



Directorate of  
Intelligence

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*CPAS / imc / control Branch*

**Terrorism  
Review**



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9 December 1982

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GI TR 82-005  
9 December 1982

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**Terrorism  
Review** [Redacted]

25X1

9 December 1982

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iii	Overview (OGI)	
1	Salah Khalaf Preparing Terrorist Apparatus in Europe (OGI)	[Redacted] 25X1
3	Franco-Spanish Cooperation Against Basque Terrorists (OGI)	[Redacted] 25X1
5	New Developments in the Agca Case (OGI)	[Redacted] 25X1
7	Libyan Support for Terrorism (NESAs)	[Redacted] 25X1
9	Group Study: The International Revolutionary Cells (OGI)	[Redacted] 25X1
11	Statistical Overview	
13	Chronology	

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*Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone*

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


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**Terrorism  
Review** 

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**Overview**


We believe conditions are ripe for an increase of localized terrorism in Western Europe during the next few weeks. 

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This would interrupt a relatively placid period of several weeks during which the level of international terrorist incidents worldwide has been down by almost half from the three-month period immediately following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. We have indicated in earlier editions of *Terrorism Review* that we believe the reduction is largely due to law enforcement successes in West Germany and Italy, to accommodations between major Palestinian groups and certain West European governments, and to the accession to power of the Socialists in Spain. This latter event has resulted in probes by Spanish terrorist groups for a temporary truce and a disposition on the part of the French Government to assist the Spanish Socialists by cracking down on Spanish Basques harbored in southern France.



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The 12th of December, the anniversary of NATO's decision to deploy modernized nuclear weapons in Western Europe, is likely to be marked by widespread protests. Leaders of the protests want to avoid violence because they recognize the disastrous effect that it could have on public perceptions of the "peace" movement. Nevertheless, terrorist groups—including the Revolutionary Cells and so-called RAF legals in West Germany—will probably seek to exploit anti-NATO and anti-US sentiments. The violence-prone Onkruid group in the Netherlands has increasingly directed its antimilitary activities against the placement of nuclear weapons in Holland and seems likely to seek opportunities to exploit protests. 

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9 December 1982

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**Salah Khalaf Preparing Terrorist Apparat in Europe** [Redacted]

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Recent activity in Europe, particularly in West and East Germany, indicates that Salah Khalaf is involved in building up a terrorist network in Western Europe. [Redacted]

[Redacted] on 7 November four terrorists claiming to be members of Fatah were arrested at East Berlin's Schoenefeld Airport carrying explosives and weapons. [Redacted]

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Salah Khalaf, one of Arafat's chief deputies and the head of PLO security, has been in Eastern Europe trying to recruit former members of the Black September Organization (BSO) to revive that group,

Khalaf is the leader of the radical faction within Fatah and has often disagreed with Arafat, particularly regarding Arafat's ban on international terrorist attacks and his attempts to achieve a diplomatic settlement of the Palestinian problem. Arafat's ban dating from the mid-1970s is being adhered to by PLO groups. In May 1981, however, probably in response to pressure by radicals to resume international terrorism, Arafat, [Redacted] had agreed to contingency planning and gave Khalaf the go-ahead to recruit new members and strengthen Fatah's terrorist apparatus abroad. The recent activity in Europe may be a continuation of this planning. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] new apparatus for international terrorism would be set up to be activated if negotiations failed. We believe that Khalaf, in his position as head of PLO security, would be the logical person to set up such an organization. [Redacted]

In early August three Palestinians were arrested in Istanbul while, according to Turkish authorities, preparing an attack on Israeli interests. The terrorists claimed that they were recruited by Fatah's Western Sector office and were told that, if captured, they were to claim to be members of Black September. They also said that, while BSO was not yet back in operation, they had heard that Khalaf was going to revive it. [Redacted]

While it is possible that Khalaf is trying to organize his own terrorist organization without Arafat's knowledge, it seems unlikely that this much activity in Europe could go undetected by Arafat. We believe that it is more likely that Arafat has agreed to demands by more radical members of Fatah and the PLO to make contingency plans to conduct terrorism in the event that negotiations fail. [Redacted]

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**Franco-Spanish Cooperation  
Against Basque Terrorists** [redacted]

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The election of a Spanish Socialist government has spurred Spanish and French Socialists to limited collaboration against the Basque terrorist organization Fatherland and Liberty (ETA). [redacted]

while the Marxist faction within ETA/M, led by Eugenio Echeveste Arizguren, favors continuation of the armed struggle. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] the Socialist election victory has solidified Spanish democracy and removed any justification for French protection of the Basque separatist organizations. [redacted]

[redacted] tension has already arisen within ETA/M over the negotiations issue. Any further split would seriously weaken the support structure and shrink the operational area. [redacted] 25X1

The PS has already begun to put pressure on the leadership of the violence-prone military wing of ETA (ETA/M) now in France. A recent PS offer to act as intermediary for negotiations between ETA/M and the Spanish Government may be connected with unconfirmed information circulating in ETA circles that the PS has told ETA/M to dismantle its infrastructure in France within two years. [redacted]

Despite recent French initiatives, [redacted] the French effort will remain limited to harassment. The recently approved French policy of easing extradition of alleged terrorists to democratic countries will probably not be implemented with regard to Spain. The French Consul in Bilbao has stated the French Government will not extradite ETA/M members, and at least one ETA/M leader arrested in France has already been released from custody, allegedly for lack of evidence. [redacted] 25X1

Both ETA/M and ETA Political/Military (ETA/PM) have approached the Spanish Government seeking negotiations. [redacted]

[redacted] both ETA/M and ETA/PM Eighth Assembly are attempting to reach an accord with the Spanish Government, employing different tactics. ETA/M has decided to increase its terrorist activities to force the Spanish Government to negotiate. ETA/PM Eighth Assembly has chosen to exploit the Revolutionary Party of Basque Workers to achieve its political objectives. [redacted]

The French Government also may be employing another tactic to weaken ETA/M. In early November, PS First Secretary advised that the French Government would release its imprisoned leader Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, if negotiations with Spain were successful. According to Jospin, the French Socialists believe Iturbe's release would probably splinter ETA/M. Iturbe, a member of the Executive committee, favors negotiations with the Spanish Government,

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New Developments in the Agca Case [redacted]

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Although the confidentiality of the Italian magistrate system inhibits the flow of information on the arrest in Rome of Bulgarian airlines official Antonov, [redacted]

[redacted] caution be used in connecting Antonov with would-be papal assassin Mehmet Ali Agca. At the same time, two other Bulgarian officials have been implicated in the case. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Martella undertook the investigation over a year ago with the preconceived notion that the Bulgarians and Soviets were involved with Agca. [redacted]

[redacted]


[redacted] Martella presented Agca with a list of Soviet and Bulgarian names and a stack of photographs. When Agca identified Antonov, [redacted]

[redacted] Martella ordered him arrested.

The Italian press has speculated that Antonov may be released soon because of a lack of evidence. [redacted]

[redacted] the evidence against Antonov is insufficient for conviction and that it may be limited to Agca's identification of the photograph.

[redacted]



Bulgarian Airlines employee Sergei Ivanov Antonov in Italian custody. [redacted]

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Italian magistrate system gives investigators and prosecutors independence and wide latitude and prohibits public release of information. This had led in at least

one instance to an abuse by a magistrate in terrorism cases. Following the rescue of General Dozier in earl

1982, the investigating magistrate fed to the Italian press the story that the Red Brigades were supported

by Israeli intelligence services. [redacted] 25X1

According to press reports, Judge Martella's research on the Bulgarian angle of the Agca case has led to a request by the Italian Foreign Ministry that Bulgaria

lift the diplomatic immunity of Bulgarian Embassy employee Teodorov Akvasov, currently out of the

country. His position of cashier is, according to the Embassy, not covered by diplomatic immunity, but he

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has "certain rights" (unspecified). In the meantime, judicial sources in Italy have informed the press of an international arrest warrant issued for another former Bulgarian Embassy employee, Vassiliev Juelio Kolev, who returned to Bulgaria some months ago. In view of Buglaria's strong denials of possible complicity of Sergei Ivanov Antonov in the Agca case, it is unrealistic to anticipate cooperation with the Italians with respect to Akvasov and Kolev.

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**Libyan Support for Terrorism** [redacted]

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During the 13 years he has been in power, Libyan leader Qadhafi has gained a deserved reputation as a principal patron of international terrorism. Active Libyan support for terrorism has ebbed and flowed over the years, however, and Qadhafi has demonstrated considerable sensitivity to public opinion and concern for his international image. [redacted]

months has been lashing out at his fellow Arabs.

[redacted]

Qadhafi's most recent activist phase dates back to 1979 when he was faced with mounting dissent at home, a major foreign policy setback in Uganda, and the example of a successful revolution in Iran that prompted him to reassert his own revolutionary credentials. In 1980 Libyan hit teams began to murder Libyan dissidents in Europe, killing 11 people and wounding several others between March 1980 and February 1981. Qadhafi put a stop to the murders when the international outcry persuaded him that the policy was counterproductive. [redacted]

Sudan's President Nimeiri has long been an important Qadhafi target—initially because he stood with Sadat after Camp David and was willing to cooperate with the United States and more recently because of personal antagonism. In August 1981, at the time of the formation of the Tripartite Agreement among Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, Qadhafi persuaded Ethiopia's Mengistu to join forces with Libya in training Sudanese dissidents and in mounting anti-Sudanese operations. [redacted]

Later in 1981 Qadhafi became convinced that the United States was planning to have him assassinated. Following the downing of two Libyan planes during a US exercise in the Gulf of Sidra in August, Qadhafi began to turn his terrorist capability against the United States. [redacted]

[redacted] Libya infiltrated a 22-man Sudanese "revolutionary committee," trained in Libya, into Sudan to recruit and to plan terrorist and assassination missions—one target being the US Embassy in Khartoum. [redacted]

[redacted] serious consideration was given to attacks against the President and Secretary of State. Again, a flood of publicity, combined with the withdrawal of US citizens from Libya and a US boycott of Libyan oil exports, apparently persuaded Qadhafi to moderate such high-visibility activities. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Nevertheless, Qadhafi is continuing, and even accelerating, activities aimed at undermining other governments. In contrast to the summer of 1981 when he devoted himself to mending fences with a number of his Arab colleagues, Qadhafi for the past several

[redacted] Tripoli is also beaming radiobroadcast at Saudi Arabia, giving details about the alleged corruption of officials in an effort to stir up dissidence. Qadhafi also has apparently turned his attention to overthrowing the smaller Gulf states and assassinating their leaders. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

Although Qadafi seems to have singled out the United States as the source of all his troubles—ultimately responsible for the oil glut, the failure of the Tripoli summit, the defeat of the Palestinians, internal dissent, and the financing of Libyan exile organizations—current information does not indicate that active Libyan planning for an anti-US campaign is under way. Another direct confrontation such as the Gulf of Sidra incident, however, would probably spark a new campaign against US interests. [Redacted]

Tunisia is another prime target of Libyan activity. The Libyan-sponsored raid on the Tunisian mining town of Gafsa in January 1980 strained relations between the two countries. In early 1982 [Redacted]

[Redacted] the Tunisians. [Redacted] picked up a group of 15 Libyan-trained commandos attempting to infiltrate Tunisia. [Redacted]

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Where dissident movements do not already exist, Qadhafi works to create them. He recruits foreigners working in Libya for his elaborate system of terrorist training camps; he attempts to influence and ultimately control Islamic movements and institutions in neighboring countries; and he broadcasts propaganda to potentially disaffected groups—particularly the Tuareg tribes in Mali and Niger, who have ties with Libyan tribes. Qadhafi has avoided more overt moves against his neighbors since his withdrawal from Chad,

[Redacted]

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Qadhafi may be on the verge of yet another upsurge of terrorist activity. He has publicly warned Libyan dissidents in exile that he will renew his assassination campaign unless they "repent" and return home. In a speech on 7 October, he called on all Libyan people's conferences to endorse the policy of carrying out murder as a "war in self-defense." He also declared that the murder operations will no longer be carried out exclusively by revolutionary committees or hit squads; every Libyan who travels abroad will be responsible for the elimination of enemies [Redacted]

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

**Group Study:  
The International Revolutionary Cells**

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The International Revolutionary Cells (IRZ), a shadowy, loosely organized association of West German terrorists, has apparently lost much of its original ideology and connections with the domestic Revolutionary Cells while maintaining some ties with Palestinian terrorist organizations and with "Carlos."

German officials describe the IRZ as an offshoot of the West German Revolutionary Cells (RZ), a terrorist organization that has conducted more attacks against US military installations in Germany than any other group during the last decade. According to the German Federal Criminal Office (BKA) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), the IRZ was formed in the mid-1970s by some early RZ members who had trained in the Middle East under the auspices of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and thereby became oriented to international issues. The BKA and the BfV believe that the IRZ has had no significant contact with the indigenous RZ since the initial split.



We believe that the IRZ as an entity became relatively inactive after Wadi Haddad's death in March 1978 but that individuals associated with it continued to engage in terrorist activity. This is supported by an incident in Paris in February 1982. Kopp and Breguet were arrested in a parking garage by a policeman suspicious of their behavior.

weapons and explosive materials were subsequently confiscated from their car. During followup interrogations by French Government officials, Kopp

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and Breguet declared themselves members of an "Organization of International Revolutionaries." Breguet stated that their targets were not French interests. [redacted]

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Shortly thereafter, in a letter to the French Interior Minister, Carlos demanded the release of Kopp and Breguet and safe passage to a country of their choice, threatening reprisals against French property and high-level French Government officials. The ultimatum suggests that the two were involved in a Carlos-sponsored operation, and their continued imprisonment could well trigger additional efforts to secure their release. Indeed, the spate of terrorist incidents in France—such as the March 1982 explosion aboard the Paris-Toulouse train—may be linked to the ultimatum. [redacted]

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Although lack of information precludes us from drawing firm conclusions about the current configuration of the IRZ, we believe that it has changed considerably since the death of Wadi Haddad. Perhaps the most striking difference between the Wadi Haddad-era and the present-day IRZ is the apparent absence of a strong ideological conviction. The IRZ now appears to be a loosely organized association of individuals rather than a closely knit terrorist organization. The West German authorities believe that the IRZ, while influenced by Carlos, have become essentially apolitical terrorists for hire. [redacted]


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**International Terrorist Incidents, 1982**

— Total, 645  
 — Of which: US targets, 335



Category of International Terrorist Incidents, 1982, by Month	Total												Total
	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	
Total	77	34	76	72	55	95	73	90	49	56	34		711
Kidnaping	5	2	2	3	1		3			3	2		21
Barricade, hostage				1	1		1	1	7	1	5		17
Bombing	39	16	36	32	20	47	42	31	13	16	16		308
Armed attack			2	1	1				2	1			7
Hijacking	2	4	1	4	2	1	3	4	1	3	2		27
Assassination	4	3	5	9	1	8	3	4	5				42
Threats, hoax	21	5	25	16	26	32	19	45	16	22	6		233
Sniping	2	3	2	3	2	1	1	2	3	2	1		22
Other	4	1	3	3	1	6	1	3	2	8	2		34

Break-ins, conspiracy, shoot-out, etc.

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**Chronology**

**18 November 1982**

**Spain**

An ETA/M communique claims responsibility for the killing of one person and severe wounding of two others, whom ETA/M describes as police informants. Recent police successes in defusing bombs placed by ETA/M appear to lend credence to ETA/M claims of police informers within its ranks. [redacted] 25X1

In Guernica, ETA/M claims credit for an attack on Civil Guard barracks and the bombing of a bank in Bilbao. [redacted] 25X1

**19 November 1982**

**Azores**

On Sao Miguel Island, the Popular Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of the Azores (MPRLA) is suspected in the attempted bombing attack on a Portuguese commercial transmitter. Although MPRLA has been active in Lisbon, little is known about the group or its objectives. [redacted] 25X1


**Spain**

In Tudela-Navarra, ETA/M is believed responsible for the bombing of the National Labor Institute. In Bilbao, one bomb exploded at a local bank and a second bomb at another bank was defused by Spanish police. ETA/M continues its attempts to raise funds through extortion of "revolutionary taxes" from Basque banks. [redacted] 25X1

**21 November 1982**

**Spain**

In San Sebastian, ETA/M is believed responsible for a rocket grenade attack on National Police motorpool. Severe damage and injury are averted when the rocket explodes between two cars. ETA/M rocket grenade attacks indicate lack of training with the weapon. [redacted] 25X1



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25 November 1982



**Italy**

Italian police arrest Sergei Ivanov Antonov, Balkan airlines official in Rome, in connection with independent investigation of attempted assassination of the Pope by investigating magistrate Ilario Martella.

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Martella

charges within week that two former employees of Bulgarian Embassy in Rome also involved in case.

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26 November 1982

**Ecuador**

Two policemen and a passerby are killed when a bomb explodes while being removed from the Israeli Embassy in Quito. Ecuador has no active indigenous terrorist group, and there has been no attempt from any group to claim credit.




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30 November 1982

**United Kingdom**

In London, a previously unknown group, Animal Rights Militia, claims responsibility for a letter bomb sent to Prime Minister Thatcher. Only minor injury to one person result. Police intercept and defuse four additional letter bombs sent to members of Parliament.



1 December 1982



**Italy**

Nine Red Brigades members arrested in Turin, including BR leader Marcello Ghiringhelli, whom Italian authorities believe is responsible for five murders. The Italians believe the BR column in Turin is nearly destroyed.

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**1 December 1982**

**Lebanon**

In Beirut, an apparent attempt is made to assassinate Druze leader and prominent leftist Walid Jumblatt. A car bomb explodes while Jumblatt is nearby. He is only slightly injured. [redacted]

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**2 December 1982**

**Thailand**

The Iraqi Consulate in Bangkok is destroyed by a bomb left in a briefcase, which detonates during an attempt to disarm it. [redacted]

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**5 December 1982**

**Spain**

In Barcelona, the suspected leader of the First of October Anti-Fascist Group (GRAPO) Juan Martin Luna is killed in a shootout with Spanish antiterrorist police. Considered the operational brains behind numerous terrorist attacks since the early 1970s, Luna's demise may permanently cripple GRAPO. [redacted]

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