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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

THE SINKIANG EXODUS OF 1962

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FOREWORD

This study is one of an informal series published by the Directorate of Intelligence dealing with various aspects of internal dissidence and control in Communist China. Others have been *The Kwangtung Exodus of 1962*, OCI No. 0343/65, February 1965, S; *Resistance in Honan, 1960*, OCI No. 2508/65, September 1965, S; *Dissidence and the Potential for Resistance in Communist China*, OCI No. 3088/65, December 1965, S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM; and *Assessment of 1965 Dissidence Levels in Five Provinces of Southern China*, CIA/BI GR 66-1, April 1966, C/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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Although Sinkiang attracts much intelligence attention, the intelligence perspectives on the province are clouded by the spottiness of areal and topical coverage and the dubious reliability of much of the reporting. Ethnic Russian refugees who have come from northwestern Sinkiang to the Free World have provided the most useful reports on the 1962 exodus that is the subject of this study. Other miscellaneous sources include Chinese Communist propaganda and Soviet propaganda; the latter generally has been the more informative. A few reports from defectors, both Chinese and Soviet, from Western diplomats and journalists, and from persons who had been given information through Chinese Communist Party channels provide useful perspectives. This study examines the Sinkiang exodus as an intelligence problem and, in the context of Sino-Soviet relations, attempts to establish needed benchmarks for further study of Chinese policies on security and on minority nationalities as observed in the province.

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MAP

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China - U.S.S.R. Border: Western Sector (52171)

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The Sinkiang Exodus of 1962

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The Sinkiang exodus, which occurred in April and May 1962, was a movement of 50,000 to 70,000 non-Chinese Muslims from Communist China into the USSR. They were mostly Kazakhs and Uighurs from the T'a-ch'eng (Chuguchak) and I-ning (Kuldja) regions of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou (IKAC) (see Map 52171). Local Chinese and Soviet authorities, long habituated to some intermittent illegal westward emigration associated with a legal repatriation program, were suddenly confronted with a mass movement that overtaxed available transportation and disrupted existing border control procedures. The exodus was climaxed by a riot in I-ning on 29 May. The actual disorder was short lived, and controls were rapidly restored.

Strictly as a border problem, the exodus was not especially significant. Neither country disputed the location of the boundary in the sectors involved. The acrimony that developed grew out of mutual failure to control the recognized border effectively. As a refugee movement, the exodus was of relatively minor significance. Compared to other midcentury refugee movements, the numbers involved were neither large nor especially costly to either side. The USSR received no more people than it could conveniently handle and put to work immediately. China lost few whom it valued highly as producers or technicians, although some local economic impact was felt in parts of Sinkiang as a consequence of the loss of large numbers of livestock that crossed into the USSR with the emigrants. Unlike the Kwangtung exodus, which also occurred in May 1962, the Sinkiang exodus was not costly in terms of Communist China's prestige among the Overseas Chinese. Furthermore, reverberations that might have been expected throughout the Muslim world were effectively dampened by the tacit cooperation of China and the USSR at the time in suppressing news of trouble in Sinkiang.

Sino-Soviet frictions were nonetheless aggravated by the exodus, and it probably was a factor in Peking's subsequent decision to order closure of Soviet consulates not only in Sinkiang but elsewhere in China as well. The episode almost certainly contributed to growing Chinese sensitivities concerning the border with the USSR and particularly concerning Sinkiang because of the presence there of strategic installations. Finally, it also led Peking to reexamine

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and later to retighten its policies on minority nationalities within China. The exodus was subsequently exploited by the Communist parties of both China and the USSR as a basis for recriminatory propaganda and official retaliation, and thus it helped to deepen the Sino-Soviet split.

A mischievous implication of the episode remains. Despite increased Chinese and Soviet sensitivities over Sinkiang and the frontier region, the very remoteness of the border and the comparative insignificance to either China or the USSR of the interests of the indigenous population in northwestern Sinkiang continue to make the area attractive as an arena for reciprocal provocation by the two powers.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Geographic Setting

Sinkiang is physically part of the larger region of Central Asia—a region that embraces vast desert basins, high mountains, and steppe lands politically divided between China and the USSR. Ethnically, this region is neither Chinese nor Russian but rather consists largely of Turkic-speaking Muslim peoples of several groups—Kazakhs, Uighurs, Uzbeks, and others—including both sedentary agriculturalists and nomads. Historically, the region has been one of contact and rivalry between China and Russia for political influence.

The I-ning and T'a-ch'eng regions of western Sinkiang lie north of the Tien Shan, a great west-east aligned mountain mass that separates Sinkiang into northern and southern halves. Subsidiary ranges north of the main range enclose on three sides the I-ning region, which is drained by the upper I-li River and its tributaries. The I-li flows westward in a widening valley comprised of grasslands and agricultural land; this easy westward approach to the USSR through the I-li Valley contrasts sharply with the difficult access across high mountains from other parts of Sinkiang. Still farther north the T'a-ch'eng region forms a similar physical pattern on a smaller scale; here the valley of the westward flowing O-min (Emel') River provides relatively easy access to the USSR, and the mountains isolate the region from centers of Chinese control in the Dzungarian Basin to the south and east.

B. Local Nationalism

1. ETHNIC GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE EXODUS

The participants in the exodus from Sinkiang in 1962 had a unique political background—a nationalistic separatism that had frequently been in conflict with Chinese and Soviet interests in the area. Within the last two generations the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang, who comprise an estimated 85 percent of the total population of the province, have become wedged increasingly tightly between Chinese and Soviet regimes that have been sometimes benevolent, sometimes repressive, and sometimes neglectful. Their traditional independence, which has tended to unite the several Muslim peoples and thus further separate them from the Chinese, is called "local nationalism" by the Chinese Communists. The exodus came at a time when for about a decade "local nationalism" had been under increasing Chinese pressure to conform to Communist concepts.

The "nationalism" of the Kazakhs and that of the Uighurs have been based on different territorial origins and different traditions. The nomadic Kazakhs, who are concentrated in the northwest and some other parts of northern Sinkiang, represent a spillover from Central Asia under the pressure of Russian expansion,

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the spread of agriculture into formerly pastoral areas, and Soviet regimentation. Traditionally, members of Kazakh families have enjoyed a large degree of personal independence within a paternalistic tribal structure suited to a mobile and precarious way of life. The sedentary Uighurs, whose traditional homeland is in southwestern Sinkiang, now occupy other parts of the province as well. Those of the I-li Valley are mostly agricultural and consist of emigrants and their offspring from southern Sinkiang, but they are more adventurous and more self-reliant than the average Uighur of the south. They are concentrated in the four counties that lie north of the I-li River between I-ning and the Soviet border, and they have been exposed continuously to transborder influences—especially those which have been transmitted by commercially active, politically aware, and culturally influential Uzbeks and Tatars from the USSR. Uighur leadership and experience have contributed significantly to local nationalism.

The Uzbeks, Tatars, and ethnic Russians—trading and farming peoples also of non-Chinese origin—were likewise an important element in the population of the I-li River region up to 1962. Uzbeks and Tatars may have joined the 1962 exodus to the USSR, but it is unlikely that any ethnic Russians were included. Many Hui (T'ung-kan), or Chinese Muslims, live in Sinkiang and enjoy the goodwill of the non-Chinese Muslims. Although they were long a truculent group, they have been suppressed and now have no significant political influence. Apparently, they were only minor participants in the exodus. It is unlikely that the non-Muslim Hsi-po (Sibo), who predominate on the south bank of the I-li River not far from I-ning, took any part in the exodus. They are descendants of an old Manchurian people who were installed during the Ch'ing Dynasty to stabilize the border. They have no transborder affinities and are relatively uninvolved in provincial politics, and thus they still serve to insulate this part of the border.

2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Rivalry for influence in Sinkiang has colored Sino-Russian relations for at least a century, but prior to 1944 the attention given to Sinkiang by both Chinese and Russian leaders was often interrupted and mitigated by more pressing affairs elsewhere. This neglect, as well as geographic remoteness, permitted the rise of separatist aspirations among the conservative Turkic Muslims. Though incompatible with doctrinaire Communism, this spirit was tolerated intermittently. The USSR, however, recognized that the nationalistic aspirations of Sinkiang's Muslims, though a helpful counter to Chinese nationalism, would be inimical to Soviet interest in Central Asia if allowed to flower into genuine autonomy. Under Stalin the USSR had accordingly established a position of strong influence in Sinkiang that lasted until 1942, when Soviet officials were expelled by the governor of the province. Then briefly, until the establishment of the autonomous East Turkestan People's Republic (ETAR) in 1944, the non-Chinese people of Sinkiang paid allegiance to the Chinese Nationalists.

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The USSR had encouraged the ETAR movement, which began as an authentic indigenous independence rebellion that had its own leaders, its own armed forces, and a nascent mass party. When the USSR was able to reestablish its influence in Sinkiang in 1944 the ETAR movement was developed into a Soviet-controlled regime through the imposition of Soviet-trained leaders.

Although the ETAR was nominally Communist, it was unacceptable to the Chinese Communists because it was thoroughly anti-Chinese; and when the Communists took over control of the region in 1950, they dispersed or recruited the former ETAR leaders. The ETAR armed forces were absorbed or consigned to farming. Fortuitously for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), three of the top ETAR leaders were killed in 1950 in an airplane crash when they were on their way to Peking. In northwestern Sinkiang in 1951 a purge initiated the ongoing process of "rectification," and by 1954 all indigenous armed dissidence had been suppressed and tame leadership had been installed. The Chinese Communists initiated the philosophy that local "autonomy" for minorities could not go beyond self-administration under central dictation. It was in line with this philosophy that the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou (IKAC), encompassing the former ETAR territories, was established in 1955. The local Muslims, however, tended to resist acceptance of subservient roles under the Chinese Communists. They had an ingrained exclusiveness, a background of earlier republican experience, and a familiarity with Soviet Communist practices. They believed in the ideological legitimacy of local nationalism, were conservative in their approach to economic and social reform, and were potential sinophobes.

Local nationalism came under direct attack from the Chinese in 1957-58 when a severe purge was aimed at certain local leaders who still dared to favor republicanism, Soviet style, as a better vehicle for political expression of local nationalistic aspirations than local autonomy, Chinese style. Local Chinese propaganda portrayed the Soviet consulate in I-ning as a source of sinister influence. Party spokesmen condemned the sinophobia of the defunct ETAR, attacked Islam, and bluntly proclaimed to the dissident non-Chinese and their supporters the CCP philosophy of eventual disappearance of differences among minority nationalities.

During all of the political housecleaning of the 1950's in Sinkiang the old ETAR territories were treated with especial sternness. The treatment, directed at consolidating a new political base and eliminating the Russian-laid base as soon as the old leaders could be displaced, included the imposition of a new sinocentric system of language reform aimed at eliminating the use of both Cyrillic and old Central Asian scripts. After the 1957-58 purge, there was little left to sweeten the pill of Chinese Communist reform other than the promises of better hygienic conditions, better education for children, extension of minor economic privileges, and imported entertainment. The first decade of Chinese Communist rule thus ended with a withering of the optimism that had been engendered by the nominal bestowal of "autonomy" on minority nationalities in 1955.

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C. Transborder Movement Before 1962

During the Russian Revolution refugees from the USSR moved into Sinkiang in sizable numbers, and a part of later Soviet interest in Sinkiang was based on the presence of Russian nationals and ex-nationals in the province. During the great influx of Russian-born Muslims into Sinkiang in 1932-33, refugees estimated variously to number from 100,000 to 250,000 fled from the harsh Soviet collectivization policies of that day. The Kazakhs who participated in this last influx were part of a larger border-straddling tribal system and considered their homeland to be Soviet Central Asia. During the 1950's the Chinese Communists collaborated with Soviet officials to repatriate Soviet nationals and ex-nationals who because they had been born in the USSR qualified for Soviet citizenship, together with their families (even if born and raised in China), if they could be induced to leave. Thus, many non-Chinese residents of Sinkiang qualified for dual citizenship.

Official tolerance of dual citizenship was a practice that served the interests of non-Chinese Muslims in Sinkiang best, those of the USSR to a degree, and those of China quite poorly. The clarification of dual citizenship status for eligible individuals and families required keeping Soviet documentation up to date. This began for some individuals and families during the ETAR period (1944-49), when some people acquired valid Soviet citizenship and passports. Interest in securing passports, however, was not widespread until a year or two before the 1962 exodus.

Chinese Communist internal administrative policies added to the pressure on Soviet consular officials for passports. Theoretically, communalization required that the public security bureaus confirm Chinese citizenship for individuals before they could formally belong to communes, even though virtually the entire population was herded into the communes. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, there was also a quickening trend toward use of individual instead of household documentation, thus adding to the administrative task and to the complexity of an individual's situation. "Voting" eligibility and rationing began to be administered on an individual basis, while identity and residence documentation could be either familial or individual, depending on personal occupation and on the kind of documents an individual actually needed. In the 2 or 3 years before the Sinkiang exodus such developments, originating in both local and national policies of the CCP, increased pressure for tighter administration of documentation controls and added to the accumulating nervousness and tension among the non-Chinese people. More and more the non-Chinese were placed in the position of having to choose one allegiance and renounce the other, thus losing the advantages of dual citizenship.

As the volume of passport work grew, the Chinese police checked the validity of Soviet passports and are reported to have marked some of them invalid. What the Soviet consulates seem to have done was to issue passports to people whom

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they were already prepared to admit, solely to enable them to secure Chinese exit permits. In issuing such documentation unilaterally the Soviet officials circumvented existing Chinese Communist procedures.

D. The Situation Early in 1962

1. PLIGHT OF THE INHABITANTS

The letdown in economic expectations in Sinkiang between 1955 and 1962 was great, particularly in the northwest. As of 1955, the promise of "autonomy" for the province was still a basis for optimism, a trans-Sinkiang railroad was soon to be built to help make China rich and strong, the USSR was prepared to continue its assistance to the province, and the petroleum prospects in northern Sinkiang seemed promising. By 1962 this dream had faded. Hopes of a petroleum bonanza at Karamai had evaporated, the trans-Sinkiang railroad had not been completed and apparently would not be, originally splendid economic goals had been reduced to a slow-paced and modest provincial plan, and the economic and social basis of "autonomy" had been weakened by the shock of the 1957-58 ideological "rectification" campaign and purge, by the 1958-59 communalization and leap-forward campaigns, and by the depression of 1959-62.

The full weight of underemployment and unemployment in the towns and cities reached the corners of the economically depressed province when the nationwide *hsia-fang*, or down-to-the-country, campaign to send superfluous urban inhabitants and industrial workers into rural communes or back to their native settlements peaked in late 1961 and 1962. It meant that the native families, who were already under pressure from Han Chinese immigrants and had been deprived of traditional economic incentives by the imposition of communalization, had to accept the burden of integrating into their struggling communities not only their own people who were forced to return from the towns but also some newcomers. The local Kazakhs and Uighurs suffered most as the economy was reshaped to a form in which they would be less and less influential. Kazakh pastoral life was especially disrupted by new Chinese land policies that required Kazakh resettlement; this new kind of settled farming was unfamiliar and disagreeable to the Kazakhs. The newly established communes were impoverished, and much expertise for stock raising in the communes was disappearing with the departure of people who were experienced but who were ideologically unacceptable. There was little or no work in the towns. The continuing replacement of Russians, Uighurs, and Kazakhs by Han Chinese in both urban and rural occupations cut through the community along ethnic lines, thus nourishing sinophobia.

By 1962 the choices open to non-Chinese Muslims with transborder affinities were few and the foreseeable future seemed hopeless. The argument for repatriation to the USSR had previously been viewed with suspicion, since these people had known Soviet political chicanery in the past and therefore cherished no illusions about the motives of official Soviet propaganda. In 1961-62, however,

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prospects for a better life in the USSR seemed brighter. Far from being dismayed by the "evils" of Soviet "revisionism" as portrayed by Chinese propaganda, the potential emigrants were encouraged. For the first time there was a general readiness to submit to legal repatriation to the USSR. Apparently, these potential emigrants preferred the collectives of the USSR to the communes of Communist China as the lesser of two evils; and in any case, they had heard rumors that the Soviet collectives would soon be dissolved. The new readiness of many of these people to return to the USSR was reinforced by the fact that the inflowing tide of Chinese settlers had destroyed their isolation, the last advantage that Sinkiang had once possessed for them, and also by the impression that Islam, despite being under political control, was faring better in the USSR than in Sinkiang. There had been no pilgrimage to Mecca from the Ili region since 1946, most mosques were closed, religious teachers were controlled or under detention, and many young people were attempting to conceal Muslim origin for the sake of expediency.

2. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST POSITION

The exodus came near the end of 3 years of worsening internal troubles for the Chinese Communist regime and also at a time when the regime was setting out, under pressure of internal discontent and worsening foreign relations, to reorient its internal policies in the direction of firmer ideological controls. Major conferences were convened in Peking during the spring of 1962 as the regime began to set the process going. The National People's Congress (NPC) and its supporting popular-front group, the Chinese People's Political and Consultative Conference (CPPCC), were both in session while the exodus was building up. Within the NPC, which met from 27 March to 16 April, and also within the CPPCC, which met from 23 March to 19 April, the equilibrium was precarious. Heated discussions in both forums reflected disarray within the CCP. Some party members and subordinate party organs were in open disagreement with the central party organs and had slid into selective execution of party policies. In order to restore vitality to party life after the economic catastrophes of 1959-61 the CCP had to reassert its infallibility, but the lack of consensus within the party forced it to move slowly. The CCP leaders chose to emphasize the development of intraparty "democracy" (a prudent policy of hearing critics out) and the strengthening of centralization and unity (the reestablishment of efficient intraparty controls).

The Chinese Communists were fully aware of the existing low state of popular morale in Sinkiang. Their 1962 line for the cautious treatment of Sinkiang Muslims was based on a policy of letting the pressures be valved off gradually rather than tempting an explosion. According to Saifudin, then the governor of Sinkiang, local nationalism was a continuing menace, Han and non-Chinese party workers were not integrating themselves satisfactorily, party workers generally had inadequate bilingual capabilities, and minority nationality party workers were exclusive in attitudes and mediocre in performance. The solutions

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proposed by the party for the problems of 1962, however, were little more than familiar and relatively noncontroversial formulae, conservatively phrased. Nothing more was demanded of the party workers than to persevere in being patient with persons of "faulty class background" and to avoid antagonizing persons of "nonpeasant origin" as well as those of "religious circles." The guidance was worded so as to cover a retreat from the harsher measures previously in force against Islam and to allow for considerable flexibility in enforcing "class struggle" concepts.

3. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

China refrained from injecting new venom into the Sino-Soviet quarrel during the precarious months of late winter and early spring 1962, and a weak detente with the USSR took shape temporarily. The annual trade agreement with the USSR, which was under negotiation in Moscow during the weeks prior to its signing on 13 May, may have been a specific incentive to Chinese discretion in dealing with the USSR over Sinkiang, since among matters under review was the determination of new levels of petroleum imports and minerals exports, both vital to the Sinkiang economy.

Whether the Chinese Communist regime was sufficiently prepared for possible border trouble in western Sinkiang in 1962 is a question. Premonitory border incidents had occurred as early as 1960, when in some sort of hot-pursuit situation Chinese troops violated the border of the Kirgiz SSR. This and perhaps other unreported events had produced Sino-Soviet recriminations within the closed international circle of Communist parties. The USSR was concerned over uncontrolled border crossing and in 1961 began to increase surveillance of the border through use of locally raised auxiliary troops. Early in 1962, however, neither side was fully prepared to seal all possible border crossing points or to put large formations of well-trained troops along the border, although the USSR was far ahead of China in border surveillance and patrols.

Soviet concern for Soviet citizens in Sinkiang ran deep throughout the buildup to the exodus. From the Soviet point of view, the Chinese determination to base citizenship on place of birth was unacceptable. The USSR accordingly became oriented not only toward protecting Soviet sympathizers and citizens from harassment but also toward preserving the Soviet image as the friend of all irredentist peoples represented within the USSR. Situations in which these prestige considerations mattered stood to multiply as the fever to leave spread.

Soviet officials were in a potentially embarrassing spot on the local scene in I-ning at this time. With the consolidation of Chinese administration after 1955, direct Soviet influence had diminished; but the USSR had retained indirect influence through sympathizers and persons of dual citizenship scattered throughout the IKAC in party and government positions, including influential public security and police posts. These people were destined for eventual elimination; there was nothing intrinsically sinister in their dual role, but as former ETAR

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supporters, they were blacklisted by the Chinese. They and their Soviet contacts had come under open attack as early as 1958, and after 1960 the CCP had assumed more direct control of the province through the reassignment, isolation, and removal of Soviet-oriented elements.

The remaining Soviet political influence in western Sinkiang was exercised in large part through the Soviet consulate in I-ning and through the Society of Soviet Citizens (OSG), which was controlled by the consulate. OSG had been founded in 1950 to replace an earlier association for Russian emigres, and after most of the ethnic Russians left during the 1950's the society had survived with a membership of Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims who held Soviet passports. It maintained organizational centers in many sizable settlements throughout the province and conducted a program of ostensibly innocent activities related to health, education, and information.

The Soviet consulate in I-ning had come under direct attack in 1958, and the consul had been forced to leave suddenly at that time. Although the consulate was reopened later and early in 1962 was still involved in the last phases of the legal repatriation program for Soviet citizens, its influence had been considerably reduced. This consulate was the last Soviet listening post in western Sinkiang and the last point of direct Soviet contact within the IKAC for Soviet nationals and persons of dual citizenship. Because it had become an obstacle to the accomplishment of Chinese Communist objectives, however, the Chinese had greatly limited the consul's prerogatives and had placed his agents and friends in the IKAC under scrutiny. They also banned the OSG, thus further limiting Soviet influence. The Chinese Communist objectives included solidification of economic and political control over the minorities, elimination of Soviet influence over persons who wanted to retain dual citizenship, and elimination of the Soviet image as competitive with that of Communist China. By the time of the exodus and riot these objectives had been virtually attained.

II. THE 1962 EXODUS*

A. Emigrant Movements

The exodus of 1962 was only the climactic episode of a westward flow of unwanted or disaffected elements of Sinkiang's Muslim population that began about 1951 and finally ended in 1963. During this 12-year period, some people who had been born in Soviet Central Asia responded to Soviet inducements and returned to the USSR voluntarily. Others who may have preferred to remain in Sinkiang were either driven to accept repatriation to the USSR or were simply arrested by local authorities and deported.

* Reports of the exodus, most of them from ethnic Russian refugees now in the Free World, are secondhand and typically vague. The refugees themselves were incidental recipients of information rather than eyewitnesses or participants in the exodus, and in reporting they were dependent on their memories of what they had heard. Their accounts reflect these limitations

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The 1962 movement of emigrants from T'a-ch'eng hit its peak in the last 2 weeks of April, probably very shortly after the side roads became passable and the Tarbagatai Mountain passes were open. There was probably more than one large group movement. On or about 21 April emigrants originating in the suburban Hsien-feng commune closest to the border went to Bakhty (on the border) in groups of up to 200 persons, with carts, animals, families, and personal effects. They were not hindered at the frontier by either the Chinese guards or the Soviet guards, although some of them were persuaded by the Chinese guards to turn back. Other groups crossed the Tarbagatai Mountains north of T'a-ch'eng as soon as the passes were open and headed for the Zaysan area in the Kara Irtish Valley. Without some advance planning these breaks would have been difficult to accomplish, and it is scarcely likely that the Soviets lacked advance knowledge of tentative plans. Some reports assert that the break from the Hsien-feng commune was definitely prearranged. The exodus caused genuine economic difficulty in T'a-ch'eng, where the local communes lost at least 160,000 animals—cattle, sheep, horses, and camels. Such a loss, though not catastrophic, represented possibly 10 percent of the flocks in the area.

In the I-ning area population concentrations were located somewhat farther from the border than at T'a-ch'eng, and the 15-mile-wide frontier zone lying west of Sui-ting was sparsely populated. Large-scale movements originated mostly in the I-ning area itself and in the communes located west of I-ning and north of the I-li River. The magnitude of movement from areas farther east was probably not as great. The flow of emigrants appears to have been manageable, even if increasingly heavy, until 3 to 5 days prior to 29 May, when very large numbers picked up and left. They swamped the I-ning transport office, which by 29 May had sold advance tickets for 3 months ahead. Most emigrants had had to divest themselves of whatever property they still owned in order to secure exit permits before departure. Large-scale breakouts of people with mounts and herds from the I-ning region may have taken place close to the border, as they did from T'a-ch'eng. Unless people seized riding animals from their communes, however, most of the traffic to the border must have gone afoot or in animal-drawn carts. Even 20 trucks a day, the number reportedly provided by the transport authorities, could carry no more than a few thousand people in a week.

and also leave out key elements of which the authors were unaware, particularly those that concern the activity of local Chinese Communist authorities. Many refugees attributed the exodus to Soviet meddling, but their reports do not limit the allegedly provocative activity to early 1962. Instead, they date it back to 1959 or 1960, but they give no explanation of the Chinese failure to put a stop to activities that must have been considered to be unusual or even illegal. One refugee who firmly believed that the mass emigration from T'a-ch'eng was arranged beforehand by the Soviets, for instance, reported that the emigration ended because no more people wished to emigrate, not because the authorities stopped it. Despite the size of the exodus, there have been literally no firsthand reports from any of the 50,000 to 70,000 non-Chinese participants in the exodus, and only three reports from Chinese participants.

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Without Soviet documentation, people who wished to qualify for entry into the USSR could not satisfy Chinese requirements for an exit permit. Those who went to the border without documents in the hope of stealing across were not likely to be shot by Soviet guards, but they ran the risks of pursuit by Chinese guards, of being turned back by Soviet guards, and of being shot by Chinese guards if they tried to return to China surreptitiously. The mounting size of the movement exacerbated problems of control at the border. When the Soviet officials accepted people even without Chinese exit permits, officials of the Peking regime were irritated, this being an obvious diplomatic affront. When the Chinese Communists failed to prevent such large numbers of these people from reaching the border, the Soviets were annoyed.

Peking argued as the situation worsened and delayed closure of the border on the Chinese side. Neither side, presumably, wanted casualties. A Soviet request that Peking send people to help screen the T'a-ch'eng emigrants, and possibly those in Ho-ch'eng as well, reportedly was refused. The Soviets also asked the Chinese to regulate the movement within Sinkiang to keep people from reaching the border. The Chinese replied that the Soviets should simply close the border, shooting people if necessary.

The situation seems to have continued unresolved until 29 May, when the Chinese took their first serious step to close the border by cutting off transportation from I-ning. Whether the border actually was closed at Ho-ch'eng is hard to determine from available information, but the measures to restrict transportation from I-ning effectively stopped large-scale movement to the border. On 31 May the Soviets closed the border at Bakhty. Illegal movement probably tapered off quickly thereafter as stiffer border controls were imposed on both sides, making it no longer possible for large groups to swamp border guards.

B. The I-ning Riot

When trouble broke out in I-ning on 29 May the senior government officials on the scene were the vice governor of the Autonomous Region (Iminov) at the frontier and the regional IKAC governor (Kurban Ali) in I-ning. Anvar Zhakulin, a Kazakh and the director of the provincial party committee's political and legal department, was at the local CCP office. He had won his party spurs in a 1951-53 purge in the I-ning region and was one of the few renegade Muslims in high party posts. He was probably supported by the regional party secretary, a Han Chinese, who kept in the background, as did all Chinese authorities.

A rumor had been abroad that as of midnight on 28 May the Soviet authorities, under Chinese pressure, would no longer accept any more would-be emigrants without valid Soviet citizenship papers—presumably papers that had gone the full circuit of review and authentication in I-ning. On 29 May, some 40 persons who had applied to the CCP committee for permission to leave were refused a hearing. Meanwhile, at the transport office, people waiting in a long queue learned that the sale of tickets for transportation by truck to Ho-ch'eng had

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ceased, that no more tickets for transportation to the border would be sold, and that people holding advance tickets would have to surrender them.

These rebuffs drove a crowd to break into the IKAC government offices and demand help from the governor, Kurban Ali, whom they assaulted while tearing up his office. Attempting to placate the crowd, Kurban Ali telephoned the provincial vice governor at the frontier and secured immediate approval to resume transportation services. He gave the informal leaders of the crowd a paper to that effect, thus saving himself from further beating. However, at the CCP office, where the leaders of the crowd then went to get the endorsement of the party authorities attached to their paper, they found the gates barred. Infuriated, they stormed the compound, but gunfire from guards stationed at the building and across the street prevented them from rampaging through the CCP offices. The crowd was unarmed and unled, and it yielded quickly under fire. Approximately 300 persons had gathered at the CCP headquarters, but only some 50 tried to break in. The riot ended in about 20 minutes, with 20 or more people killed and perhaps 50 wounded. Although it was not a big riot, it could have become more serious, as many hundred spectators watched from a safe distance. The streets were quickly cleared and cleaned up and were heavily patrolled by police and troops that night and for several weeks thereafter. A roundup of rioters naturally resulted in investigations and punishments. A curfew was immediately imposed, fully advertised to the population through rediffusion, and was relaxed by stages over the ensuing weeks only as calm returned to I-ning.

Available reports indicate that communal barriers remained high throughout the trouble. Although rumors flew swiftly, the indigenous minority peoples did not communicate effectively with disaffected Han Chinese settlers in the area; anti-Communist feelings they may have shared did not weaken the enduring racial and cultural barriers dividing the population.

There is no conclusive evidence that the riot was an organized and deliberate act of rebellion. Available accounts indicate that it was apparently spontaneous, being sparked by the despair of people who were crowding the city in order to leave the country and were suddenly blocked from doing so.

C. Post-riot Developments

1. CHINESE CONCESSIONS AND RESTRICTIONS

After the Chinese authorities had recovered control, conspicuously visible concessions were made to the local population. Although Russian goods disappeared from the I-ning shops, supplies of foodstuffs and consumer goods began to increase. The most conspicuous concession to Muslims was the re-opening of more mosques, although at the same time Muslims were being sent from I-ning to country communes in increasing numbers. The lot of the rural inhabitant was brightened by the granting of permission, from 1962 on, for

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families to till small private plots and to own small flocks of cattle and sheep. The border restrictions did not interfere with legal repatriation or deportation. These practices continued for a month or so after the riot and were resumed in the first half of 1963 for an unspecified length of time.

During a period of several weeks after the riot, Peking strengthened public security investigations and enforcement in northwestern Sinkiang and began closer control of the border zone in order to prevent a recurrence of the trouble. A publicity campaign was started by the Peking regime to show planning and deliberate incitement of the riot by the USSR. Youths as young as 15 who had been onlookers were sentenced to labor reform. Reports of a wider security sweep, though not substantiated, are credible. Fresh Han Chinese troops were brought into the border areas. Han Chinese military colonists replaced local nationals altogether on the lands near the border north of the I-li River. The border zone west of the road junction at Sui-ting was restricted to entry, and direct control of this zone may have been transferred from local to national authorities.

2. DETERIORATION OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Relations between the Chinese and the Soviets deteriorated at an accelerated pace after the Sinkiang episode. Until the day of the riot, even the mounting exodus had not broken the late winter lull in open controversy between the Communist parties of China and the USSR—the CCP and the CPSU. The problems of control at the border were apparently papered over successfully. For the riot, however, blame had to be assigned and scapegoats found. In the recriminatory propaganda and official retaliation that followed, the Chinese had the last word, beginning with the expulsion of the Soviet consuls from I-ning and Urumchi and continuing, in September, with the termination of all Sino-Soviet consular relations in China, except those maintained through the USSR Embassy in Peking.

By mid-1963 the exodus episode had become a public scandal on a larger scale, generating open recrimination between the USSR and Communist China for propaganda advantage. Public utterances were marked by self-righteousness on the Soviet side and exaggeration and pique on the Chinese side. The Soviets charged the Chinese with 5,000 border violations in a context that placed most of them in Manchuria. The Chinese, minimizing events in Manchuria and maximizing the exodus, retorted that "tens of thousands" of "Chinese citizens" had been "enticed and coerced" into going to the Soviet Union from Sinkiang. The Chinese asserted that although China had lodged repeated protests and made repeated representations, the USSR had refused to return these "Chinese citizens," basing its position on a "sense of Soviet legality" and "humanitarianism."

In December 1964, 2½ years after it happened, Chou En-lai branded the exodus as a "traitorous counter-revolutionary rebellion . . . [by] reactionary protagonists of local nationalism . . . under instigation and direct command of

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forces from abroad." Significantly, however, Chou exercised restraint in not naming the USSR outright as the instigating element, and he implicitly admitted that outside influence was secondary to the forces of local dissatisfaction.

III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXODUS

A. Communist Chinese Policies on Minority Nationalities

Ultimately after the exodus, the CCP's "hard line" on minority nationalities was reimposed; by June 1964, *Red Flag* articles were calling for more restrictive policies toward minorities. In the early postexodus period, however, when reappraisal of earlier programs for Sinkiang was underway, the Peking regime was cautious in its approach to reimposition of controls in Sinkiang and to tightening of the temporary relatively permissive CCP line on local nationalism. The regime undoubtedly was aware that the CCP had indeed strengthened its overall supremacy in Sinkiang, as elsewhere, but that the province was not capable of an immediate and lively recovery from the political and economic shocks of the preceding 4 years. The CCP could only bear with the economic weakness and the political weakness of provincial and regional organs of "self-government"—self-administration under rigid central controls—that it had erected in 1955.

On the heels of the March-April 1962 NPC and CPPCC meetings in Peking a nationalities work conference had been convened for cadres responsible for the execution of minority nationalities policy. Circumspection prevailed in this conference (which sat from 21 April to 29 May, the weeks when the exodus was at its height, and coincidentally was adjourned on the day of the I-ning riot), and no call for ideological or political "progress" was forthcoming. Instead, injunctions were to pursue existing objectives at a conservative pace, to avoid giving undue offense to "non-Chinese nationalists," and to be patient in party work.

Any sudden cancellation of the policy of greater tolerance for Muslim activities probably would have required study by party leaders from several provinces and would have generated consultation at several levels. Although the local authorities in Sinkiang spread reports that Muslim priests were the agitators whose spreading of pro-USSR propaganda had sparked the exodus, national authorities let the line stand that pressure on Muslim religious practices should be moderated throughout China.

Excessive repression could have caused well-known non-Chinese leaders to defect to the USSR, and had such defections materialized, drastic consequences might have ensued. The discrediting of local non-Chinese authorities and a new political housecleaning of local nationalists could easily have negated a decade of party work in developing non-Chinese leadership for administration and control in the province. Reconstitution of the facade of local self-government might have been difficult and prolonged. The exposure of the Chinese Communist structure of minority representation in government to unfavorable popular comparison with the USSR's federal system would also have embarrassed

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the CCP. There was a real risk of weakening the ideological structure of the state through failure to maintain the facade of autonomous government in Sinkiang.

As matters worked out, the merits of the USSR system of republics as a vehicle for political expression of nationalism did not come up publicly in 1962, as it had in 1958. The hollowness of the facade of autonomy by which the Chinese Communist regime could claim that its minorities were provided with adequate means of political self-expression was not exposed. The Soviets in their propaganda did not belabor the CCP on this long-recognized point of weakness until September 1964, when Khrushchev, in rebutting censure by Mao Tse-tung of Russian imperial conquests, praised the advantages of the Soviet system especially for its recognition of the right of secession.

B. Security in Sinkiang

From one point of view the long-range security of Sinkiang was probably weakened by the exodus, since the flight of large numbers of disaffected Kazakhs and Uighurs to the USSR has potentially increased the Soviet subversive capability against Sinkiang. If and when it suits their purpose, the Soviets could use these refugees to subvert the irredentists of northwestern Sinkiang toward local nationalism once again. In their eagerness to insure political stability in a permanently Chinese mold, the Chinese Communists are rapidly populating strategic parts of Sinkiang with a transplanted Chinese population. However, they cannot entirely discount the Soviet potential to subvert restless Chinese settlers as well as non-Chinese irredentists. The presence of at least a few presumably well-indoctrinated Chinese youth among the 1962 emigrants, a fact unremarked by both Soviet and Chinese protagonists, is an indication that Soviet subversion of Chinese settlers themselves is a possibility. Reports of border crossing forays in 1964 by armed rustlers from the USSR suggest another kind of troublemaking of which the emigrants along with other elements of the Kazakh SSR population are capable, if their activities are tolerated by Soviet authorities.

On the other hand, the exodus may have contributed to an improvement in Communist China's control of internal security in Sinkiang, since it removed 25 to 35 percent of the unreconstructed portion of the IKAC population. According to Foreign Minister Ch'en I, more than 60,000 inhabitants, probably 6 to 8 percent of the IKAC minority population, left the Sinkiang border areas for the USSR. The least tractable portion of the IKAC population—the partially disaffected and potentially dissident—numbered about 150,000 to 190,000, or almost 20 percent of the entire population, in 1956. By reducing this figure the exodus, at least numerically, reduced the local security problem. The leadership potential for dissidence was further reduced by the removal of persons of dual citizenship from responsible positions in the governmental and police organs of the IKAC and the province. Finally, closure of the Soviet consulates,

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
the last Soviet listening posts in Sinkiang, was a substantial security gain for the Chinese Communists. This was even more desirable in 1962 than in earlier years, because of the imminence of nuclear testing in the province.

New political orientations and new lines of internal cleavage are in the making in Sinkiang. The province is becoming more of a melting pot. Future re-settlement of Han Chinese will tend to restructure the security situation. For the existing vulnerabilities of its non-Chinese peoples to Soviet-style federalism will be substituted the future vulnerabilities of Sinkiang's Chinese people to Soviet "revisionism" seeping across the border. Unless the CCP's effort to make Sinkiang more Communist than Muslim is finally successful, it may only have succeeded in making the province more Chinese than Communist.


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
ORIENTATION




VEGETATION - ECONOMIC RESOURCES




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

POPULATION



CHINA-U.S.S.R. BORDER: WESTERN SECTOR



SELECTED ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS



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NOTES ON DISTRIBUTION OF SINKIANG EXODUS

STATINTL

1. Classification is Secret/Noform. [REDACTED]

STATINTL

2. The Standard Distribution List for CIA/BI GR Series is satisfactory providing the following additions are ~~made~~ considered:

1 White House through DD/I-- [REDACTED] STATINTL

DDI Area:

STATINTL

STATSPEC

- 2 [REDACTED]
- 3 DDI/RS
- 4 CIA/DIA/JAG
- 5 DCS/Plans
- 6 [REDACTED]

STATINTL

DBS Area:

OTR/SIC

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8 [REDACTED] Coordinator of Academic Relations, 1H1112, Hq., China Task Force

STATINTL

(see distrib. for GR 66-1 for his mailing address)

STATINTL

7625 Hq. for [REDACTED]

(ISA Pen Agm)

STATINTL

STATINTL

10 [REDACTED] -- 2 plus copies for various stations as they may wish to request

Author -- 4 for special distribution to other interested parties

STATINTL

3. ϕ It would be desirable for [REDACTED] to get together over soliciting the necessary interest from the above addressees to justify getting them on the standard list. We shouldn't attach too much importance to previous failures of these potential addressees to take the initiative in getting themselves on the list, but should simply get their telephonic request or indication of non-interest. (This does not apply to [REDACTED])

STATINTL [REDACTED]

STATINTL

STATINTL

* Based on telecon with [REDACTED]

STATINTL

A [REDACTED] * 7572 who handles

3057

61.2226A STATINTL

GR 67-13

DDI Research Staff



LRW

11 August 1966
11 Aug. 1966

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RNA

20 Dec 1966

AMA 13 Dec
 Br Ch AMEJ 23 Nov-12 Dec
 Typist (clean draft) M&D 6 Dec-12 Dec
 = draft M&D 24 Dec-30 Dec
 Clean Draft AMA/AOE 13 Dec
 Final draft P&B/M&D 3-4 Jan
 LRW 1 Feb. 67

Since this study consists largely of political analysis and is thus outside the scope of what we normally consider to be "geographic intelligence", I suggest it be treated in the same manner as P.N.61.2275; i.e., issue it first in a "reasonably formal" "Provisional Draft" (see GS 66-22) and finally as a finished GR (see GR 66-1). LRW

Final Editor's Report
 Before Reproduction or Distribution
 All changes on Blue Copy
 Distorted copy unacceptable
 Copy not to be made

30 Dec 66 - Approved For Release 2000/05/31 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100690001-0
in final typing prior to coordination with ONE, OCI, State (INR)
to be GR 67-13

STATINTL

9 Jan 67 Typing completed, coordination request sent to ONE, OCI, + INR, and to [redacted]
deadline of 12 Jan for return of three coordination copies.

13 Jan 67 In deadline for comments expired yesterday - more have been received - Geo will
call each one before moving ahead to print.

20 Jan Comments rec'd from John H. D. [redacted], State, but not yet fully read, so do determine
what if any are to be incorporated in the study.

27 Jan - George will incorporate changes that came in from [redacted].

1 Feb - To PD for page proofs; MLD says it has 250 copies on hand.

6 Feb.

17 Feb - Proofed galley & returned them to P.D.

2 Sept

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9 "

" " " " " "

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16 "

not much time devoted to this - [redacted] writing this report on [redacted] etc

23 "

" " " " " " [redacted] concerned with this etc

30 "

Ready for retyping + eventual ~~approval~~ submission

9 Oct

no change

14 Oct

Returns to Dir Review

16 Dec 70 Dir on 19 Dec

24 "

In editing

28 Oct

" + [redacted] will analyze

2 Nov

In editing but not approved by [redacted] yet

Publication undecided

14 Nov

Moving along in editing but at small pace

18 Nov

BC reading - will make a decision about what to do with this

28 Nov

In editing after conference between [redacted] RT + DNA

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2 Dec

In edit + grand conference

12 Dec

DM working steadily on this + Geo has

Updating of Sinkiang Exodus of 1962 to be ready for [redacted] review soon;

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As considered before, the Tibet and Sinkiang studies will not be combined into one.
6 May 66 In abeyance; analyst involved in Collation Project.

1 Jun 66 Considerable progress made on revision of the Sinkiang Exodus of 1962.

10 June 66 In work. (Updating of Sinkiang Exodus of 1962)

13-16 Jun No work this week.

20-24 Jun No work this week.

1 July No work

8 July In revision of draft and copy to be completed for World by 15 July

15 July still in work draft probably completed by end of July

22 actual work by BCh.

29 "

Aug " Do not suggest distribution to show on weekly production sheet

11 Aug " " 25 Approved For Release 2000/05/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100690001-0
In abeyance

21Sep64	PIM written; research under way. STATINTL
10Oct64	Approved For Release 2000/05/31 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100690001-0 Prelim. work done in Sep; ██████████ to begin in earnest midOct
28Oct64	██████████ spending most of his time on this now.
21Jun65	Draft has been finished and turned over to OCI review people
1Jul65	Future work not decided. STATINTL
2Aug65	China Research Advisory Group says OBI to publish Sinkiang and Tibet studies. Brammell to consider this. STATINTL STATINTL
23Aug65	No change so far as Sinkiang and Tibet studies concerned. ██████████ has given asst. to ██████████ on summary paper on dissidence and control. Ch.GD/F will proposed that OBI review the Sinkiang paper in Sep with view to publishing.
30Sep65	Sinkiang Exodus of 1962. ██████████ has this; will talk with ██████████ about publishing.
25Oct65	Sinkiang to be given to ██████████ shortly for determination as to kind of OBI issuance. RAN covering Tibet to be submitted. STATINTL STATINTL STATINTL
2Dec65	Research on Tibet, which began in October, is proceeding. RAN???
3Jan66	Research on Tibet study delayed by 61.2275
25Jan66	██████████ considering doing a single study comparing Tibet and Sinkiang; however, no work being done currently.
24Feb66	Delayed by 2275. STATINTL
1Apr66	An updated draft of the Sinkiang Exodus of 1962 was prepared and will be Approved For Release 2000/05/31 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100690001-0
61.2226	Dissidence/Disaffection--Com.China DDI/Res.Staff 25X1A ██████████

MEMORANDUM FOR:

AN 61. 22 24

Project materials
 samples - NPIC
 provided [redacted]
 materials

(DATE)

STATINTL

TR (SMITTAL SLIP)		DATE
TO:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p>61. 2226A = Linking 2226B = Tibet</p>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 35-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO : 1957 - O-4394