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Terrorism
Review



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12 May 1983

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GI TR 83-010
12 May 1983

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**Terrorism
Review**

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(OGI)

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*Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone*

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**Group Profile: West Germany's
Revolutionary Cells** [redacted]

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Along with the West German security authorities, we believe that the Revolutionary Cells (RZ), a leftwing West German terrorist group, is a more serious threat to both US and German interests than are other, more notorious German terrorist groups. Although German authorities have recently had significant success against the notable terrorist group the Red Army Faction (RAF), they have not been able to penetrate the RZ or conduct successful counterterrorism actions against them. [redacted]

These goals have apparently changed little in the intervening years:

- To attack alleged US imperialism and Zionism.
- To support workers, youth, and women.
- To free imprisoned comrades.
- To punish "enemies of the people" and "exploiters," including government bureaucrats, police officers, judges, traffic controllers, nuclear plant guards, property owners, and doctors. [redacted]

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In its exploitation of the popular issue of the US presence in Germany, the RZ has been responsible for the greatest number of attacks against US military installations in West Germany. The scheduled deployment of intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) systems to Germany in late 1983 will provide the RZ with yet another opportunity to exploit the existing anti-NATO and the increasing antinuclear sentiment of a sizable segment of the German populace. [redacted]

The RZ seeks to exploit popular local issues. Under this strategy—termed the "connection strategy" by German authorities—RZ targets change with public concerns. For example, RZ antinuclear activity in the late 1970s paralleled growing domestic concern over nuclear issues. [redacted]

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Based on statements of former RZ member Hermann Feiling and subsequent investigations, we believe the RZ is organized into three- to five-member cells. We concur with West German authorities that no national-level structure exists. [redacted]

[redacted] the RZ has cells in West Berlin, Frankfurt, Duesseldorf, Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, Mainz, and Bochum. [redacted]

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Despite the compartmented structure of the RZ, we agree with German authorities that there is some coordination of cell activities. Regional coordination was obviously required for the RZ bombing of four widely separated US military installations within a few hours on 1 June 1982. Moreover, Roman Herzog, Interior Minister of Land Baden-Wuerttemberg, has said that the RZ is conducting coordinated operations throughout West Germany, and, according to a fall 1982 BKA report, the RZ sometimes shares logistic bases. [redacted]

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The RZ claims to seek adoption of a Marxist-Leninist system in Germany. [redacted]

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[redacted] the RZ had identified its goals as early as 1975.

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
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Attacks by the Revolutionary Cells (RZ) in West Germany, 1973-82^a



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25X1 Maintaining compartmented units enhances RZ security and makes penetration by German authorities almost impossible. Unit members know little about the work or identity of persons in other cells. RZ members meet informally and briefly when planning operations, which, unlike those of the RAF, require little preparation. [redacted]

25X1 The relative unsophistication of RZ operations—bombings and arson are its primary modes of attack—means that operating costs are minimal. The small funding requirements are probably met by the earnings of RZ members, many of whom hold regular jobs, and donations from sympathizers. Typical of the low cost of operations is the February 1982 bombing of the Neu-Isenburg construction company, Holzmann AG, in which the explosive device was a 2-kilogram fire extinguisher filled with a homemade explosive mixture of sodium chlorate and sugar; an electric alarm clock was used as the timer. [redacted]

25X1 We know very little about the overall size of the RZ.
25X1 [redacted]
25X1 German [redacted] Official estimates of hardcore membership range from 30 to 60, with perhaps as many as 60 supporters, who probably contribute little beyond moral support, agitation against policies of “enemies of the people,” and occasional funds. [redacted]

25X1 Although all RZ operations have been conducted in West Germany, 24 percent of the attacks were directed against foreign diplomatic, military, and commercial establishments—particularly American—or against facilities believed by the RZ to represent foreign interests. The RZ has also bombed many government buildings in West Germany. [redacted]

The attacks claimed by the RZ since its inception in 1973 suggest that the Frankfurt cell (or cells) is the heartbeat of the movement. The *Revolutionary Wrath* newsletter is probably published in this city. Overall, the states of Hessen—where Frankfurt is located—and Nordrhein-Westfalen have witnessed the largest number of RZ attacks. Frankfurt was the site of the first known anti-US military activity by the

RZ. Since January 1982, 33 percent of the RZ-claimed attacks occurred within a 45-mile radius of Frankfurt and 25 percent were perpetrated within a 25-mile radius of Duesseldorf, in Nordrhein-Westfalen. [redacted] 25X1

Given the focus on anti-NATO issues in its recent publicity, we expect increases in RZ attacks in opposition to NATO policy but few changes in RZ targets and areas of operation. The group will continue to attack American facilities, particularly as the scheduled 1983 deployment of INF systems will offer opportunities to exploit anti-US, anti-NATO, and antinuclear sentiments. The Frankfurt area will almost certainly sustain the bulk of attacks, given the concentration of RZ terrorist activity in the region and large US presence. Recent US military reporting links an RZ member to targeting and collection activities against 18 separate US military facilities in the nearby Mainz/Wiesbaden area. The Frankfurt area cell (or cells) is also likely to continue its attacks on construction companies working to build the new runway at Frankfurt airport, which the RZ has linked to NATO. We believe that RZ attacks on German Government facilities will also continue. In the absence of a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, RZ actions probably will be undertaken against US facilities because of US support for Israel. We expect the RZ to continue its attacks on nuclear-related targets, particularly in Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, where more than half of such attacks, including all of those perpetrated in 1982, have taken place. [redacted] 25X1

We concur with the Interior Ministry’s recent assessment that the RZ is West Germany’s most dangerous leftist terrorist group and believe it will remain so at least over the next several years. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted]

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Chronology of Selected RZ Operations

Year/Month	Location	Type of Attack	Target
1973			
November	Berlin	Explosive	International Telephone and Telegraph firm.
	Nuernberg	Explosive	International Telephone and Telegraph firm.
1974			
June	Berlin	Explosive	Chilean Consulate General.
1975			
October	Mainz	Explosive	Spanish Vice Consulate.
1976			
June	Frankfurt	Explosive	US Army V Corps Headquarters; 16 injured.
December	Frankfurt	Explosive	US Air Force Officers' Club at Rhein-Main Airbase (<i>Washington Post</i> , 3 December 1976, reports 18 injured).
1977			
January	Giessen	Explosive	US Army fuel depot.
1978			
March	Berlin	Unknown	El-Al office.
September	Garlstedt	Explosive	US Army barracks.
1979			
October	Wiesbaden	Arson	Company vehicle of Hochtief firm, contractor for a nuclear power plant.
November	Ahaus	Explosive	Weather tower of a planned interim storage depot for nuclear waste.
1980			
May	Osterholz-Scharmbeck	Explosive	US Army installation.
1981			
May	Frankfurt	Small arms	Land Hessen Minister of Economy and Transport, at his home.
October	Frankfurt	Explosive	Premises of Bratengeier construction firm, contractors to extend Runway West at Frankfurt airport.
December	Wiesbaden	Explosive (attempt)	Land Hessen Ministry for Economy and Technology.
1982			
June	Bamberg	Explosive	US Officers' Club.
	Frankfurt	Explosive	Headquarters of the US Army V Corps.
	Gelnhausen	Explosive	US Officers' Club.
	Hanau	Explosive	US Officers' Mess.
	Berlin	Explosive (attempt)	Armed Forces Network radio transmission tower.
	Cologne	Explosive	Near building housing offices of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. (confessor letter identified company as prominent manufacturer of military aircraft, such as those used by Israelis in attack on Palestinians in Lebanon).
July	Frankfurt	Explosive	Between two communications vans outside Abrams Building, Headquarters of the US Army V Corps. (US responsibility for "Israeli massacre in Lebanon.")
October	Cologne	Explosive	Office related to nuclear energy, the Company for (Nuclear) Reactor Safety.
	Bergisch-Gladbach	Explosive	Office related to nuclear energy, Interatom.
November	Kalkar	Explosive	Support tower of powerline supplying electrical energy to nuclear power plant.

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Book Review

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Violence as Communication, by Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, London, Sage Publications, 1982. (U)

After a dramatic hijacking by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in September 1970, a PFLP spokesman noted that the act "was a direct assault on the consciousness of international opinion. What mattered most to us is that one pays attention to us." Schmid and de Graaf's *Violence as Communication* postulates that modern terrorism is primarily a form of communication through which a message is conveyed via violence or the threat of violence to a target audience broader than the victims of the threat or act. This attempt to communicate via victims who are merely the instruments of the message is what distinguishes terrorism from ordinary criminal violence.

Violence as Communication provides a comprehensive and well-organized treatment of the controversial relationship between the mass media and terrorism. It explores the potential influence media treatment can have on the terrorist act itself, discusses the various techniques of media manipulation terrorists have employed, and speculates regarding the possible effects of censorship on terrorism. Each subject is treated with attention to detail and respect for the complexity of the subject. The book's second chapter also presents a useful multidimensional typology of politically motivated terrorism. This typology incorporates a range of actors (political, criminal, and pathological); it differentiates between terrorism directed against the power holders within a state and state repressive terrorism; and it encompasses various motivational justifications including single-issue terrorism, separatist or nationalist terrorism, and social revolutionary or insurgent terrorism.

One caveat should be noted. The authors are undisguised in their defense of the "people" whose grievances they contend are ignored by those who dominate the media until they do something dramatic, novel, or violent enough to fulfill the criteria for coverage. Although such polemics detract from the core paradigm of this work, this book is worth your reading.

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Special Analysis

Rightist Terrorism in Western Europe [redacted]

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This is the first of five articles on the subject of rightist terrorism in Western Europe. Future issues will take an in-depth look at the situations in Italy, West Germany, France, and Spain. [redacted]

financiers, but rightist extremism has mainly represented the revolt of the propertied middle class against the twin forces of economic modernization and leftist advance. It is members of the downwardly mobile class of small shopkeepers and artisans and their children—once the backbone of an urban European society that no longer has much use for them—that have found fascism most appealing. [redacted] 25X1

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The attention devoted over the past decade to leftist terrorism in Western Europe has obscured all but the most spectacular instances of rightist political violence, such as the Bologna train station massacre in 1980. In acts of this sort and in attacks against specific individuals, however, rightist groups often achieve much greater loss of life than those on the left. [redacted]

A close look at the social composition of the West European extreme right suggests that this downwardly mobile class continues to be represented in contemporary extreme rightist political parties and terrorist groups. Since the World War II legacy of the extreme right in Western Europe is even more odious than that of the far left, however, neo-fascist groups are increasingly attracting a greater number of misfits, mentally disturbed, and common criminals, especially at the rank-and-file level. With the possible exception of those in Spain, neo-fascist groups are less the representatives of a social or even a political force than they are gangs of thugs intent on lashing out at groups and institutions—including governments—perceived to be responsible for their plight. [redacted] 25X1

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Neo-fascist and neo-Nazi groups exhibit many of the traits of the extreme rightist movements that swept Europe in the period between the two world wars. Like their predecessors who hastened the collapse of constitutional government in several European countries in that period, contemporary rightist terrorists continue to attack socialist and Communist parties, Jewish communities, labor unions, and symbols of parliamentary democracy in countries such as Italy, West Germany, France, and Spain. [redacted]

Because of the poor quality of their recruits, contemporary extreme rightist groups tend to be ideologically sterile, badly organized, and random in their violence. With the exception of Spain's still fledgling democracy, we do not believe they pose a threat to democratic systems. Still, their penchant for violence and indiscriminate killing gives them at least the potential to destabilize particular governments and to endanger selected nongovernmental organizations. [redacted] 25X1

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Historically, fascist movements generally have been a response to the rise on the left of mass political parties and labor movements that have seriously challenged traditional social, political, and economic institutions. Their ranks have included some big businessmen and [redacted]

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A Profile of Rightist Terrorism

Ideology. Increasingly, in our judgment, both leftist and rightist terrorist groups are driven by a mindless nihilism. To the extent that they still adhere to an ideology, however, the two types diverge significantly. Based on their professed goals, leftist groups are usually committed to complex idea systems such as Marxism or Maoism and cast themselves as seekers of a new and more just proletarian order; the goals of rightist groups are more simplistic. [redacted]

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Typically, rightists aim at reestablishing a reassuring—and often mythical—past in which they enjoyed a higher status. Hence, they favor church, family, patriotism, and primitive capitalism against such perceived modern menaces as Communism, democracy, secularism, pornography, abortion, and divorce. [redacted]

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Rightist terrorist groups seek a governmental and societal catharsis to clear the way for a return to the old order. The 1980 bombing of Bologna's railroad station with its multiple deaths and injuries, for example, may have sought to raise the question of the Communist city administration's ability to protect ordinary citizens. The rightists also tend to be chauvinistic and racist. Some even continue to believe they are the vanguard of a super race. This "biological-historical" view of society lends itself to anti-Semitism and a general dislike of anyone or anything foreign, as underscored by the West German right's frequent attacks against Turkish guestworkers and French rightist attacks against Jews. Consistent with its simplistic and dramatic view of the world is the ultraright's love of folk symbols, uniforms, and militarism, all of which emphasize a larger entity into which the individual can merge. [redacted]

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Operational Code. The divergence in belief systems has made for differences in how the two extremes operate. [redacted]

[redacted] rightist groups make only limited use of tracts or public statements and seldom claim responsibility for attacks, whereas leftists try to exploit the attention drawn to their attacks by disseminating ideological treatises. More important, leftist and rightist terrorists differ in their choice of targets. Leftist groups usually strike selectively, trying to hit only individuals whom they regard as guilty of opposing proletarian causes. Hence, no bystanders were

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harmed in the Red Brigade's kidnaping of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro. The right, when it has any coherent political purpose at all, seeks to create enough despair to make society eager for authoritarian law and order, as in the case of the 1980 random slaughter at the Munich Oktoberfest. [redacted]

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Organizational Features. The differences in far left and far right ideology have also influenced their organizational practices. Marxist ideology provides a natural basis for cooperation across national boundaries, while the nationalism and xenophobia of most rightists create a barrier to such collaboration. [redacted]

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The leftist emphasis on commitment to a cause also places a premium on carefully structured organizations and systematic campaigns of action. Rightist groups rely more on emotional involvement and are often commanded by a single individual who depends on blind obedience to his orders. Captured rightist terrorists often talk more freely than leftists once they have been separated from their leader. [redacted]

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Member Characteristics. The differing ideologies, operational codes, and organizational characteristics of far left and far right groups have attracted distinct personality and social class types who in turn have reinforced the ideological differences. Information on captured terrorists [redacted]

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[redacted] suggests that leftist terrorists tend to come from traditional middle class families of comfortable circumstances, good education, and religious affiliation. As youngsters, many leftists enjoyed relatively privileged environments, were good students, participated in church activities, and appeared to be model citizens. They were typical or above-average youth who rarely roused suspicion or controversy. In rebelling against the political system, they are often in fact rebelling against their parents or expiating the guilt they feel as members of a privileged class. Despite fanatical commitment to their cause and readiness to employ violence, leftist terrorists do not demonstrate serious pathological personality disorders. [redacted]

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The profile for rank-and-file rightists is different. Extreme rightists continue to be drawn from social groups that have suffered a progressive loss of social or economic status, such as the old aristocracy and the small shopkeeper class. Increasingly, however, the typical rightist terrorist is characterized by a disadvantaged background, including a broken home, economic adversity, limited education, and little discipline. [redacted]

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He often appears uncertain of his place in contemporary society and reflects his alienation in intense identity problems. His relations with colleagues are more likely to be stormy and violent, and he often does not function well even within his own paramilitary organization. Brutality and murder are reported within the rightist terrorist groups of most countries. Imprisoned rightists do not hold up well in the stress of confinement and are more prone to suicide. Rightists also have a high incidence of sexual identity and drug abuse problems. [redacted]

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The more limited educational and cultural background of most rightist terrorists and their sense of alienation affect their behavior. Rather than seeing the issues of the world in terms of an idea system, as their leftist counterparts tend to do, rightists perceive a contest between good and evil and more often respond with emotion rather than reason. Their limited educational development probably helps explain their tendency not to think through the implications of their deeds or to plan effective, coordinated, and sustained campaigns. Their narrow intellectual horizons probably also account for their failure to exploit the opportunity created by their violence for propagating ideological statements. [redacted]

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These are alienated and anomic individuals who, rather than pursuing solutions in idea systems, prefer to follow a "superman's" lead into violent action. The ideas and symbols promoted by the leader are secondary in practice. When a rightist leader is captured or killed, his group tends to disintegrate, as in the case of the Action Committee of National Socialists in West Germany. With leftists, leadership is more often subservient to the realization of the group's political

goals, and leftist groups are more likely to reconstitute themselves and return to the battle after losing a leader. [redacted]

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Rightist Terrorism in Individual Countries

Rightist terrorists are most prominent in countries with a fascist or Nazi past such as Italy, West Germany, and Spain, and in countries like France that have deep historical cleavages between left and right.² One common feature of rightist terrorist groups in these countries is their close link with archconservative parties. Although this connection is obscure and difficult to document, evidence—such as overlapping memberships—suggests various forms of collaboration or liaison between far right parties and rightist terrorist groups. [redacted]

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Rightists typically venerate their own nation's experience as a central element of their outlook, and there is much less ground for common cause among them across country lines. For instance, anti-Semitism and xenophobia are leading themes of West German rightist terrorism, reflecting past Nazi hostility to Jews and the growing resentment of foreign guestworkers today. By contrast, Italy's rightists, faced with Western Europe's largest Communist party, often strike at the PCI or engage in random acts of violence designed to embarrass a government they see as too accommodating toward the Communists. French rightist terrorist groups are inspired both by anti-Semitism and anti-Communism. In Spain, rightist terrorism is fueled by the broader concerns of pro-Franco forces who fear they are losing their status in the new democratic system. [redacted]

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In contrast to leftist extremism, the few principal unifying links of rightist extremists across national

² Rightist terrorism has also appeared on a lesser scale in the smaller West European countries. Its perpetrators include the Flemish Militant Order in Belgium, the New Right Action in Austria, and the New Order in Greece. Small terrorist organizations also exist in the Netherlands and Portugal, while others have been cited by the press in the United Kingdom and in the Scandinavian countries. Although Turkey has a formidable rightist terrorist problem, we believe its dynamics are substantially different than those elsewhere in Western Europe, and it is thus not discussed in this study. [redacted]

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in National Elections**

	Votes	Percent	Seats
Italy			
MSI (Italian Social Movement)			
1972	2,869,792	8.7	56
1976	2,245,376	6.1	35
1979	1,927,233	5.3	31
West Germany			
NPD (National Democratic Party)			
1969	1,422,010	4.3	0
1972	207,465	0.6	0
1976	122,661	0.3	0
1980	67,798	0.2	0
1983	79,000	0.2	0
France			
FN/PFN (National Front/New Forces Party)			
National Assembly			
1968	28,736	0.1	0
1973	679,684	2.8	0
1978	270,409	1.0	0
1981	90,422	0.4	0
Presidential ^a			
1965 (Tixier-Vignancour)	1,260,208	5.2	
1974 (Le Pen)	190,291	0.8	
Spain			
FN (New Force)			
1977	63,501	0.4	0
1979	378,964	2.1	1
1982	100,899	0.5	0

^a No extreme right candidates ran in the 1969 and 1981 elections.

lines are essentially abstract. Rightist terrorism has brought together people who fear that either they or the institutions with which they intimately identify are in jeopardy. Although there is some evidence of contacts between rightist groups across national boundaries, we believe it is sporadic and limited to occasional tactical cooperation. In short, we do not believe there is a "black international" composed of rightist extremist groups. [redacted]

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Outlook

Given the economic distress and social volatility in West European society, we believe conditions exist that could produce growing numbers of the downwardly mobile, alienated, and disturbed individuals who have traditionally joined rightist terrorist and political groups. Moreover, the pervasive presence in Western Europe of the extreme right's traditional objects of hate—leftist parties, labor movements, foreigners, Jews, and democratic institutions—ensures that rightist terrorist groups will have ample targets against which to vent their rage. Their activities, however, will vary in frequency and intensity according to the interplay of factors such as student and labor unrest, economic difficulties, and leftist party activity. We further believe that the relative success or failure of rightist terrorism will vary according to the attitude toward it adopted by national governments and security services. Except for the potential danger they pose to democratic institutions in Spain, however, we do not expect the contemporary extreme right to pose a direct threat to West European political stability. [redacted]

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
Statistical Overview

Type of Victim of International Terrorist Attacks, July 1982–April 1983 ^a

	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Total
Total	73	90	49	57	42	46	54	57	70	56	594
Government officials	4	5	1	0	2	2	6	2	3	5	30
Diplomats	36	47	29	35	19	22	27	33	35	26	309
Military	8	10	9	13	6	10	9	2	10	9	86
Business	13	13	4	2	11	8	1	8	7	3	70
Private parties, tourists, missionaries, and students	7	2	5	3	2	3	7	9	6	8	52
Other	5	13	1	4	2	1	4	3	9	5	47

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks, July 1982–April 1983 ^a

	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Total
Total	73	90	49	57	42	46	54	57	70	56	594
North America	6	8	2	7	0	4	3	5	5	2	42
Latin America	17	11	10	18	12	8	14	9	16	14	129
Western Europe	25	37	24	22	20	21	18	25	29	13	234
USSR/Eastern Europe	1	2	3	3	3	0	1	1	3	0	17
Sub-Saharan Africa	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	3	3	1	13
Middle East and North Africa	13	24	5	3	2	4	12	6	12	18	99
Asia/other	10	6	4	3	4	9	6	8	2	8	60

^a Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks,
1981 and 1982/83

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Chronology

This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications. [redacted] 25X1

1 March 1983

Portugal: Arrest of Portuguese Terrorists

In Porto, two members of the Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) were arrested after a shootout, in which two policemen and three terrorists were wounded. Police are searching for three other FP-25 members whose identities may have been revealed by arrested terrorists. Confiscated weapons, tools, clothing, and sketches indicated the group was planning a bank robbery. [redacted] 25X1

7 April 1983

West Germany: Third Cache of Kexel Group Located

In Heusenstamm, security authorities uncovered a cache belonging to the right-wing Kexel group. This cache, the third to be found since the February 1983 arrest of five group members, contained various currencies, identification documents, and other written material. The arrest of a Kexel group contact also resulted in the confiscation of explosive ingredients, instructions for making explosives, identity cards, and cash, as well as a map of other cache sites. [redacted] 25X1

12 April 1983

Canada: Terrorists Charged in Litton Bombing

Five members of the Canadian Direct Action group, being held for a series of terrorist activities in British Columbia, have been charged in connection with the 14 October 1982 bombing at the Litton Systems, Ltd., plant in Toronto. In a communique following the attack, Direct Action threatened Canadian contractors working on US strategic systems. [redacted] 25X1

Lebanon: Press Offices Targeted

Agence France-Presse (the French news service) offices in Beirut were the target of an attempted bombing in mid-April. Following the discovery of a suspicious suitcase by an AFP employee, Lebanese police defused a 45-pound TNT bomb minutes before it was set to explode. No group has claimed credit. [redacted] 25X1

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15 April 1983

Spain: Incendiary Attack on US Air Force Vehicle

In Tudela, a small leftist radical group, Communist Movement, claimed credit for an incendiary attack on a US Air Force truck; the attack caused only minor damage. The Communist Movement also conducted a similar attack on a plaza in Tudela on 14 April. This group is antigovernment and anti-American and previously carried out minor attacks annually on 14 April to commemorate Franco's defeat of the Republic during the Spanish Civil War. The group has only attacked targets of opportunity, apparently without intent to cause personal injury.

[REDACTED]

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20 April 1983

Peru: Embassy Guard Wounded

Unidentified terrorists firing from an automobile wounded a Peruvian Civil Guard on duty at the Costa Rican Embassy. According to the police, the Guard returned fire, but the assailants fled. The attack was the third at an embassy in Lima this year.

[REDACTED]

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21 April 1983

Burma: Karen Insurgents Attempt Hijacking

An attempted hijacking of a Burma Airways domestic flight by three Karen National Union (KNU) members was thwarted by Burmese authorities. The KNU is an ethnic insurgent organization, which has conducted guerrilla and terrorist operations against the Burmese Government.

[REDACTED]

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South Africa: Fourth Bomb Attack in Pietermaritzburg

A bomb explosion near the old Supreme Court Building in Pietermaritzburg caused extensive damage. Earlier in the day the Supreme Court had upheld a conviction under the Terrorism Act. This was the fourth bomb attack on Pietermaritzburg this year.

[REDACTED]

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22 April 1983

Italy: Arrest of Italian Terrorists

In Rome, two members of the extreme rightwing terrorist organization "Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari" (NAR) were arrested by Carabinieri. The subsequent discovery of an NAR safehouse led to confiscation of weapons, blank identification cards, and two police uniforms. Italian police believe one of the arrested NAR members, Fabrizio Zani, who had recently returned from France, was attempting to reorganize the terrorist group in Italy.

[REDACTED]

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France: Vandalism on Behalf of Direct Action

In Paris, a group described as "Anti-Imperialist Commando Unit" vandalized the Museum of the Legion of Honor, causing considerable damage to exhibits. In a communique the group demanded the release of Direct Action member Frederic Oriach arrested in October 1982.

[REDACTED]

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23 April 1983

Malta: Off the Diplomatic Hook

With the return of two Libyans responsible for the hijacking of a Libyan aircraft to Malta in late February, Valletta has avoided Bonn Declaration antihijacking sanctions. In an effort to bring the hijacking to a peaceful conclusion, Malta initially guaranteed the hijackers temporary haven and safe passage out of the country. The Libyans, however, were held incommunicado by the Maltese. Diplomatic rumor had earlier suggested that Malta might try to arrange a deal with Tripoli in exchange for the hijackers, but we believe Western pressure played a role in the outcome of the case. [redacted] 25X1

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25 April 1983

The Middle East: Armenian Threat

A letter containing veiled threats against the US presence in the Middle East and calling for US withdrawal from the region was delivered to the US Embassy in Damascus by the Armenian Orthodox Bishop for Southern Syria. The letter was written by an anonymous group of Syrian and Lebanese Armenian intellectuals. We note the Armenian community has generated an intense media campaign in the wake of the December 1982 disappearance of the Dashnag Party Intelligence Chief in Beirut. This letter may be another example of the campaign to gain publicity for the Armenian cause. [redacted] 25X1

26 April 1983

Ecuador: Honduran Embassy Seized

Approximately 20 persons identifying themselves as members of the Ruminahui Solidarity Front took over the premises of the Honduran Embassy in Quito demanding the withdrawal of the Ecuadorean Ambassador to Honduras and an Ecuadorean Foreign Ministry statement in favor of a peaceful solution in Central America. The group held three embassy employees hostage for 16 hours before reaching agreement with Ecuadorean authorities that no arrests would be made. [redacted] 25X1

27 April 1983

Denmark: Bomb Attacks Against US Firms

In Copenhagen, homemade bombs were thrown at two US firms, causing limited property damage but no injuries. No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, but police suspect that a local anarchist/squatter/youth group, "BZ," may have been responsible, acting in sympathy with a protest demonstration against US policy in Central America. [redacted] 25X1

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Spain: Iraultza Claims Spanish Bombing

In San Sebastian, the Basque group Iraultza claimed responsibility for the bombing of a computer firm, which caused considerable damage. A communique to a Basque newspaper claimed the attack was to protest "Yankee imperialism." Since the computer firm was wholly German owned, we suspect Iraultza lacks a competent intelligence apparatus. The ability of the group to conduct bombings is of concern, given its targeting of US firms. [redacted]

25X1

Haiti: Officials Receive Letter Bombs

Three Haitian officials and a prominent Haitian businessman were mailed letter bombs from the United States; all but one bore a Miami postmark. One letter bomb was opened by its intended victim but failed to explode. Police immediately initiated a search and found the remaining three. We believe the letter bombs were probably mailed by the Hector Riobe Brigade, a Haitian terrorist organization based in the United States, and may have been the Brigade's response to an alleged assassination plot directed against a Brigade financier living in Jamaica. [redacted]

25X1

28 April 1983

France: Arrest of FLNC Terrorists

In Paris, police arrested two Corsican FLNC members in possession of \$480,000 in counterfeit US currency, apparently for use in terrorist operations. [redacted]

25X1

29 April 1983

Spain: Bombing of US-Affiliated Company

In Pamplona, a bomb exploded outside the Rank Xerox office, resulting in minor damage. Although no group has claimed credit, the Rank Xerox office in Bilbao had been the target in February 1983 of an attack claimed by the Basque terrorist group. We suspect this attack may also be the work of Iraultza because to date Iraultza has been the only Basque terrorist group targeting US interests. [redacted]

25X1

Spain: Civil Guard Slain in Basque Country

In Laracha, a Civil Guard officer was killed in an ambush. No group has yet claimed credit, but we suspect the Military Wing of the Basque separatist group ETA was probably responsible. [redacted]

25X1

France: Corsican Terrorism Spreads to France

In Marseilles, the Corsican separatist group Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) spokesman called *Agence France-Presse* to claim responsibility for 15 bomb explosions in Paris, Marseilles, and Aix-en-Provence. The FLNC spokesman also stated FLNC had ended its truce with the French Government and threatened more attacks. Although the explosions caused considerable damage, there were no injuries. The attacks on French mainland targets appear to be in response to the French police crackdown on the terrorist group in Corsica. [redacted]

25X1

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30 April 1983**France: Arrest of FLNC Terrorists**

In Paris, French police arrested five FLNC members, including the Paris representative of the banned FLNC, and discovered two arms caches containing bomb-making equipment and counterfeit US currency. The latest arrests are the most damaging blow yet struck at the FLNC by French authorities. [REDACTED]

25X1

Italy: Arrest of Prima Linea Terrorists

In Rome, Italian antiterrorist police arrested three Prima Linea (PL) terrorists, including most wanted escaped prisoner Massimo Carafara, who masterminded the Ronconi Prison break several months ago. Police recovered weapons, disguise kits, and documents listing names and titles of Italian police, political figures, and public officials. [REDACTED]

25X1

Late April 1983**Pakistan: Iranian Terrorists Released**

Several Iranians held by Pakistan in connection with the mid-February bombings of French facilities in Karachi have been released, [REDACTED] In a move that angered Pakistani intelligence and security officials, the Secretariat of the Chief Martial Law Administrator—which reports directly to President Zia—ordered the release of all remaining detainees in the case, despite their confessed involvement. Authorities had initially arrested about 12 Iranian students at the Karachi University on suspicion of involvement in the incident; seven were freed shortly thereafter. Although Zia has been described [REDACTED] as extremely irritated by Iranian activities in Pakistan, he almost certainly approved the release of the students. Islamabad's successful effort in late February to have the Iranian consul general—who was also implicated by the students—recalled might have prompted the release as a conciliatory move. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Beirut: Heads Up at American University

Press reports indicate that at least three small bombs have been discovered at the American University in Beirut since the 18 April bombing of the US Embassy. All were defused by Lebanese authorities. The most recent attempt occurred on 27 April when an explosive device was found set to detonate with the opening of a restroom door at AUB. No group claimed credit for the bombs, which were most likely inspired by the attack on the Embassy a few days earlier. [REDACTED]

25X1

1 May 1983**United States-Cuba: US Aircraft Hijacked**

A Capitol Airlines flight en route from San Juan to Miami with 212 persons aboard was hijacked to Cuba by a man claiming to have a weapon and explosives. The hijacker was later identified as Rigoberto Gonzalez Sanchez, a Cuban exile with a record of at least two prior hijacking attempts in the United States. The hijacker was taken into custody by Cuban authorities, and the plane and passengers proceeded on to Miami without further incident. [REDACTED]

25X1

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2 May 1983

West Germany: Sentencing of RAF Terrorist

In Stuttgart, RAF terrorist Helga Roos was sentenced to four years and nine months in prison for her part in the RAF-attempted assassination of a US Army commander in Europe in 1981. Roos provided support for the RAF members who conducted the attack on General Kroesen. [redacted]


25X1

Spain: Bombings in Basque Country

In Irun and Bilbao, Basque terrorists bombed three shops. An anonymous caller gave a warning, which probably prevented any injuries, in one of the attacks. Although no group has claimed credit for the attacks, we believe these bombings are a continuation of ETA's attempts to fund operations through the extortion of "revolutionary taxes" by threatened violence. [redacted]

25X1

3 May 1983



25X6

Italy: Italian Terrorist Attack

In Rome, two members of a Red Brigades (RB) subgroup shot and wounded a university professor. In a later telephone call, a spokesman claimed credit for the attack in the name of the Partito Communist Combattente, a known subgroup of the RB militarist column. The targeting was uncharacteristic of Red Brigades operations; the professor may have been attacked because of his association with the Italian Socialist Party, or as part of a terrorist effort to disrupt national elections in June. [redacted] this PCC group is in touch with three Prima Linea terrorists arrested 30 April (see item). These contacts may indicate an attempted reorganization within various Italian terrorist groups and possible cooperation on terrorist attacks. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

4 May 1983

Spain: Basque Terrorists Suspected in Triple Slaying

In Bilbao, three people were slain in an apparently botched kidnap attempt. Two of the victims were police officers—the third, the pregnant wife of one of the men. Basque terrorists are suspected of the killings because they have frequently targeted the police and Civil Guard. [redacted]

25X1

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Brazil: US Consulate Receives Bomb Threat

A caller identifying himself as Habib Rashid, a Lebanese member of the Black September Organization living in Rio de Janeiro, advised the US Consulate in Recife that a bomb had been placed on the premises and that Secretary Shultz would "be eliminated." In a subsequent call, Rashid demanded that the Consulate release a statement to the local media repudiating US Middle East foreign policy. A search of the premises revealed no bomb. [redacted] 25X1

5 May 1983

South Korea-China: Hijacking

Six people hijacked a domestic Chinese flight to South Korea, wounding two crew members before the hijackers surrendered to authorities. The hijackers were seeking political asylum; the penalty for hijacking in China is death. [redacted] 25X1

Spain: Continuing Basque Violence

25X1

In Vitoria, two grenade attacks and a machinegun attack severely wounded a Civil Guard in Guernica, prior to the 8 May municipal elections in Spain. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] the increased violence by the Basque separatist group ETA will hurt the election chances of the Herri Batasuna, the political arm of ETA. [redacted] 25X1

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