



Directorate of
Intelligence

MASTER FILE COPY

**DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON**

~~Secret~~



25X1

**Terrorism
Review**



25X1

1 September 1983

~~Secret~~

*GI TR 83-018
1 September 1983*

Copy **488**

Page Denied

Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

**Terrorism
Review**

[Redacted]

25X1

1 September 1983

25X1

1	Perspective—Turmoil in Central America: The Terrorist Fallout (OGI)	[Redacted]	
3	[Redacted]		25X1
5	Peru's Sendero Luminoso: Status of the Insurgent Threat (ALA)	[Redacted]	25X1
7	Group Profile: The African National Congress (OGI)	[Redacted]	25X1
11	The African National Congress's Communist Ties (ALA)	[Redacted]	25X1
15	[Redacted]		25X1
17	Drug Trafficking Activities of Insurgent and Terrorist Groups (OGI)	[Redacted]	25X1
21	[Redacted]		25X1
23	Statistical Overview		
25	Chronology		

*Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone*

[Redacted]

25X1

Secret



25X1

Perspective

Turmoil in Central America: The Terrorist Fallout



25X1

25X1

Terrorism, once relatively rare in much of Central America, has increased substantially since the installation of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the intensification of leftist subversion and insurgency in El Salvador. Despite some counterterrorist successes in several countries in the region, we believe the terrorist threat—especially against US interests—in all of Central America probably will increase in the next year.

We are particularly concerned about the recent willingness of traditionally nonviolent Central American Communist parties to join with more radical groups in emphasizing armed struggle:

- Since 1981 some officials of the generally nonviolent Costa Rican Communist Party (PVP) have suggested an increasingly militant line;



Honduras has been an especially important focus of terrorist activity during the past two years. In 1981 there were eight terrorist attacks in the country; last year the number rose dramatically to 24. Terrorist attacks declined in the first half of 1983, probably because of tougher law enforcement and security measures. The most important Honduran Government counterterrorist success this year was the arrest of Efraim Duarte Salgado, Secretary General of the Popular Revolutionary Forces—Lorenzo Zelaya (FPR).



Despite the arrest of Duarte, the terrorists' capabilities in Honduras remain substantial. Indeed, there may be considerable cooperation among the various groups operating in Honduras. For example, the four most important Honduran terrorist groups have jointly declared "revolutionary war" on the government. One of the organizations, the FPR, we regard as posing the greatest threat to Americans in Honduras. The FPR has previously attacked US interests, including the 1980 and 1981 strafings of the US Embassy; the 1981 ambush of a US mobile training team in which two US sergeants were wounded; the 1982 bombings of IBM, Air Florida, and the Datum Corporation; as well as attacks against the Honduran subsidiaries of several other US companies. Cuba and Nicaragua have provided the FPR funding, training, propaganda support, and arms;



25X1

Secret

GI TR 83-018
1 September 1983

25X1

Secret

A second member of the terrorist front, the Popular Liberation Movement/People's Revolutionary Union (MPL/URP), more widely known as the Cinchoneros, also receive Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Soviet support. Although Cinchonero targets have been primarily Honduran, we believe the group is likely to focus on the American presence, probably at the urging of Sandinista and Salvadoran revolutionaries. In late 1982, Cinchonero terrorists captured and held hostage for several days prominent Honduran officials and businessmen in San Pedro Sula. The terrorists demanded the Honduran Government sever security ties with the United States as a condition for release of the hostages. [redacted]

25X1

Costa Rica, until recently, had seen little of the terrorist activity that has affected its neighboring states. In March 1981, however, terrorists attacked a US Embassy jeep in San Jose, wounding three Marines and killing their Costa Rican driver. A second, near-simultaneous attack severely damaged the Honduran Embassy. During 1981 and 1982, Costa Rican terrorists with Salvadoran and Nicaraguan assistance also carried out a series of kidnappings, robberies, and bombings. Many of the terrorists were captured by the security forces; others were driven underground or forced to flee the country. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] a terrorist infrastructure remains in place capable of carrying out operations against government or US targets. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Guatemala has experienced political violence and acts of terrorism by forces of both the left and right for almost 20 years. Even segments of the normally docile Indian population have been radicalized and are being recruited by guerrillas. Cuba has provided training, arms, and ideological guidance to various insurgent organizations, each of which conducts terrorist activities [redacted]

25X1

We believe the terrorist threat in El Salvador, especially against US interests, will intensify, partly in response to the increase in US involvement there. The guerrilla faction responsible for the May assassination of a US military adviser also mounted a grenade attack against the US Embassy in June. Additional attacks on the Embassy and on US civilian and military personnel are likely. Salvadoran insurgents appear intent on increasing urban terrorism to disrupt the country's upcoming elections. [redacted]


25X1

Secret

Secret


Highlights

25X1



Significant Development

Fatah Dissidents Splintering. Five members of one of the PLO groups supporting the Fatah dissidents in the Bekaa, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), have rebelled against their leader Ahmad Jabril because they believe Jabril is becoming nothing more than a Libyan puppet. The five leaders have formed a provisional committee to counter Jabril's leadership. [redacted] some supporters of the Fatah dissidents are becoming disenchanted with the dominant role Libya and Syria are playing in the rebellion. [redacted]



25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

GI TR 83-018
1 September 1983

Secret

**Peru's Sendero Luminoso:
Status of the Insurgent Threat**

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

forces, including inadequate equipment, inappropriate training, and a fragmented intelligence network. [Redacted]

In the past year, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) insurgent group has become—along with the economy—one of the two major concerns of the Belaunde administration. In our view, the SL—which has been engaged in violent activity since 1980—will remain a major security problem for the government for the next year or so. We believe that the SL probably has sufficient manpower reserves to maintain the number of hardcore militants at—or perhaps slightly above—the present estimated total of 1,000 to 1,500 in this time frame. [Redacted]

In their effort to eradicate the Sendero Luminoso, we expect that the security forces probably will use more repressive tactics. Although the SL also has employed brutality—and in our view alienated some potential peasant supporters—we project that the government stands to lose more in terms of domestic and foreign backing and—perhaps—increased recruitment opportunities for the insurgents. In turn, the SL is likely to initiate more strikes outside its traditional strongholds to relieve pressure on its home bases and promote the appearance of a spreading insurgency. [Redacted]

Despite reported heavy SL casualties since the military joined the counterinsurgency effort last December, we believe the group's political-military apparatus remains largely intact. We think that most of those killed have been second-echelon cadre and civilians and, in any event, that the SL has a sufficient reserve of personnel to replace losses for some time to come. Since this spring, the SL has increased its urban terrorist operations in Lima and other cities. The SL's urban operations have included bombing attacks against police and military facilities, electrical towers, government ministries, foreign embassies, and various businesses. A terrorist attack on the headquarters of President Belaunde's Popular Action Party on 11 July barely missed several important government and party figures. [Redacted]

The guerrillas, however, face certain constraints, even in the short term. The SL's appeal is still relatively narrow because of its alien Maoist ideology and its sometimes harsh tactics. Additionally, the group's ideological incompatibility with most potential foreign arms suppliers, and the Soviet Union's concern over jeopardizing its ties with Lima, have left the SL completely dependent on limited local sources for arms and equipment. We believe these factors mean that SL combatants probably will remain under-equipped. Consequently, we anticipate a continuation of the cyclical pattern of short periods of intensive attacks on high-visibility targets followed by consolidation, recuperation, and resupply. [Redacted]

Fundamental insurgent strengths—a unified and committed leadership, mastery of guerrilla and terrorist tactics, and relatively effective intelligence and counterintelligence—have allowed the Sendero Luminoso to remain firmly entrenched in the isolated and rugged Ayacucho Department. The SL further benefits from several key deficiencies of the security

President Belaunde's determination to combat the SL is solidifying and is leading to changes in the government's counterinsurgency strategy. In our view, he has recognized the deficiencies of the police and will allow the armed forces progressively greater latitude in directing the counterinsurgency. Although Peru's troubled economy limits funding for the military and

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

GI TR 83-018
1 September 1983

Secret

police, efforts to purchase needed equipment reflect some reordering of government priorities. We believe that the counterinsurgency forces will gradually improve their effectiveness over the next two to three years. Already, for example, the Army appears to be organizing small units specifically designed for counterinsurgency operations, and the government is moving ahead with plans to purchase helicopters. Thus we judge that, within this time period, they should be able to contain the Sendero Luminoso and possibly force it onto the defensive toward the end of President Belaunde's term in 1985. [redacted]

25X1

The Sendero Luminoso could change this picture, in our view, by adopting new tactics—such as kidnaping for ransom, more sophisticated use of publicity, and a less rigid approach to ideology—to acquire more arms and win larger numbers of adherents. So far, the group's dogmatic and long-term approach to revolution suggests it will not shift tactics easily or quickly—at least as long as its present leadership remains in control. [redacted]

25X1

The picture also could change if the insurgents begin to receive substantial foreign support—although this seems unlikely at present. [redacted]

[redacted] Cuba's Castro may be becoming more interested in the group, but there is only an outside chance he would offer direct support in view of:

25X1

- The high value the USSR places on its lucrative arms supply relationship with Lima.
- Castro's desire to restore full diplomatic relations with Peru.
- The insularity of SL leaders, who have denounced both Moscow and Beijing as "revisionist." [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted]
[redacted]

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

Group Profile:
The African National Congress




25X1

25X1

25X1

Long the most prominent South African black opposition group, the African National Congress (ANC) was founded in January 1912. Its original aim was reform rather than revolution, and for years it confined itself to legal political action. The group went underground only when it was proscribed in 1960 following the Sharpeville incident in which police opened fire on a large crowd of black demonstrators, killing 67 and wounding 186. In 1961 the ANC formed a military wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe or Spear of the Nation. During the next few years it conducted a campaign of low-level sabotage directed particularly against police stations and economic targets.




The Soweto riots in 1976, together with an influx of young people, breathed new life into the ANC and forced the established leadership to take a more militant stance. The reinvigorated Umkhonto We Sizwe renewed operations in 1980, although until the May 1983 bombing in Pretoria the damage from its attacks was generally light, most of its bombs being set to explode when the target area was not crowded.



External Links

The ANC's Communist ties are extensive. It receives weapons, explosives, and training from the USSR, East European countries, and Cuba. The Soviets provide most of the military equipment, which consists mainly of small arms and explosives, although on one occasion the ANC employed 122-mm rockets in South Africa.



25X1

25X1

Secret

With South Africa having demonstrated both the capability and the readiness to operate outside its borders, most of the neighboring states are loath to risk becoming the targets of reprisals by the South African Defense Forces (SADF). For example, although the ANC has established its political headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia does not, as far as we know, allow any ANC military training to take place on its territory nor any ANC operations to be mounted from there. For economic reasons, Zimbabwe also requires tolerable relations with South Africa. Therefore, Harare is not inclined to provide any overt assistance to the ANC. The Zimbabwean Government has, however, permitted the ANC to maintain unofficial offices in Harare [redacted]

[redacted]

Only Angola permits the ANC to maintain a major guerrilla presence. Until the past few years, Tanzania was the main site of ANC military training as well as political indoctrination and academic instruction [redacted]

[redacted]

Operations

[redacted] the political wing of the ANC recruits from among university students and from upper economic classes, including whites. Umkhonto We Sizwe recruits largely from lower educational and economic classes. The large number of guerrillas who do not return from their first assignments due to arrests and desertions has caused difficulties in morale, expertise, and recruitment. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] ANC operations inside South Africa are carefully planned and designed to be carried out in stages that maximize the chances for success and minimize the risk to the attackers. Typically, one ANC team enters South Africa to scout a likely target while another group smuggles weapons across the border and caches them. Finally, a third team enters South Africa unarmed, retrieves the weapons from the cache, proceeds to its objective, and mounts the attack.² Most ANC teams try to leave South Africa soon after completing their operations.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Staging Areas

Most ANC guerrillas infiltrate into South Africa via Swaziland from Mozambique. Officially, the Mozambique Government prohibits the ANC from using its territory as a springboard for attacks against South Africa, but in practice it has turned a blind eye toward ANC personnel operating there, [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Swaziland has tried to crack down on the ANC but lacks the resources to prevent members of the group from transiting its territory. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

South Africa has long been aware that the ANC maintains some safehouses in Gaborone and stages some operations from Botswana. Most of these operations have consisted of reconnaissance by unarmed teams; the deaths of three ANC members at a

25X1

25X1

² Such a procedure reduces the danger to the participants, since only one team needs to carry incriminating material across the border. It also reduces the chances that the mission will fail, because the team bringing in the weapons (which is the one most likely to be caught) does not know the target. [redacted] most guerrillas on such missions insist on arming themselves with a pistol and a grenade, which gives them the option of trying to fight their way through a road or checkpoint if stopped, even though it eliminates any possibility they could talk their way out of trouble. [redacted]

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

African National Congress Terrorist Operations, 1981-10 August 1983



634900 8-83

Secret

Secret

roadblock shootout on 4 May 1983 marked the first time the SADF found armed ANC members attempting to infiltrate South Africa from Botswana [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]
25X1

The ANC also occasionally uses Lesotho as a staging area for operations. Alleging that the government had been ignoring rather than trying to control ANC activities there, South Africa put economic pressure on Lesotho. In response, Lesotho recently announced that it will expel South African refugees associated with groups banned in South Africa. [redacted]

25X1

Possible Shift in Strategy

The ANC bomb that exploded on 20 May in downtown Pretoria may have signaled a sharp change in the group's policy of avoiding civilian casualties. The car bomb—designed to cause casualties rather than damage property—was detonated during rush hour outside the South African Air Force Headquarters. More than half of the 217 injured and 19 killed were civilians, many of them whites. In addition, the US Embassy reports that on 9 May Durban police defused a bomb—identical to the one used in Pretoria—in a heavily traveled area near a public airport with Air Force facilities. [redacted]

25X1

We believe that the ANC's apparent shift in strategy may have been the result of an internal "compromise." There may have been a causal link between this shift and the South African raid on Maseru last December, in which about 30 ANC personnel were killed. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] following the raid, the ANC leadership came under pressure—presumably from black militants in the organization—to begin killing white civilians [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] the leadership refused to authorize attacks specifically directed against civilians, but did instruct the military wing that it no longer needed to be as concerned as before with avoiding civilian casualties. In its communiqués on the car bombing, the ANC emphasized that the target of the attack was military: South African Air Force Headquarters and the Directorate of Military Intelligence. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]
25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

**The African National Congress's
Communist Ties** [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

The African National Congress, the principal anti-South-African insurgent group, has a long history of ties to the Pro-Soviet Communist Party in South Africa. Communists today are well represented in the ANC's leadership and exert considerable influence on it, especially with regard to military strategy. The ANC's heavy dependence on Soviet Bloc military aid is an important source of leverage for the South African Communist Party (SACP). [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] In our view, the aid came at a critical time for the ANC and was instrumental in tying the ANC to the SACP. [redacted]

25X1

**Origins of the Relationship Between the ANC
and the Communist Party in South Africa**

The Communist Party in South Africa and the ANC have been intertwined during most of the last 60 years. The ANC was formed in 1912 as a black reformist group composed mainly of tribal chiefs and educated elite. The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), which was founded in 1921 and joined the Comintern the same year, began recruiting black members and infiltrating the ANC in the mid-1920s after the government enacted a series of discriminatory laws. [redacted]

A high command—comprised of leading ANC and SACP members—directed the military wing, which launched a campaign of sabotage bombings in 1961. The campaign fizzled out after police arrested a number of ANC and SACP leaders in 1963-65. Those members of the ANC and SACP hierarchies who escaped the dragnet went into exile to rebuild their organizations. The SACP was able to expand its influence on the ANC during this period largely because the SACP had more international contacts than the ANC and was more experienced in operating underground. [redacted] by 1968 most figures in the ANC leadership were Communists. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Moscow, probably believing that the Soweto riots in 1976 signaled an extended phase of violent unrest in South Africa, increased its military aid to the ANC.

[redacted]

Following the outlawing of the CPSA in 1950, black Communists who had not previously done so now joined the ANC, while Communists of other races infiltrated existing political and labor groups and established new ones. Former CPSA members secretly reorganized the party in 1953 and renamed it the South African Communist Party (SACP). [redacted]

The South African Government banned the ANC shortly after the Sharpeville riots of 1960. Forced underground, the ANC lost its ability to generate income inside South Africa and began to turn more directly to the SACP. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Bolstered by the new aid and recruits, the ANC launched another campaign of bombings and attacks in 1980 to increase its support among South African blacks and to focus international attention on the grievances of South African blacks. The ANC has conducted some 106 attacks in the last four years.

25X1

Overlapping Organizations

Today, the SACP and the ANC maintain separate organizational structures. This helps to play down the image of a Communist/Soviet-controlled ANC, but the two organizations openly describe their relationship as an "alliance."

25X1

The SACP—a semisecret party based in London with a strong pro-Soviet line—remains well represented in the ANC's leadership. More than half of the ANC's policymaking National Executive Committee members are Communists, as are all of the members of the key Revolutionary Council.

Communist Assistance to the ANC

The ANC's heavy dependence on the Soviet Bloc for military aid is an important source of leverage for the SACP. The Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba are virtually the only suppliers of military training and arms to the ANC today. Most of the ANC's military training is conducted by Cuban and East German military advisers at several camps in Angola. The Soviet Union and various East European states also provide some 200 scholarships a year to the ANC for nonmilitary courses in the Soviet Bloc.

25X1

The latter body is responsible for all ANC activities in South Africa, including conducting military operations, establishing underground cells, and forming links to trade unions. In addition, the SACP District Committee in Lusaka, Zambia, acts as a "watchdog," monitoring the ANC's responses to party policies and interests.

25X1

Promising ANC members can study general academics in the USSR for up to five years, or trade unionism for up to three years.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

The SACP—which claims that 90 percent of its members are blacks—is solidly entrenched in the ranks of the ANC itself.

25X1

25X1

the SACP is quite selective in its recruitment. Moreover, we believe that the majority of the ANC's rank and file is comprised of three categories of blacks: nonideologues, anti-Communist nationalists, and moderate socialists who are comfortable working with Communists but do not fully embrace Marxism-Leninism—especially its doctrine of atheism.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Secret

Page Denied

Secret

Prospects

Despite the tensions, the ANC and the SACP will undoubtedly continue their symbiotic relationship if only because the alliance facilitates the ANC's access to Communist assistance. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] the ANC also gets many new members through SACP recruiting efforts. These recruits usually are more dedicated than the typical recruits; the most energetic and capable ANC officials reportedly are Communists. The SACP, for its part, recognizes the value of its ties to the ANC—the most popular opposition group among South African blacks. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

We expect non-Communist ANC leaders to continue to seek alternative sources of military aid to offset the influence of the pro-Soviet faction. Tambo met with Chinese Premier Zhao in Tanzania in January and traveled in May to Beijing, China, which has provided material support to a rival guerrilla group—the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)—but not to the ANC in recent years, is considering supplying arms to the ANC. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Secret

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Secret

Drug Trafficking Activities of Insurgent and Terrorist Groups

25X1

25X1

Rural-based insurgent/terrorist groups often play a major role in the cultivation and initial processing—though not in the smuggling and distribution—of illicit drugs. Urban terrorist groups, on the other hand, rarely become directly or extensively involved in drug trafficking. The greater involvement of insurgent groups results from two principal factors. First, insurgent groups are often active in the same rural areas where marijuana, coca, or opium are or can easily be grown. The remote locations and rough terrain characteristic of such areas limit the influence of central governments and hinder efforts to eradicate illicit crops or drug trafficking. Second, drug trafficking can be a lucrative and practical method for a rural insurgent group to obtain funds. The level of involvement of insurgent groups ranges from the extortion of protection money from known traffickers to direct involvement in the cultivation and transportation of drugs.

Insurgent Groups

A number of so-called insurgent groups—notably in Southeast Asia—are so heavily engaged in drug trafficking that they are more like criminal enterprises than true insurgent groups.

The Shan United Army (SUA) is a smuggling and trafficking organization of 3,000 to 4,000 armed members that receives, by our estimate, some 80 percent of its funds from drug trafficking. Although generally not involved in the cultivation of opium, the SUA until recently controlled about two-thirds of the opium processing and trafficking in the Thailand-Burma border area.

Although Thai Government military operations since early 1982 have disrupted SUA operations, we believe that the SUA will continue to play an important role in Golden Triangle drug trafficking.

The Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF) have the longest history of involvement in drugs in the Golden Triangle, although they have always officially denied it. the CIF began drug trafficking in the early 1950s, and today the remaining 1,500 to 2,500 members are primarily involved in the production and trafficking of refined heroin for Thai, Burmese, and international markets. There is evidence of CIF connections to Chinese criminal syndicates, but not to organized criminal elements in Europe and the United States.

25X1

The Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA), established in 1969, is a smuggling and trafficking group of 800 to 1,000 armed members active in the southern part of Burma's Shan State. It masks its nature and activities by claiming to seek autonomy for the Shan State. The SURA, with the cooperation of corrupt officials, extorts money from local farmers, taxes opium producers, and operates several border refineries.

25X1

Other insurgent organizations directly involved in drug trafficking devote only a part of their effort to drug-related activities and use the funds derived from these activities to further their political goals.

25X1

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest and most formidable insurgent group in Colombia, entered the drug business around 1977, according to US Embassy reporting. As coca cultivation has expanded into traditional FARC strongholds, their involvement has increased. FARC units in these areas began by taxing coca production and exacting fees from traffickers for use and transit of FARC-controlled territory. According to a US Embassy report, the FARC even established produc-

25X1

25X1

Secret

GI TR 83-018
1 September 1983

Secret

tion quotas and set wage guidelines for workers and growers. There is evidence that one of the FARC's fronts in southeast Colombia was organized expressly for the control of coca production with the aim of using the profits from the trade to support other fronts. Embassy reports also indicate that the FARC is involved with organized smuggling networks in a brisk trade of drugs for guns. [redacted]

The Burmese Communist Party (BCP) involvement in drug trafficking prior to 1978 was on a minor scale and appears to have been the work of individuals without explicit approval of the party leadership. In 1978, however, the BCP apparently began compensating for a sharp reduction in Chinese assistance by sponsoring and even supervising opium poppy cultivation and trafficking. Today the BCP controls large areas of Burma's opium-growing regions and is the principal purchaser of raw opium from farmers. According to US Embassy assessments, the BCP refines a small percentage of its opium into heroin at refineries inside Burma but transports most of its opium to the border with Thailand where it is refined into heroin by other narcotics trafficking organizations. [redacted]

The Shan State Army (SSA) is an ethnically based insurgent group established in 1960. Its 2,000 to 4,000 armed members are active throughout Burma's Shan State. The SSA encourages opium poppy cultivation and taxes local producers and dealers as well as caravans. The profits are used to bribe officials and purchase weapons and supplies. [redacted]

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), also founded in 1960, is an ethnically based insurgent group of more than 4,500 armed members that operates throughout the Kachin State and in the northern part of the Shan State in Burma. The KIA taxes opium producers, traffickers, and caravans and acts as a broker between growers and trafficking organizations. [redacted]

Some insurgent groups are only marginally involved in the drug trade, with trafficking-related activities ranging from extortion of producers and processors to limited participation in domestic distribution. [redacted]

The National Liberation Army (ELN), a Castroite Marxist-Leninist organization, was established in 1963 and, although small, operates throughout Colombia. According to unconfirmed US Embassy reporting, ELN members have been involved in extorting money from coca growers and in cultivating marijuana. [redacted]

The Popular Liberation Army (EPL), founded in 1967, is associated with the pro-Beijing Colombian Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (PCC/ML). The EPL is active in northern Colombia in Cordoba Department and the Gulf of Uraba region. Colombian authorities have told the US Embassy that they suspect the EPL obtains some of its weapons from drug traffickers operating in the Gulf of Uraba and that some EPL members may be engaged in marijuana cultivation and trafficking. [redacted]

Sendero Luminoso (SL), or Shining Path, is a Maoist insurgent-terrorist group based primarily in the Ayacucho region of Peru. According to Embassy reporting, it has extorted money from traffickers operating in its territory. Charges by Peruvian officials that the SL is itself involved in drug trafficking have not been substantiated. [redacted]

Various groups in Southwest Asia, particularly in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, have long been involved in smuggling operations, some of which involve narcotics. The Kurds, in particular, have an experienced cadre of narcotics traffickers, couriers, and processors who operate relatively freely throughout western Iran and eastern Turkey. There are conflicting reports regarding the involvement of the Afghan insurgents. According to a September 1981 statement [redacted] the insurgents were at one time earning more than \$300,000 a month from the sale of drugs and gems. Most evidence suggests, however, that insurgent organizations are not directly involved in the opium traffic but are financed in part by taxes and contributions from growers and smugglers. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

25X1

Philippine insurgent groups, including the New People's Army (NPA), cultivate marijuana and sell it locally to help finance their operations. [redacted]


Urban Terrorist Groups

Compared with our information about the involvement of rurally based insurgent groups in drug trafficking, our information about the involvement of urban terrorist groups is sparse and equivocal. What information we have points to a minor role for terrorists, compared with that of the organized criminal elements that dominate the business, and toward individual opportunism rather than group complicity.

The most credible example of terrorist involvement with drug traffickers involves the Colombian 19th of April Movement (M-19). In October 1981, M-19 used the drug-smuggling apparatus of Jaime Guillot Lara to bring a large shipment of weapons into Colombia. According to US Embassy reporting, M-19 has extorted money from traffickers and growers and has kidnaped wealthy traffickers and members of their families for ransom.

Following are some other examples of drug-related activity involving terrorists:

- [redacted]
- [redacted] According to the US Embassy, ETA has employed known drug smugglers as low-level operatives and couriers, and some individual ETA members use and occasionally traffic in drugs.



- Rightist groups such as the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR) in Italy and the Turkish Nationalist Action Party (NAP) in Turkey have been linked to trafficking by local press accounts that did not, however, provide any specific details. 25X1
- The Palestinian terrorist group 15 May, like the ETA, has been known to use drug smugglers as low-level operatives and couriers, but we doubt it is involved itself in drug trafficking. 25X1

Why the Difference?

The manifold reasons why urban terrorist groups are less involved in drug trafficking than insurgent groups are practical rather than ideological.

Lack of Opportunity. The involvement of insurgent groups is generally limited to the areas that they physically control or dominate; urban terrorists do not control territory. Furthermore, the involvement of insurgent groups is generally associated with cultivation, refining, or transport—not with distribution, which is predominately an urban affair. In other words, neither insurgent groups nor terrorist groups are much involved with the distribution of illicit drugs on the street.

Availability of Alternatives. Urban terrorist groups have a wider variety of ways to make money than do insurgent groups. Traditionally, urban terrorists finance their operations through bank robberies, kidnappings, or extortion (“revolutionary taxes”), or they depend for their funds upon some external source such as a patron state or rich supporter. Insurgent groups operating in remote areas often do not have such a choice.

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Stiffer Competition. The distribution of illicit narcotics in urban areas is dominated by tough and well-organized criminal elements prepared to defend their business ruthlessly and without regard for any of the legal or civil rights that terrorists or insurgents might be exploiting in their battle with government authorities. [redacted]

25X1

Operational Difficulties. Many urban terrorists are so well known to the authorities or to the population at large that they must live outside their own countries, which limits them essentially to periodic terrorist raids and prevents them from establishing, much less maintaining, drug distribution networks. Other terrorists depend for their viability in their own countries on maintaining a circumspect lifestyle that does not arouse police suspicion. Associating with elements of the drug trade is not compatible with such a lifestyle; a clandestine urban terrorist also involved in drug trafficking has multiplied his chances of getting caught and put out of business. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Secret

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Secret

Statistical Overview

Type of Victim of International Terrorist Incidents, November 1982–August 1983 ^a

	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
Total	47	50	57	59	77	82	59	66	70	29
Government officials	2	2	6	3	4	5	7	10	10	2
Diplomats	23	22	27	33	36	40	28	25	32	18
Military	6	12	11	2	11	13	8	4	10	3
Business	12	8	2	9	8	7	9	8	7	3
Private parties, tourists, missionaries, and students	2	5	7	8	7	10	3	16	6	3
Other	2	1	4	4	11	7	4	3	5	0


sb

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, November 1982–August 1983 ^a

	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
Total	47	50	57	59	77	82	59	66	70	29
North America	0	4	3	5	5	6	11	2	6	3
Latin America	12	9	13	10	18	20	12	19	20	3
Western Europe	25	23	20	26	33	20	18	20	15	11
USSR/Eastern Europe	3	0	1	1	3	0	1	0	2	0
Sub-Saharan Africa	1	1	0	3	4	5	4	8	2	2
Middle East and North Africa	2	4	14	6	12	23	8	16	20	9
Asia/other	4	9	6	8	2	8	5	1	5	1

^a Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.

Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks



Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.

300401 (DE3105) 8-83

Secret

Chronology

This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology unless new information has been received. [redacted]

25X1

July 1983**Cyprus: Explosives Cache Discovered**

In Nicosia, 15 to 18 explosive devices—each comprised of four to six sticks of TNT with timing and detonator devices—were discovered in the water at the Polemidhia Dam. Cypriot security officials advised that examination of the devices has revealed they are of US origin and are identical with the device utilized in a bomb explosion against the Iraqi Airline office in spring 1983. Several attache cases filled with hand grenades were also discovered in the cache. Investigation is continuing. [redacted]

25X1

26 July 1983**West Germany: Insurance Company Attacked**

We originally attributed the bombing of the Alliance Life Insurance Company in Stuttgart to the Revolutionary Cells. West German police, however, have subsequently attributed the incident to squatters. [redacted]

25X1

12 August 1983**France: Explosion Precedes Papal Visit**

In Lourdes, an anti-Church group calling itself "Stop the Priests" claimed responsibility for an explosion that destroyed a statue behind the basilica where Pope John Paul II was scheduled to make a pilgrimage 21-22 August. In a telephone call to a French news agency, the group claimed the attack was anticlerical, aimed at the "Vatican multinational" and threatened more attacks. [redacted]

25X1

West Germany: Penetration of Conventional Weapons Storage Area

US Air Force sentries challenged three unidentified intruders at Morbach in Rhineland-Palatinate. Guards fired a warning shot before the intruders fled. US military officials have suggested that this was a training exercise for future penetrations of weapons storage sites. [redacted]

25X1

14 August 1983**France: Arrests of Weapons Smugglers**

In Paris, French police arrested three people—an Irishman and two Frenchmen—after seizing a cache of arms believed destined for the outlawed Irish Republican Army (IRA). The cache—contained in a false fuel tank of a tractor-trailer—included 28 pistols and revolvers, 12,000 cartridges, 100 rifle magazines, two hand grenades, as well as explosives-related material and 22 pounds of explosives. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

GI TR 83-018
1 September 1983

Secret

15 August 1983

France: Car Bomb Attack

In Paris, a car bomb killed the chauffeur of the South Yemen Ambassador to France. [redacted]

25X1

18 August 1983

US-Cuba: Delta Flight Hijacked

A Delta Airlines flight en route from Miami to Tampa with 80 persons aboard was hijacked to Cuba by a man who sprayed a flammable liquid in the first-class section of the plane and threatened to set the plane on fire. After the plane landed in Havana the hijacker was taken into custody and the plane and passengers continued on to Tampa. The incident was the 12th attempted and 10th successful hijacking of an American carrier to Cuba since May. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X6

19 August 1983

United Kingdom: London Letter Bomb

In London, the Scottish National Liberation Army (SNLA) claimed responsibility for a letter bomb sent to a coal mine official to protest the closing of a coal mine. The device was intercepted and did not explode. The SNLA—a Scottish separatist group—has sent letter bombs and firebombs to four government ministers in the past year, although none has caused any serious injury. [redacted]

25X1

20 August 1983

Spain: Bomb Attack Injures Five in Basque Country

In Laredo, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorists claimed responsibility for two bombs that exploded at a Civil Guard post. No warning call was given before the attack, which injured five people, including two daughters of a guardsman at the post. We suspect the Military Wing of ETA was responsible for this attack—the latest in its campaign against a special security plan for the Basque country introduced by the Spanish Government earlier this year. [redacted]

25X1

United Kingdom: Bombing of US Firm

In London, the Angry Brigade—a British radical group of the 1970s—claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on an office of American Express. A confessor letter sent to Britain's national news agency claimed—but gave no explanation for—the attack. The group had been inactive since the early 1970s until it claimed responsibility for an explosion at a prison officers' training college in late 1982. [redacted]

25X1

South Africa: Explosion Outside Pretoria

The South African police claim that an electric pylon was exploded with plastique by the African National Congress. The blast interrupted electricity to several eastern Pretoria suburbs. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret

21 August 1983**Philippines: Aquino's Assassination**

Opposition leader Benigno Aquino was shot at Manila's airport as he returned from three years of self-imposed exile in the United States. The unidentified assassin was killed by security police. Authorities are investigating. 25X1

22 August 1983**Honduras: Bomb Explodes in San Pedro Sula**

A bomb exploded in an empty building on the corner of the central square in San Pedro Sula causing minimal damage and no injuries. An anonymous call to a local newspaper claimed credit for the attack in the name of the Cinchonero group, a leftist terrorist organization. The Embassy believes the attack, the first since last December, was meant to reaffirm the group's continued viability. 25X1

23 August 1983**Spain: Bank Bombing in Basque Country**

In Orio, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty/Military Wing (ETA/M) is believed responsible for an attack on a bank that refused to pay "revolutionary taxes." An anonymous telephone call gave a 45-minute warning before the explosion. There were no injuries. 25X1

25 August 1983**West Berlin: Bombing of French Consulate**

In West Berlin, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) has claimed responsibility for an explosion that nearly destroyed a building holding the French Consulate. One man was killed and 23 injured in the blast, believed to be a retaliatory attack against the French Government for the arrest of 51 Armenians following the 15 July bombing at Orly Airport. 25X1

**27 August 1983****Austria: Air France Hijacking**

Four unidentified individuals hijacked an Air France 727 with several Americans on board during a flight from Vienna to Paris. Following a number of European and Middle Eastern stops, the Arabic-speaking hijackers diverted the aircraft to Tehran. Tehran radio reported that the hijackers demanded a change in France's military and political support for Chad, Lebanon, and Iraq and the release of a number of Lebanese prisoners in French prisons. Although no Iranian involvement can be confirmed, Tehran has supported groups in the past that have targeted French interests. 25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

28 August 1983

France: Bombings Protest French in Chad

Action Directe claimed responsibility for the explosion of two bombs outside the Socialist Party's Headquarters and the Defense Ministry in Paris. Action Directe wants France to withdraw its troops from Chad immediately. There were no casualties.

25X1

Secret

Secret