



Directorate of  
Intelligence


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**Terrorism  
Review**



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23 November 1983

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GI TR 83-024  
23 November 1983

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**Terrorism  
Review** [Redacted]

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23 November 1983

1	Perspective—West Germany: The Terrorist Milieu [Redacted] [Redacted] OGI	25X1 25X1
3	Highlights	
7	Italian Leftist Terrorism: Defeated but Not Destroyed [Redacted] <i>European Issues Division, EURA</i>	25X1
	[Redacted]	25X1
19	Statistical Overview	
21	Chronology	
	[Redacted]	25X1

*Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy  
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone*

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**Terrorism  
Review** [Redacted]

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23 November 1983

**Perspective**

*West Germany: The Terrorist Milieu* [Redacted]

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West German terrorism is in a period of transition. Indications point to a West German terrorist scene no longer composed of well-defined "professional" organizations—as in the 1970s—but rather fluid. Many groups operate and interact on an informal and spontaneous basis, united only by their opposition to "imperialism," which by their definition includes NATO and the US military presence in West Germany. While the most notorious terrorist group, the Red Army Faction (RAF), may be in decline following the government's successful counterterrorist operations in 1982, the Revolutionary Cells (RZ) and RAF supporters, in our view, pose continuing threats to West German and US interests, and the full range of leftist extremist groups provides a large reservoir of potential terrorists. West German terrorism in the future, though it may change in shape, is likely to be as troublesome as it has been in the past. [Redacted]

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Most recent analyses of West German terrorism have been underpinned by certain basic assumptions:

- There is a sharp distinction between the anti-imperialist ideological orientation of the RAF and its support network and the RZ philosophy which holds that revolutionary acts should be linked to particular social issues.
- RZ attacks have a distinct character—conducted late at night, in unoccupied buildings, by small "spontaneously forming" cells—that sets the RZ apart from other terrorist groups.
- The RAF support network and the RZ are entirely separate organizations. [Redacted]

On the basis of assessments of RAF and RZ propaganda during the past year. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] these distinctions (which may have been exaggerated) may be breaking down. Most notably, RZ confessor letters have begun to express anti-imperialist attitudes, an indication that the RZ's philosophy may be moving closer to that usually attributed to the RAF. Moreover, recent attacks claimed by RAF militants (the bombings at Hahn Airbase in August and at the Bundeswehr installation in Bad Ems in October) had many of the operational characteristics usually associated with the RZ. These trends suggest to us and to German authorities that the RZ and the RAF support network are not entirely separate organizations, but rather that membership is fluid and may occur spontaneously as a specific issue or operational plan come to the fore. Furthermore, we suspect that what we have described as the RAF "periphery" no longer exists for the sole reason of providing support to the underground members of that organization. In fact, the RAF periphery has developed its own "raison d'etre"—the battle against imperialism—which has little to do with supporting the hardcore RAF. [Redacted]

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GI TR 83-024  
23 November 1983

Secret

The West German terrorist scene is further complicated by the large number of radical leftist groups. These groups are loosely organized amalgamations of extremists and fall roughly into two broad categories: the anti-imperialists and the autonomous groups. The distinctions between these organizations are somewhat vague, but the anti-imperialists tend to adhere to the philosophy associated with the RAF, while the autonomous groups do not share a common ideology or maintain a concrete structure. These groups are not terrorist organizations per se, but they do not oppose the use of violence and are particularly adept at instigating street riots. [redacted] it is becoming more difficult to distinguish between the propaganda of the autonomous/anti-imperialist groups and that of the RZ and RAF militants. We suspect that individual members of these extremist groups are increasingly moving among a variety of circles, while forging no formal links to any particular group.

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[redacted]

Our impressions of the still evolving shape of West German terrorism hold some disturbing implications. West German security officials have long bemoaned their inability to apprehend RZ members because their loose cellular structure makes them difficult to penetrate and less likely to be betrayed by informants. Though German authorities in many instances believe they know the sea of leftists in which the terrorists swim, a broadening of this kind of terrorist structure—by autonomous and anti-imperialist groups—will make counterterrorist successes far more difficult to achieve. Equally disturbing is the fact that these groups are developing parallel “anti-imperialist” orientations, suggesting that US and NATO interests increasingly will bear the brunt of terrorist attacks in West Germany. Although this kind of terrorism currently poses only a low-level threat—mostly against installations rather than people—it may well become a more serious threat in the future. [redacted]

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A final point: despite the success of counterterrorist operations against the RAF in 1982, we are not entirely convinced that the group is finished. In the past, the organization has used periods of dormancy to regroup and plan their next attack. There is at large a small but well-trained and dedicated hardcore whose strength should not be underestimated. If the RAF is able to regenerate a leadership core and again carry out terrorist attacks, the threat to US interests in West Germany will increase significantly. [redacted]

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**Highlights**

**Alert List**

**International: Abu Nidal Group May Be Targeting US.** [redacted]


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[redacted] the Abu Nidal terrorist group may be ready to strike at US targets. An explosive device, which was discovered and defused outside a USAID employee's home in Amman, Jordan, may have been the work of the group. It may also have been part of Abu Nidal's ongoing terrorist campaign against Jordan, whose "moderate" position and apparent willingness to negotiate Palestinian issues on the basis of US proposals the group strongly opposes. According to Embassy reporting, US interests in Egypt and Kuwait have also recently been threatened by the group. [redacted]

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**Key Indicators**

**West Germany: Anti-INF Demonstrations Continue.** Numerous protest demonstrations across West Germany have been planned for the week beginning 21 November to coincide with parliamentary debates on INF. Although most of these are expected to be nonviolent, [redacted]

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**Guadeloupe: Escalating Terrorism.** A car bomb that exploded in a Guadeloupe prefecture on 14 November injured 23 persons. Five other bombs exploded and three additional devices were discovered and disarmed. This is the latest in a series of bombings that started last spring; it is the first to have been carried out without

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GI TR 83-024  
23 November 1983

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regard for the safety of bystanders. Police suspect the pro-independence Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance. The relative sophistication of the bombs raises the possibility that the terrorists are receiving outside—perhaps Cuban—support. [redacted]

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**Lebanon: Possible Use of Human Suicide Bombs Against MNF.** Husayn Fadlallah's Muslim Student Union (MSU) may be planning to use "human kamikazes"—people willing to carry and detonate explosives on their persons—in future terrorist operations against the American and French contingents of the MNF.

[redacted]

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[redacted] Similar tactics have been previously used against the Khamenei regime by other groups. [redacted]

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**Caribbean: Leftists Plan for Violence.** [redacted]

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eastern Caribbean leftist leaders recently met in Barbados to discuss possible responses to the US intervention in Grenada. Bombings and other actions targeted primarily against US citizens and property in Grenada and other eastern Caribbean countries are being considered. [redacted]

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**Significant Developments**

**Iraq: Abu Nidal Has Left Baghdad.** Abu Nidal and his remaining personnel left Baghdad for Damascus in mid-October. [redacted]

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[redacted] We believe that Saddam Husayn may have pressured Abu Nidal to leave to demonstrate to the West, moderate Arabs, and the PLO that Iraq no longer supports the terrorist group. We judge it unlikely that Iraq has curtailed all support because Husayn probably does not want to force the group to become totally dependent on Syria. [redacted]

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**Greece: Assassination of US Naval Officer.** On 15 November 1983 the "17 November Revolutionary Organization" shot and killed US Navy Captain George Tsantes, assigned to the Joint US Military Assistance Group in Greece (JUSMAGG), and his driver while en route to work in downtown Athens. Results of ballistics tests indicate that the .45-caliber pistol used in the slayings was the same weapon used in the assassination of CIA station chief Richard Welch in 1975, as well as the murders in 1976, 1979, and 1980 of three Greek police officers. In its message to the Greek press, the organization proclaimed the JUSMAGG, together with the US military facilities and intelligence services in Greece, "an occupation, terrorist force" and claimed to have killed Tsantes to protest Socialist Premier Andreas Papandreou's failure to close US bases there. The 17 November group warns it is resuming violence (following a three-year hiatus) in response to the failure of the PASOK government to effect promised social reforms. The 17 November organization, which takes its name from the date in 1973 when the military junta quelled a student uprising at the Athens Polytechnic, is affiliated with the Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA). [redacted]

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***Yemen Arab Republic: Abu Nidal Suspect Apprehended.*** [redacted]

[redacted] authorities apprehended an individual who was surveilling the Jordanian Embassy in Sanaa. Jordanian authorities believe the person is a member of the Abu Nidal group, which has recently attacked Jordanian officials in Athens, New Delhi, and Rome. [redacted]

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***Italy: Autonomia May Be Targeting Cruise Missile Storage Base.*** [redacted]

[redacted] Autonomia member Giuseppe Signorella photographed the antenna farms at the Sigonella Naval Air Station while he was employed there. Autonomia may be planning a demonstration at, or an attack against, the facility, perhaps to coincide with the arrival there of cruise missiles for temporary storage. The risk of attack is believed significant because the facility is isolated and manned by four unarmed military personnel. We remain concerned that INF deployment-related facilities in Western Europe could be targets for terrorist groups intent on derailing the missile deployments. [redacted]

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**Italian Leftist  
Terrorism: Defeated  
but Not Destroyed** [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Leftist terrorists in Italy have suffered severe setbacks during the past 18 months from which they are not likely to recover fully any time soon. As late as December 1981, the Red Brigades were still strong enough to kidnap Gen. James Dozier and to plan equally ambitious operations for the following year. But those plans collapsed with General Dozier's rescue and the arrest of most of his kidnapers. Three of the most important terrorists immediately began to confess, prompting numerous other arrests. By July of last year, then Interior Minister Virginio Rognoni was able to inform the Parliament that over 400 leftist terrorists had been captured since the Dozier kidnaping. Police successes continued throughout 1982 and into 1983, with the smashing of the relatively new Brigades organization in Naples, the "Walter Alasia" column in Milan, and the arrest of many important figures in the Rome organization. [redacted]

taken credit for only three murders this year. Some violence-prone autonomists are participating in the anti-INF demonstrations in Sicily, but we do not believe they are hardcore terrorists. The most recent terrorism has been limited to a bungled assassination attempt and a holdup attempt last May in Rome by some young amateurs and the murder last June of a Turin magistrate—which some Brigaders disclaim. Another indication that the back of leftist terrorism has been broken is that no terrorism against politicians accompanied the national election last June. [redacted]

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**Anatomy of the Decline**

The decline of leftist terrorism is partly the result of improvement in the government's counterterrorist capability, but confessions of imprisoned terrorists indicate clearly that battle weariness and internal dissension in their ranks also played an important role.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the terrorists never attracted more than a minuscule fraction of the political left away from the reformist Communist Party or won support from the increasingly hostile general public. [redacted]

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The other leftist terrorist groups, simultaneously rivals and allies of the Red Brigades, suffered as heavily from police action. The largest, Prima Linea, saw the last of its fugitive chiefs arrested by January 1983. The numerous "autonomist" terrorist groups, which served as recruiting grounds for the Red Brigades and Prima Linea, were hit hard even earlier by the police [redacted]

**Improved Counterterrorist Tactics.** The Italian Government initially appeared helpless in the face of Aldo Moro's kidnaping in 1978 and his eventual murder. Two of its three intelligence services—the intelligence arm of the police and the defense intelligence service—were in the middle of sweeping reorganizations. Coordination was at a nadir, and even basic files were not always available. [redacted]

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Terrorist ranks are now severely depleted. Estimates of the number of remaining hardcore terrorists range from no more than 80 [redacted] to 225 (US Embassy Rome). Although quality and clan are at least as important as numbers, police successes, in our judgment, have gone far toward diminishing these as well. In any case, there have been no political kidnapings since the Dozier affair. Moreover, although leftist terrorists still managed to murder 10 individuals and wound 10 others in 1982, they have

The government decided temporarily to bypass its intelligence services while they were being reorganized and created a special antiterrorist group under the energetic carabinieri general, Carlo Alberto [redacted]

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**Terrorism in Society**

Although the Red Brigades are the best known terrorist group in Italy, the cumulative effect of leftist terrorism on Italian society cannot be understood by studying the actions of the Red Brigades alone or even by including Prima Linea, the second-largest organization. According to published Italian security service records, 120 persons have been killed in Italy during 1974-83 by some 22 leftist terrorist groups. Of these, only 68 were killed by the Red Brigades and 18 by Prima Linea. One hundred fifty-seven persons were wounded, 78 by the Brigades and 25 by Prima Linea.

[redacted]

The number of extremists once galvanized by the broader movement, however, is estimated by Italian

studies on terrorism to have been some 10,000. The Italian literature shows that semilegal autonomist groups spawned hundreds of clandestine organizations; some 20 of these have been implicated in the murder of individuals. Overall, leftist terrorists committed at least half of the 13,000 violent acts recorded between 1973 and July 1982 according to a report to Parliament by then Interior Minister Virginio Rognoni. The cumulative impact of this relentless attack against selected symbols of the state, in our judgment, was as important as the murder of Aldo Moro and the kidnaping of General Dozier in mobilizing the Italian state and the public to battle the terrorists.

[redacted]

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Dalla Chiesa. Armed with powers to hold suspects longer without a hearing and to tap telephones more freely, and acting rapidly on leads that had been ignored, Dalla Chiesa got results. His first big success was a general offensive in April 1979 against autonomist leaders such as Antonio Negri, Oreste Scalzone, and Franco Piperno, who for years had overtly preached "legal" tactics, such as demonstrations that frequently ended in violence, while denying responsibility for the consequences. The government, in our judgment, had been afraid to move against them lest it be accused of acting illegally, but after the Moro affair, both government and police were bolder.

[redacted]

Moreover, by 1980 the reorganization of the security services had begun to have an impact. While the government's techniques became increasingly proficient, Italian authorities carefully avoided indiscriminate crackdowns that might have evoked sharp criticism from Italy's civil liberties-conscious public. Civil rights continued to be respected, and the extreme left was given no excuse to claim that the state had abandoned due process in favor of tactics practiced against terrorists in states such as Uruguay and Argentina.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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In addition to Dalla Chiesa's effort, the government's chief weapon against leftist terrorism was a new law permitting the reduction of terrorists' sentences by as much as three-fourths if they cooperated with the police. Although the law was actually in effect only in 1981 and 1982, hopes aroused by its consideration may have helped prompt Brigades Turin chief Patrizio Peci in April 1980 to become the first important Brigader to make a full confession. In any case, the enactment of the plea bargaining law was followed by a flood of confessions and new leads.

[redacted]

Despite their growing loss of support among the broader public, Brigades recruiters were able to

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**Relations Among Terrorist Groups**

*For a long time, the relation of the autonomists and Prima Linea with the Red Brigades was poorly understood by police and observers, who assumed all were in tow to the Brigades. The evidence that has accumulated over the past 18 months from the confessions of "repentant" terrorists has clarified the pedigree of the various groups. All arose after the tumult of 1968 and the "hot autumn" of labor strife and wildcat strikes in 1969. All the groups were violence prone, all assumed that the Italian Communist Party was hopelessly committed to an increasingly revisionist course, and all shared the motto "Don't change the state—fight it!" They disagreed strongly, however, on organization and tactics.* [redacted]

*Red Brigades founder Renato Curcio and his cohorts, and to a somewhat lesser extent the leaders of Prima Linea, looked to the example of Mao Zhedong and to urban guerrillas in South America. They foresaw a*

*long, difficult struggle—perhaps for 40 years, wrote Curcio. In this struggle they thought only a tightly structured, Leninist-type clandestine group of urban guerrillas could survive and conduct the campaign of "armed propaganda"—which would in a later phase win growing support from a proletariat formerly in tow to the PCI. The penultimate phase would be civil war followed, as in the Chinese example, by victory.* [redacted]

*The autonomous groups rejected the Brigades' Leninist model, which they thought too elitist and certain to isolate them from the very masses they sought to influence. They envisaged a struggle on two levels—one overt, in which they would claim the civil rights given them by the bourgeois state while contesting its legitimacy, and a covert level in which they would rely on spontaneous street violence as well as more methodical clandestine activities.* [redacted]

co-opt new members from other leftwing groups. These new recruits came mostly from the less disciplined and motivated autonomist groups, according to biographical accounts. Although few of the old-guard Brigades leaders talked upon being arrested—after Peci confessed in April 1980, no leader cooperated with police until Antonio Savasta began to talk following his capture in January 1982—some rank and filers formerly belonging to autonomist groups did. So have many leaders and followers in the various autonomist groups. Indeed, the more than 300 confessions secured by police have come in large measure from them. [redacted]

Leftist terrorism was dealt another severe blow when the old dispute between Brigades and autonomists over strategy and tactics found its way into Brigades ranks. By 1981 the Brigades were fast splitting into rival groups. The quarrel was effectively dramatized in December 1981 when two different Strategic Directives—supposedly the action plan for the following year—were issued publicly within days of

each other. According to the statements of former Brigaders, the split with its accompanying public polemics weakened the overall combative power of the Brigades. Although the two factions continued to parley with each other, they no longer planned joint operations. Their ideological differences were aggravated by a bitter power struggle and mutual suspicion, all of which persuaded several arrested Brigaders to talk. [redacted]

**Lack of Public Support.** The testimony of former sympathizers shows that as murder followed murder, even those originally not ill disposed toward the terrorists began to ask what justified such tactics. Observers had once calculated that 300,000 to 600,000 persons in Italy had varying degrees of sympathy with the terrorists. Neither the Red Brigades nor autonomists succeeded in mobilizing them. Instead, after the police had arrested some 1,500 active terrorists and another 1,000 had fled the

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country, their supporters failed to step forward to replace them. In contrast to a poll conducted in December 1981, which showed that 40 percent of those queried believed that the Brigades were struggling for a more just society, a public opinion poll taken early this year showed that 87 percent of those queried in various degrees opposed terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades. [redacted]

Part of the terrorist audience, in our judgment, had expected quick and exciting results. They did not bargain for a long murder campaign and began to ask what relation it had to social causes, and what positive measures the terrorists favored. They found no satisfying answer. The long struggle Renato Curcio had written about proved to be unexpectedly long. By 1983 it had lasted 14 years and seemed to be going nowhere. [redacted]

We believe that the terrorist generation was the product not of economic depression but rather of great expectations fostered by the West European-wide "economic miracle" of the 1960s and the related revolutionary spirit that engulfed much of Western Europe's youth and working class. The recent hard economic times and the waning of revolutionary impulses that produced a conservative trend among youth and labor elsewhere in Western Europe during the late 1970s also has affected Italy. At least for now, Italian high schools, universities, and radical working-class strongholds, the former spawning grounds for terrorist militants, are quiet. [redacted]

**Remaining Terrorists Taking Stock**

By early 1983 the combined effect of sweeping arrests, ideological dissidence, and the terrorists' growing realization that radicalized workers and students would not rally to them prompted several leading terrorist figures to declare that their campaign was over. "The cycle of revolutionary armed struggle launched in the early 1970s on the wave of vast and radical student and workers' movements is substantially finished," says a document drafted by Renato Curcio. Other terrorists have taken a similar line. These statements are admissions of defeat, in our judgment, but not declarations of unequivocal surrender [redacted]

Some imprisoned leaders, such as Mario Moretti, arguably the brightest and most respected of the Brigades chiefs, call for a continued campaign. "The armed struggle is not finished," said Moretti to a reporter who interviewed him in a courtroom. "It will take a qualitative leap, and adopt new forms." A continuing debate thus divides those like Curcio, who seek new forms of struggle that will appeal to the masses, and others such as Moretti, who apparently think their defeat is largely tactical and can be remedied by better organization, more effective clandestineness and a few resounding successes. [redacted]

We believe that both the Red Brigades and the autonomists correctly diagnosed each other's weaknesses. Red Brigades clandestineness did isolate the organization from the workers. But the spontaneous tactics of the autonomists were also deficient, and their loose organization created vulnerabilities helpful to the police when the autonomists went underground. Above all, in our view, both were wrong in believing that a combative minority could by "armed propaganda" galvanize an army of partisans into provoking the state to take repressive actions that would trigger civil war. [redacted]

**Outlook**

It is unlikely, in our judgment, that leftist terrorists will be in a position any time soon to mount another sustained assault against Italian institutions. Terrorist groups are likely to remain bedeviled by their internal failings, the government's strengthened counterterrorist capability, and a hostile public. Nevertheless, the quiet that has fallen over the terrorist scene and the figures showing that relatively few terrorists remain at large can be misleading. Terrorism as a mass phenomenon may be finished, but the unwillingness of many terrorists to admit defeat could still produce spectacular violence. [redacted]

The Brigades are trying to rebuild, [redacted] but even without further recruitment, we believe there are probably enough hardcore terrorists left to engage in limited new terrorist activity. The Brigades characteristically used an attack squad of four or five persons for murder or [redacted]

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**International Connections**

*The many terrorist confessions suggest strongly that terrorism in Italy is essentially an indigenous movement. Various groups have occasionally received arms from other European terrorists and from elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization, but none of the repentants has claimed to have firsthand knowledge of training of Italian terrorists in Arab countries or in Eastern Europe. The Red Brigades do not appear to have had ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization much before 1978, and the only major Palestinian arms shipment known to confessing Brigades terrorists did not arrive until July 1979.*

[redacted]

[redacted] *the autonomous groups had better international connections than the Brigades. Antonio Negri reportedly had extensive contacts in Paris since the early 1970s with violence-prone Spanish and French groups, while others in the autonomy movement sought out Palestinian and*

*Eastern Bloc contacts.*

[redacted]

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*Toward the end of the 1970s, as police efficiency in Italy increased, Italian residents in France with past connections to terrorism set up a network to help fugitives.*

[redacted]

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woundings, and only nine persons carried out the Moro and Dozier kidnappings. Such small groups, in our judgment, could attack unguarded or unsuspecting lower-level Italian or US officials, and they could even set their sights again on high-ranking ones. [redacted]

To have the most dramatic impact, a renewed terrorist offensive would probably have to take one of the following forms:

- A prison attack, freeing a number of prisoners.
- A kidnaping or murder of a high Italian or US official.
- An attempt to seize a nuclear weapon or an attack designed to foil INF deployment.

An attack against a US military facility in particular would require a level of organization and training the terrorists seldom possessed at their peak, but given luck and daring, even an abortive raid could become a

political success for the terrorists and revive their morale. [redacted]

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The cadres for an eventual resurgence of leftist terrorism are not lacking, given the US Embassy in Rome estimate that as many as 225 Brigaders and Prima Linea figures may still be at large in Italy and that hundreds more will eventually have to be freed from prison because their terms have expired or because of lack of evidence to convict them.

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[redacted] several hundred Italian terrorists have taken refuge in France, 100 in Paris alone. [redacted]

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[redacted] some have given up the struggle, others have vague thoughts of continuing, and still others firmly intend to resume it. [redacted]

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Signs that leftist terrorism is recovering would include a successful murder or kidnaping of a guarded, high-level official, a wave of attacks against lower level targets, or new theoretical proclamations outlining the terrorists' rationale. The election of Antonio Negri, the chief theorist of autonomist terrorism, to Parliament on the Radical Party ticket last June while he was under preventive detention was, in our judgment, less a harbinger of renewed public sympathy for the terrorist cause than it was a protest against his four-year pretrial detention. [redacted]

At least for the next few years, however, leftist terrorism is likely to threaten only selected individuals, and not the stability of the Italian state. Some of the police attention trained on terrorism has already shifted to organized crime and drugs, where the death rates greatly exceed those exacted by terrorism—over 1,000 Mafia or Camorra murders in southern Italy alone in 1982. Although the Red Brigades and other terrorists have written a great deal about politicizing prison populations, statistics suggest that few common criminals were absorbed into Brigades structures. A more important phenomenon, in our judgment, was the degeneration of the autonomist political gangs into almost purely criminal ones, robbing banks under the guise of expropriation of the wealthy. [redacted]

In the future some criminals might give their actions a light wash of political justification, but a significant number of criminals probably will not be drawn into basically political terrorism. Although some Italian press accounts claim that the Red Brigades in Naples collaborated in 1981-82 with one of the Camorra "families," it is difficult to see what advantage the Camorra or Mafia could find in extensive collaboration with leftist terrorism. These organizations have in common systematic crimes frequently including murder. But the criminals seek private profit, often guaranteed by links with corrupt officials, while the political criminals, by seeking to overthrow the whole system, attract greater police attention and complicate the practice of crime. Terrorist murder is thus likely to exist alongside criminal murder, degrading life in Italian cities but not ripping the basic fabric of society. [redacted]

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### Statistical Overview

**Type of Victim of International Terrorist Incidents, February–November 1983 <sup>a</sup>**


	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov
<b>Total</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>41</b>
Government officials	3	4	5	8	10	10	4	2	2	1
Diplomats	33	36	40	28	25	33	37	36	35	25
Military	2	11	13	8	4	10	2	8	19	8
Business	9	8	7	9	8	7	8	4	5	7
Private parties, tourists, missionaries, and students	8	7	10	2	16	6	6	4	3	0
Other	4	11	7	4	3	5	3	2	0	0

**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, February–November 1983 <sup>a</sup>**

	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov
<b>Total</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>41</b>
North America	5	5	6	11	2	6	3	4	0	4
Latin America	10	18	20	12	19	20	15	11	17	9
Western Europe	26	33	20	18	20	15	21	18	25	18
USSR/Eastern Europe	1	3	0	1	0	2	1	1	0	0
Sub-Saharan Africa	3	4	5	4	8	2	5	0	1	1
Middle East and North Africa	6	12	23	8	16	21	11	14	11	7
Asia/other	8	2	8	5	1	5	4	8	10	2

<sup>a</sup> Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.

### Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks



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### Chronology

*This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology unless new information has been received.* [redacted]

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**20 October 1983**

**Spain: Slaying in Basque Country**

In Renteria, the military faction of the Basque terrorist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA/M) claimed credit for the assassination of a 50-year-old baker. No reason was given for the killing. [redacted]


25X1

**25 October 1983**

**Turkey: Terrorist Assassination of Police Informers**

In Tunceli Province, Turkish security forces found the bodies of two police informers who had suffered "execution style slayings"—with hands tied behind the back and shot in the head. The Turkish Communist Party Marxist-Leninist-Partisen is believed to be responsible for the killings. [redacted]

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
25X6

**27 October 1983**

**Spain: Second Slaying in Basque Country**

In Irun, ETA/M claimed credit for the assassination of a 34-year-old butcher but provided no motive for the killing. We believe the terrorists may suspect that this victim and another killed a week earlier were police informers. [redacted]

25X1



**29 October 1983**

**United States: Recovery of Explosives Possibly Linked to Armenian Terrorists**

In Franklin, Maine, four plastic bags containing 125 sticks of dynamite and several hundred blasting caps were discovered in a wooded area adjacent to property owned by the Armenian Youth Federation's youth camp. Investigation has determined the dynamite was part of a lot stolen from a commercial firm in Michigan in 1976 and sold to an Armenian radical group. Police investigation has

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GI TR 83-024  
23 November 1983

Secret

determined that a member of the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) who was arrested at Boston's Logan Airport on 22 October 1982 had in his possession five sticks of dynamite traced to the stolen lot. [redacted]

25X1

30 October 1983

**Belgium: Arrest of ETA Members**

The Belgian National Gendarmerie arrested two ETA members after a search of their car resulted in the discovery of 2,000 rounds of 9-mm ammunition—a trademark of the Basque terrorist group. Previous discoveries of ETA arsenals in Belgium and the Netherlands has led Belgian police to suspect that there is a clandestine ETA arms depot in the Antwerp region. Spanish police have requested extradition of the two ETA members. [redacted]

25X1

2 November 1983

**Chile: Bomb Explodes at Chilean-American Center**

A small bomb exploded at the Chilean-American cultural center in Rancagua, causing minor damage. No group claimed responsibility for the incident. [redacted]

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
3 November 1983

**Chile: US-Owned Bank Bombed**

A bomb exploded in front of the Santiago branch of Citibank, seriously damaging the building's facade. No injuries were reported, and no one has claimed responsibility for the attack. [redacted]

25X1

4 November 1983



25X6

**West Germany: Bombing at Krupp Firm**

In Kiel, an early morning explosion at the data processing center caused considerable damage, but no injuries. We note that firms involved in armaments production increasingly are the targets of terrorist attacks by leftist groups. [redacted]

25X1

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5 November 1983

**Spain: Assassinations in Basque Country Continue**

Basque terrorists are suspected in the killing of a 27-year-old laborer who was shot as he left a bar. This was the third killing in less than three weeks in the Basque country—two of which were claimed by ETA/M. [redacted]

25X1

**West Berlin: US Military Training Center Bombed**

The explosion at the training facility, which is used daily by US troops, caused minor damage, but no injuries. No group has claimed responsibility. [redacted]

25X1

**West Berlin: ITT Subsidiary Bombing**

An early morning explosion at the computer center caused light damage, but no injuries. No group has claimed responsibility for the bombing. [redacted]

25X1

6 November 1983

**Corsica: Bombings Continue**

In Bastia, seven bombs exploded during the night, causing heavy damage to six banks and a clothing store, but no personal injuries. The detonation of an eighth bomb sank an unmanned paramilitary police patrol boat in Calvi. Although no group has yet claimed credit for the attacks, we believe the outlawed Corsican separatist group National Front for the Liberation of Corsica is responsible. [redacted]

25X1

**Peru: Bomb Discovered at US Marines' Residence**

Peruvian police defused a bomb placed outside the residence of US Marines in Lima. The perpetrator, who was observed painting "Marines out of Grenada" on the front wall of the house, escaped [redacted]

25X1

**West Germany: Bombings at Siemens Plants**

Explosions at two different Siemens firms caused moderate damage to each. These attacks reinforce our impression that firms involved in armaments production are at increasing risk of terrorist attack. [redacted]

25X1

7 November 1983

**Spain: Kidnaping in Basque Country**

In Beasain, the ETA Political Military VIII Assembly (ETA/PM-VIII) faction claimed credit for the kidnaping of industrialist and Basque National Party supporter Jose Cruz Larranaga. ETA/PM-VIII also warned the Spanish Government to take its demands—not yet specified—seriously or face the death of another victim. ETA/PM-VIII was responsible for the kidnaping and subsequent killing of a Spanish Army officer in October. [redacted]

25X1

**Italy: Firebombing of US Soldier's Car**

Italian security officials have reported that the privately owned vehicle of a US soldier was firebombed. The vehicle, bearing Allied Forces Italy license plates and parked near the owner's residence in Padua, was extensively damaged. There were no injuries, and no one has claimed credit for the attack. [redacted]

25X1

**Portugal: Bombings Claimed by Leftists**

In Lisbon, the leftwing terrorist group Popular Forces of April 25 (FP-25) claimed responsibility for two bombs—one in Lisbon and the other in Estoril. The explosions injured two people and caused minor damage. FP-25—named after the

Secret

date of the 1974 Portuguese revolution—is a small, quasi-criminal group advocating the overthrow of the Portuguese Government. It has sporadically conducted terrorist attacks and numerous robberies. FP-25 had been relatively inactive since 1982. [redacted]

25X1

**Portugal: Possible Terrorist Bombing**

In Lisbon, a bomb exploded at the residence of a local businessman who was seriously injured by the blast. A passerby also was injured in the explosion. No group has claimed credit for the attack, but we suspect the FP-25 may have been responsible. [redacted]

25X1

**Portugal: Bombing Claimed by FP-25**

In Lisbon, FP-25 has claimed credit for a bomb that exploded at the residence of a local businessman, causing minimal damage, but no injury. Pamphlets were left at the scene, claiming support for workers and demanding an end to workers' layoffs. A later caller to the Portuguese Press Agency denied FP-25 involvement in the attack. We note that FP-25 has previously claimed solidarity with the working class and conducted attacks against "capitalist" targets. [redacted]

25X1

**Namibia: Three SWAPO Members Killed**

A small group of SWAPO members fired on a Department of Agriculture camp but caused no injuries. South African forces made contact with six of the terrorists and killed three of them. [redacted]

25X1

**Italy: Police Discover BR Cell in Florence**

Local police in Florence and Prato have arrested four members of a BR cell, the Umberto Caltabiani Brigade, and issued arrest warrants for two others following an armed robbery at a post office in Prato on 2 November. The Italian press reports the six have been charged with formation of an armed cell for terrorist activity; three unnamed individuals are also being sought for complicity and participation in the cell. During the investigation that followed last week's robbery, Florentine police discovered that two houses used by the group contained weapons and ammunition, domestic and foreign automobile license plates, falsified documents, and names of local businessmen, magistrates, politicians, police and security agents, and maps of banks and public buildings. [redacted]

25X1

**Chile: Bomb Discovered At US Pavilion**

A small explosive device was found in the garden adjacent to the US Chamber of Commerce pavilion at the Santiago International Fair. No group claimed responsibility for placing the device. [redacted]

25X1

7-11 November 1983

**India: Bombing in Assam**

On 7 November a bomb exploded at the train station in Gauhati, capital of Assam, killing 17 and injuring 60. On the eve of Indira Gandhi's arrival there, two people died in three bomb explosions in Gauhati. On 11 November, four bombs exploded in Assam, killing one and wounding three. [redacted]

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8 November 1983

**Chile: Terrorists Again Attack Judge's Home**

Three unidentified terrorists wielding handguns tried to attack the Carabineros guarding the home of a Santiago appellate court judge, but were repelled. The incident marked the third time the judge's home had been attacked. In recent weeks, three Carabineros have been killed by unidentified subversives whose apparent motive was to steal weapons and ammunition from the slain officers.

[redacted]

25X1

9 November 1983

**Jordan: Disarming of Bomb Outside Saudia Airlines Office**

A 13.5-pound bomb was discovered and disarmed outside the Saudia Airlines office in Amman. [redacted] No one has claimed responsibility for the bomb, which was found wrapped in newspaper in a garbage can. [redacted]

[redacted]

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25X1

**Spain: Shooting in Basque Region**

In Bilbao, ETA/M is suspected in the shooting death of a waiter in a bar operated by the rightist Brotherhood of Former Legionnaires. The motive for this shooting—as well as for several other recent killings—is unknown. ETA/M's increasingly indiscriminate choice of targets in the past two months leads us to believe that there may be internal dissension within factions of ETA or that ETA may fear that police informers may have infiltrated the group.

[redacted]

25X1

10 November 1983

**Jordan: Targeting of USAID Employee**

25X1

A 30-pound package of explosives was found on the sidewalk directly in front of the residence of a USAID employee in Amman. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The bomb may have been placed by members of Abu Nidal's group. [redacted]

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25X1

**Peru: Terrorists Attack Lima Targets**

Sendero Luminoso (SL) terrorists conducted several simultaneous attacks in Lima, damaging the Honduran Embassy, a military garrison, high-tension towers, a government building, and private businesses. Terrorists also attacked an arms company and stole a variety of weapons and ammunition. The attacks were part of a largely unsuccessful effort by the SL to disrupt the municipal elections scheduled for 13 November. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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11 November 1983

**Jordan: Bomb Discovered Near Chinese Embassy**

A 25-pound bomb was discovered and defused in a vacant lot near the Chinese Embassy in Amman. The bomb may have been placed by Fatah dissidents in retaliation for the PRC's public support in early November of Arafat's continued leadership of the PLO. [redacted]

[redacted]

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**Austria: Terrorist Resentenced**

In Vienna, a Black June member convicted of participating in the 1981 assassination of a Vienna city councilor and a raid on a synagogue was again sentenced to life imprisonment. His retrial had been ordered by the Austrian supreme court because of procedural errors in the first trial. [redacted]

25X1

**Guatemala: More AID Workers Murdered**

The bodies of two Guatemalan AID employees and the daughter of one of them were found in a burned-out car near Coatepeque, Guatemala. An examination of the bodies and subsequent investigation suggests the individuals were tortured, killed, and placed in the automobile, which was then set afire. The evidence suggests possible complicity by Guatemalan security forces. [redacted]

25X1

12 November 1983

[redacted]

25X6

**Peru: Terrorists Attack Lima on Eve of Elections**

Sendero Luminoso (SL) terrorists conducted coordinated attacks against the capital, killing three policemen and wounding several civilians. The terrorists machinegunned and dynamited district offices of the Popular Christian Party (PPC) and the Popular Action Party (AP). SL members also attacked a bank, a prison, and a police station in their effort to create a climate of fear prior to the municipal elections. [redacted]

25X1

**Somalia: Brief Abduction of American Citizens**

Four Americans from Project Concern International and a group of Somali police were abducted by six to eight men, probably members of the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SADF) in northern Somalia. When the police vehicle got a flat tire, the SADF destroyed it, stole the Americans' car and all their money and possessions, and left them to return on foot with the policemen. The Americans made contact with Somali officials, who returned them to safety the same day. [redacted]

25X1

**Spain: Naval Officer Slain by ETA**

In Bermeo, ETA/M has claimed responsibility for the killing of a Spanish naval officer gunned down by two terrorists. This latest death raises to 37 the toll of terrorist killings in Spain this year. [redacted]

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12-13 November 1983

**Bolivia: New Wave of Bombings**

Five bombings took place in Bolivia during the evening and early morning hours, causing only property damage. In La Paz, a high-explosive bomb was set off outside the home of Jorge Siles Salinas, half-brother of President Hernan Siles Suazo and director of the daily newspaper *Ultima Hora*. Other bombs exploded at an electric power plant and at the headquarters of two labor unions. In Orero, a dynamite blast severely damaged the offices of *La Patria* newspaper. As in previous La Paz incidents, red flags bearing the name "Sendero Luminoso Bolivia" were left at the scenes of some of the bombings. The US Embassy continues to doubt—as do we—that the group is linked to the Peruvian terrorist group of the same name. [redacted]

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
14 November 1983

**Bolivia: Lufthansa Manager Kidnaped**

The General Manager of Lufthansa Airlines in La Paz was kidnaped by a previously unknown group calling itself the 10th of November. The motive for the abduction appears to be monetary, and the 10th of November may be a cover name for a criminal group. [redacted]

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**Guadeloupe: Bombing Campaign Escalates**

Six terrorist bombs were detonated in Guadeloupe in the most serious outbreak of revolutionary violence to date. One device, a car bomb, detonated in the parking lot of the Guadeloupe Prefecture and wounded some 20 bystanders. In another incident, terrorists seized the Radio Caribe International Station in the capital, Point-a-Pitre, forced the employees to evacuate the station, and then detonated a large bomb that seriously damaged the eight-story building. [redacted]

25X1

15 November 1983



25X6

**Spain: Bombing of Two US Firms**

In Bilbao, bombs exploded at offices of two US firms—Bank of America and Rank Xerox—causing minor damage, but no injuries. The Basque terrorist group Iraultza claimed responsibility for the attack and indicated the US firms were targeted because of US action in Grenada and the presence of US Marines in Lebanon. [redacted]

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**Greece: Firebombing of US Air Force Officer's Car Near Athens**

A firebomb completely destroyed the personally owned van belonging to a US Air Force military police officer. No injuries occurred, and no group has claimed responsibility for the incident. According to a preliminary investigation, it does not appear to be linked to the assassination of US Navy Captain George Tsantes. [redacted]

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**Greece: Assassination of US Navy Captain**

The Greek Marxist terrorist group "17 November Revolutionary Organization" claimed responsibility for the shooting death of Captain George Tsantes, assigned to the Joint US Military Assistance Group in Greece. Tsantes' driver subsequently died from wounds received in the attack. The 17 November group had previously claimed responsibility for the assassination of CIA station chief Richard Welch in 1975 and two Greek police officers in 1976 and 1980. [redacted]

25X1

**Guatemala: Police Patrol Attacked**

Terrorists attacked a National Police Patrol in Guatemala City. Two of the attackers were wounded; there is no information concerning government casualties. [redacted]

25X1

**Somalia: Bomb Threat to US Embassy**

An anonymous caller threatened to blow up the US Embassy in Mogadishu but did not make any demands. A search by authorities turned up nothing suspicious, and the 24-hour deadline passed without incident. [redacted]

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16 November 1983

**Guatemala: Another AID Employee Murdered**

According to local press, a group of unknown men fatally attacked a truck driver, who had a vague connection with an AID family-planning program. It is not known if this attack is connected to the recent violence directed against Guatemalans employed by AID. [redacted]

25X1

17 November 1983

**Australia: Bomb Found at Atomic Plant**

Army explosives experts dismantled a bomb found after authorities received a tip. The bomb was in a power-relay station 500 yards from the Lucas Heights Atomic Energy Commission plant. [redacted]

25X1

18 November 1983

**Lesotho: Two Bombings in Capital**

Two bombs exploded in Maseru, the first outside the Evangelical Church and the second in a supermarket, killing two people and injuring 19. The press claims that political observers have attributed the explosions to the Lesotho Liberation Army, the military wing of the exiled opposition Basutoland Congress Party. [redacted]

25X1

**Greece: Bomb Threat Made to American Club in Athens**

A bomb threat was made to the AAFES-operated store located at the American Club in Kifissia, Athens. Greek police and a USAF team responded and searched the building with negative results. The American Club operates a boarding facility for students at the American Community School. [redacted]

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**Spain: Release of Kidnap Victim**

In San Sebastian, ETA/PM-VIII Assembly freed Jose Cruz Larranaga Mendizabal after his family paid an unspecified sum in ransom—believed to be less than \$300,000. In a statement to local newspapers, ETA/PM-VIII Assembly claimed Larranaga—the director of an electronics firm in the Basque country—was freed on the condition that his company lay off no workers and create more jobs.

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**19 November 1983**


**Spain: Bombings in Basque Country Continue**

Bombs exploded outside a bank in Bilbao and a factory in San Sebastian causing damage, but no injuries. Although no one has yet claimed credit for the attack, the early morning timing of the blasts and the targets indicate ETA terrorists were responsible.

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**20 November 1983**



**France: Bombing Attacks on Two Restaurants**

In Paris, a motorcyclist hurled a bomb into a crowded restaurant, injuring nearly 30 people. A second small bomb also damaged an empty restaurant in the Latin Quarter of Paris. No group has yet claimed credit for either attack, and police have no clues regarding the motives behind the attacks.

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