction that PLO involvement in international terrorism would undermine political efforts to establish a Palestinian homeland prevailed at the meeting of the Palestinian National Council in February 1983 against contrary views expressed by the leaders of most other PLO groups (specifically the PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, PSF, and as-Sa'iqa). [Redacted]

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The Fatah mutiny in the spring of 1983 resulted in a de facto split within the PLO, with many of the extremists from other PLO groups aligning themselves with the dissidents. Though the larger radical PLO groups like the PFLP and the DFLP have publicly declared their support for Arafat, this support is tenuous, [Redacted] [Redacted] indicating that their leaders have been considering setting up a rival organization to the PLO. [Redacted]

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Though Arafat has not thus far agreed to a resumption of international terrorist attacks, he would probably do so if he felt that the survival of the PLO as an organization or his continuation as its leader was contingent on it. In the meantime, however, Arafat has been taking steps to isolate headline rejectionists in order to keep them from impeding his political maneuvers. [Redacted]

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Renegade Palestinian Groups

Abu Nidal's *Black June Organization* was the most active Palestinian terrorist group last year. In addition to assassinating PLO moderate Issam Sartawi in Portugal and attacking Jordanian officials and facilities in Amman, India, Greece, Italy, and Spain, the group also claimed credit for an explosion aboard a Gulf Air carrier in Abu Dhabi. [redacted]

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Until last fall, Abu Nidal and some of his group lived in Baghdad, while the rest of the group lived in—and operated from—Damascus. Then the Iraqi Government discontinued all aid to the group and expelled its remnants from the country, forcing them to depend solely on Syria for both material support and a safehaven. This situation is undoubtedly uncomfortable for Abu Nidal, who has maintained operational independence in the past by obtaining support from rival patrons. He has therefore been shopping around for ways to offset the group's dependence on Syrian aid. [redacted] Abu Nidal has had some success extorting protection money from some of the smaller Persian Gulf states. [redacted]

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Since moving to Syria, BJO members have had increasing contact with the Iranian Government through the Iranian Ambassador in Damascus. Possibly as a means of soliciting or earning Iranian support, the BJO attempted to mount a number of operations against US interests in the Middle East last fall (none of them successful), including the planting of a car bomb near the US Embassy in Amman. [redacted]

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[redacted] the BJO may now be cooperating with both Basque separatists and elements of the PFLP-GC in planning attacks against US military bases in Spain. We have not seen any corroborated evidence yet that Iran has agreed to support the group; we doubt the Iranian Government either needs or wants to get seriously involved with a secular group like Abu Nidal's. [redacted]

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Black June has increased its operational capability over the past year through its contacts with radical PLO groups, especially the PFLP-GC. These contacts were probably encouraged and brokered by Syria. [redacted] the BJO has also cooperated with the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) in terrorist attacks in the Middle East. [redacted]

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Abu Nidal ardently rejects any negotiated Palestinian peace settlement and is likely to continue targeting any players who are involved in or support such negotiations. We have no reason to expect any near-term change in either the nature of the targeting or the frequency of the terrorist attacks by the Abu Nidal Group. Its current posture and activities are consistent with the views and goals both of its own leaders and of its patrons, most notably the Syrians. [redacted]

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¹ Credit for some of the attacks that we believe were carried out by the Abu Nidal Group was claimed by the previously unknown Revolutionary Brigades or Arab Revolutionary Movement. This may be the latest name adopted by the Abu Nidal Group, which has changed its name several times in the past. [redacted]

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The Iraqi-based *15 May Organization*, which carried out a bombing campaign against Pan American carriers in 1982, was relatively quiet in 1983. Western and moderate Arab pressure on Iraq to stop its support for international terrorism probably resulted in Saddam Husayn forbidding the group to continue targeting US interests.

[Redacted]

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State-Supported Terrorism

The dispersal of the Palestinians that began in 1982 and the present de facto split within the PLO has resulted in radical states like Syria, Iran, and Libya wielding increased influence not only over the radical elements in the PLO but over the PLO as a whole. Syria, for example, has traditionally used both as-Sa'iq and the PFLP-GC to maintain a voice in the PLO. Since the Palestinian withdrawal from Beirut and the Fatah rebellion in the Bekaa, Syrian influence over other elements has grown as well.

[Redacted]

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Syria has increased the terrorist capabilities of radical Palestinians by promoting collaboration between radical PLO groups, such as the PFLP-GC and as-Sa'iq, and the non-PLO Black June Organization.

[Redacted]

it was at Syrian behest that a group of BJO terrorists, carrying PFLP-GC identification cards, entered the Bekaa in April 1983 to assassinate moderate PLO leaders. Furthermore, we believe it is no coincidence that Black June's current terrorist campaign against Jordanian interests, which Abu Nidal has asserted is being carried out because of Amman's refusal to release imprisoned BJO members, is also serving Assad's desire to discourage Jordan from playing a role in any Palestinian settlement.

[Redacted]

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Syria has also helped Iran to play a bigger role in the Palestinian arena. Iran shares Syria's desire to counteract Western influence in Lebanon and prevent the establishment there of a government friendly to Israel. Damascus, therefore, allows the presence of Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.

[Redacted]

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The PLO radicals have been accepting financial and material aid from Libya, but Libya's attempts over the past year to get them to form an independent, anti-Arafat bloc have not met with success. Among the probable reasons for this are the relatively low opinion the Palestinians have of the mercurial and unreliable Qadhafi, and the fact that, unlike Syria, Libya does not control territory from which the Palestinians want to operate against Israel.

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
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Highlights

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Alert List



Kuwait: Continuing Threat From Da'wa. [redacted] indicate a continuing danger to Kuwaiti officials and their families, as the trial of the suspects in the bombing in December progresses slowly. [redacted]

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[redacted] US personnel and facilities probably also face an increased threat from this group as it tries to disrupt the trial. [redacted]


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France: Concern for Troops and Diplomats in Lebanon. With the withdrawal of the other Multinational Force contingents from Beirut, the French are concerned about the danger of terrorists concentrating on French interests. Security measures have been beefed up in Lebanon and at French embassies throughout the Middle East. We believe the French do face increased danger from pro-Iranian terrorists; on 22 February one French soldier was killed and two wounded when three mortar rounds struck a French MNF position in Beirut. Terrorist elements may have been responsible. [redacted]

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Key Indicators



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International: Establishment of PFLP Cells. [redacted]

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the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is being reorganized to provide for a greater emphasis on "military operations." PFLP leader, George Habbash, has reportedly ordered PFLP cells—possibly to be responsible for these operations—to be established within existing PLO offices in the United States, Bulgaria, Jordan, and Spain. [redacted]

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Significant Developments

Colombia: ELN Plans Government Destabilization. A National Liberation Army (ELN) document reportedly captured during the January raid on an ELN people's jail details the group's strategy for destabilizing the Colombian Government. According to the plan, the ELN hopes to challenge the political and military strength of the 19th of April Movement (M-19) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) by late 1985 or early 1986. The document also mentions plans to assassinate government officials. It is highly unlikely that the ELN will be able to put its strategy into effect, but the existence of the plan does much to explain the recent increase in ELN activities. [redacted]

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Brazil: Montonero Leader Arrested. On 13 February Brazilian authorities arrested the leader of Argentina's Montonero terrorist organization, Mario Firmenich. Argentina has requested his extradition, underscoring President Alfonsin's promise to bring justice to both leftist guerrillas and senior military officers responsible for the violence during the 1970's counterinsurgency campaign. Firmenich has a Brazilian son—an issue that might hamper the extradition process. [redacted]

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France: Iparretarrak Increases Activity. After announcing to French authorities a "toughening" of its stance, the French Basque Nationalist Movement Iparretarak has claimed credit for the attempted derailment of a Paris-Madrid train—carrying 110 passengers—on 18 February. Even though the group claims to have given advanced warning of the attack, the attempted sabotage represents a radicalization of the group, which has previously said it would not attack civilians. Its previous actions have been minor bombings—aimed at causing property damage—and bank robberies. [redacted]

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Italy: Assassination of MFO Director General Leamon R. Hunt. The Red Brigades for the Combatant Communist Party have claimed responsibility for the 15 February assassination in Rome of Leamon R. Hunt, US civilian head of the Multinational Force and Observers, the Rome-based peacekeeping force for the Sinai Desert. The previously unknown "Armed Lebanese Revolutionary Brigades" claimed responsibility in Beirut, underscoring the possibility of Middle Eastern involvement in the attack. [redacted]

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**France:
Developing a Policy
on International Terrorism** [redacted]

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France has traditionally been tolerant of the activities of political exiles based on French soil, even when these activities have included involvement in international terrorism. The reasons for this high level of tolerance range from the idealistic to the egoistic. France's own tradition of revolutionary democracy has inclined most Frenchmen to be sympathetic to those who profess the same ideals, particularly when they have been perceived as the victims of political oppression. On a less idealistic plane, the French appear to have calculated that their willingness to offer asylum to political exiles of all stripes would shield France itself from terrorist attacks. [redacted]

Until recent years, French assumptions had seemed justified. France had been only infrequently a victim of international terrorist violence. This relative immunity permitted France to avoid the necessity of developing stringent and clearcut policies regarding international terrorism. [redacted]

France's equivocal positions have occasionally put it at odds with its neighbors. While denying that they harbor terrorists, the French have seldom drawn a distinction between terrorist actions and "political" actions. In addition, France has traditionally refused to extradite accused terrorists unless they have committed a crime in France. [redacted]

Tradition and the Socialist Position

Francois Mitterrand's Socialist government has been very sensitive to the French traditions of civil liberties and political asylum. During his campaign, Mitterrand promised to strengthen French civil liberties and to extend the full benefits of French laws to resident foreigners. [redacted]

Mitterrand followed through in the early months of his term. Among other initiatives, his government ended the death penalty, abolished a special state security court, and restricted the power of the police

to make spot identity checks. The government hoped these steps would defuse political tensions and lead to a decrease in terrorist incidents in France. [redacted]

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Unfortunately, the reforms were followed by new levels of violence. According to press reports, in the first five months of 1982, 21 terrorist attacks in France killed 15 people and injured more than 100. [redacted]

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Mitterrand's Response

As a result, Mitterrand came under public pressure to deal with the problem. In response, in 1982 Mitterrand announced the creation of a secretary of state for public security, tighter border controls, centralized computer information centers, more careful security of diplomatic baggage, and an increase in antiterrorist security forces. Mitterrand wanted to rely on administrative measures and tighter enforcement rather than risk pushing for politically sensitive legal reforms. [redacted]

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The general outlines of French policy remained unchanged, and these steps were not enough to enable the government to master the threat of terrorism. In fact, policy toward terrorism has taken on an increasingly reactive character. Situations involving Basque and Armenian terrorists in particular have severely tested Mitterrand's policies. [redacted]

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The Basque Problem

France's traditional position on Basque terrorism has been that the problem is a Spanish one. The French have been reluctant to admit that Spanish Basques taking refuge in southern France would use French bases to launch attacks in Spain. Spanish pressure on the French yielded little or no response. According to

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the US Embassy in Paris, part of the French reluctance to crack down on Spanish Basques stemmed from fear that this could lead to a rise in French Basque terrorism.¹ [redacted]

According to the US Embassy in Paris, the Mitterrand government's moderate changes in its policy on Basque terrorism during January 1984—including stepped-up arrests and increased cooperation with the Spanish Government—were made for four reasons:

- The arrival of a Socialist government in Spain and an evolution of Spanish policy away from traditional rightwing connections and human rights abuses.
- Prime Minister Gonzalez's strong pressure on Mitterrand and the desire of Mitterrand to help Gonzalez deal with a major threat to democracy in Spain.
- A desire to end attacks on French soil on suspect Basque terrorists by a shadowy organization believed connected with the Spanish police.
- The successful Spanish effort to convince Panama to accept some Basques expelled from France. This achievement permitted the French to avoid at least technically a violation of the tradition of political asylum.

[redacted] further arrests and expulsions to Latin America are possible, but general French policy on extradition will remain unchanged. [redacted]

The Mitterrand government has apparently tried to mark a course of action which will avoid completely antagonizing either the Spanish Government or the exile Basque community in France. As a result, it risks satisfying neither group. For the moment, however, Madrid probably is pleased by any indication that Paris is prepared to take a harder line with Basque terrorists. [redacted]

¹ There are about 200,000 French citizens of Basque descent. [redacted]

The Armenian Problem

The French have been more unwilling to deal with the Armenian group ASALA. This is an issue with strong domestic political overtones because of widespread French sympathy for the Armenians. France has publicly recognized the historic grievances of the Armenians against Turkey, in particular their charges of Turkish responsibility for a genocidal massacre of Armenians in 1915. The Mitterrand government is therefore unwilling to take strong action against ASALA and risk upsetting the large Armenian community and the influential number of pro-Armenian sympathizers in France. Because of this reluctance, the Mitterrand government finds itself at odds with the Turkish Government. [redacted]

Turkey and various pro-Turkish groups have repeatedly accused France of making a special deal with the Armenians. According to the US Embassy in Paris, in January Turkish officials in France stated their belief that the French arranged to condemn the genocide officially in return for an Armenian agreement not to commit terrorist acts in France. [redacted]

Relations between the governments of France and Turkey have grown even more tense in recent months as a result of the recent trial and conviction in France of four ASALA members for the 1981 takeover of the Turkish Consulate General in Paris in which one Turkish official was killed, one wounded, and the rest of the staff held hostage for 15 hours under threat of death. The four were sentenced to seven years—a sentence the Turkish Government feels is too light. The Turkish press asserted that the French Government rejected statements from the Turkish MFA criticizing the trial and sentences and claiming that France had failed to carry out its duty in the struggle against terrorism. [redacted]

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Recent French willingness to cooperate with Spain on Basque terrorism may raise Turkish expectations for cooperation on the Armenian issue. This belief could perversely add to the strain between the two governments. [redacted]

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Meanwhile, Mitterrand also seems unable to please the Armenians with his policy on this issue. In a French press interview in late November, Monte Melkonian, a spokesman for the ASALA Revolutionary Movement splinter group, warned that there is no reason that France would be exempt from terrorist attacks. According to Melkonian, everything depends on changing French policy toward Turkey. [redacted]

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Outlook

Mitterrand's attempts to appease both foreign exile communities and governments have failed to satisfy either group. It remains to be seen whether the French public feels Mitterrand's policies are an adequate solution to the problem. We believe that terrorist groups will continue their activities, thus eventually forcing him to consider tougher positions on terrorism. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Sudan: The Southern Dissident Problem Worsens [redacted]

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The southern Sudanese dissidents are displaying increasing strength and effectiveness in their battle against the Nimeiri government. Terrorist attacks and kidnappings by the dissidents in recent months have forced foreign firms engaged in key development projects in southern Sudan to suspend operations. If the dissidents continue their successful hit-and-run tactics, their prospects for prolonging the insurgency and thus perhaps winning concessions from the government are good. [redacted]

During November 1983 dissidents kidnaped two employees of Chevron Oil and took hostage nine employees of Compagnie de Construction Internationale (CCI)—the French company responsible for the construction of the Jonglei Canal, which is designed to remove water from the marshy south and increase the Nile's flow to the north and Egypt. As a consequence CCI suspended work on the canal. In February 1984 southern dissidents launched four attacks against the same companies. On 2 February Chevron's Rub Kona camp was attacked; three third-country nationals were killed and seven wounded—including one American—causing Chevron to join CCI in suspending operations. On 6 February a CCI truck hit a mine, killing an undetermined number of people, and on 10 February the dissidents killed one CCI employee and took six hostage. In the worst attack, a CCI-owned steamer evacuating people from southern Sudan was hit by rebels—possibly as a target of opportunity—on 14 February, reportedly killing hundreds of passengers. [redacted]

The southern dissidents have several areas of disagreement with the Nimeiri government. The rebels view Chevron's oil exploration and the Jonglei Canal project as exploiting southern resources to line northern pockets. In a letter to the western companies one of the dissident groups—the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)—requested these companies stop operations, withdraw their staffs, and refrain from any dealings with the Sudanese Government. In

addition, most southerners view President Nimeiri's decision last spring to divide the semiautonomous southern region into three provinces as an abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa Accords—which ended the 17-year civil war by granting the south special regional status. Moreover, the Christian/animist south reacted strongly against Nimeiri's imposition on the entire country of Sharia (Islamic) law in September, believing it to be a challenge to its regional and cultural identity. Col. John Garang, the most prominent rebel leader, has claimed that the rebels will end their terrorist activities if the government agrees to restore special status to the south, drop Sharia law, and cancel the Sudanese-Egyptian integration agreement concluded in October 1982, which they fear will result in economic exploitation by Egypt. [redacted]

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The government identifies the southern dissidents by the generic term Anya Nya II (Anya Nya was the name used by the rebels in the civil war). The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the armed wing of the SPLM, has only claimed responsibility for the attacks on the CCI camps; we are not sure it is responsible for all the recent terrorism. Garang, a dissident in the civil war who subsequently served in the Sudanese armed forces, appears to have a major leadership role in both the SPLM and the SPLA. [redacted] Garang has approximately 3,000 followers in Gamela, Ethiopia. Another rebel leader, Samuel Gaitut, has about 2,000 followers scattered throughout the Bahr El Ghazal and upper Nile provinces of Sudan. There may also be other bands not part of the SPLM or Gaitut's following who are operating independently in the south. [redacted] the dissidents, largely deserters from the regular military, are reasonably well trained, disciplined, and equipped. In addition to the weapons they took with them when

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they deserted, they probably are receiving weapons and ammunition from Libya and are permitted to operate from bases in Ethiopia. The dissidents have shown themselves capable of protracted military operations, possess and are familiar with heavy mortars and landmines, and are capable of sustained and accurate antiaircraft machinegun fire. The dissidents are probably not Communists or pro-Marxists even though the government tries to paint them as such. [redacted]

[redacted] some Sudanese officials believe that the Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF) cannot prevent dissident terrorist acts. The SPAF is poorly trained, lacks sufficient equipment and spare parts, and suffers from poor morale. As evidenced by the failure of the personnel at the army camp near the CCI compound to protect that company's employees, the SPAF appears unable to provide essential security. [redacted]

Thus far the rebels have been highly successful in attacking key economic targets and forcing both Chevron and CCI to suspend their operations. If the dissidents continue their successful hit-and-run tactics, their prospects for prolonging the insurgency are good. Nimeiri will have further problems if the rebels decide to extend terrorism to the northern cities, bringing the southern problem to the northerners' doorstep and possibly forcing them, through destabilization and fear, to make concessions [redacted]

Nimeiri may have to accept the fact that a military solution is not feasible. Egypt is reluctant to support a military campaign in the south and even rapprochement with Ethiopia might not guarantee that any aid to the dissidents would be cut off. Nimeiri, however, has shown little enthusiasm for pursuing a political settlement. Any attempt at a settlement would have to address such key southern concerns as a unified regional government, the removal of corrupt southern governors, increased social services, cancellation of Sharia law, and a guaranteed portion of profits from development projects assigned to the south. [redacted]

Some southern politicians have expressed optimism that an agreement is still possible because the dissidents' demands that Khartoum improve conditions in the south are still moderate. Moreover, Nimeiri still is widely perceived as the only northern leader with the stature to resolve north-south problems. If, however, the dissidents' military and terrorist operations continue to take a heavy toll, the rebels could decide to escalate their demands possibly including calls for secession or Nimeiri's removal. Nimeiri is a survivor who has repeatedly demonstrated his political skills, but the economic and political concessions that he could make to the southerners, given Sudan's economic situation, are probably insufficient to end their resistance to northern domination. [redacted]

[redacted]

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**The Hakim Brothers:
Leaders of the
Da'wa Party of Iraq** [redacted]

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The Da'wa Party of Iraq, the country's largest Shia dissident group, is funded principally by Iran and advocates the violent overthrow of the Ba'thist regime of President Saddam Husayn. The party may also be cooperating with Tehran's campaign against the United States and against the moderate Arab states who are Iraq's chief financial backers. [redacted]

[redacted] the Da'wa is led by the three Hakim brothers: Mahdi 'Abd al-Muhsin, Muhammad Baqr, and 'Abd al-'Aziz. Scions of a respected religious family with a long history of opposition to Iraqi governments (their father, the late Ayatollah Mushin al-Hakim, founded Da'wa's predecessor, the Fatima Society, in the early 1960s), the Hakims claim they are not Da'wa members, although each leads a wing of the party. During the past two years the group has been responsible for bomb attacks in Baghdad against a radio and television station, Iraqi Air Force Headquarters, the Ministry of Planning, and the Iraqi News Agency, and it has carried out several assassination attempts against senior Iraqi Government officials. The 13 Iraqis accused of bombing the US Embassy in Kuwait in December 1983 are also members of the Da'wa Party. [redacted]

The primary goal of the Hakim brothers is to overthrow Saddam Husayn, and to achieve that aim they have moved beyond their involvement with Da'wa to participate in other antiregime organizations. All three are members of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a group based and funded in Tehran. [redacted]

[redacted] at least the two elder Hakims—Mahdi and Muhammad—differ ideologically and hold disparate views on what the political framework should be for a future government in Iraq. Those differences are reflected in each brother's affiliation with other groups and in the activities they carry out. Despite their differences, the brothers maintain contact with each other and closely coordinate their individual Da'wa responsibilities. [redacted]



Muhammad Baqr Hakim

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The middle brother, Muhammad (who is probably in his late thirties), resides in Tehran. We believe that he has the most influence and power within the Da'wa.

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[redacted] most of the Iranian funding for the party goes directly to Muhammad, thus increasing his power within the movement and Iran's influence over the Da'wa. In addition to being the contact point between the Iranian Government and the Da'wa, Muhammad is the party's principal spokesman and leader of Iraqi exiles in Iran.

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[redacted] he is the leader of the Iraqi Opposition League of Religious Scholars and of the Iraqi Revolutionary Council, organizations composed of exiled Iraqi religious figures who plan to overthrow Saddam Husayn. [redacted]

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[redacted] with 'Abd al-'Aziz he heads the Islamic Iraqi army, which recruits volunteers from the ranks of Iraqi prisoners of war and deserters to fight with Iranian forces against the Ba'thist regime.

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A hojat-ol-Eslam (one rank below an ayatollah), Muhammad is greatly influenced by the fundamentalist doctrine of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. He has said he believes that the Iraqi people desire an Iranian-style religious state and has dedicated himself to leading an Islamic revolution in his own country.

[redacted] Khomeini chose Muhammad to head an Iraqi Islamic republic should Iran defeat Iraq in the ongoing war between the two nations. [redacted]

[redacted] ideological differences have developed between Muhammad and Khomeini, resulting in a decrease of Iranian support for the Da'wa. We have seen no evidence to date, however, that Muhammad's prominence in the Da'wa has been seriously eroded. [redacted]

The eldest brother, Mahdi (who is about 40), is based in London. From that city he directs the secular wing of the party, which is composed of nonleftist Iraqis living in the West. We believe he also acts as Da'wa's liaison with non-Shia opposition groups inside and outside Iraq. He is committed to the establishment of a freely elected secular government. [redacted]

[redacted] Mahdi believes that the Iraqi populace would not support an Islamic state. He is convinced that a successful post-Ba'thist government would have to include Iraq's various religious and ethnic factions. Mahdi publishes antigovernment propaganda and solicits funds for Da'wa activities. He serves as the party's liaison with the Governments of Libya and Syria and obtains aid from those countries. He also receives limited financial aid from Iran. [redacted]

[redacted] in the 1960s Mahdi worked with Savak, the Shah's security organization, and that in the early 1970s he received a stipend from the Shah. We believe he endorses a coalition of all opposition groups against Saddam Husayn. [redacted]

Mahdi's political orientation alienates him from the Iranians—Da'wa's major benefactors—and his operation in London is too far from Iraq to allow him to have much access to Da'wa's power base or to be the party's paramount actor. Although he is unhappy with the extremism of the Khomeini government, [redacted]

[redacted] he has refrained from publicly criticizing the ayatollah because he does not want to jeopardize the assistance both he and Muhammad get from Khomeini. [redacted]

Abd al-'Aziz, who is about 27, dominates Da'wa's terrorist activities. As leader of the Mujahedin, the military wing of the movement, he moves freely inside Iran and northern Iraq. As mentioned above, he is also coleader with Muhammad of the Islamic Iraqi Army. [redacted] he has an excellent understanding of guerrilla tactics and plans the many acts of terrorism that the Mujahedin execute in Iraq.

[redacted] he also works closely with Kurdish dissidents, especially the Kurdish Democratic Party. [redacted]

'Abd al-'Aziz does not appear to influence the movement's political direction. [redacted]

[redacted] in his brothers' ideological disagreements he sides with neither. Nor does he, as far as we can discern, espouse an ideology of his own. He is loyal to both Mahdi and Muhammad and closely coordinates his activities with them. [redacted]

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**Special Feature—
Iran: Spreading
Islam and Terrorism**

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Terrorist Capabilities and Assets

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In many cases, Iran draws upon the resources of its own Revolutionary Guard either to carry out terrorist operations or to plan for and equip foreign surrogates to act on its behalf. Elements of the Foreign Ministry also support these activities and, at least in some countries, control terrorist operations directly:

Increasing Iranian Terrorist Activities

Prior to participating in an aborted coup attempt against the Bahraini Government in December 1981, the regime in Tehran was preoccupied with its own internal power struggle and the war with Iraq. Aside from the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979, Iran is believed to have been involved in at least three terrorist incidents during the period between the 1979 revolution and December 1981. [Redacted]

- The Iranian Embassies in Paris and Vienna and the Consulate in Karachi appear to be important centers for this activity.

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[Redacted]

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The past two years have seen a dramatic rise in Iranian involvement with international terrorist violence. During the period, Iranian operatives have gained considerable experience in organizing support elements and in planning and carrying out terrorist operations in foreign countries. As a result, Tehran has become bolder in striking out at perceived enemies of Islam, and the regime has broadened the range of its terrorist operations. [Redacted]

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Motivations. Iran's ruling clerics believe it is their religious duty to foster the creation of Islamic governments along Iranian lines. This has been the principal motivation for Iranian support of Iraqi Shiites and Persian Gulf Islamic liberation groups. With this in mind, Tehran has also seized the opportunity provided by sectarian strife in Lebanon to support fundamentalist Shiites there. Because Tehran perceives the US, Israeli, Lebanese, and moderate Arab governments as obstacles to the achievement of Tehran's objective, Iranian and pro-Iranian terrorists have targeted the interests of these states. Tehran's terrorist activities also are designed to protect Iran's own revolution, as indicated by attacks against Iraq and France, Baghdad's chief Western arms supplier and financial supporter. [Redacted]

- [Redacted] the Iranian Students Islamic Association (ISIA) carried out a coordinated series of attacks against French targets in Karachi and Lahore in February 1983. This operation was carried out under the direction of the Iranian Consul General in Karachi, who was subsequently expelled from the country. [Redacted]

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Tehran also has at its disposal a number of surrogate groups that can conduct terrorist activities. Some of these groups—such as the smaller Islamic revolutionary groups in the Persian Gulf—owe their creation and existence to Tehran, while others—such as the Iraqi Da'wa Party—predate the Iranian revolution but have come to depend heavily on Tehran for financing and training. In addition to enhancing Iran's operational capabilities, these surrogates permit Tehran to create the perception that an increasing number of independent, international Islamic fundamentalist organizations are at work against US, Western, and moderate Arab interests. In some cases, operations are carried out by Iranian agents and subsequently claimed by surrogate groups; in other instances, operations are carried out by Iranian operatives or various surrogates and claimed using a common *nom de guerre*:

- While Iranians were involved in the anti-French bombings in Pakistan—and probably in a December 1982 bombing of the Iraqi Consulate in Bangkok and the 11 August 1982 bombing of the Iraqi Embassy in Paris—pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiite dissidents claimed credit.
- Similarly, the name “Islamic Jihad” has been used to take credit for a number of terrorist threats and actions by groups of differing nationalities, including the MNF bombings in Beirut on 23 October and the bombings in Kuwait on 12 December. [redacted]

To date we have found no reliable information to indicate that Islamic Jihad is a distinct, organized terrorist group. We believe it almost certain that it is only a cover used for Iranian-inspired or directly controlled operations, whether employing locally recruited agents such as Shias in Lebanon or Iraqi Da'wa Party activists, as was the case in Kuwait. With time, however, Tehran could change the present character of “Islamic Jihad” from a loose association of largely independent, irregularly organized Shiite factions into a more formalized, international organi-

zation with an enhanced ability to coordinate and expand radical Islamic terrorist activities. [redacted]

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Terrorist Targets

Lebanon. During the past year and a half, most Iranian terrorist activity has been concentrated in Lebanon. Islamic Amal, the radical Shia group headed by Husayn al Musawi, has received both material and financial support from Tehran via Damascus and has developed links to Shia elements in the southern Beirut suburbs by providing both funds and training. Clearly backed by the Iranians, Musawi and his radical Amal of Islam are seen by many Lebanese as the vanguard of an Iranian-influenced revolutionary movement. [redacted]

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During the past year there have been many instances of Shia-inspired violence in Lebanon. Presumably, several Shia clans have participated in that violence, but the extremist Amal of Islam—and a possible subgroup called the Husayn Suicide Commandos—has been linked [redacted] to the 23 October bombing attacks on US and French Multinational Force (MNF) components. [redacted]

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Iraq. Members of the Shiite opposition in Iraq serve Iranian interests through attacks against the Baghdad regime. According to public confessions, they have been responsible for a number of bloody bombings of Iraqi and French targets:

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- The 1 August 1982 bombing of the Iraqi Ministry of Planning in Baghdad.
- The 16 December 1982 bombing of the Iraqi News Agency in which seven died.

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- The 5 March 1983 bombing of an Air France office in Baghdad that killed one employee.
- The car bombings of the Iraqi television and radio-broadcasting complex and the Iraqi Air Force Headquarters on 21 April that reportedly killed two busloads of children and at least 29 other individuals. [redacted]

The factionalized, Shia-based Iraqi Da'wa Party—led by the al Hakim brothers, Muhammad Baqr, Mahdi, and 'Abd al 'Aziz—probably is the most credible long-term terrorist threat to the Baghdad regime. Iran is most closely aligned to the faction headed by Muhammad Baqr al Hakim. His faction is headquartered in Tehran and is probably the group that has carried out the bombing attacks in the name of the Iraqi Mujahedin Movement. A more secularly oriented faction headquartered in London is led by Mahdi al Hakim, who has made an attempt to lessen dependence on Tehran by seeking support from Syrian, Libyan, and wealthy Iraqi exiles. [redacted]

Persian Gulf. Tehran has made extensive preparations for subversive/terrorist activities in the Persian Gulf. Iran has trained and equipped Islamic fundamentalist groups from several countries, including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait. Although only a few of these groups have more than several dozen members, they all provide Tehran an increasingly more capable terrorist pool to use against the Gulf states:

- [redacted] Iranian Revolutionary Guards run special training camps near Tehran and Isfahan. Training activities reportedly include ideological/religious instruction as well as paramilitary/terrorist instruction in the use of small arms and explosives and the techniques of economic sabotage and assassination. [redacted]

More recently, Iran has used these surrogates to strike at a number of its enemies in Kuwait. On 12 December 1983 powerful car bombs exploded at a number of US, French, and civilian Kuwaiti installations in Kuwait. The US Embassy was seriously damaged by an explosives-laden truck, which crashed through the

main gate and detonated in the Embassy compound. We believe that the selection of targets and information, which surfaced subsequent to the attacks, leave little doubt of Iranian involvement at the highest levels:

- Kuwaiti authorities reportedly have established that the explosives used in the bombings were smuggled (along with a quantity of weapons) into Kuwait from Iran via Qatar some two months before the bombings. [redacted]
- The truckdriver killed in the attack on the US Embassy was a member of the Iraqi Da'wa Party. He owned most, if not all, of the vehicles used for the bombings. [redacted]

Exiles. Tehran's concern regarding the activities of exiled opposition groups apparently has prompted planning for terrorist attacks against dissidents living abroad. [redacted]

[redacted] Iranian officials have provided financial support to and encouraged mob violence by pro-Khomeini activists against *dissident student groups*. The best documented case occurred in April 1982 at Mainz University in West Germany when a group of anti-Khomeini Iranian demonstrators was attacked by a large group of pro-Khomeini counterdemonstrators. One death, several injuries, and a number of arrests resulted. [redacted]

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Conflict between various Iranian student factions has continued to be a serious problem. [redacted] incidents between pro- and anti-Khomeini students continued in 1983; in both November and December in Giessen, West Germany, student clashes resulted in further arrests and injuries.

[redacted] Iran also has prepared for and succeeded in assassinating *exiled opposition leaders* and individuals associated with the former imperial government.

[redacted] the murder of the late Shah's nephew in 1979 and an unsuccessful attempt against former Prime Minister Bakhtiar in 1980 were the work of Iranian agents. The assassination of General Oveisi in January 1984 in Paris almost certainly was the work of Iranian agents.

We believe that Iranian attempts to eliminate dissidents are likely to continue to be centered in France. Since the overthrow of the imperial regime in Iran, France has become a mecca for dissidents opposed to the present Islamic government. In addition, a large expatriate Iranian population in France provides a cover from which Iranian agents can operate. French authorities believe that the Iranian Government has developed a large, elaborate structure in France to keep watch on active dissidents and to support operations against them.

International Terrorist Cooperation

Over the past two years, Iran has cooperated to varying degrees with other Middle Eastern governments and groups with which it shares a similar political outlook or willingness to use terrorism to promote common objectives. The cooperation has occurred in the areas of financing, material support, and training. In recent months, cooperation with Syria and radical Palestinian terrorist groups has increased significantly.

Syria. Because Iran shares Syria's desire to counteract Western influence in Lebanon and prevent the establishment there of a government friendly to Israel, Damascus condones the presence in Syria of Iranian Revolutionary Guards and their paramilitary

and propaganda activities in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon. Only through Syrian sufferance do perhaps 700 Iranian Revolutionary Guards, centered in the Baalabaak area of the Bekaa Valley, direct the activities of extremist groups such as Islamic Amal (a splinter faction of Amal, the main Lebanese Shiite group) and the obscure Hezbollah, the Party of God.

Information suggests that some tensions have surfaced between the Syrian and Iranian Governments over Iranian terrorist activities in Lebanon. Damascus appears increasingly concerned that Iran's radically violent activities may involve Syria in a war with the United States or Israel not of its own choosing:

• [redacted] in early January 1984 Damascus imposed stricter visa controls over Iranian personnel entering Syria out of concern for their activities in Syria and Lebanon.

This development leads us to conclude that Syria is not aware in advance of every terrorist incident sponsored by Iran in Lebanon. In addition, while Damascus generally has been content to allow Iran to act as the front in these violent activities, this acquiescence appears conditioned upon Iranian activities continuing to serve Syria's objective of forcing an MNF withdrawal from Beirut. The secular Ba'hist regime in Damascus has no desire to see the establishment of an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Lebanon. The failure of Syrian air defense to respond to Israeli and French air attacks on Iranian training camps in the Bekaa Valley may indicate the extent of Damascus's support for Iran and the radical Islamic groups.

Damascus and Tehran also have cooperated in other terrorist fields. Because of their common hatred for Iraq's Saddam Husayn, Syria and Iran are cooperating against Iraq. Damascus allows Iraqi Shiite oppositionists—elements of which have carried out numerous car bombings in Baghdad—to maintain offices

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near Damascus [redacted] Iranian-backed Bahraini dissidents also have office facilities in Damascus, and, on at least one occasion, members of the group were given refuge in Syria following their expulsion from another country. (In mid-October 1983, Bahraini Shias arrested in Vienna were put aboard a flight to Syria.) [redacted]

Prospects

Because many of the high-ranking Iranian officials involved in terrorism believe that using violence as a tool to spread their fundamentalist version of Islam is morally right, it will be difficult to dissuade Tehran from engaging in terrorist activities. Iranian leaders have applauded publicly, while denying actual involvement in, the recent terrorist operations directed against US and French interests in the Middle East, characterizing them as the inevitable consequences of opposition to Islam. [redacted]

The attraction of Lebanon as a locus of Iranian terrorism will not diminish. Iran remains committed to the establishment of an Iranian-style Islamic state there, or at least of a system in which Tehran would have great influence over religious activities. While the character of future Iranian involvement in Lebanon will hinge upon the continued acquiescence of Syria, Tehran maintains and will continue to strengthen surrogate assets to use in attacks against a variety of domestic and foreign targets. [redacted]

A second major arena for Iranian operations will be Iraq. In its war against the regime in Baghdad, Tehran continues to train, finance, and equip religious opponents of the Iraqi regime and will continue to support terrorist attacks by these groups. Occasionally, Tehran also may utilize its own assets to carry out attacks against Iraqi interests located in third countries, attacks such as those it has already conducted in India and France; the responsibility for such attacks would most likely be claimed by the Iraqi Shiite opposition. [redacted]

The Persian Gulf and the South Asian regions also will be of operational importance to Iran. Tehran will continue to train Islamic dissidents from several Gulf states. Assets already in place may conduct isolated terrorist attacks—Bahrain would be a prime candidate. In the unlikely event that a settlement involving all the major players in Lebanon, including Syria, were achieved, Damascus would probably restrict Iranian activities there. This might lead Tehran to shift more of its attention to the Gulf states. Similarly, should the Iran-Iraq war end, Iran almost certainly would continue to support Shiite groups in Iraq opposed to the regime, but could direct other Iranian assets now devoted to the war effort to Persian Gulf targets. Many of the attacks in this region probably will be directed against Western interests in addition to the interests of the country in which they occur, such as Kuwait. [redacted]

Implications for the United States

Iran apparently intends to expand the scope of its anti-US terrorist activities not only in the Middle East but also possibly to Europe. [redacted] point to Iranian plans for terrorist activity in the Persian Gulf and in some European capitals where assets already are in place:

- The December 1983 bombings in Kuwait—which we are almost certain were executed by Iranian agents—probably were the opening salvo in this new wave of terror.
- According to the US Embassy, only two days before the bombings in Kuwait, the Iranian Ambassador in Abu Dhabi—in a comment to a UAE official—made an explicit threat against US interests in the Persian Gulf and the rest of the world.

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[Redacted]

- In Baghdad as well, Iranian-supported Iraqi Shia terrorists, who have carried out a number of devastating car bombings during the past couple of years, could be directed against US facilities or personnel.

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[Redacted]

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Terrorist operations against the United States and France conducted in a European city such as Athens—easily accessible and containing a large number of anti-US Palestinian and leftist groups—would enable Tehran and Damascus to hide their involvement and avoid US military reprisals.

We believe there exists an increased prospect for some type of Iranian-sponsored violence in Western Europe. There appears to be little doubt that pro-Iranian activists are considering terrorist operations—bombings and assassinations—in Europe;

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[Redacted] Iranian operatives are already active in a number of European countries:

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[Redacted]

- [Redacted] a “handbook for terrorists” was found among the personal belongings of four Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain activists arrested in Vienna in October 1983. Nothing among the belongings suggested an imminent terrorist attack by this group.

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The short-term threat to US personnel and facilities in much of the Middle East remains critical. The ease with which the extensive and well-coordinated series of bombings was carried out in Kuwait—a country whose security service probably is as good as any in the Persian Gulf—illuminates the vulnerability of US interests in the region:

- Many of the Gulf countries such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have large Shia populations that provide pools from which Iran can recruit—or already has recruited—terrorist assets. While Bahrain and the UAE—which has extensive trade and transportation ties to Iran—might be most vulnerable, the large number of small, motorized boats operating along largely unguarded coastlines makes nearly all of the Persian Gulf countries susceptible to terrorist infiltration.
- US establishments in countries with large Iranian student populations—such as Pakistan—could also be threatened. (While large numbers of Iranians, many in sympathy and in contact with Tehran, reside in the United States, we have no credible information regarding an immediate Iranian terrorist offensive here.)

- Despite the expulsion in December of one Iranian diplomat and 10 Iranian citizens connected with the cultural center in Paris, the subversive “infrastructure” [Redacted] almost certainly continues to operate under the direction of Iranian diplomats and agents who are resident in France. [Redacted]

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While moving to reduce the possible danger from the overt Iranian presence, the French—and the United States and moderate Arabs—may face another more serious and difficult threat to counter.

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[Redacted] the international terrorist Carlos and the pro-Iranian Lebanese Islamic Amal of Husayn Musawi reached agreement in December 1983 on terrorist cooperation in Europe.

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[Redacted] the agreement would serve as a

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convenient division of labor between the two anti-French terrorist groups:

- The claim by Carlos for the 31 December and 1 January bombings against French targets in Marseilles, France, and Tripoli, Lebanon—carried out in retaliation for French actions in Lebanon—lend credibility to this reported agreement.
- In addition, on 25 January 1984 an Aerospatial facility near Paris involved in the production of Exocet missiles was bombed. Although a caller took credit in the name of the “Martyrs of Baalabek,” the previous bombings in Paris by Carlos and the reference to the agreement in Lebanon lead us to believe Carlos’s group may have been responsible for this attack as well. [redacted]

We believe that Islamic Amal could take advantage of links to a group with established capabilities in Europe and a successful anti-French track record. On the other hand, Carlos, whose background includes mercenary activities for the Syrian Government, would likely benefit financially—probably from Musawi’s Iranian backers. The agreement might also be a convenient incentive for Carlos to continue his 1982 and 1983 attacks on the French for the 1982 arrest in Paris of two of his associates. In this regard we speculate that he also could take advantage of Islamic Amal’s terrorist capabilities in Lebanon. For example, the bombing of the French cultural center in Tripoli on 1 January was more likely the work of the Lebanese group. [redacted]

While our analysis leads us to believe that the Iranian threat remains high, we are unable to provide details on specific targets or timing for attacks. To a large degree, warning capabilities are hampered by our lack of access to those sources knowledgeable about the plans of individuals or groups most likely to be directly involved in such activity. Furthermore, we know very little about the size and capabilities of the Da’wa and Islamic Amal organizations in Europe. The presence of Iranian operatives in some European countries, however, would enable Tehran to initiate, at a minimum, limited operations on fairly short notice. In addition, the relatively open environment that prevails in Western Europe also would make it fairly easy for Iran to infiltrate specially trained terrorists for other selected operations. [redacted]

We believe that any operations sponsored by Tehran would most likely follow the pattern of attacks in Lebanon and include operations against relatively vulnerable military and diplomatic facilities. Car bombs or other explosive devices could again be employed, while attacks against individuals are possible and would be consistent with an emerging trend in Lebanon. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the geographic distribution of Iranian terrorism in the near term is likely to be confined principally in those areas where Iran has an established network of operatives, such as the Middle East and Europe. [redacted]

[redacted]

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**Iranian Terrorism:
The Warning Problem** [redacted]

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In the months since the Marine headquarters bombing in Beirut, [redacted] warnings of terrorist threats and impending Iranian actions against US interests across a wide geographic area. These reports have taken an increasingly alarmist tone, giving the impression that virtually every US interest or diplomatic establishment abroad—and even in this country—was at imminent risk from radical Islamic terrorists. It is possible, for example, that Iran's violent reputation recently was responsible for the interpretation [redacted] for terrorist operations in places as diverse as Africa, Southeast Asia, and China. [redacted]

out both the worst in sources and the worst sources.

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At the same time, the rumored methods of attack have become more and more sensational. Since the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut last year, we have received warnings of everything from bomb-laden gliders to the surgical implantation of explosives into animals destined for shipment to Europe. Nearly all of these warnings thus far have turned out to be false alarms:

Although a critical threat from Iranian-backed terrorists does exist to US personnel and facilities in a number of countries in the Middle East and possibly Europe, [redacted] sorting fact from fiction has become increasingly difficult. In this environment, anticipating, in a broad sense, Tehran's next moves is difficult; specifically predicting its next target is almost impossible. And while a germ of truth may lie at the core of many of these reports, we usually cannot identify with certainty what that is before the warnings must be relayed to the purported targets. What is more, as the Long Commission investigation into the bombing of the Marine headquarters pointed out, a continuous stream of warning reports eventually can lead to uncertainty in security precautions as many of the threats fail to materialize. All this only makes the terrorists' job easier by overextending or misdirecting security and intelligence services that otherwise might normally perform their protective function well. [redacted]

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- [redacted] remote control, television-guided rubber dinghies and suited-up Iranian frogmen were spotted in Muslim areas of Lebanon preparing for attacks against the US Navy. [redacted] the scenario of such attacks in Lebanon seems extremely implausible, especially since easier targets were available on the ground in Beirut.)
- [redacted] Iranian "Red Cross" members had entered Saudi Arabia in late 1983 to plot attacks against US AWACS aircraft. (One of the more obvious problems with this report is that Muslims are members of the Red Crescent, not the Red Cross.) [redacted]

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The excitement generated by spectacular international incidents like the Beirut bombing seems to bring

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GI TR 84-005
1 March 1984

Chronology

This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology unless new information has been received. [redacted]

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14 January 1984

Spain: Telephone Company Bombed

In Bilbao, the Basque terrorist group Iraultza claimed credit for the explosion of one of four bombs placed at the National Telephone Company. The three other bombs were deactivated. [redacted]

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25 January 1984

Greece: Threat of Bomb Attack on El Al Offices

An unidentified person telephoned the El Al Airline offices in Athens, threatening to blow them up unless the offices are closed within two months. [redacted]

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Turkey: Actions Against TPLP/F

In the Sumerevler area of Adana, the Turkish National Police arrested two Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front, Revolutionary Way (TPLP-F RW) members and confiscated arms and ammunition belonging to the group. [redacted]

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30 January 1984

Bahrain: Arrest of Da'wa Party Leader

On the opening day of the trial of a Da'wa Party member for keeping arms buried in his garden, the President of the Islamic Enlightenment Society of Bahrain, Abd' Ali Ibrahim Mansur, was arrested. [redacted]

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Early February 1984

Bolivia: Potential Terrorist Organization Discovered

[redacted] an umbrella organization designed to coordinate the underground activities of leftist political parties should they need to resort to terrorist activity in response to a rightwing coup. The organization, called the Democratic Coordinating Committee (JDC), is reportedly Cuban sponsored and led by President Siles's aide, Felix Rospigliosi. [redacted]

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Italy: Arrests in Connection With Burning of Italian Air Force Aircraft

Italian press reports five members of the Italian Air Force assigned to Pisa Airbase have been arrested in connection with the burning of a military aircraft on 17 January, lending credence to the conjecture of some Italian Air Force officials that the incident was the work of disgruntled base personnel, rather than terrorists. [redacted]

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February 1984

Pakistan: Expulsion of PLO Members

Four PLO officials and 16 Palestinian students, accused of plotting to kidnap Arab diplomats in Pakistan, were and expelled. [redacted]

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
2 February 1984

Guatemala: Law Student Kidnaped

A law student was kidnaped by unidentified men and released unharmed some two weeks later. His family reported that he had been working on a labor case just prior to his abduction. This was one of several recent kidnappings of labor lawyers and union leaders. [redacted]

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4 February 1984

Central African Republic: Libyan Terrorists Arrested

Two additional suspected Libyan terrorists were arrested in Bengui as they attempted to place a Soviet explosive in the French compound. Of the original team of five Libyans, three have been apprehended. [redacted]

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Iraq: Kurds Kidnap Two West Europeans

The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) kidnaped one Italian and one Swiss construction engineer while they were driving through Kurdish territory in Iraq. The KDP announced on 14 February that it will release the prisoners if Baghdad agrees to free jailed party members and to end its summary executions of Kurdish prisoners. Baghdad is unlikely to comply with these demands. [redacted]

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6 February 1984

Turkey: TIKKO Members Arrested

The Turkish National Police arrested two members of the Turkish Workers and Peasants' Liberation Army (TIKKO) in Istanbul. One of the arrested was identified as the military wing chief of TIKKO. A sizable amount of ammunition was also discovered at this time. [redacted]

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8 February 1984

West Germany: Bombing at the Turkish Consulate

The German leftist group Revolutionary Cells (RZ) claimed responsibility for a bomb explosion at the Turkish Consulate in Cologne, which shattered windows and caused other damage but no injuries. The Turkish and Northern Kurdistan Liberation Organization also claimed responsibility. [redacted]

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9 February 1984

Angola: Explosion on Angolan Plane

An Angolan plane crashlanded soon after takeoff from Huambo. The government believes that a bomb had been placed in the forward cargo hold by four members of UNITA whom they have in custody. There were no injuries. [redacted]

Greece: Turkish Airlines Offices Occupied

In Athens, 15 leftwing Turkish extremists occupied the offices of Turkish Airlines where they issued a statement condemning "American imperialists and their followers." After surrendering, the Turks claimed they belonged to six leftwing extremist groups and stated they were also protesting the alleged deaths of eight Turkish hunger strikers in eastern Turkey. [redacted]

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Guatemala: Political Leader Murdered

Five hooded armed men kidnaped and subsequently murdered a leader of the social democratic political party, *New Force*, as he was leaving party headquarters in Guatemala City. His body, which was found the following day, showed signs of torture. [redacted]

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10 February 1984

Australia: Threat to Consulate

The Melbourne Consulate received a letter threatening to destroy 18 embassies around the world if the USS New Jersey continues to shell Lebanon. [redacted]

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11 February 1984

Poland: Bomb Threat at Private Residence of Embassy Personnel

The housekeeper for the commercial officer at the US Embassy in Warsaw told Embassy officials that several bomb threats had been made to the private residence of the commercial officer by unidentified callers. [redacted]

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Guatemala: Labor Leader Kidnaped

The Secretary General of the *Prensa Libre* newspaper union was kidnaped by unidentified men and released three days later. Embassy sources at *Prensa Libre*, however, do not believe he was abducted by the security forces and suggest the operation was carried out by elements that wished to embarrass the Mejia government. [redacted]

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12 February 1984

Spain: Police Post Bombed

In San Sebastian a police post was damaged by two rocket grenades and machinegun fire. There were no injuries from the attack. The Basque Separatist Group ETA is suspected of perpetrating it. Police also defused a bomb on the road near Bilbao, also probably the work of ETA. [redacted]

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13 February 1984

Chile: Terrorists Attack Police Garrison

A five-man terrorist commando unit attacked a national police garrison with automatic weapons in Santiago, causing extensive damage but no injuries. Fleeing the scene, the unidentified terrorists left behind a bag containing two powerful homemade bombs and a Chilean flag inscribed with the logo of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). [redacted]

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14 February 1984

Sudan: Attack on Steamer

Southern dissidents attacked a river steamer which was evacuating foreigners from the south, reportedly killing hundreds of passengers. The steamer may have been a target of opportunity rather than the object of a planned operation. [redacted]

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Colombia: Guerrillas Occupy US News Agency

Members of the 19th of April (M-19) guerrilla organization occupied the offices of the Associated Press (AP) in Bogota. Two men and three women, posing as journalism students, forced the news agency's correspondents at gunpoint to send a message to Panama demanding its government to return the body of former M-19 leader Jaime Bateman. They then painted M-19 slogans on the walls of the offices. [redacted]

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Spain: Preelection Bombings

In Zarauz, the Autonomous Anticapitalist Commandos (CAA), a radical splinter group of ETA, claimed responsibility for two bomb explosions outside a school hall where Spanish opposition leader Manuel Fraga was addressing a rally. No injuries occurred in the blasts. [redacted]

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Spain: Bombings in Reuteria and Bilbao

Members of ETA are suspected of bombings at two banks in Reuteria and at a bar in Bilbao. No injuries were reported. [redacted]

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15 February 1984

Chile: Rightwing Terrorists Strike Again

Unidentified terrorists threw a firebomb at the parked vehicle of Dr. Rodolfo Seguel, chairman of the Arica Human Rights Commission. The vehicle was destroyed but no injuries were reported. The previously unknown "Command of Peoples Organizations" claimed responsibility for the incident. [redacted]

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Peru: Terrorists Black Out Lima

Unidentified individuals, presumed to be members of the Sendero Luminoso (SL), bombed three high tension electrical towers, plunging portions of Lima into darkness. Terrorists also set off bombs at a bank and several businesses, causing little damage. Minor attacks occurred in several other Peruvian cities, also causing little damage. The last instance of coordinated attacks in Lima occurred 1 January 1984. [redacted]

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Turkey: Terrorist Killed

In Tunceli Province, a member of the Turkish leftist group, Dev Sol, was killed in a shootout with Turkish security forces. [redacted]

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15-25 February 1984

Turkey: Terrorists Arrested

[redacted] the Turkish National Police arrested 102 suspected members of the leftist terrorist group Acilciler (Swift Ones) in Bursa, Ankara, Adana, Usak, and Izmir. [redacted]

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16 February 1984

Spain: Bomb Blasts Unemployment Office

An explosion at a Madrid unemployment office caused extensive damage, but no casualties. Basque separatist guerrillas are suspected. [redacted]

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Spain: ETA Members Killed, Wounded

One member of ETA was killed and two others seriously injured in a shootout with police near Bilbao. Several other members of ETA were arrested during the operation. [redacted]

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Colombia: ELN Raids Petroleum Camp

A small band of guerrillas from the National Liberation Army (ELN) raided a petroleum company camp in northeast Colombia along the Venezuelan border. The guerrillas burned tents and stole several pieces of equipment. [redacted]

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Italy: Anti-US Threat in Vicenza

[redacted] Vicenza police authorities received a telephone call from an unidentified person who stated, "We will kill an American citizen, stuff the body in the trunk of an auto, and park the auto either in an American housing area or at Site Pluto." Occurring as it did on the heels of the assassination of Leamon Hunt, this threat is probably part of the spate of anti-US threats—many not attributable to terrorists—that often accompanies a major terrorist action. [redacted]

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Italy: Telephone Threat Against Jordanian Embassy

An unidentified caller threatened to carry out an unspecified attack against the Jordanian Embassy in Rome stating, "We've killed Hunt and now it is your turn." Officials of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Rome were notified by the Jordanians of the telephone threat and reportedly are concerned that they will be the next target for terrorists in Rome. [redacted]

25X1

Lebanon: Prominent Shiite Imam Assassinated

Shaykh Raghav Harb, the second-highest Shiite leader in south Lebanon, was killed by unknown gunmen. Harb was one of several militant clergymen campaigning against Israeli occupation of the south and had contacts with revolutionary Moslem clerics in Iran. Violent demonstration followed the assassination, as most Lebanese blame Israel for the attack. [redacted]

25X1


17 February 1984

Peru: State of Emergency Extended

The Belaunde government decided to suspend civil liberties in 11 provinces in south central Peru for at least 60 more days in an effort to aid the military in its battle against the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla group. The extension of the state of emergency is the ninth since guerrilla action escalated in 1982. [redacted]

25X1

25X6



Italy: Bomb Explodes at US Company Concessionary

A bomb exploded in the parking lot of the Rome-area concessionary of the US Caterpillar Tractor Company, causing slight damage, and no injuries. No group or individual has claimed responsibility. [redacted]


25X1

Guatemala: Labor Lawyer Abducted

Unidentified men kidnaped and murdered a prominent labor lawyer. A note pinned to his shirt said he had been executed as a traitor to Guatemala's Communist Party Orthodox Wing. [redacted]

25X1

18 February 1984



25X6

Guatemala: Trade Union Leader Kidnaped

The Guatemalan press reported that the leader of a trade union, affiliated with the Communist trade-union confederation FASGUA, was kidnaped from the streets of Guatemala City by armed men. (FASGUA, at one time the trade-union arm of Guatemala's Communist party, remains a legal entity.) The union leader's abduction in broad daylight and his FASGUA affiliation suggests the operation was probably mounted by the security forces. [redacted]

25X1

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
19 February 1984

Lebanon: Saudi Diplomat Released

The Saudi Consul General in Lebanon was released by Syrian officials after being held for over one month by radical Lebanese Shias we believe are members of the Islamic Amal. The Saudis apparently sought Syrian help to obtain the release of their diplomat. [redacted]

25X1

21 February 1984



25X6

Egypt: Jewish Terrorist Threat to Anti-Mubarak Intellectuals

Meir Kahane acknowledged publicly that his "Kach" organization had sent letters threatening violence to several Egyptian academics and journalists loosely associated with the anti-Mubarak opposition. Kahane stated the threats to these Egyptian intellectuals is merely a beginning, and he accused them of anti-Semitism. [redacted]

25X1

Iran: Possible Threat to Exiles in United States

Several former Iranian military officers in exile in the United States reportedly received letters threatening them with the same fate as General Oveisi, who was assassinated by Iranian agents in Paris on 7 February. [redacted]

25X1

23 February 1984

Greece: Caller Threatens Safety of US Personnel in Athens

An unidentified caller to the State Department made an unspecified threat against US Government personnel in Athens if one Dimitrios Mattes, apparently charged in connection with criminal activity in New York, is not "left alone" by US legal authorities. The caller, who claimed to be calling from Athens, said he represented the "Progressive Greek Officers Organization." [redacted]

25X1

Spain: Preelection Assassination

In Bilbao, a faction of the Autonomous Anticapitalist Commandos (CAA) Mendeku (Vengeance in Basque) claimed responsibility for the assassination of a Socialist senator, who was a leading candidate in regional parliamentary elections and an outspoken critic of ETA. The action was in revenge for recent attacks against ETA exiles in the French Basque country by the Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL). [redacted]

25X1

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Peru: Terrorists Attack Senate President's Home

Six members of the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla organization traveling in a car hurled explosives at the home of the President of Peru's Senate, Ricardo Monteaugudo. The early morning attack caused minor damage to the residence and no injuries. No arrests have been made [redacted]

25X1

South Africa: Bombing of Power Substation

Three explosions in a power substation near Pietermaritzburg caused extensive damage but did not affect the electrical power supply. Police found five additional unexploded limpet mines which, had they exploded, would have cut the power. Police suspect the African National Congress was responsible. [redacted]

25X1

24 February 1984

Peru: Government Expands Emergency Zone

The government has extended the state of emergency to a 12th province in southeastern Peru, placing it under military control and suspending individual rights. Interior Minister Luis Percovich announced that emergency decrees would be applied in Castrovirreyna Province because of "the continued acts of violence and terrorism generated" by the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla movement. [redacted]

25X1

Italy: Sentences for Red Brigades Crimes

An Italian court sentenced 22 defendants to jail terms of up to 25 years for shootings, kidnappings, and membership in the Red Brigades. Among the defendants was Barbara Balzarani, who was tried in absentia. One of the most notorious BR figures still at large, she is suspected by Italian authorities of having played a role in the recent assassination in Rome of Leamon R. Hunt. [redacted]

25X1

25 February 1984

Spain: Spanish Basque Killed in France

In Idaux-Mendy, members of the Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL) claimed credit for the shooting death of an ex-ETA member [redacted]

25X1

26 February 1984

Iran: British Businessman Killed

A British businessman was shot dead in Tehran, apparently because he was mistaken for a French diplomat. An anonymous phone call in Tehran described the murder as a revolutionary execution of a French diplomat by a group called The Organization of French Socialists [redacted]

25X1

Late February 1984

West Germany: Threat Against Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Employees

US Embassy officials in Munich report that a former Bulgarian militia officer, whose current reliability is undetermined, has relayed information to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty personnel about a possible threat by the Bulgarian Intelligence Service to two RFE/RL staff members, one of whom was the victim of an apparent unsuccessful assassination attempt in 1978. The Bulgarian Government reportedly is upset about broadcasts of Sofia's alleged complicity in the papal assassination attempt [redacted]

25X1

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