



Directorate of Intelligence

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Terrorism
Review



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5 January 1984

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GI TR 84-001
5 January 1984

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**Terrorism
Review**

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5 January 1984

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Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues,

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**Terrorism
Review**



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5 January 1984

Perspective


1983: Not All Bad

The serious escalation in the level and intensity of terrorist violence in the Middle East should not be allowed to obscure the positive developments of 1983, a year when not all terrorists had it their own way. The picture brightened most in Western Europe:

- In Italy, the number of violent terrorist events was well down from previous years. The Red Brigades, decimated by arrests and defections, limited themselves primarily to rebuilding efforts. Threatened terrorist incidents at Comiso, Sicily, Italy's sole INF deployment site, did not materialize. 25X6



- In West Germany, not one person died from terrorism during 1983. The hunted remnants of the Red Army Faction hardcore mounted no attacks, and their call for the amalgamation of "the guerrilla and the resistance" into a single front apparently went unanswered. Overall, the number of violent terrorist incidents decreased by about half compared with the previous year. Five of the six members of the Kexel-Hepp Group, the country's only rightwing terrorist cell, were arrested, and the sixth (Hepp) is believed to have fled the country. Terrorists threatened but failed to forestall the scheduled INF deployments.

- In Turkey, the military government completed its self-assigned task of suppressing both rightwing and leftwing terrorism in Turkey and turned back authority to a civilian government in a peaceful election.  25X1

Even in the Middle East there were some bright spots in the picture:

- The Government of Iraq kicked Abu Nidal and his organization (formerly known as Black June) out of the country. It also apparently suppressed the sophisticated bombing operations of the Baghdad based 15 May Organization.
- The Government of Jordan refused to yield to Abu Nidal's demands that it release members of his group that it holds prisoner, even though as a consequence its diplomats have become the targets of repeated assassination attempts by the group.

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- In an attempt to repair relations with certain moderate African and Arab states, Libya's Muammar Qaddafi downplayed terrorism during the year. Threats against exiled opponents of Qaddafi were not followed up.
- The Government of South Yemen ceased fomenting terrorist attacks against neighboring North Yemen and in general reduced its support for international terrorists.
- Despite serious setbacks to Yasir Arafat and his moderate supporters, their ban against international terrorist operations by the PLO continued in effect.

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In the Far East, South Korea resisted the blandishments of the Taiwan Government and upheld its international obligations by trying and sentencing to prison terms of seven to 10 years the four Chinese who mounted the first successful hijacking of a Chinese civil airliner.

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In Latin America, there were positive developments in a number of countries:

- The newly elected civilian government of Argentina has indicted several former military leaders on criminal charges in connection with the thousands of "disappearances" which occurred while they were in power. And several Montonero leaders have returned to the country professing to have abandoned terrorist tactics in favor of peaceful political activity, which would be good news only if they mean it.
- In Honduras in early May, authorities captured three key members of the Popular Revolutionary Forces—Lorenzo Zelaya Command, the most violent Honduran terrorist group. Among those apprehended was the group's leader, Efraim Duarte, who was persuaded to identify other members of the group and provide details of Cuban and Nicaraguan support; ultimately, he even condemned violent revolution at a government-sponsored press conference. The information he provided enabled the Honduran Government to arrest many members of the group and, for the present, render it ineffective as a revolutionary force.
- In the fall, the Honduran military decimated a force of some 100 Honduran insurgents, backed by Cuba and Nicaragua, that had tried to establish a base of operations in the remote region of Olancho. The defeat was a serious setback to Cuban and Nicaraguan plans to destabilize the Honduran Government and to punish it for its support of anti-Sandinista forces and US regional policy.
- Several terrorist groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and the Movement of 19 April (M-19) in Colombia and the Shining Path in Peru—offered cease-fires. While these offers may have been tactical in nature (and may not be accepted), they demonstrate that the groups in question were failing to achieve their political objectives through purely terrorist tactics.

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
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Highlights

Significant Developments

Costa Rica: Militants Seize Control of Communist Party. Leading San Jose dailies reported that militant elements of Costa Rica's traditionally bland, pro-Moscow, nonviolent Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) seized control of the party's machinery in a vicious internal power struggle. According to the media reports, the militants advocate armed struggle and guerrilla warfare. PVP legislator Arnaldo Ferreto was quoted in the local press as stating, "We have a hundred companeros fighting in Nicaragua and we will send a thousand more if we have to." The PVP is the country's largest leftist party. It claims a membership of some 6,000 to 7,000, can mobilize an estimated 50,000 union militants, and controls Costa Rica's most powerful union. The party [redacted] currently maintains a 200-man paramilitary capability and provided the Sandinistas armed volunteers during their struggle against the Somoza regime. [redacted]

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Italy: Antonov Under House Arrest. The Bulgarian Airlines functionary Sergei Antonov, under investigation for complicity in the May 1981 Papal assassination attempt, was released from prison and placed under house arrest, ostensibly because his health was deteriorating. [redacted] Antonov is required to remain at home but may receive phone calls and visitors. His passport was lifted to prevent departure from Italy. [redacted]

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Spain: Attack on Jordanian Officials. The Arab Revolutionary Brigades (ARB) claimed responsibility for the 29 December attack on two Jordanian officials in Madrid. We suspect the ARB is a cover name for Abu Nidal's organization, which has been attacking Jordanian officials abroad for the past few months. Earlier this month, Abu Nidal threatened Jordan with renewed terrorism if Amman continued to refuse to release imprisoned members of his group. In addition, Abu Nidal may be targeting Jordanians to dissuade King Hussein from reinitiating a dialogue with Yasir Arafat. [redacted]

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Colombia: No Truce With Guerrillas. According to Defense Minister Landazabal, in late December President Betancur bowed to military pressure not to agree to a cease-fire with Colombian guerrillas. In recent weeks the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 19th of April Movement (M-19) announced

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they were joining forces in a "peace offensive" in order to obtain a cease-fire and a negotiated truce. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Argentina: Montonero Leader Arrested. Exiled Montonero leaders Ricardo Obregon Cano and Oscar Bidegain returned to Argentina on 20 December to announce the organization's formal dissolution. Obregon Cano was immediately arrested. Earlier this month, five exiled Montonero leaders, including Obregon Cano and Bidegain, published an open letter to President Alfonsin announcing they would return to Argentina to pursue their political objectives through peaceful means. [redacted]

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France: Moves Against Potential Iranian Terrorists. The French Government has moved to disrupt a potential Iranian terrorist network in France. According to press reports, France closed the Iranian Islamic Center in Paris, expelling three Iranian Embassy officials and eight members of the Center on the grounds it was a potential staging ground for terrorist operations in the country. Quoting French security service sources, the press reports indicated the Center was involved in propaganda activities in France and also was involved in preparations to assassinate Iranian exiles and conduct attacks against French interests as well. No connection has yet been established between the expulsions and the two bombings in Marseilles on 31 December. [redacted]

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Nicaragua's Support of International Terrorism [redacted]

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Nicaragua promotes and supports terrorism in Central America to further its primary objectives of preserving its revolutionary gains and destabilizing non-Marxist governments in the region. Managua provides revolutionary groups with arms, ammunition, training, and safehaven, as well as propaganda and financial support. The Sandinistas also offer sanctuary to South American terrorists. [redacted]

a Honduran airliner and may have played a role in the 1982 seizure of the Chamber of Commerce Building in San Pedro Sula, an operation in which many of Honduras's financial leaders were taken hostage.

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In El Salvador

The Salvadoran insurgents regularly employ terrorist tactics to intimidate the opposition and to coerce the uncommitted. [redacted]

In July 1983, a group of 96 Cuban-trained Honduran guerrillas infiltrated Honduras from Nicaragua. They were decimated by the Honduran military, and their leader, Reyes Matta—who reportedly served with Che Guevara in Bolivia and with the terrorist Rebel Armed Forces in Guatemala—was killed. [redacted]

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[redacted] Managua serves as base and safehaven for the Salvadoran insurgent command, whence it directs the political and military struggle. [redacted]

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[redacted] Managua also furnishes large quantities of arms, ammunition, and other material received from Cuba, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and other sympathetic states. A variety of overland, sea, and air routes are used to transport war materials from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Local revolutionary groups and sympathetic or corrupt officials facilitate this traffic. [redacted]

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In Guatemala

Nicaragua, we believe, facilitates the travel of Guatemalan terrorists to Cuba and Eastern Europe for clandestine meetings and training. [redacted]

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[redacted] The Sandinista leadership has described the Salvadoran guerrillas as "our shield"—viewing their survival as essential to the preservation of Nicaragua's revolutionary gains. [redacted]

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In Costa Rica

In 1983, Costa Rican authorities charged Nicaragua with complicity in two assassination plots against Eden Pastora and the Costa Rican-based anti-Sandinista leadership. The arrest of a Basque terrorist, accused of involvement in this latest plot and allegedly tied to Managua, raises the possibility that extraregional terrorists with a high order of expertise are being imported by the Sandinistas to target opposition leaders. [redacted]

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In Honduras

Nicaragua also serves as sanctuary for Honduran terrorist leaders and, in the past, has provided direct support for terrorist operations. These include the sabotage of two electric substations in July 1982 that blacked out 80 percent of the country's capital, cost the Honduran economy an estimated \$20 million, and idled some 50,000 workers. There is also evidence that Managua may have provided direction and weapons to the terrorists responsible for the 1981 skyjacking of

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
The Sandinistas have placed renewed pressure on President Monge to enforce Costa Rican neutrality in response to recent attacks by anti-Sandinista forces they charge are based on Costa Rican soil. This, coupled with Monge's antipathy towards Managua and his strong support of US policy in the region, we believe, could lead Nicaragua to sponsor terrorism targeted directly against the Costa Rican Government if the Sandinistas come to believe that San Jose, despite its declared neutrality, is unwilling to restrain the anti-Sandinista opposition. For such operations, Managua would probably use Costa Rican or third-country nationals to provide the Sandinistas a degree of plausible denial.

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In South America

Nicaragua also is a haven for South American terrorists, including Argentine Montoneros and Uruguayan Tupamaros.

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**Threats and Hoaxes:
Dealing With the Ambiguity
of Nonviolent Terrorism**

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The terms *threat* and *hoax* reflect a wide variety of terrorist actions, some of which have major impacts on the targets and victims. The fear engendered by a credible threat or hoax may be as intense as that resulting from a violent terrorist act—and sometimes more debilitating. Accordingly, in our computerized data bases we have been characterizing threats and hoaxes as terrorist incidents, thereby giving them the same statistical weight as bombings, armed attacks, and other forms of terrorist violence.

But threats and hoaxes are not the same as other forms of terrorism. They do not involve direct physical violence, nor its customary consequences, personal injury or property damage. Instead they work at the psychic level, and the damage that they cause is often difficult to identify and usually impossible to quantify. Consequently, threats and hoaxes are seldom taken very seriously or examined very closely by terrorism analysts.

Thus there is a fundamental ambiguity in the way we think about and deal with terrorist threats and hoaxes. In the current period of heightened anxiety occasioned by recent major terrorist successes against US and allied targets in the Middle East, terrorist threats are being taken more seriously than usual, in some cases more seriously than necessary. The great number of spurious threats tends to overload the system, interfering with the capability of potential US targets to recognize and protect themselves from true danger. Therefore, in an effort to assist those who must evaluate and respond to terrorist threats and hoaxes, we present below some facts and observations about the ambiguous terrain of nonviolent terrorism.

Impact of Threats and Hoaxes

The impact of a threat or hoax (not to be confused with the impact of the *event* itself, should it

subsequently materialize) is almost completely dependent on whether it is believed or not.¹ If it is believed, or if the target is uncertain about whether to believe it or not, the impact can be severe. Our records are replete with examples in which buildings have been evacuated or closed (temporarily or even permanently), personal and physical security precautions upgraded (perhaps at great expense or inconvenience), diplomats, executives, officials, functionaries, and dependents moved or reassigned, trips called off and travelers rerouted, plans and programs substantially modified or even abandoned, all on account of terrorist threats. Often, however, nothing is done at all because the threat is not believed.

How does a target decide whether or not to believe a threat, whether or not to take action to try to avert the consequences? In our opinion, based on examination of data involving thousands of international terrorist threats over the past 15 years, the impact of a threat or hoax is a product of the credulity of the target, the gravity of the anticipated consequences, and—clearly most important—the credibility of the threat.

Credulity of the Target

Whether a terrorist threat is believed, or has any impact at all, depends partly on who the target is. Some people are naturally more credulous than others, or more inclined to believe that bad things may happen to them, or more certain that enemies are out to get them. Other people, in contrast, may refuse to credit even overwhelming evidence of danger.

¹ We are talking in this article about *articulated* threats—what prospective attackers say to their targets. We are not talking about *perceived* threats—what prospective targets apprehend about the danger they face. Such apprehension can spring from many sources—from an articulated threat, to be sure, but also from an intelligence report or analysis, from a tip by a third party, or from an accretion of observations by an individual that causes him to conclude he is in danger.

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Definitions and Distinctions

In the context of terrorism the terms threat and hoax may have multiple meanings or connotations, depending on who is talking—or listening. In fact, in some cases the terms may be deemed interchangeable. Soon after beginning any discussion of these phenomena, then, we must carefully define our terms.

For the purpose of recording incident data, we define a threat as the expression of an intent to inflict injury on a person or thing. It may be conditional: "We will get you unless you do this—or stop doing that." Or absolute: "We will get you no matter what you do." The extortion of "revolutionary taxes" from Spanish businessmen and bankers by members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) is a kind of conditional threat. So was the recent vague but menacing message from an alleged spokesman for Islamic Jihad in Beirut, who gave the US and French Multinational Force (MNF) contingents 10 days to get out of town or face "an earthquake." In contrast, most of the hundreds of threatening telephone calls received around the world each year by US diplomatic and military installations are absolute threats, simple expressions of animosity coupled with a stated intention to do harm.

Threats should be distinguished from warnings, in which terrorists who have already arranged for violence to occur, typically by planting a time bomb, try to limit the casualties, typically by encouraging persons in the immediate area to depart before the explosion. Warnings are not terrorist acts.

For the purpose of recording incident data, we define a hoax as an attempt to mislead someone into believing that a terrorist event has just occurred (false notification) or is just about to occur (false

warning). Most hoaxes are verbal. Commonly, an anonymous person telephones the target installation and announces that a time bomb has been planted there, but a subsequent search turns up nothing. Occasionally, a hoax takes the form of the planting of a dummy explosive device; this increases the ostensible menace, since it demonstrates that the perpetrator had access to the premises and could have planted (and might still plant) a real bomb.

It will be observed that we are treading through a semantic minefield. Most threats, after all, are also hoaxes, since the perpetrators rarely intend to follow through—but a target has no way of knowing that at the time the threat is made. By the same token, the planting of a fake bomb is surely a threatening act. Indeed, the very idea that someone hates you enough to try to trick you into thinking you are about to die is in itself threatening. Consequently, in examining the ramifications of threats and hoaxes, it is necessary to distinguish carefully between them. The distinction we employ, admittedly rather arbitrarily, is that threats refer to events which are to take place in the future, whereas hoaxes refer to events that have already taken place. Note that the actual intent of the perpetrator—to harm or just to frighten—is not a distinguishing criterion. To cite two examples:

- Threat: "I am going to plant a bomb in your embassy," announces a telephone caller. (It is irrelevant whether the caller actually intends to plant the bomb and equally irrelevant whether he later actually does so or not.)
 - Hoax: "A bomb has been planted in your embassy," announces a telephone caller, but a subsequent search turns up nothing, indicating he was lying.
-

Regardless of whether they are predisposed toward credulousness or skepticism, however, prospective targets come to rely heavily on their own experience in deciding whether to believe a terrorist threat. For example, if a particular installation had been the target, say, of 50 anonymous bomb threats over a

week or so, and if none of them had panned out, the person receiving the 51st anonymous bomb threat—no matter how credulous he was innately—would not take it nearly as seriously as he took the first one.

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Gravity of the Consequences

Other things being equal, a threat to level a building with a car bomb will have more impact than a threat to pour acid into the innards of a subway ticket vending machine. A threat to firebomb a crowded theater is clearly of more consequence than a threat to torch an automobile—even an occupied automobile, unless the occupant is a VIP.

If the potential consequences are grave enough, even obviously incredible threats receive serious consideration even by extremely skeptical people. For example, threats involving the use of chemical, biological, or radiological agents always cause a flurry of activity and concern because the potential consequences might involve mass casualties or huge damage. This is so, even though acts of so-called hi-tech terrorism have been extremely rare and none have done much damage.

Credibility of the Threat


More influential than the credulity of the target or the gravity of the consequences, however, is the credibility of the threat itself. Deciding whether or not a threat² is credible, however, may be a complicated process, for credibility is the product of the interplay among several factors, including the identity, capabilities, and reputation (alleged, suspected, or known) of the person or agency making the threat and the context or environment in which the threat is made. If the threat is of an immediate, bomb-in-the-building nature, a decision must be made instantly, whether or not there is enough information at hand to determine whether the threat is credible. In most such cases, the target decides to evacuate now and evaluate later.

² All such incidents must be treated initially as threats or bona fide warnings; only after evaluation or more information can some be identified later as hoaxes.

Identity. Determining the identity and affiliation of the person making the threat often involves negotiating a maze of possibilities:


- The person making the threat may or may not identify himself. In the latter case, the threat is anonymous.
- If the person making the threat identifies himself, either as an individual or as a member of a particular group, the name he gives may or may not be known to the target (or to the security authorities); if not, the threat might as well be anonymous.
- Even if the name given by the person making the threat is known to the target, it must nevertheless still be established whether this person is in fact the person he claims to be or actually represents the organization he claims to represent; if he is not, or does not, the threat might as well be anonymous.

In order to enhance the credibility of their threats, or to distinguish their warnings from hoaxes, some terrorist groups offer proof of their bona fides.



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Capabilities and Reputation. However accomplished, once the identity and affiliation of the person making the threat have been firmly established, the probability that the threat is real may usually be determined rather easily. In most cases, this entails deciding (a) whether the authors of the threat are capable of carrying it out; and (b) whether they have a record of carrying out their threats.



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says he is does not mean that what he says can safely be disregarded.

Environment and Context. When the identity of the person making the threat cannot be established, the environment and context in which the threat was made take on increased importance. Almost any kidnaping threat in Colombia, for example, is credible, because kidnaping seems to have become the Colombian national sport; more than 100 kidnapings have occurred there this year alone, and many of the kidnapers have never been identified. In Spain, so many Basque bankers and businessmen have been the victims of kidnapings, bombings, and other ETA depredations that explicit threats from this quarter are hardly needed any more; after numerous object lessons, many pay protection money without being asked. This must be the ultimately anonymous threat; yet its credibility is unquestioned.

In contrast, consider the following hypothetical example: an anonymous telephoned threat to the effect that Black June will soon explode a nuclear device at the US Embassy in Beirut. Such a threat would not be credible. The organization almost certainly does not possess nuclear weapons, and it no longer uses the name Black June; thus the caller would probably be deemed a crank having no connection to the Abu Nidal Group and neither the intention nor the capability of carrying out his threat.³

Evaluating Anonymous Threats. The great majority of anonymous threats are never carried out. The same goes for most of the threats made by persons or in the names of organizations nobody ever heard of. And even threats made in the names of well-known terrorist groups can often be discounted after a bit of thought. Suppose, for example, that a self-proclaimed spokesman for Islamic Jihad purported to announce the date and site of the next truck bomb attack against a US facility in Beirut. We should doubt the validity of this threat on the basis that such attacks succeed only through surprise and that Islamic Jihad would hardly provide what amounted to a warning that would eliminate any possibility of achieving surprise.⁴

Nevertheless, once in a while an anonymous threat is followed by action. Occasionally, a new terrorist group announces its arrival by making a threat and then carrying it out. And just because the representative of a real terrorist group cannot prove he is who he

Recently one evening, the US Embassy in San Salvador received the following series of threatening, one-sentence telephone calls from an anonymous male who spoke English with a heavy Spanish accent:

First call: "You will die tonight."

Second call: "Americans . . . [verb, obscene in context]."

Third call: "You will die tonight."

Fourth call: "There's a bomb in your Embassy."

Fifth call: ". . . [obscene verb] you."

After the fourth call (which was, in fact, the only explicit threat), Embassy security officials searched the chancery and grounds, with negative results. They also notified appropriate Embassy personnel and put into effect standing bomb drill procedures, checking the neighborhood to determine whether anybody might be watching; apparently nobody was. This was a case where the environment weighed heavily in the assessment of credibility. In other US installations in other countries, the calls might have been taken less seriously.

³ It should be noted, though, that the extreme gravity of such a threat would ensure that it received serious attention.

⁴ At the same time, a report by an intelligence source—or even a tip by a one-time informant—that offered details of a planned car bomb attack by Islamic Jihad might be highly credible.

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Threats as Indicators

When all is said and done, it does not much matter to a target whether he learns of a possibly impending terrorist attack via an articulated threat or from an intelligence report or tip. In either case, he must go through a similar process of evaluation:

- To evaluate a threat, the target needs to identify the author and his affiliation; and if he can do so, he must then decide whether the group in question can and is likely to carry out its threat.
- To evaluate an intelligence report, the target needs to determine the reliability of the source and of any subsources; and if they seem reliable, he must then decide whether the group in question can and is likely to carry out the allegedly planned attack.

It may be seen that, both in import and impact, terrorist threats are operatively much closer to warnings, tips, intelligence reports, and other indicators of impending terrorist attacks than they are to the attacks themselves. Partly for this reason, we have under reconsideration our longstanding practice of recording threats and hoaxes as terrorist incidents.⁵

⁵ Another reason is our growing suspicion that most terrorist threats and hoaxes are perpetrated not by practicing terrorists but by feckless counterfeits who would never dare to act out their hostility. Probably more often than not, the author is an adolescent misfit acting in solitude or in the giggling company of others of his ilk. To liken such posturing to the activities of real terrorists may hinder rather than promote a clear understanding of the actual terrorist threat.




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Statistical Overview: International Terrorist Incidents, 1982-83

█ Total, 1136
 █ Of which: US targets, 528



Category of International Terrorist Incidents, 1982-83, by Month	1982												1983												Total
	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N ^a	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N ^a	D	
Total	72	62	66	90	62	71	60	56	52	59	47	50	57	59	77	82	59	66	71	60	56	86	93	1136	
Kidnaping	4			1					1	4	3	2	2	4	4	3	3	2	3	6	3	1	7	52	
Barricade, hostage	1	1		6					1	5	2	1	2	2	3	4	2	2	3	1	3	8	4	49	
Bombing	40	32	13	17	18	23	22	25	27	30	22	32	22	22	17	19	31							412	
Armed attack				2	1				2	2	4	1	2	3						2	1			21	
Hijacking	3	4	1	3	3	1	4	6	3	4	7	6	10	3	2							1		61	
Assassination	3	4	5		1	2	4	1	4	5	2	4	2	3	3	4	2							49	
Threats, hoax	19	44	18	23	14	16	20	15	29	25	18	17	24	23	23	37	41							406	
Sniping	1	2	3	2	1		1	2	1	2									1	1	3	2		22	
Other ^b	1	3	3	8	2	4	3	2	4	5	4	1	4	1	2	13	4							64	

^aFigures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.

^bBreak-ins, conspiracies, shootouts, etc.

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Chronology

This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology unless new information has been received. [redacted]

November 1983

Djibouti: Hijackers Convicted

Suddenly and without public notice, the Government of Djibouti tried, convicted, and sentenced to six months' imprisonment the three Palestinians who on 20 January 1983 hijacked to Djibouti a South Yemen Airlines flight bound from Aden to Damascus. The light sentences violated the spirit if not the letter of international laws regarding air piracy. Since they had already spent 10 months in jail, the hijackers were released after the trial. Djibouti is currently looking for a country that will accept them. [redacted]

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5 November 1983

West Berlin: Bombing of Turkish Bank

The bomb exploded outside the bank, causing property damage but no injuries. On 14 November, Associated Press in West Berlin received an unsigned confessor letter which stated the bank had been singled out because of its support to the Turkish junta. Police believe the bombing was the work of Turkish leftists. [redacted]


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10 November 1983

Spain: Bombing of National Police Station

In Barcelona, the Catalan separatist group Tierra Lliure (Free Land) claimed responsibility for a handgrenade attack on a station of the National Police which caused no damage or injuries. Although Tierra Lliure had previously conducted minor terrorist attacks against the Spanish Government in its attempt to gain autonomy for the Catalan region, it had not been active in nearly a year. [redacted]

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20 November 1983

Spain: Bombing of Courthouse

In Valencia, Tierra Lliure claimed responsibility for a bomb which exploded at the courthouse. [redacted]

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6 December 1983

Guadeloupe: More Attempted Bombings

Authorities disarmed two butane bombs in Point-a-Pitre, one under the car of the Sub-Prefet and the other under a military vehicle. These attempts followed the arrest on 5 December of three independence activists; they were charged with plotting against the state. [redacted]

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16 December 1983

Guatemala: Ultrarightist Murdered

A regional leader of the ultraright National Liberation Movement (MLN) in the Department of Chiquimula was murdered by unknown assailants using automatic weapons. The facts surrounding the case are obscure, but the US Embassy doubts the killing was perpetrated by terrorists and suggests the MLN leader may have fallen victim to a family feud. The MLN has demanded a full investigation, and we believe the organization may use the incident to justify continued attacks against Guatemalan reformist and liberal elements as well as leftists. [redacted]

25X1

Peru: Terrorist Leader Captured

Peruvian police arrested Antonio Diaz, a key lieutenant of Sendero Luminoso (SL) leader Abimail Guzman. Diaz was reportedly operational head of SL activities in much of southern Peru. This marks the first time since the SL began its armed campaign in the spring of 1980 that Peruvian security forces have captured a ranking terrorist leader. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X6

19-21 December 1983

Turkey: Abu Nidal Linked to Recent Bombings

On 19 December in Izmir, a car bomb was discovered and defused at the French Cultural Center. On 21 December in Ankara, a car bomb exploded near the office and residence of PLO Representative Abu Firaz. No deaths were reported, but there were some injuries and property damage. A French weapon with a silencer was found at the scene. On 21 December in Istanbul, a bomb exploded near the Iraqi Consulate, injuring three people. Turkish police, after arresting several people, have established that members of Abu Nidal's group and at least one Syrian agent were responsible for all three bombings. [redacted]

25X1

20 December 1983

South Korea: Hijackers' Appeal Overturned

The six Chinese found guilty of the first successful hijacking in Chinese aviation history lost their appeal to have their seven-to-10-year sentences overturned. China is unhappy with the sentences and wishes the hijackers returned to China—where the penalty for hijacking is death. Taiwan, which sees the hijackers as political refugees, would offer them asylum if South Korea would release them. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

South Africa: ANC Strikes Again

Two bombs that exploded in government buildings outside Durban caused no injuries but damaged the Port Natal Administration Board offices. The African National Congress was probably responsible. [redacted]

25X1

Madrid: Attack on Jordanian Officials

One employee of the Jordanian Embassy in Spain was shot and killed and another wounded by an unknown assailant. The Arab Revolutionary Brigades (ARB) claimed responsibility in a call to the Agence France Press in Paris. We suspect that ARB is a cover name used by Abu Nidal's organization, which has been carrying out a terrorist campaign against Jordan for the past few months. [redacted]

25X1

21 December 1983**South Korea: American Cultural Center Threatened**

In Kwangju an anonymous telephone caller claimed that there was a bomb in the building housing the American Cultural Center. A search produced negative results. [redacted]

25X1

21-27 December 1983**Lebanon: Continuing Attacks Against MNF**

Troops of the Multinational Force (MNF) in the Beirut area continue to be the targets of terrorist attacks. On the afternoon of 21 December, a large truck bomb exploded outside the French MNF headquarters killing at least one French soldier and nine Lebanese civilians, and wounding more than 125 others. US sources credit extensive fortification of the facility with preventing more French casualties. At about the same time, one person was killed in another blast at a bar in West Beirut frequented by US Marines. An individual claiming to represent the previously unknown "Black Palm" or "Black Hand" organization took credit immediately following both bombings in a telephone call to a Lebanese radio station. In a call to the French news agency in Beirut the following morning, an individual also took credit for the headquarters bombing in the name of Islamic Jihad and warned of further attacks if US and French forces were not withdrawn from Lebanon in 10 days.

The same afternoon, a US airman searching for explosives was wounded by a sniper. Neither the airman nor others present heard the shot fired, suggesting that the sniper may have used a silenced weapon.

Finally, the first attack directed at British MNF forces was recorded on 27 December, when a car bomb was detonated by remote control as a British convoy passed near it in the port area. Two British soldiers were slightly wounded; no group claimed credit for the attack. [redacted]

25X1

22 December 1983

Guatemala: Terrorists Destroy Government Information Office

The Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) claimed responsibility for the bombing of a government information office located in an office building only two blocks from the US Embassy. The attack was carried out by three masked terrorists carrying automatic weapons. They set off three bombs which gutted the facility and caused heavy smoke damage in the rest of the building. No injuries were reported. [redacted]

25X1

Italy: Arrest Warrant for Yasir Arafat

Italian dailies report that a Venice court has upheld an international arrest order for Yasir Arafat on charges that the PLO leader and Al Fatah were directly involved in supplying arms to the Red Brigades (BR) in 1978-79. Since an extradition agreement exists between Italy and Tunisia, Arafat could face arrest on the Italian charges when he sets foot on Tunisian territory—although this seems unlikely. The warrant against Arafat was first issued in September of this year by a Venetian magistrate but was rejected by his superiors due to a lack of solid evidence against Arafat personally. However, the Venetian "Liberty Tribunal" which later reviewed the case found the evidence—much of it based on the testimony of "repentant" BR members—strong enough to call for Arafat's arrest.

[redacted]

25X1

Saudi Arabia: Bombing in Taif

A series of bombs exploded at a power plant, causing extensive damage. No group has claimed credit, and the Saudi Government has made no public statements about the attack. [redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

23 December 1983

Malta: Israeli Charge Attacked

In Valletta, Esther Millo, the Israeli Charge d'Affaires, was shot at five times from close range by an assailant who approached on foot the parked car in which she was sitting. Improbably, none of the shots hit her, although she suffered minor cuts from pieces of glass. Some diplomats in Valletta suspect the Maltese Government—under pressure from Libya—was behind the attack, which may have been intended to frighten the Israelis into closing their mission. [redacted]

France: Restaurant Bombing Injures 12

In Paris, a shrapnel-filled bomb exploded at an exclusive restaurant injuring 12 people, including five Americans. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the attack. [redacted]

Spain: Bombing of Government Buildings in Basque Region

Two bombs exploded in government buildings in the Basque port of San Sebastian and Vitoria, causing damage but no injuries. The Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) has claimed credit for the attacks. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

24 December 1983

Martinique: Two More Bombings

The Court of Appeal building in Fort de France was bombed but received only minor damage. A television relay station near Grand Riviere was destroyed in a second blast. We believe both attacks were the work of proindependence forces that have been carrying out a bombing campaign in the French Caribbean.

25X1

Guatemala: Terrorists Attack Nicaraguan Embassy

Members of a previously unknown group which identified itself as Counterrevolutionary Solidarity fired on the Nicaraguan Embassy with automatic weapons from a passing car. Damage was minimal, and no one was injured.

25X1

25 December 1983

United Kingdom: Second Bombing in London Shopping District

A second bomb—believed to be the work of the same Active Service Unit of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) which attacked Harrods department store on 17 December—exploded outside the Marks and Spencer department store on Oxford Street, a major London shopping area. Two people were injured in the blast, which also caused minor damage to store windows. Police believe that the current bombing campaign may continue through the traditional post-Christmas sales season.

25X1

Spain: Bombing of Socialist Party Offices in Basque Country

Two bombs exploded outside the headquarters of Spain's ruling Socialist Party in Hernani and Lasarte, causing damage but no injuries. Although no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, we suspect the ETA Military wing (ETA/M) was responsible.

25X1

26 December 1983

Peru: Harassment Bombing at Chinese Embassy

On Mao Zedong's birthday, unknown individuals presumed to be Sendero Luminoso (SL) terrorists tossed five dynamite sticks over a wall into the Chinese Embassy compound. Damage was minor and no injuries were reported. This incident marks the third occasion in which the PRC Embassy has been targeted since 1981. SL is an avowedly Maoist organization.

25X1

28 December 1983

Chile: Three Cities Darkened

Terrorists bombed electric power installations in three cities, blacking out large parts of central Chile for the second time in two weeks. No group claimed responsibility for the bombings.

25X1

[Redacted]

25X6

Secret

29 December 1983**Egypt: US Ambassador Threatened**

In Cairo, the US Embassy received an anonymous telephone call indicating that the US Ambassador's life was in danger. Later the same day, the US Embassy switchboard received a second call alleging that the first call was in error. [redacted]

25X1

30 December 1983**Turkey: Fake Anti-US Banner Bomb**

In Izmir, police discovered a banner stretched across the street near Ege University bearing an anti-US slogan by the leftist Turkish terrorist group Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left) and attached to metal canisters believed to contain explosives. Police detonated the canisters and found both were empty. The use of banner bombs has been a trademark of Turkish terrorist groups; however, most have carried slogans about the Turkish military junta rather than anti-US statements.

25X1

Spain: Bombings Continue in Basque Country

In Plascencia de Las Armas, a bomb exploded outside a bank, causing damage but no injuries. Although no group has yet claimed credit for the attack, we believe a faction of ETA was responsible for the attack, which was probably associated with its attempts to extort "revolutionary taxes" from banks in the Basque country. [redacted]

25X1

31 December 1983**France: Retaliatory Bombings**

In Marseilles, a bomb exploded at the St. Charles train station, killing two persons. It was followed shortly by a second bomb explosion aboard a high-speed train en route from Marseilles to Paris. Three persons on the train were killed and nearly 40 injured. Although eight groups so far have claimed credit for the attacks, police are most inclined to believe the claim of the Armed Arab Struggle, which also claimed credit for the bombing of the French Cultural Center in Tripoli, Lebanon, on 1 January. A communique from the group asserted that the attacks were in revenge for French air raids on Baalbek, Lebanon, on 17 November (which, in turn, were in retaliation for the suicide truck bomb attack on the Beirut Headquarters of the French Multinational Force on 23 October which killed 58 French paratroopers.) [redacted]

25X1

1 January 1984**Lebanon: Bombing of French Cultural Center**

In Tripoli, the Armed Arab Struggle—a Middle Eastern terrorist group with links to the notorious international terrorist Carlos—claimed credit for a bomb which destroyed the French Cultural Center. No one was injured in the attack. [redacted]

25X1

Peru: Another Big Blackout

Coordinated attacks by Sendero Luminoso terrorists at midnight left nearly 40 percent of Peru's population without electrical power. The US Embassy called the attacks the most telling blow against the government since the attacks in the capital last summer. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret

2 January 1984

Spain: Reemergence of GRAPO

In Madrid, the leftwing urban guerrilla organization October First Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) claimed responsibility for the murder of two policemen. The killings were carried out to commemorate the death of GRAPO's leader, who was killed in a gun battle with police in Barcelona on 5 December 1982. Despite numerous police claims that GRAPO has disbanded, the group reappears regularly to attack police targets.

25X1

Secret

Secret

Secret