



Directorate of  
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**Terrorism  
Review**



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14 April 1983

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14 April 1983

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**Terrorism  
Review** [Redacted]

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*Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone*

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**France:  
Terrorism on Corsica**



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The terrorist activities of the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) are likely to continue despite French attempts to stem the violence on the island.

terrorist groups, among them the Irish, Basques, Kurds, Catalonians, and Galicians. Speculation in the press has centered on ties to Libya and the Middle East, including the possibility that Corsicans have been trained in Lebanon.

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The FLNC was formed in 1976 and operates as the terrorist faction of the Corsican autonomist movement. The FLNC initially directed its attacks against businesses, a tactic that caused few casualties. The imposition of a "revolutionary tax" on "foreigners" in December 1982 marked a change in FLNC policy. No longer satisfied with property destruction, the FLNC has expanded its targets to include individuals refusing to pay the tax.

At present, most Corsicans are opposed to the methods, if not the aims, of the terrorists, and, while the FLNC will almost certainly continue its terrorist activities, it is highly improbable that the group will gain broad support.

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The French Government banned the FLNC on 5 January 1983 following a violent wave of bombings at the end of 1982. After his election in 1981, President Francois Mitterrand attempted to appease Corsican autonomists, promising to end police surveillance and to cut back the French police force. The upsurge in FLNC activities gave conservative critics an opportunity to accuse the Socialist government of being soft on terrorism and forced Mitterrand to enact tough measures to reaffirm his opposition to terrorism. In the course of this crackdown Mitterrand fired the two senior law enforcement officials on Corsica, sent in French police reinforcements, and appointed a nationally known police official, Robert Broussard, as coordinator of Corsican security forces.

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An FLNC spokesman has stated that at least one faction of the party is undeterred by French Government actions and intends to continue its terrorist activities, expanding them to the mainland if necessary. We are not able to confirm widespread public speculation that the FLNC is receiving outside support, which, if true, would be an important factor in the group's ability to continue the attacks. There have been public contacts between the FLNC and other

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**The Legal Response to the Terrorist Challenge** [redacted]

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The international community has enacted conventions and agreements to counter skyjacking, extradition, threats to diplomats, and hostage seizure; more effective remedies, however, have been taken by individual nations that make the operational climate less hospitable for the terrorist by limiting, in specific circumstances, constitutional guarantees. [redacted]

shock value, and a 1973 antiskyjacking agreement with Cuba. A PLO declaration in 1975 that air piracy would be treated as a crime served as a further deterrent. [redacted] 25X1

More than any other act, aircraft hijacking has mobilized the international community which, under the aegis of the International Civil Aviation Organization, adopted three international conventions—the 1963 Tokyo Convention, the 1970 Hague Convention, and the 1971 Montreal Convention. Although these agreements provide a legal framework for dealing with attacks against civil aviation and address important jurisdictional issues, none compels compliance. In 1978 a major step was taken to rectify this weakness when a declaration was formulated and signed in Bonn by the heads of state of the Seven Summit Countries.<sup>2</sup> This accord provides for the suspension of service by the airlines of the signatory states to any country refusing to return a hijacked aircraft or failing to extradite or prosecute an aircraft hijacker (see table 1). [redacted]

Like the three antiskyjacking conventions, other international antiterrorist agreements are also flawed. Both the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and the 1979 UN Convention Against the Taking of Hostages permit a state to deny extradition if it determines the act to have been a political offense and, therefore, nonextraditable.<sup>3</sup> In general such accords lack effective sanctions and contain loopholes. They do, however, provide a legal framework for action and put countries on record as being prepared to take certain measures in response to terrorism. [redacted] 25X1

National-level antiterrorist or emergency legislation complemented by vigorous enforcement have been more effective than international accords in combating international terrorism. These measures are tailored to specific legal, social, and security considerations. They may limit freedom of speech, association, and movement and also restrict access to counsel, bail, and speedy trial (see table 2). [redacted] 25X1

The effect of such agreements is difficult to gauge. A precipitous drop in skyjacking occurred in 1973—when the number of offenses fell to less than half the 1969-70 high—after the three conventions but some five years before the Bonn Declaration. Open source literature and terrorism experts ascribe the marked decrease to improved airport security, diminished

In 1968, to counter mounting leftwing student violence, West Germany passed legislation that facilitated implementation of a state of emergency—thereby providing the federal government special powers to cope with a growing terrorist threat. The penal code was amended in the early 1970s to permit exclusion from a particular trial of a defense attorney for involvement in activities that endangered the security of the state. In response to the kidnaping of German

<sup>2</sup> Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. [redacted]

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**Table 1**  
**Antiskijacking Agreements**

Agreement	Key Provisions	Remarks
Tokyo Convention (1963)	Clarifies jurisdiction over alleged offender.  Provides legal principles for dealing with offenses committed aboard an aircraft.  Provides for return of skyjacked aircraft to owners.	Although this convention provides no effective means to bring a skyjacker to justice, it established a precedent for multilateral action.
The Hague Convention (1970)	Requires a contracting state to prosecute or extradite an alleged offender and impose "severe" but unspecified penalties.	Established universal jurisdiction for skyjacking, thereby allowing any country holding an alleged skyjacker to try him, but did not establish priority of jurisdiction in event of competing claims nor deal with a hijacking initiated or attempted before takeoff or after landing.
Montreal Convention (1971)	Extends provisions of The Hague Convention to sabotage and attacks against airports, navigation facilities, and aircraft on the ground.	Employs The Hague extradite-or-prosecute formula, but leaves the determination of "severe" penalties to the state holding the fugitives, thereby providing a loophole that enables a state to fulfill the letter but not the spirit of the agreement.
Bonn Declaration (1978)	Asserts that when a country refuses to extradite or prosecute an aircraft hijacker or to return the hijacked aircraft, the airlines of the Seven Summit Countries will halt service to the offending state.	Since the airlines of the signatory states carry an estimated two-thirds of the non-Communist world's air passenger traffic, the Bonn Declaration provides the means to effectively punish countries that violate the antiskijacking conventions.

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**Table 2**  
**Selected European Countries: Key Provisions of National Legislation Used to Counter Terrorism<sup>a</sup>**

	Austria	Belgium	France	Italy	Netherlands	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom	West Germany
Association with a terrorist deemed a criminal offense	CC	CC	A/EL	A/EL	CC	CC	CC	A/EL	A/EL
Advocacy of terrorist acts deemed a criminal offense	CC	CC	CC	A/EL	CC	CC	CC	CC	A/EL
Detention without formal charges for limited time	CC	CC	CC	A/EL	CC	CC	CC	A/EL	A/EL
Temporary restriction or ban on lawyer-client contact	None	A/EL	None	None	A/EL	None	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL
Monitor lawyer-client communication	CC	A/EL	CC	CC	A/EL	CC	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL
Interrogation without counsel present	PC	PC	PC	A/EL	PC	PC	PC	PC	PC
Exclusion of defense attorney from trial	PC	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL	PC	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL
Trial without defendant present	PC	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL	PC	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL

<sup>a</sup> Cited in general provisions of the national criminal code (CC) or the national procedural code (PC) or provided for by special antiterrorist/emergency legislation (A/EL).

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industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer in 1977, Germany passed a law that provided a two-week ban on contact between a terrorist prisoner and the outside world when such contact could facilitate terrorist operations. Specifically designed to prevent attorneys from using their access to imprisoned terrorists to smuggle contraband or to serve as a covert communications link, this law remains particularly controversial as it limits access to legal counsel. This law may be amended to allow state-appointed attorneys to talk with terrorist prisoners during the ban. [redacted]

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Italy, too, has enacted tough antiterrorist legislation that permits search without warrant, detention up to 48 hours without charge, interrogation without presence of counsel, and pretrial detention for up to five years. One of the most effective measures, passed in 1982 but since lapsed, provided reduced sentences for repentant terrorists. Although Italian authorities had obtained valuable information through plea bargaining in the past, this law formalized such arrangements and provided a legal basis for fulfilling prior promises.

[redacted]

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In our view, national law will continue to be the more effective means to counter international terrorism. Its most useful application, in our estimation, is to offer security forces increased latitude and capabilities without doing violence to constitutional guarantees or cherished legal traditions. Experience has shown that the public in a democratic society will support such measures if they perceive them to be necessary, short term, and exercised with restraint. [redacted]

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**Group Profile:  
15 May Organization**

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The radical Palestinian terrorist group 15 May is based in Baghdad and specializes in the use of sophisticated, hard-to-detect explosive devices.

[Redacted]

The Arabic Organization of the 15th of May for the Liberation of Palestine (15 May)<sup>1</sup> was formed from a remnant of Wadi Haddad's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Operations Group (PFLP-SOG), one of the most effective terrorist groups in the Near East and Europe, which splintered after Haddad's death in March 1978. Abu Ibrahim (the nom de guerre of Husayn al-Umari), an expert in fabricating explosives and sabotage devices, announced the establishment of 15 May in early 1979 and has since headed the group.

The 15 May group is not affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It has conducted international terrorist operations against Israeli and Western interests since its formation. PLO-affiliated groups have refrained from terrorist attacks outside Israel and the occupied territories during this period.

[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Area]

<sup>1</sup> The name commemorates the date of the establishment of Israel.

[Redacted]

To date all but two targets, US commercial aircraft, have been Israeli or Jewish interests. We believe that some 15 May operations against Israeli interests in Western Europe were undertaken, at Iraqi instigation, to retaliate for the Israeli airstrike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in the summer of 1981.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] the group started a bombing campaign in the summer of 1982 to retaliate for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

15 May operatives were dispatched to various cities with bombs hidden in luggage. Such devices were discovered on board two American airliners and in a Geneva hotel.

[Redacted]

Based on technical examinations, Abu Ibrahim has devised a means of passing plastic explosive devices undetected through airport security systems. Made of pentareathirite tetrinitrate (petn) the explosives have a strong odor of cocoa butter. They neither register on explosive detectors nor can be detected by bomb dogs. The device discovered in a suitcase in a Geneva hotel by Swiss police included a sheet explosive sewed behind the liner of a suitcase. At first glance the plastique resembled a thick cardboard liner. A second carry-on bag with explosives also contained a charge and an electronic firing device in a plastic-encased flap. The firing mechanism was further disguised by being placed beneath a portable radio. When X-rayed, the firing device components blend into the radio circuitry.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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**Chronology of 15 May Operations**

	City	Event
<b>1980</b>		
17 January	London	Bomb explosion in Mount Royal Hotel.
21 April	Zurich	Explosive discovered in luggage of an El Al passenger.
27 July	Antwerp	Two grenades thrown at Jewish vacationers.
<b>1981</b>		
16 May	Rome	Bomb explosion at El Al office.
	Istanbul	Bomb explosion at El Al office.
9 August	Rome	Bomb explosion at El Al office.
10 August	Athens	Israeli Embassy bombed.
	Vienna	Israeli Embassy bombed.
20 December	Haifa	Orion sunk.
<b>1982</b>		
9 January	Istanbul	Bomb explosion at El Al office.
15 January	Berlin	Jewish restaurant bombed.
11 August	Tokyo	Bomb explosion on Pan Am flight en route to Hawaii.
25 August	Rio de Janeiro	Bomb discovered on Pan Am jetliner.
2 September	Geneva	Bomb discovered in Noga Hilton Hotel.

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## Book Review

*The following is the first of a series of monthly reviews of books and articles concerning terrorism, which we believe are worth your attention. We intend to be selective rather than comprehensive in our approach to the literature.*

***Terrorism: Theory and Practice***, edited by Jonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson, West View Press Incorporated, 1979.

This well-chosen collection of essays provides an interesting overview of the terrorist problem. Its initial essay, entitled "Out-Inventing the Terrorist," suggests some important conceptual distinctions relevant to the analysis of the terrorism problem. This essay approaches the subject of terrorism from three separate yet interrelated points of view. The first approach, entitled "traditional analytical," is the approach of the intelligence analyst, which precedes from known capabilities and intentions—a firm data base—to projections of likely future behavior and trends. The second approach, termed "speculative," reverses the capabilities-intentions progression and begins by evaluating the optimum terrorist target. The final approach focuses on "crisis management" and those areas of information that must be provided rapidly to support crisis decisionmaking in a terrorist event.

Two articles by British social scientist Paul Wilkinson are also worthy of note. The first—"Social Scientific Theory in Civil Violence"—explores the rather thin theoretical foundation in the social and behavioral sciences for a comprehensive understanding of the terrorism phenomena. Wilkinson's second piece—"Terrorist Movements"—explores the origins of the archetypical terrorist group that explicitly practices terrorism as its primary weapon for certain professed political ends.

Several of the other articles that focus on key issue areas—the Northern Ireland problem, hostage negotiations, the relationship between terrorism and the media, and the future of terrorism—may also be of some interest.



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## Special Analysis

### Spain: The Socialists Tackle ETA

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The landslide victory by the Socialist Party (PSOE) in the parliamentary election last year generated considerable public speculation that the 24-year history of ETA, the Basque terrorist organization, might be drawing to a close. For nearly a quarter of a century ETA—a Basque acronym for “Basque Fatherland and Liberty”—has fought for an independent, and in recent years Marxist, Basque state.

ETA's prestige has dropped sharply in the post-Franco era. The restoration of democracy in 1977, and especially the granting of extensive autonomy to the Basque country and other regions, deprived the terrorists of virtually all their popular support outside Euskadi (the Basque region). Within Euskadi, support for ETA also appears to have declined: in a 1982 poll only 8 percent of Basques claimed to favor ETA, down from 15 percent in 1981. Electoral results reveal that ETA retains some credibility chiefly among the roughly 15 percent of Basque voters who support Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity—HB), the political front of ETA's military wing.

Increasing isolation has exacerbated ETA's divisive tendencies. The longstanding division between the organization's political-military wing (ETA-PM) and the originally more aggressive military faction (ETA-M) has been supplemented in recent years by schisms within ETA-PM itself. The need to replicate support systems for a dwindling number of terrorists, battle fatigue on the part of ETA militants, and improved police efficiency have combined to lessen the effectiveness of all segments of the organization in recent years. Nevertheless, ETA remains a dangerous and thoroughly professional terrorist group. The pos-

sibility of military reactions to its actions is a constant threat to Spain's political stability: the abortive coup of 23 February 1981 was above all justified by the need to excise the so-called “separatist cancer” of ETA.

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#### The Socialists in Power

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We believe that many Spaniards felt that only the Socialists—who had sympathized with the anti-Franco motives of the pre-1975 ETA—could successfully negotiate with the organization. Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez nourished these hopes indirectly by citing the resolution of the Basque problem as one of his government's top priorities and by making a vague, but encouraging, public offer of comprehensive negotiations to Carlos Garaicoechea, President of the Basque regional government.

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More concrete developments also fueled speculation about an end to the cycle of violence. HB publicly announced that it was beginning an internal debate on the advisability of participating in provincial and regional governments in the Basque country, which it had previously boycotted as “illegitimate.” ETA-M's political front also offered to hold open discussions with the Socialists on a general solution to the Basque problem—a move that could be interpreted only as an offer by the terrorists themselves to negotiate.

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The time frame envisaged for a settlement, however, was two years, and the more lethal ETA-M was determined to step up its terrorist activities in the short run in order to

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force Madrid to the negotiating table. ETA-PM, on the other hand, was reportedly considering disbanding and joining a far left Basque nationalist splinter party.

[redacted]

**An Empty "Peace Table"**

The post-electoral optimism was shattered by the 3 November assassination by ETA-M of General Victor Lago Roman, the Spanish Army's top field commander. The spectacular murder revealed that the PSOE could expect no favors from ETA-M. Nevertheless, the attack, condemned by all parties except HB, did not quash all talk of a negotiated settlement. Garaicoechea, accepting Gonzalez's olive branch, elaborated a plan for tripartite public negotiations among his Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), the PSOE, and HB. HB accepted, and the PSOE affirmed its willingness to talk provided that ETA-M maintained a de facto cease-fire during the negotiations.

[redacted]

The Peace Table, however, was never constituted. An attempt to bring all parties together failed in mid-January when HB refused to participate unless the press was permitted to cover the proceedings live. ETA-M simultaneously launched a new round of violence that claimed five victims. The PSOE then pulled out of the stillborn talks, stating that it could not talk with "murderers." Garaicoechea tried to revive the discussions during early February, but the PSOE now demanded an explicit truce with ETA-M before talking. ETA responded with yet another escalation of violence, and Garaicoechea pronounced his proposal to be at present "unviable." After only a few months, hopes for a peaceful solution to the Basque problem had degenerated into bitter public recriminations and a stepped-up cycle of terrorist atrocities.

[redacted]

**ETA's Motives**

We believe that the erratic behavior of both ETA-M and HB during the Peace Table interlude was the product of struggles between hardline and more conciliatory elements in both organizations. HB's decision not to revise its policy of refusing to recognize provincial and regional Basque institutions indicates that party hardliners have reasserted control. HB, however, has not been able to preserve its public

facade of total unanimity. According to press reports, a top HB leader has recently submitted an "internal paper" severely critical of the party and predicting a setback in the May municipal election if HB does not alter its "leftist, childish, mystical, and third-worldish" policies.

[redacted]

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In our view, however, ETA-M dictates HB's actions. HB probably demanded live press coverage of the Peace Table talks in response to ETA-M's request to stall the negotiations until the terrorists could completely torpedo them by breaking the de facto truce demanded by the Socialists. The derailment by ETA-M and HB of the discussions they themselves had first proposed has, in our view, stripped both groups of what little credibility they may have retained as good faith negotiators.

[redacted]

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ETA-PM's absence from the Peace Table negotiations was as significant as HB's abortive presence. The Political-Military branch was crippled last year when one of its factions (the 7th Assembly) accepted former Interior Minister Juan Jose Roson's clandestinely negotiated offer of amnesty for militants not suspected of blood crimes and resettlement in South America for others. The 7th Assembly has since dissolved itself, leaving the small 8th Assembly to carry on alone. Weakened by defections and under intensifying police pressure, elements of ETA-PM are reconciling their differences with ETA-M and fusing with the military wing. The press speculates that ETA-PM is poised to dissolve itself, [redacted] the most radical of 8th Assembly terrorists have already joined ETA-M, leaving only a rump of several dozen individuals constituting a rapidly disintegrating ETA-PM.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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**The Socialists' Strategy**

We believe that the Socialists' experience at the Peace Table has convinced them of the futility of open talks with the terrorists. Txiki Benegas, the top PSOE leader in the Basque country, has publicly enunciated the government's new strategy. After a period of reorganization and reinforcement, the police will stage an all-out offensive against the terrorists, including the first thorough dragnet of the Basque

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provinces in years. If these police measures have a telling effect, then the government might be prepared to enter into secret negotiations regarding the surrender of the organization's remaining members.

In our view the PSOE has good reason to adopt a tough stance at this juncture. Popular resentment of ETA in the Basque country is at an alltime high, fueled by a series of particularly bloody attacks that killed innocent bystanders. A recent anti-ETA march in Bilbao drew a record number of demonstrators. The government probably feels it can take advantage of the backlash against ETA to introduce into the Basque country without serious incident the higher profile police presence that a massive antiterrorist operation requires. Madrid has given the police strict orders not to resort to torture—the persistence of which has impeded full-scale public mobilization against ETA in the past

the government is cautiously optimistic that the French will at least marginally increase their cooperation with Spanish authorities. Even minimal cooperation, such as the exchange of information on terrorists' whereabouts, could significantly enhance the Socialists' anti-ETA drive.

**The Basque Government: Caught in the Middle**

The collapse of Garaicoechea's peace plan has placed the PNV-controlled Basque regional government in an uncomfortable position. As fellow Basques who in the past sympathized with the terrorists (ETA emerged from a PNV youth group in the 1950s), the PNV considers itself to be uniquely qualified to broker a political compromise between Madrid and ETA. The content of such an arrangement, however, has never been clear. Madrid granted a blanket amnesty for political crimes in 1977, and the Basque country has attained the highest level of regional self-government compatible with the constitution. Madrid has little but symbolic gestures or generous rhetoric to offer either the PNV or ETA. As long as the terrorists refuse to accept the PSOE's demand for a truce, chances for a resumption of talks are virtually nil. Even if the PNV managed to lure ETA and the government back to the negotiating table, we believe

that no government in Madrid could accept even ETA's minimum demands.

The Basque government has one trump card: its newly created autonomous police force (Ertzaina). The Ertzaina is now restricted to ceremonial and traffic functions.

We believe that if the PNV's contacts and knowledge were exploited jointly by the Ertzaina and the national police, considerable headway would be made in the struggle against ETA. A recent assault by ETA-M on an Ertzaina barracks—resulting in no deaths but in the theft of arms and ammunition—indicates that the terrorists do not intend to treat the autonomous police as "neutrals." If more such attacks take place, the Basque government could begin to shift away from its current position of ineffectual equidistance between the warring parties and toward more forthright cooperation with Madrid.

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**Outlook**

The collapse of Garaicoechea's peace initiative has embittered political relations between regional and national parties in Euskadi and ended the postelectoral honeymoon between the PNV and the PSOE.

government-mandated personnel shakeups in the counterterrorist police units will probably lessen their effectiveness over the near term. The apparent reunification of various ETA factions will in our view temporarily strengthen the terrorists by enabling them to pool resources. Thus we believe that the prospects for a short-term settlement—whether political or police centered—of the Basque problem are exceedingly poor.

The longer term perspective, however, is not quite so grim: Some of the government's structural changes in the counterterrorist apparatus—such as moving the command headquarters from Madrid to the Basque

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country—may enhance its long-term effectiveness. A comprehensive dragnet operation in the region would probably further deplete ETA's already dwindling ranks. The arrests of a number of terrorists in recent weeks may be the first fruits of the government's hardline tactics. Similar detentions across the border are also evidence of a willingness on the part of the French to cooperate in a restricted fashion with Spanish security forces. Finally, the massive repudiation of violence by the Basque populace after the breakdown of the peace talks and ETA's particularly gruesome recent attacks augur for a less hospitable environment for the terrorists. [redacted]

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Whether the PSOE can quickly and effectively take advantage of these potentially favorable circumstances will depend in part on its general public support in the region. The municipal election scheduled for May will be an important bellwether in this respect. A drop in the HB vote, combined with stagnation for the PNV and a good showing for the PSOE, would indicate that a substantial segment of the population had at least grudgingly accepted the government's resort to police methods. [redacted]

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Changes in the correlation of party forces, gestures by Madrid or Vitoria, and political or negotiating measures in general, however, will in our view go only so far toward eliminating Basque terrorism. The most flexible and realistic of ETA terrorists have in large part already given up the fight. What remains is a hard core of fanatics, financed by an elaborate system of extortion (the so-called revolutionary taxes) and still enjoying a relatively safe haven in France. This nucleus resembles an organized crime syndicate more than a classic ideologically motivated terrorist organization. Its final destruction will depend on the PSOE's willingness to use tough and thorough police measures, accompanied by negotiations only when the government has a position of unassailable strength. Spain's Socialists are prepared to take this route—and they know it will be long and difficult. [redacted]

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### Statistical Overview

#### Type of Victim of International Terrorist Attacks, July 1982–March 1983 <sup>a</sup>


	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Total
<b>Total</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>536</b>
Government officials	4	5	1	0	2	2	6	2	3	25
Diplomats	36	47	30	35	22	22	27	33	32	284
Military	8	10	9	13	6	10	9	2	10	77
Business	13	13	4	2	11	8	1	8	7	67
Private parties, tourists, missionaries, and students	7	2	5	3	2	3	7	9	6	44
Other	5	13	1	4	2	1	4	3	6	39

#### Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks, July 1982–March 1983 <sup>a</sup>

	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Total
<b>Total</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>536</b>
North America	6	8	2	7	0	4	3	5	4	39
Latin America	17	11	11	18	13	8	14	9	15	116
Western Europe	25	37	24	22	20	21	18	25	26	218
USSR/Eastern Europe	1	2	3	3	3	0	1	1	3	17
Sub-Saharan Africa	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	3	3	12
Middle East and North Africa	13	24	5	3	4	4	12	6	11	82
Asia/other	10	6	4	3	4	9	6	8	2	52

<sup>a</sup> Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.

#### Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks 1981 and 1982/83





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### Chronology

*This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications.*

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**January 1983**

#### **Turkey: Terrorists Penetrate Police**

A Turkish National Police (TNP) counterterrorist operation produced evidence that Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left) members had scheduled a bombing campaign against the US Consulate and several Turkish businesses in Istanbul, to be conducted by terrorists wearing stolen Turkish military uniforms. The TNP believes the arrests of approximately 70 Dev Sol members and the confiscation of weapons, explosives, and Turkish military, police, and telephone company uniforms have disrupted the campaign. Police interrogations have indicated that several National Police personnel were supplying intelligence to Dev Sol terrorists. Internal police investigations to identify terrorist sympathizers within TNP ranks are under way.

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**28 February 1983**

#### **West Germany: Bombing of US Subsidiary**

We believe the fire extinguisher bombing of Standard Electric Lorenz (SEL) in Dusseldorf, a subsidiary of US-owned corporation ITT, was conducted by the Revolutionary Cells (RZ). Despite the lack of a confessor letter, the type of device used and the time of attack match previous RZ attacks. We note the RZ has become increasingly active in the North Rhineland area. The group conducted and claimed 13 attacks in 1982, compared with two attacks it claimed in 1981.

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4 March 1983

**Switzerland: Expulsion of Libyan Diplomat**

A Libyan intelligence officer has been expelled from Switzerland. [redacted]

[redacted] Muhammad Abd al-Malik, head of the Libyan People's Bureau in Bern, was deported following revelations that Malik had used an American woman in intelligence operations directed at Swiss parliamentarians. Evidence against Malik had also been established during the trial of two Swiss terrorist sympathizers in late February indicating that weapons found in their possession were brought into Switzerland from the United Kingdom by the Libyan official. We believe the Libyans have provided weapons to terrorists in Europe since at least the early 1970s, but this is one of the few well-documented cases of such support. [redacted]

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7 March 1983

**France: Armenian Terrorist Plans**

In a magazine interview, the French lawyer representing imprisoned Armenian terrorists stated that Armenian terrorism in the future will be directed against Turkish economic targets in the United States, particularly Turkish Airlines. [redacted]

25X1

8 March 1983

**Lebanon: Attempted Assassination of PLO Official**

[redacted] the Christian-led Lebanese Forces Militia was responsible for the assassination attempt of a senior PLO official in Beirut, Tawfiq Safadi. [redacted] PLO intelligence officials believe the militia intended to undermine rapprochement between the Lebanese Government and the PLO, in light of the private meetings held between Arafat and Gemayel at the Nonaligned Summit meeting in New Delhi. [redacted]

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17 March 1983

**Afghanistan: Al Zulfiqar Leader Killed**

Parvez Shinwari, the third-ranking official in Al Zulfiqar, was killed in Kabul, possibly by Gallumulla Khan, who led the March 1981 hijacking of a Pakistani airliner. [redacted] the Afghan secret police may have also been involved. [redacted]

25X1

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23 March 1983

**United Kingdom: Parcel Bomb**

In London, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) headquarters received a parcel bomb containing a confessor letter from the previously unknown "English Peoples' Liberation Army." Police examination of the device after its deactivation revealed no evidence to link this bomb with three letter bombs intercepted on 15 and 16 March in London. [redacted]

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**25 March 1983****Spain: Attack on Spanish National Police**

In Oyarzun, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) splinter group Anti-Capitalist Autonomous Command (CAA) claimed credit for the machinegun ambush of a Spanish National Police patrol. One policeman was killed and two injured. The CAA has also claimed responsibility for the 21 March kidnaping of a Basque industrialist. [redacted]

25X1

**Spain: Second Basque Kidnaping**

In Madrid, Basque Fatherland and Liberty Military Wing (ETA/M) terrorists have claimed responsibility for the kidnaping of a wealthy Spanish businessman with close links to the monarchy. The kidnaping was staged outside ETA/M's usual territory by ETA/M members posing as plainclothes police. No ransom demand has been received. The kidnaping occurred four days after another ETA splinter group abducted a Basque businessman in northern Spain. [redacted]

25X1

**Republic of Ireland: Shooting of Prison Official**

In Dublin, the chief prison officer at the jail holding more than 1,000 Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorists was shot and seriously wounded by two gunmen on a motorcycle. No group has yet claimed credit for this attack—the first on a prison officer in the Irish Republic—although IRA terrorists are likely suspects. [redacted]

25X1

**Turkey: Terrorist Shootout**

In Istanbul, three security officials were killed in a shootout with members of the Revolutionary Communist Union of Turkey. Two members of the group were slain. Police confiscated weapons and ammunition, a significant quantity of dynamite, and correspondence between imprisoned and at-large members. Despite the martial law controls and continuing police sweeps against terrorists, the potential for violence remains high throughout Turkey. [redacted]

25X1

**26-27 March 1983****Spain: Basque Terrorists Arrested**

Spanish authorities arrested seven Basque Fatherland and Liberty, Political/Military Wing-VIII Assembly (ETA/PM-VIII) members as they crossed the border from France. Two are believed to be members of the Director's Committee, which coordinates terrorist operations. Police also seized several weapons, fake identification, and plans for future activities. The arrests resulted from a tip from French police, indicating continued French cooperation with the Spanish against Basque terrorists. [redacted]

25X1

**27 March 1983****Spain: Police Officer Killed**

In San Sebastian, one police officer was killed and another injured while attempting to defuse a bomb. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the bomb; we suspect Basque terrorists. [redacted]

25X1

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31 March 1983

**Republic of Ireland: Arrest of INLA Leaders**

In Dublin, Irish police arrested 11 members of the outlawed Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) in the first major police operation since the group was outlawed. Police do not know if the arrested INLA members represent the entire leadership. [redacted]

25X1

Late March 1983

**Syria: Anti-Muslim Brotherhood Activities**

The intention of the Muslim Brotherhood—announced in West Germany in late March—to renew anti-Assad regime operations could spark a new round of government terrorist attacks against the MB. The best organized and most credible threat to the regime, the Brotherhood has led the effort to overthrow Assad. The MB was responsible for a devastating car bombing in Damascus in 1981 and the Hamah rebellion in 1982. In response to these activities, the Syrian security services since 1980 have attacked Muslim Brotherhood objectives in Western Europe and the Middle East, including at least five assassination attempts against leading MB activists in West Germany. [redacted]

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**Libya: Antiregime Activities**

A series of anti-Libyan bombings and attempted bombings took place during late March. Within a period of two weeks, at least five bombs were placed at Libyan-associated facilities in Europe and the Middle East, including one that exploded at Tripoli's Embassy in Madrid on 17 March; two that were successfully removed from the Libyan Embassy in Beirut on 19 March; a third that exploded near the offices of a pro-Libyan magazine in Nicosia on 26 March; and a fourth that was found outside the wall of the Libyan cultural center in Nicosia on 26 March. Another bomb was found in Nicosia on 27 March, and, although it had no apparent connection with a Libyan target, it was described by the Cypriot press as similar in design to the other devices. No groups as yet have claimed credit for the attacks. Most, however, were almost certainly the work of Libyan exile elements and may have been the result of reported dissident meetings in early March. Libyan leader Qadhafi has already publicly threatened exiled oppositionists to cease antiregime activities, and attacks such as these could spark another dissident assassination campaign similar to that of 1980-81. [redacted]

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**April 1983****International: Armenian Terrorist Threat**

The 24 April commemoration of "Martyrs Day," marking the Armenian genocide, has resulted in Armenian terrorist threats against Turkish facilities throughout the world. Both the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos have declared April the "month of revenge" and have threatened Turkish installations in Switzerland, West Germany, and the United States. Also in the United States, the Justice Commandos have mailed death threats to Turkish representatives to the 15-17 April Convention of the Turkish-American Association in Atlanta. We believe the threat from Armenian terrorists will remain at a high level throughout April as Armenians attempt to draw attention to the grievances. [redacted]

25X1

**3 April 1983****Greece: Hotel Bombing**

In Alexandroupolis, four bombs exploded in a hotel following a speech by a Greek opposition leader. Twenty suspects were reportedly arrested, but we do not yet know if the explosions were terrorist related. No group has claimed credit for the attack, which injured three people. [redacted]

25X1

**4 April 1983****Peru: Shining Path Guerrillas Attack Villages**

According to Peruvian authorities, approximately 200 Shining Path guerrillas attacked two villages in Ayacucho, killing at least 70 peasants and looting houses and businesses. Police quoted witnesses as saying that some villagers were executed following "people's trials" but that others, including women and children, were killed trying to escape into the mountains. It was the largest guerrilla action since President Belaunde sent troops into the area. [redacted]

25X1

**6 April 1983****Argentina: Bomb Damages Buenos Aires School**

A bomb exploded before dawn at an English-language school in suburban Buenos Aires shattering windows but causing no injuries. The attack may have been carried out by the April 2nd Command which, in a 16 March telephone call to a local news agency, claimed credit for sending letter bombs to Prime Minister Thatcher and the US Navy headquarters in London and threatened actions against English-language schools and other "British-related institutions" in Argentina. The group is protesting British control over the Falkland Islands. [redacted]

25X1

**7 April 1983****Spain: Release of Kidnap Victim**

In San Sebastian, Basque terrorists released the Basque industrialist kidnaped 21 March. The Anti-Capitalist Autonomous Commandos, a radical splinter of the Basque terrorist group ETA, claimed credit for the abduction. Although family spokesmen declined to comment regarding the ransom payment, we believe some amount was paid to secure the victim's release. [redacted]

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