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MEMORANDUM FOR: John W. Coffey, Deputy Director for Support

Attached herewith are several past MAG papers that touch on the problem of esprit within the Agency as related to personnel management. In case you are not aware of these past papers, we thought they might provide a useful insight into what MAG has written in the past on this general subject.

We are working on a paper that will deal specifically with the problem of esprit as it exists today within the Agency. We will forward it as soon as it is completed.

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
Co-Chairmen, Management Advisory Group

Attachments:
As stated

MORI/CDF Pages 13-15, 51-55,
57-62

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11 August 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAG

THROUGH :

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SUBJECT : Proposed Agency Survey on Youth and
Communication Issues

1. The attached memorandum, prepared by the Psychological Services Staff, OMS, will serve to introduce our research interests and plans on the "Youth Issue" in the Agency. At the request of the DDS, this memorandum was forwarded to the Executive-Director Comptroller. Colonel White has directed us to undertake the proposed research.

2. Although the "Communication Issue" in which MAG has expressed especial interest is not referenced in the memorandum, it is our intention to fully explore the dimensions of this issue with our respondents. I'm sure the Human Resources Study Group would welcome advice and inputs from MAG re the design, conduct, and use of the proposed research.

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1 June 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Support
THROUGH : Director of Medical Services
SUBJECT : Research Possibilities on the "Youth Issue"

1. A recent survey of 191 well-known business and industrial concerns asked whether or not recent graduates are found to be different after employment than their counterparts of a few years ago. While some reported little or no difference, most did, stating that today's graduates are more concerned about social problems, more anxious to have early responsibility, want more challenge, and are more likely to question operating policy and practice. (See Attachment 1) TIME magazine (May 24) quotes the board chairman of a major corporation as saying that while it is easy to hire top-ranking students in today's tight job market, industry must invent challenging, decision-making jobs for its bright young recruits and back their involvement in social causes if it expects to keep them. A social scientist recently described attitude changes in today's youth as "irreversible" and concluded that the marketplace must find ways to adapt.

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SUBJECT: Research Possibilities on the "Youth Issue"

2. Within the Agency, rumblings from both articulate young Agency professionals and from their superiors in management suggest that the Agency is by no means unaffected by these trends. While concern has mounted recently, a survey demonstrated wide-spread perception of change at least as long as two years ago. In a survey conducted by the Psychological Services Staff, OMS, of job-related attitudes of Agency officers who had been on board five and ten years, opinions as to both the capability and the motivation of young professionals were sought.* While 83% of those surveyed agree that "Young professionals entering the Agency today are as capable as those who entered when I did", only 56% felt that they are as motivated (i.e., committed to their work) "as those who entered when I did." More significantly, only 22% felt that the Agency is doing a good job of managing the young professionals who have recently entered on duty. Today, discussion about the changing attitudes of youth in the Agency abounds, with little agreement as to the implications, and even less about what, if anything, the Agency should do about them.

* A Survey of Job-Related Attitudes of Five- and Ten-Year Agency Officers, OMS/PSS/RB, January 1970.

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SUBJECT: Research Possibilities on the "Youth Issue"

3. The Human Resources Study Group,* taking note of these concerns, has discussed the question of whether or not a systematic research effort could address itself in any meaningful way to those concerns. The answer is yes, if what is needed (and we think it is) is an attempt to define the problem, framing it in questions like these:

a. How representative are the views being currently expressed by an articulate few? Of whom are they representative? Does the "Silent Majority" have similar views, or contrasting ones? How strongly are they held?

b. If we can identify common viewpoints on significant issues among young Agency professionals (whether they are like or unlike those of the articulate few), do these really differ in a crucial way from those held by their seniors in management positions?

c. If some real differences between views of "youth" in the Agency and "management", are identified, what are the implications for such issues as the Agency's ability to continue to attract and hold "good" people, develop identification with the Agency's mission,

* Organized by DMS at the direction of the DDS in October 1970. Charged with the task of studying needs and recommending research in the human resources area. Currently composed of representatives of OP, OS, OTR, and OMS; chaired by C/PSS/OMS.

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SUBJECT: Research Possibilities on the "Youth Issue"

stimulate desire to produce, inspire career commitment?

4. Not all of these questions are equally researchable, of course. Those in "a" are relatively easy to tackle, "b" somewhat less so, "c" much tougher. Clearly, a "profile of attitudes" derived from a standard opinion survey approach, while a useful first step, would not carry us very far. We need to know more about which attitudes make a difference in the way people respond--to their jobs, to managerial approaches, to the decision to cast their lot with the Agency or look elsewhere. While the methodology for research aimed at these questions cannot be spelled out in detail at this stage, it would obviously involve some combination of focused depth interviewing, questionnaires, and probably other instruments designed to tease out and measure perceptual/attitudinal dimensions. The Research Branch of the Psychological Services Staff believes that the technology for such studies is within its capabilities. Attachment 2 illustrates one possibly useful approach.

5. To proceed in the direction indicated, the following sequence of events is suggested as appropriate:

a. Agreement of top management that research in this area is desirable. Obviously, such an undertaking would be pointless unless seen by management as relevant to

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SUBJECT: Research Possibilities on the "Youth Issue"

their concerns. We seek and welcome input and guidance from top management on the problems meriting central focus.

b. Expansion of the Study Group to include representatives of all Directorates. While we feel that, as representatives of the Support Directorate we are in a position to be aware of the Agency-wide concerns, input from representatives specifically appointed by the Directors of other components is highly desirable.

c. Designation of the Psychological Services Staff, OMS, as the action arm for the design and implementation of the study.

6. Given approval of the above, the next steps would be:

a. Talks between the expanded Study Group and a variety of individuals from both "youth" and "management" in order to define the dimensions for which measurement is desired;

b. A definition of "youth", in terms of both age and position, and a definition of "management" in terms of both;

c. An outline of the proposed study, to be submitted for approval to top management, before proceeding.

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Chairman, Human Resources Study Group

2 Attachments
as stated above

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ATTACHMENT 1

SUBJECT: How Today's Graduates are Different*

The twenty-fifth annual survey of policy and practice in the employment of college and university graduates in business and industry involved 191 well-known companies. Respondents to this year's survey were asked to indicate ways in which new graduates are found to be different after employment when compared to their counterparts of a few years ago. A total of 110 companies replied. Their responses are summarized below:

No. Companies

- 32 They are not really a new breed. We see very little difference.
- 30 More concerned about social problems - Concerned about social goals of the company - More interested in community betterment.
- 28 Overestimate potential - Impatient with progress - Expect too much responsibility too soon.
- 23 Desire early responsibility - Want to supervise immediately - Want rapid advancement - More demanding and aggressive.
- 22 -Want more challenge - Ask for more meaningful assignments - Want relevant work.
- 22 More eager to criticize - Often question operating policy - Unimpressed by protocol - Less acceptance of tradition.
- 21 More restless - Less patient.
- 16 Better educated - Better qualified - More able to take responsibility - More knowledge in special field.

* from "Trends in Employment of College and University Graduates in Business and Industry, 1971", Frank S. Endicott, Director of Placement, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois

SUBJECT: How Today's Graduates are Different

- 8 More interested in continued education.
- 5 Less concerned about dress and behavior.

Illustrative statements:

"Graduates view the corporation as having more than just a profit responsibility to stockholders. They see industry playing a major role in developing hard-core and minority groups, using corporate profits to better society. This concern is beginning to display itself among some of the recently hired engineers."

"They are more concerned with the commitment their corporation has made to resolving social problems. They also are more interested in becoming involved on their own than college graduates were in earlier years."

"More impatient for promotion and salary increases. Less regard for established procedures and policies."

"New graduates are less hesitant to question authority and work procedures. Many seem more anxious than their predecessors for immediate recognition and job responsibility. They are more competitive, more interested in social implications and less impressed by the size of the organization."

"Today's graduate is more curious and inquisitive. He is more apt to question things relating to this field and not accept them as they are. This may create friction in supervisor-employee relations."

"The recent graduate appears to desire more freedom in his work and a voice in management decisions."

"They are more likely to express their opinions long before they really have the maturity to express judgment. However, their comments on occasion show bright sparks of potential. This may be part of the maturing process."

"They want responsibility faster and are willing to rock the boat a little to get their jobs done. We need more of this type to keep us from getting lethargic."

SUBJECT: How Today's Graduates are Different


"Other than a little different mode of dress and possibly a more awareness of social, economic, and ecological problems, the "new breed" does not behave much differently."

"New breed or otherwise, we find them anxious and eager."

ATTACHMENT 2

To illustrate the sort of research approach we envision as applicable to the "Youth Issue" we provide in this attachment a specific example of a problem and a methodology. A rather new and indirect method of evaluating the differences (if any) between the values and philosophies of young and more senior Agency officers is a method called the multiple-cue judgment task. In this task, groups of young and more senior officers would be asked to judge several hypothetical "candidates" for Agency employment in terms of their overall suitability for an Agency career. Information about each hypothetical candidate on a number of dimensions would be presented to each officer. For example, one candidate might be described as follows:

Profile of Candidate 1: Personal Qualities



The task of each officer would be to subjectively weight this combination of personal qualities in order to arrive at a judgment of the overall desirability of the candidate for a career with the Agency. Other "candidates", possessing quite different degrees of these same personal qualities, would also be rated by each judge. (The specific personal qualities cited in this example are used for illustrative purposes only; preliminary inquiry would be necessary to determine what dimensions are most relevant for research of this type.)

Based upon an officer's ratings of a number of such hypothetical candidates, statistical analysis (involving multiple regression technique) would reveal which personal qualities he weights most heavily and how he weights them in

arriving at a judgment of an individual's overall suitability for an Agency career. The picture that emerges for a given officer would be a practical and potentially meaningful image of the type of individual he believes the Agency should attract.

Comparisons of the responses of groups of junior and more senior Agency officers to this technique could provide insights as to areas of agreement and conflict in basic philosophies.

This multiple-cue judgment technique has certain advantages over more conventional techniques of measurement. It offers an indirect measure of the relative importance assigned to various factors in a practical and realistic manner. People are not required to provide general answers to abstract questions, they are instead asked to make specific judgments about potentially real people using any type of intuitive (or rational) approach they wish. Subsequent statistical analysis reveals the actual basis of their decisions in a manner which can be informative to both the individual making the judgments and to the organization of which he is a part.

While difficult to anticipate the specific results of the type of research described above, it is not difficult to imagine that such research would hold implications for policies and practices in recruitment, selection, training--especially management training, performance appraisal, and career management, to name but the more obvious.

18 November 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT: Short-Term Measures to Maintain Employee Morale in Periods of Austerity

REFERENCE: MAG Memorandum "Maximizing Program and Manpower Productivity," 11 November 1971

1. In discussions accompanying the preparation of referent memorandum, MAG also considered the immediate potential threat to employee morale posed by current budget and personnel reductions. While we believe a broader long-term approach toward maximizing program and manpower productivity is required, short-term measures may help to meet the current directives.

2. Such steps as those outlined below, stressing improved communication and expanded use of non-pay incentives, can play a significant role in improving employee performance and reducing negativism during austere periods:

A. Need for Standardization and Coordination of Personnel Policies. MAG understands that a great deal of leeway in personnel management is permitted the four Deputy Directors. While this latitude has some advantages in permitting tailoring of policies to particular Directorate needs, standardization and coordination are essential in extraordinary periods such as those brought on by BALPA, OPRED and the current cuts. For example, if there is no policy precluding promotion consideration, even though promotions cannot be made effective immediately, all Directorates should be urged to continue promotion deliberations so that the process of ranking and evaluating personnel will continue.

B. Additional Emphasis on Effective Management-Employee Communication. Particularly during austere periods, Management should make a strong effort to

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insure that employees receive timely and correct information about financial and personnel management matters. In the case of the DDP, particular effort should be made to alert the employees under cover to major policy decisions and actions of his cover company or organization. More exposure of Management to the employee through speaking programs, briefings, and even written notices would be helpful.

C. Assignments. Qualifications (including experience and development potential) should dominate the selection process. Fairness is essential.

D. Retirement. Choice assignments should not be awarded to soon-to-be retired officials. If the Agency has a moral obligation to ensure eligibility for retirement, the Agency should find some way to fulfill that obligation. Release from duty with compensation until retirement would be a relatively cheap trade off in many cases, and might even give some people a better chance at non-Agency jobs by releasing them at an earlier age. On the other hand, many of these soon-to-be retired officials may have the visionary talents required for Agency long-term planning. If so, they could be removed from the command channel to a reflective or "RAND-type" assignment which conceivably could be arranged on a contract basis.

E. Continuing Consideration of Promotions and In-Grade Increases. All promotions and in-step increases should be considered and submitted as in normal times.

F. Personnel File Notations of Freeze Actions or Inactions. An official entry should be made in the personnel file of each employee whose promotion or in-grade increase has been delayed as a result of a freeze. This point is particularly important if a freeze turns out to be long term.

G. Hiring at Lower Grades. The average grade at which new employees are brought in should be reduced in functional categories where supply and

demand permit. With lower starting grades, there would still be room in the system for some relatively quick initial promotions, always a boost to morale.

H. Expanded Use of Training. MAG recommends expanded use of training as an aid to motivation and as a means of improving and developing employee skills. Many Agency employees would respond favorably to a policy which actively encouraged more exposure to the Agency courses which have high reputations (e.g., Mid-Career, Advanced Intelligence Seminar, Senior Seminar, and sections of the CT program). There would be some benefit for selected employees and the Agency, if certain Directorate courses were opened to wider Agency participation; e.g., exposing some DDI and DDS&T analysts to specialized DDP training. The Agency should be more aggressive in encouraging career-related training at outside institutions, as well. However, persons nearing retirement should be excluded from this expanded training program.

I. Expansion of Orientation Trip Programs. Management should review its policy and procedures toward orientation trips. If budgets permit, expansion of this program could be especially useful during austere periods when promotions are reduced. The time between trips for analysts is already too long, and their duration too short to be of optimum use to the analyst or to the Agency.

J. Fair Treatment for Minorities. During austere periods it is particularly important that minority employees (by race and sex) receive fair treatment.

THE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP

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MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP - Paper No. 3

21 November 1969

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Members of the Management Advisory Group have spent many hours during the past four months, in full group sessions and singularly, analyzing and considering problems confronting the Agency as it moves into its twenty-third year. We have reached a consensus on certain of the essential points and themes which consistently reoccur as principal matters. In conversations with our peers including the current Mid-Career course participants, we believe that our consensus views on these essential points do, in fact, represent a widely-held attitude of the middle-grade officer in the Agency. Our desire to attempt to articulate these views, without inhibition, represents our first effort to try to function and to serve as an advisory group to management.


The Agency needs to develop a more effective system to ensure career growth, especially of those younger officers with the greatest potential for leadership. Decisive steps must be taken in order to make the Agency a "better place to work" in the next decade. MAG findings parallel the study Attrition II, dated 14 July 1969, which noted that the heaviest loss of professional personnel is for job-related reasons and that this loss has been especially acute in the age 40 and below range. The significance of this is underscored by the fact that the Director of Personnel feels that for the years ahead the Agency may be facing a management succession crisis. In fact, the rapid growth of the Agency in its early years permitted a regular increase in personnel with a sufficiently broad base to permit comparatively fast promotions and steadily expanding responsibilities, reducing the pressures for long range career planning. The same is somewhat true today within the younger directorate, DDS&T. Indeed, this situation began to change in the early 1960's--by 1964 the personnel strength figure peaked--but it was not reflected in significant alterations in career development planning. As we moved into the late 1960's, the situation had worsened. Confronted with a reduction in manpower, in absolute terms, and a very tight budgetary situation, steps more than ever are called for in order to ensure career growth.

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The most precious asset of the Agency is its people. This is given recognition by the personal personnel management system that has always been a pride of the Agency. And we should be proud of such a system. Moreover, lack of job challenge, emphasized by a number of our younger officers, must be overcome if the Agency is to retain the dynamism and growth potential needed to meet present and future responsibilities. Despite a relatively rosy reading by some, uncertain and slow advancement in responsibility, the lack of opportunity to pursue professional interest, and slow promotions are factors which have affected morale.

Statistics provided us with some depressing eye openers. For



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the disproportionate distribution between directorates exacerbating the problem. Similarly, average time in grade--e. g., in the DDP 68 months from GS-13 to GS-14; 88 months from GS-14 to GS-15--illustrates the fact that a man, possibly entering via the CTP, moves through the early grades rapidly and then smacks head-on into the bulge which exists, especially in the DDP but also in the DDI and DDS, at the middle levels. Promotion patterns are significant because advancement of young men represents the best means of revitalizing an organization from within, is the best guarantee of broadened responsibility for top-flight officers, and sets the stage for effective management programming.

We believe the Agency is at a crossroads point and that, with an eye to meeting the challenge of the 1970's groundwork must be laid to:

- (1) encourage the development of a sound management succession program;
- (2) assist supervisors in formally identifying and weeding out of the chain of command and promotion personnel who have topped out;
- (3) facilitate promotions and increase job responsibilities; and
- (4) combine the personal security features of the Civil Service system with a recognition of the need for a shorter career base.

To make such a system work will require some rather significant changes in the modus operandi of the Agency toward career development and, incidentally, will require more candor on the part of supervisors and managers. We are mindful that the various levels of senior management, to differing degrees, are aware of these problems although they may not sense the extent of concern in the middle ranks. Pockets of sheer enlightenment have been found in our probings. The Director of Personnel, for example, has described his management succession study and plans in most relevant terms. //

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Several proposals are forwarded with this memorandum which illustrate specific ways in which MAG members believe steps could be made to achieve some of the initiatives needed in personnel management and career development. These include accelerated promotions, the establishment of a "comers list," and a selective program of involuntary retirement. These proposals interrelate and are designed to provide a package approach to the problem.

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It is essential to implement with all due speed a career development program for the Agency's most able younger officers, in a planned and orderly way. The anticipated increase in regular retirements over the next few years--possibly accompanied by limited involuntary retirement--will produce headroom at the top. This will not, however, adequately solve the problem for the middle-grade and younger officers of high ability. Time-in-grade continues to weigh too heavily in consideration for promotion of junior and middle-grade Agency officers, and the dissatisfaction of these officers is very real. They are reacting to their own considerable difficulty in moving ahead in this Agency due in part to external factors, e. g., limitation on the number of super-grade positions in the Agency, budgetary ceilings, masses of personnel grouped in the middle grades, and the general sense of movement that younger people experience elsewhere in our society both in and outside the public sector.

The new professional officer has particular concern in two areas: first, he learns that young interns in other Government branches move from Grade GS-07 to GS-11 or GS-12 more or less automatically--and at a faster rate than young Agency officers; and secondly, he quickly hears about seemingly never-ending "humps" or long time-in-grade averages beyond GS-11 or GS-12 and is depressed about his own career prospects. He can personally believe and perhaps has been told by senior officers that he could do a better job than some officers of higher grade who have topped out, but this is little consolation when he sees his advancement blocked. It is simply not enough to tell an individual, even repeatedly, that he has a career with CIA and then apply an ad hoc approach to his assignments and rate of promotion.

The two proposals which follow are designed to overcome the blockage in the middle grades so that young officers can have a greater sense of confidence in their future career growth.

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1. Accelerated Promotions. MAG would like to outline a proposal calling for the establishment of an accelerated promotion schedule. Each career service would reserve a percentage of its promotion quota for outstanding officers with only minimum regard for time-in-grade. This would introduce a system for rapid advancement of the most promising younger officers. The following table illustrates in general how this might be accomplished, recognizing it may vary from directorate to directorate.

<u>Promotion Category</u>	<u>Time-in-Grade Requirements</u>	<u>Percentage of Slots Reserved*</u>
GS-12 to GS-13	1 year or less	25%
GS-13 to GS-14	2 years or less	25%
GS-14 to GS-15	3 years or less	25%
GS-15 to GS-16	4 years or less	25%

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2. Comers List. Promising junior and middle grade officers, usually under age 40, would be identified fairly early in their careers and given positions of increased responsibility as part of a mutually-discussed career growth plan. Some Agency offices actually have such a list though it is an informal one. The number of "comers" could be specified, such as in each directorate at GS-15 or below, although the figure should probably be less in the smaller directorates. (Many of those on the "Comers List"

 *The principle of flexibility would have to be borne in mind in carrying out such a program. Take, for example, the high-performing individual in GS-13 who has slightly over two years in grade at the time the program is instituted. He should probably be compensated with promotion at that time or the time of the next panel meeting six months or a year later. The significance of the accelerated promotion proposal is that it lays down a set of impersonal criteria which would have to be followed and it commits the Agency to the principle that the accelerated advancement of highly qualified younger officers should be encouraged. This would be a significant step in restoring dynamism to the Agency's personnel profile.

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would find themselves a recipient of an accelerated promotion.) Excellent young officers who are identified as "comers" would be given special attention and moved into positions designed to forward their career development and to prepare them for leadership roles in management. In this process, certain officers who have "topped out" might be moved out of direct line jobs.

Directorates would administer this program by submitting periodic reports on its "Comers List" personnel to an Agency coordinating authority, such as the Executive Director-Comptroller. Such a monitoring program would be designed to ensure that appropriate planning for career growth of the "comers" is instituted and maintained. In addition to being given positions of increased responsibility, those on the "Comers List" would receive added opportunities for internal and external training.*

*As these personnel assumed new positions of responsibility, they would be put through an intensive program of management training. In this they should be joined by other personnel, also expanding their management skills, as part of a general effort to overcome deficiencies in management training evident at various supervisory levels in the Agency.

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SELECTIVE INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT PROGRAM

The Agency faces an externally directed reduction in personnel strength which cannot be met solely through attrition. There is a concomitant need to open up assignment and promotional opportunities in order to attract, retain, and develop the young careerists of today for the challenge of the 1970's and beyond. As a step towards solving the problem this paper outlines a limited program of involuntary retirements as one credible solution available to management.

The Director of Central Intelligence has discretionary authority to terminate the employment of any employee of the Agency under section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. It is recommended that, using this authority, the Agency undertake a limited program of involuntary retirement involving individuals under the two Federal Staff retirement systems applicable to Agency employees.

The CIA Retirement Act and the Civil Service retirement system have identical age and length of service requirements for involuntary retirement. Employees separated without cause are eligible for an immediate annuity if they have completed 25 years of service, or if they are at least 50 years of age, 20 years of service (under the CIA Retirement Act, ten years with the Agency and five qualifying). In addition, annuities have been substantially increased as a result of recent liberalizations in the Civil Service law. Legislation is now pending before the Congress to make comparable adjustments for the CIA retirement system. As a general rule:

a. After 30 years of service, assuming one year sick leave credit, the basic annuity is 62 percent of high three salary under the CIA system and 59.25 percent under the Civil Service system.

b. Generally for the first three years of retirement, when Federal income taxes are not applicable, net income from a basic annuity, based on 30 years service and one year sick leave credit, approximates the employees net take-home pay, after Federal and state income tax and retirement deductions. Further, the purchasing value of this retirement income is substantially preserved by virtue of built in adjustments to meet increases in cost-of-living.

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We recognize the fact that the Agency is a people-oriented organization. We heartily endorse this approach to the extent it clearly serves the best interests of the Agency and is not overly protective of the few to the detriment of the many. The continued retention of an employee who no longer performs with the effectiveness once expected and currently needed is clearly not in the long-term interest of the Agency when it impairs the development of promising young officers whose career commitment is essential. It is hoped that the problem facing the Agency with respect to ceiling reduction and the unblocking of developmental and promotional opportunities can be met through proper attrition, other programmatic efforts, and accelerated voluntary retirements as the result of liberalizations in retirement laws. To the extent that it is not, we propose the initiation of an involuntary retirement program using the following parameters:

a. On an Agency-wide basis identify employees 55 and over and those with 30 years of service, regardless of age, who would be entitled to an immediate annuity of not less than 60 percent of "average basic salary."

b. Rank the identified employees according to time-in-grade without promotion.

c. Establish groupings of ranked employees by specific time-in-grade criteria, e.g., GS-15's--ten or more years in grade; GS-14's--eight years in grade; GS-13's--six years in grade.

d. Establish the number of separations to be effected under the program.* Assign quotas to each directorate and appropriate independent office groupings. Provide rank/grouping data and projected annuity information on employees in the zone of consideration.

*Scope of program. It is recommended that the program be implemented on a pilot basis with total separations not to exceed the difference between authorized strength and the projected number by which the Agency would otherwise be overstrength over the time involved (considering such factors as attrition, other programmatic reductions, and anticipated voluntary retirement).

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e. Directorates and independent office groupings would nominate, according to quota, employees in the zone of consideration for involuntary retirement. Nominations would be submitted to the Director, with the Director of Personnel's accompanying recommendation on any request for exception on compassionate or other established grounds. Exceptions approved by the Director would require a replacement nominee from the proposing Directorate or independent office grouping.

It is recognized that involuntary separation is an emotionally difficult task and should only be taken after management has exhausted all other suitable efforts to overcome the problem the Agency faces. It is most important, therefore, that promotional assignment opportunities created as a result of involuntary retirement vacancies not be wasted. Hopefully, follow-on promotions and assignments will be made along the lines recommended elsewhere in this paper to meet the overall developmental needs of the Agency.

We believe that the approach recommended above, if accompanied with dignity and compassion and without a pejorative air, could begin a pipeline toward early retirement. Its effect should be felt within a year of inception. Applied equally across the several senior grades, it might stay the desirable officers from opting out early if he sees a true thinning of the ranks of his competition for promotion. The ultimate judgments on who would go and who would be encouraged to remain would clearly have to be made on a directorate-wide level if it is not to become the 701 program revisited.

We believe that the credibility of the proposed involuntary retirement program depends heavily upon the effective use of the Agency's legal authorities and capacity for initiative and innovation to assist affected employees in preparing for and establishing themselves in a second career. We believe that a responsive program in this connection would, at a minimum, include sabbaticals (academic, relocational, or vocational) and resourceful out-placement.

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4 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director - Comptroller
SUBJECT: Effective Lateral Communications

The lack of effective communications between individuals, components, or directorates can handicap the intelligence analyst, technician, case officer and manager alike. Lateral communication sometimes is viewed as unnecessary and contrary to "need to know" compartmentation. However, the younger officer especially has sought his counterpart in other parts of the Agency with benefit to both intelligence production and operations. The difficulty of defining the lateral communication "problem" was emphasized in MAG's discussions. Some MAG members felt that the problem was essentially that people did not know with whom to communicate. Others felt that the real problem was to establish effective communication between people who already know of their mutual existence and concerns. MAG considered the subject and attempted to identify successful communications techniques employed by some in the Agency which could be used by others.

The most common approach to effective communications involves personal relationships and usually takes the form of knowing key people or components knowledgeable about a particular area. These interrelationships depend very much upon personalities, mutual respect, personal needs and inadequacies. Much of this communication is on an informal basis but can be formalized. The situation of learning only too late about pertinent work or capabilities of people could be alleviated by a more organized way to identify key people in a directorate or division whom one could contact for overall direction or information. Certain people in any directorate seem to have this capability either through innate ability or their function in the organization structure which gives them an overall view of office personnel and activities. These points of contact should be more clearly identified for all. Another useful mechanism enhancing communication with the appropriate people is the use of a functional directory such as the one published by OCS.

SUBJECT: Effective Lateral Communications

An additional method of effective communication has been used in times of crisis, for example, by OCI. A task force is set up to ensure that all interested parties are in touch and contributing necessary information. People with specialized interest and knowledge in a particular country or problem are identified and a roster is made with names, phone numbers, and special area of expertise. Such a roster probably would include names of economic, political, military, scientific, estimative, and operational specialists. On any given problem, then, these people are ready and available. Sometimes meetings involving all of the people on the task force are set up so that all have a chance to exchange ideas and discuss probable events and implications. Modification of this concept might be workable even in the absence of a crisis. Lists of people with specialized interest or knowledge could be assembled and fed into a computer and made available to interested individuals.

The concept of a roster of personnel with specialized knowledge can even be extended. Practical implementation would involve providing a cross-indexed computer tabulation which identifies specific subjects and knowledgeable individuals or Agency components. It is envisioned that this data bank would reflect more than just those "experts" in a particular field. Rather, it would, to a manageable level of detail, truly reflect the activity within the Agency. This data bank would be updated regularly as "expertise" is developed within a given office or division. Younger officers who have not yet learned how to work the informal communications channels would benefit greatly by being able to tap this data bank. An important aspect of this question relates to a certain amount of middle management "inertia" which is believed to exist within the Agency. Many managers seem reluctant to search for outside expertise almost to the point of discouraging the use of the informal communications paths. If a data bank such as discussed above is to be beneficial its use must be encouraged from the top down to overcome this management inertia at whatever level it exists. Finally, security can be maintained; a valid case can be made for not making the details of the entire data bank available. At the office level an individual can act as the interface between the officers in the division and the data bank. Such an individual having the need to know

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SUBJECT: Effective Lateral Communications

and aware of the information needs of personnel in his division can query the data bank to identify the experts in other offices or to identify other components where related work is being carried out. Further, this individual being knowledgeable of the activity within his office would be responsible for ensuring that his part of the data bank is current.

The Agency spends a good deal of money each year sending people to conferences and seminars. The knowledge we collectively have in the Agency also is significant but unfortunately we seldom utilize the specialized knowledge our own people have to inform each other. Perhaps twice a year groups of interested individuals (compiled and available from the computer) could get together in a conference or seminar environment. The agenda should be flexible but include presentations and discussion from people with differing kinds of specialized knowledge (whether it's all of the French experts, groups of computer people or all those who worry about space or missile problems). Even though on a working basis many of us are in regular or informal contact with our counterpart in other parts of the Agency we seldom take time for a thorough and thought-provoking session. The organization of the meeting could be a cooperative venture with the agenda and participants worked out by the Directorates and the mechanics by the Office of Training.

Other means contributing to effective lateral communications are participation in training classes such as the DDS&T Career Development Course and all inter-directorate courses (Mid Career, Intelligence and World Affairs, Advanced Intelligence Seminar, and Senior Seminar). These courses serve to demonstrate positive implications of lateral communication between operational and analytical components. One of the most helpful 'fallouts' from these sessions is the contacts made with people from other components and directorates. Similar experiences can be gained in attending in-house seminars and technical working sessions such as the recent Human Factors Seminar and the working groups under the R&D technical coordinating committee.

MAG believes that lateral communication should be encouraged by management. While many intelligence officers

ADMINISTRATIVE/INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Effective Lateral Communications

will communicate on their own once they know with whom to get in touch, others must be encouraged as they are encouraged by their managers in other respects. Managers should make it clear from the outset of an employee's assignment that they support lateral communication and that the officer is expected to keep in touch with his counterparts in other components and directorates.

Management Advisory Group

SECRET

MAIN THEMES OR PROPOSALS MENTIONED IN PAPERS SUBMITTED BY
INDIVIDUAL MAG MEMBERS ON THE SUBJECT OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

1. Agency Barriers Leading to Personnel Dissatisfaction
and Inefficiency:

Following specific examples point up the problems caused
by arbitrary, rigid or overly-compartmented Agency practices
and policies:

a) DDS&T has vacancies for qualified personnel.

[REDACTED]

25X1

to DDS&T. However there is no movement from DDP to
DDS&T, and DDS&T is obliged to recruit outside the Agency.

[REDACTED]

25X1

c) A female, college graduate has spent one year
in RID/DDP. She believes she is under-utilized. She
informally learned that a DDP area desk is looking for a
CE/CI analyst and considers her eminently qualified.
However she is refused permission to leave RID until she
has spent a full two year apprenticeship.

Conclusion: Mobility within or between Directorates
should be encouraged. Each of the above examples, and
many others that might be cited, deserve a better
solution. One way of improving mobility would be to
establish an Agency "Want Ad" publication, circulated
periodically to all employees.

2. Training of Supervisors in Personnel Management:

Personnel management is considered to be a prime area of
weakness. Often, too much time is spent by supervisors on
substantive matters and too little attention is paid to

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personnel management. The problem begins immediately when an officer is appointed as a supervisor for the first time. No adequate program currently exists to prepare the officer as a supervisor (mid-career course and managerial grid, while useful in their own right, are clearly not enough). When a person becomes a supervisor, and periodically thereafter, he should be given a course specifically tailored to his new duties. Other frequent courses or seminars should be established on specific areas such as the fitness report, counselling of subordinates, regularly reviewing each employee's career prospects, etc.

A related concept is the instituting of career planning and development for Agency personnel who have formal training in science or engineering. The loyalties of scientists and engineers tend to lie more strongly with their profession than with an employer. A management development program would be a useful tool for retaining scientific talent and developing professional ties to intelligence among those retained. Such a program would include external and internal training, and rotation of assignments.

3. Mandatory Retirement

There is a widely held belief among middle management that in many parts of the Agency today's senior officers were also the senior officers in the late 1940's and early 1950's. There is a general impression, in part justified and in part exaggerated, that this group has become over the years self-protective and resistant to change. Because they are social as well as professional colleagues they shy away from criticizing each other or weeding themselves out. This has set a style in personnel management for the Agency as a whole. There is a reluctance, from an arguably humane point of view, to destroy or undermine the careers of people who have given long service to the Agency. This manifests itself in an unwillingness to put unpleasant personnel evaluations on paper. Another perceived indication of self-protectiveness is the virtual absence of lateral entry into the Agency at the upper levels.

Statements from senior officers that their experience is invaluable or that middle management is not in general ready to take their places merely begs the question: if middle management has inadequate opportunity to get the experience and responsibility offered only by the senior jobs, how can they be ready to replace today's senior officers? Though this impression of self-protectionism is not entirely

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justified there are certain measures which might be taken to dispel widespread unfavorable notions on this subject: foremost and specifically, it is felt that retirement waivers for those in GS-17 and below who have reached the age of 60 should not be granted. Another measure which could be applied in selected cases is the encouragement of early retirement. Those who cannot or will not retire and who are no longer pulling their weight could be shunted out of important jobs.

4. Senior Register Concept

This is the creation of a senior register list so that "topping out" personnel may be removed from the promotion and advancement mainstream. Personnel in the senior register list would still be eligible for promotion but on a restricted basis. (This has been expanded into a separate paper.)

✓ 5. Public Relations

There is a widespread notion that a more ambitious Agency public relations program should be launched, so that the gap may be narrowed between the public view of the Agency as a sinister, uncontrolled and bumbling organization and the view from inside the government (especially the users of our product) that the Agency represents objectivity, reliability and integrity.

✓ 6. Recruitment Profile

*Revs
Stat
Report
on
Ministry*

There is a need for greater recruitment of blacks and related minorities, if the Agency is to maintain its representivity in terms of the changes taking place in American society. Correspondingly there is a need for greater recruitment of "anti-establishment" or "non-establishment" young people--individuals who would be most effective in dealing with their domestic and foreign contemporaries.

7. Other MAG Forums

The MAG concept is felt to be creative and healthy. Other MAG forums in various of the directorates and offices, especially in the CT program, should be formed.

8. Automatic Data Processing

There should be a consolidation of the various Agency ADP organizations into a single organization. This should

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provide the following advantages.

- 1) Similar task areas can be consolidated.
- 2) Coordination of hardware acquisition and utilization would be guaranteed.
- 3) Better and fewer software systems could be developed rather than several of the same type.
- 4) Responsibility vested in a single point should result in better control and review of ADP activities by higher non-ADP management.
- 5) A single grade structure and a wide variety of computer work would create an attractive environment in which to work. Career planning, training, and hiring could be improved.

9. The CT Program

There are perceivable problems in the CT program--inability to recruit the top level college graduates; the question of drawing mainly from internals for recruits into the CT program; overselling of the CT program to new recruits; not giving CT course graduates sufficient responsibility soon enough; the question of an internship or probationary period for incoming CT's; and the general question of the unworkability of the present-CT program whereby recruits are taken into the program as trainees without reference to the requirements of the particular jobs they will eventually be fulfilling.

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Notes on Personnel Policy and Social Norms

*Semin Required
No bell curve
Avoidance of
Conflict*

Preface

The following is a sketch of some ideas on personnel policy in the Agency discussed as an aspect of social norms developed during the early years of the organization.

You may find these notions somewhat far-out; however, they interest me because I think that personnel policy decision making is very much bound up with the social system of the Agency. Future policy changes should be based on a thorough awareness of the social system, yet some of the social norms inhibit discussion of this emotionally loaded subject.

Please assume the usual caveats about limited, exposure, lack of knowledge, etc. I am painfully aware of the problems of viewing the world through Commo's little knothole and generalizing therefrom. Also please view what may seem like extreme statements as assertions for discussion, written in haste, not as fine-honed positions.

Introductory Assertions

Personnel policy in this Agency is like a man with certain types of serious diseases. He will surely die an untimely death unless an early detection is made, and a long term recovery program implemented. The unfortunate part is that he feels well and functions successfully on a day-to-day basis. Only a few twinges occasionally remind him of impending disaster, and he prefers to put them out of his mind. He can't face up to the discipline required in his recovery program, and probably doesn't really believe he can die. He's been too valuable to his family & community. Surely someone will save him without his having to change his habits and style of life!

The habits and life styles of the Agency were developed in the years of its birth and early childhood, and have been lovingly nurtured since then. But, like some children who were protected and sheltered during the years of growth, fail to adjust to the realities of life--the Agency has failed to adjust to realities of organizational size.

- Specifically, the Agency is characterized by:
 - Gutless management (paternalistic management?)
 - Avoidance of conflict (i.e. self-evaluation and criticism)
 - Protectionism of the first order
 - Egocentric attitudes
- } (not discussed in this paper)

Genesis

In many parts of the Agency, the senior officers today are the same group who were senior in the late 40's and early 50's. As young officers during the war and afterwards attending the birth of a new organization, a certain comradorie bound them together. As a group they, in a fashion, "grew up and matured together." During the

beginning of this period, the organization was quite small, and a club, or family atmosphere dominated. This nucleus today constitutes an organizational "in-group", whose inter-relationships have a long history.

It seems to me that the dominant characteristic of management leadership by this group is "avoidance of conflict". This characteristic manifests itself most clearly in personnel management. There is much evidence that this group shares a social norm which avoids punitive or critical evaluation of peers. The problem is that, because of their shared history, many in the management structure are social peers, but are not organizational peers. A basic conflict is thus set up. For long-term vitality organizational peers must be critically judged and separated according to ability. Social peers avoid this like the plague because it is too threatening. In the Agency the social norms have dominated.

Results

This has resulted in paternalistic management where many undesirable management practices are allowed to flourish.

The in-group looks after its own, witness the dance of musical chairs as senior officers pass jobs around to each other.

New blood is inhibited because allowing them entrance would imply critical evaluation and downgrading. This is threatening because it upsets the happy in-group family and exposes the evaluators themselves to such a possibility.

The unwillingness to face up to the realities of management responsibilities subtly affects many facets of personnel policy in the Agency.

Fitness Reports: Have you ever seen a bad one? Perhaps, but not many. We all know of people in supervisory and senior management jobs who are incompetent, worn out, obsolete, or ineffective. Yet I would wager that their fitness reports speak in glowing terms of their mature judgement, high effectiveness, dedication, and probably have overall ratings of Strong or above.

I know of one career panel who recently reviewed GS-11's for promotion. Of the 40 persons on the list, all had an overall rating of Strong, all had favorable narrative comments, and none had a significant criticism or weakness cited. Surely this was not actually the case.

It is rumored (and I have had nothing but confirmation from senior officers with whom I have discussed it,) that the great majority of GS-16's and above receive Outstanding fitness reports-- the result of the "in-group's" self-protection as they have risen together. Is it any wonder that the norms set by these leaders have propagated down to the lowest levels to render fitness reports unusable as a management tool? If you don't believe this, talk to someone who has attempted to write a bad fitness report. It's almost like trying to fire someone. The resistance of the system is tremendous. For that matter, have you ever been able to get constructive criticism of your own work?

// The Bell Curve

Thus, in my opinion the universal dissatisfaction with the failure report can be directly traced to, and is caused by, senior management themselves. They set the examples by which others follow. As long as the "in-group" won't openly and honestly judge themselves, no one else will or indeed be allowed to.

The social norm of conflict avoidance has effects in other areas. As peer groups avoid self evaluation like the plague, their norms are passed down through the organization. Often promotions seem to be made on a mechanistic-defendable basis, rather than on a hard evaluation of capability.

The retirement system is a typical example of a "solution" which failed to take into account the social norms of the organization. The present system assures us only that these individuals with alternatives will leave--probably the best people. The ones you would like to leave have no alternatives and the system can't force them to leave. (Question: Should it?) Other systems do not leave the choice to individuals.

Understanding the social system of the Agency might lead us to better solutions to personnel problems. I for one, think that it would be impossible to change the existing norms except over a very long period. Therefore, they simply must be taken into account.

Fitness Reports

If management won't officially criticize, why not require formal but unofficial criticism in a document confined to supervisor-subordinate. First, individuals could get some decent feedback on their performance and act on it. Second, it would be a start on establishing a norm that said its alright, even important to criticize and give a balanced picture of a man's performance. Maybe someday the "fitness report" and the Critique would be combined.

Retirement

If you buy the assertions in this paper, then it says a lot for the workability and acceptability of the "passed over-no promotion, but not forced to retire policy" i.e.: the senior registry we have talked about before. First and most importantly, it would unblock slots.

Second, it would clearly communicate management intentions to the senior registry group. Because of no-feedback, complimentary fitness reports, etc. there is no telling how many of the "in-effectives" are laboring under the impression that promotions are "just another year or so ahead". It is likely that faced with the fact of nonadvancement, many would face reality, and make a change.

Third, it too, would be another step in the direction of example setting--that management courage in the personnel area is acceptable, and indeed required for organizational health.

[REDACTED]
12 September 1969

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Approved For Release 2006/10/16 : CIA-RDP84-00780R004700020001-0

ADMINISTRATIVE

Executive Registry

72-6306

15 August 1972

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : A Note on Communication

Over the years Agency officers of every age, grade, job description, and component have reliably identified "communication" as either a barrier to organizational effectiveness or a major personal concern. Expressions of dissatisfaction with communication have been amply recorded in special Agency-wide attitude studies, countless IG surveys, papers of young officer groups, managerial grid critiques, and numerous other documents. Yet, we question whether the expression of this consensus has been instrumental in effecting meaningful change. Saying communication is a problem tells us very little about communication and still less about the problem. Paradoxically, simply saying communication is a problem is in itself a problem. It deludes us into believing we know what's wrong, dissuades us from doing a more systematic diagnosis of what people really mean, and disposes us to general and ineffectual remedies. What is needed, in our view, is insistence on greater precision in defining what is meant by communication as a problem. By adopting a more critical point of view with regard to the oft-heard issue of communication, all those who deal in diagnosing and prescribing for organizational ills will be rendered a potentially far more valuable service to the Agency.

Until we develop more precise conceptualizations of the varieties of Agency communication activities, and evaluate the Agency experience in relation to them, we will not be in a position to deal most effectively with the "communication" issue.

MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP

ADMINISTRATIVE

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Approved For Release 2006/10/16 : CIA-RDP84-00780R004700020001-0

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Executive Registry
22-6365

4 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director - Comptroller
SUBJECT: Effective Lateral Communications

The lack of effective communications between individuals, components, or directorates can handicap the intelligence analyst, technician, case officer and manager alike. Lateral communication sometimes is viewed as unnecessary and contrary to "need to know" compartmentation. However, the younger officer especially has sought his counterpart in other parts of the Agency with benefit to both intelligence production and operations. The difficulty of defining the lateral communication "problem" was emphasized in MAG's discussions. Some MAG members felt that the problem was essentially that people did not know with whom to communicate. Others felt that the real problem was to establish effective communication between people who already know of their mutual existence and concerns. MAG considered the subject and attempted to identify successful communications techniques employed by some in the Agency which could be used by others.

The most common approach to effective communications involves personal relationships and usually takes the form of knowing key people or components knowledgeable about a particular area. These interrelationships depend very much upon personalities, mutual respect, personal needs and inadequacies. Much of this communication is on an informal basis but can be formalized. The situation of learning only too late about pertinent work or capabilities of people could be alleviated by a more organized way to identify key people in a directorate or division whom one could contact for overall direction or information. Certain people in any directorate seem to have this capability either through innate ability or their function in the organization structure which gives them an overall view of office personnel and activities. These points of contact should be more clearly identified for all. Another useful mechanism enhancing communication with the appropriate people is the use of a functional directory such as the one published by OCS.

4-11-72
L. L. M.
22-6365

ADMINISTRATIVE/INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Effective Lateral Communications

An additional method of effective communication has been used in times of crisis, for example, by OCI. A task force is set up to ensure that all interested parties are in touch and contributing necessary information. People with specialized interest and knowledge in a particular country or problem are identified and a roster is made with names, phone numbers, and special area of expertise. Such a roster probably would include names of economic, political, military, scientific, estimative, and operational specialists. On any given problem, then, these people are ready and available. Sometimes meetings involving all of the people on the task force are set up so that all have a chance to exchange ideas and discuss probable events and implications. Modification of this concept might be workable even in the absence of a crisis. Lists of people with specialized interest or knowledge could be assembled and fed into a computer and made available to interested individuals.

The concept of a roster of personnel with specialized knowledge can even be extended. Practical implementation would involve providing a cross-indexed computer tabulation which identifies specific subjects and knowledgeable individuals or Agency components. It is envisioned that this data bank would reflect more than just those "experts" in a particular field. Rather, it would, to a manageable level of detail, truly reflect the activity within the Agency. This data bank would be updated regularly as "expertise" is developed within a given office or division. Younger officers who have not yet learned how to work the informal communications channels would benefit greatly by being able to tap this data bank. An important aspect of this question relates to a certain amount of middle management "inertia" which is believed to exist within the Agency. Many managers seem reluctant to search for outside expertise almost to the point of discouraging the use of the informal communications paths. If a data bank such as discussed above is to be beneficial its use must be encouraged from the top down to overcome this management inertia at whatever level it exists. Finally, security can be maintained; a valid case can be made for not making the details of the entire data bank available. At the office level an individual can act as the interface between the officers in the division and the data bank. Such an individual having the need to know

SUBJECT: Effective Lateral Communications

and aware of the information needs of personnel in his division can query the data bank to identify the experts in other offices or to identify other components where related work is being carried out. Further, this individual being knowledgeable of the activity within his office would be responsible for ensuring that his part of the data bank is current.

The Agency spends a good deal of money each year sending people to conferences and seminars. The knowledge we collectively have in the Agency also is significant but unfortunately we seldom utilize the specialized knowledge our own people have to inform each other. Perhaps twice a year groups of interested individuals (compiled and available from the computer) could get together in a conference or seminar environment. The agenda should be flexible but include presentations and discussion from people with differing kinds of specialized knowledge (whether it's all of the French experts, groups of computer people or all those who worry about space or missile problems). Even though on a working basis many of us are in regular or informal contact with our counterpart in other parts of the Agency we seldom take time for a thorough and thought-provoking session. The organization of the meeting could be a cooperative venture with the agenda and participants worked out by the Directorates and the mechanics by the Office of Training.

ILLEGIB

Other means contributing to effective lateral communications are participation in training classes such as the DDS&T Career Development Course and all inter-directorate courses (Mid Career, Intelligence and World Affairs, Advanced Intelligence Seminar, and Senior Seminar). These courses serve to demonstrate positive implications of lateral communication between operational and analytical components. One of the most helpful fallouts from these sessions is the contacts made with people from other components and directorates. Similar experiences can be gained in attending in-house seminars and technical working sessions such as the recent Human Factors Seminar and the working groups under the R&D technical coordinating committee.

MAG believes that lateral communication should be encouraged by management. While many intelligence officers

SUBJECT: Effective Lateral Communications

will communicate on their own once they know with whom to get in touch, others must be encouraged as they are encouraged by their managers in other respects. Managers should make it clear from the outset of an employee's assignment that they support lateral communication and that the officer is expected to keep in touch with his counterparts in other components and directorates. The Executive Director's recent memorandum on Country Seminars, which MAG saw when in the final stages of preparing this report, is an excellent example of management support for lateral communications.

Management Advisory Group

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Discussed w/ Dep
STATEMENT
of purpose +
uniformity O.K.

10 October 1972

Executive Registry
77-6304

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller

SUBJECT : Dissemination of Information

1. As MAG made clear in an earlier memorandum on the Allegations and Answers series, we believe that continued experimentation in internal communications is worthwhile. In general, MAG believes that the various efforts to pass information down from the top are worthwhile and have been well-received, particularly by offices and staffs somewhat isolated from the mainstream. There is an articulate minority, however, which views many of the notices and bulletins with a degree of skepticism and sees them as vehicles to propagate an Agency "line." This adverse reaction by some of our professionals, coupled with a certain uneasiness on our part about some of the recent releases, prompted MAG to re-examine the whole issue. We recognize that any single information vehicle, no matter how carefully designed, would probably be criticized by some. Nonetheless, MAG feels that a compromise can be achieved which could make such communications acceptable and useful to a larger number in the Agency.

2. Toward this end, MAG recommends:

A. That all information efforts (employee bulletins, notices, "Allegations and Answers," and the like) which contain factual information on controversial issues (drugs, assassinations, ITT and Chile, the Marchetti case and so forth) should be issued from one central point regardless of which office originates and drafts them. The same format, whether a notice or bulletin or whatever, should be used in all cases.

B. That one central coordinating point should be established (preferably the Office of the Executive Director/Comptroller) where all drafts are examined and reviewed before publication. The Executive Director should sign off on all notices to give a sense of continuity.

ADMINISTRATIVE
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

C. That a statement of purpose should in every case be included under the title. The statement would make clear whether the information was intended for internal use only, for selective use outside the Agency, or for any other purpose.

D. That the information should be presented in as straightforward a fashion as possible (somewhat like the CIB). The notices should contain as much background and current factual material as security considerations permit and, when possible, should delve more deeply into a subject. Of the notices issued thus far, the ones on the Marchetti case best met the above criteria. If only superficial and ambiguous treatment can be given a topic, then it should not be issued.

3. MAG again offers its services, if time permits, to serve as a sounding board for further issuances prior to distribution.

MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP

TAB

Executive Registry

77-6303

10 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller
SUBJECT : Revised Headquarters' Notice on MAG

The Management Advisory Group

1. In June 1969, the Director established the Management Advisory Group (MAG) to provide an additional vehicle for advice and assistance to upper Agency Management. MAG reports to the Director via the Executive Director. This vertical communication on Agency-wide issues is outside of formal channels but in no way replaces command and staff assistance available to the Director.

2. MAG has no formal production responsibilities. Its primary purpose is to identify and make recommendations about issues and problems arising out of the Agency's organization and practices. Although the large majority of the MAG effort relates to self-generated topics, the group does consider topics of current interest to management. In addition, MAG welcomes and has acted on suggestions from individuals. Some of the matters addressed by MAG have included personnel policies (fitness reports, promotion rates, and retirement procedures), management training for supervisors, the need for better communications between management and all employees (e.g., the State of the Agency Message), minority employment, and the duplication of some functions between directorates.

3. MAG is composed of fourteen officers who serve a one-year tour. There are three members selected from each directorate and two from the DCI area. The members are chosen from the age group 30 to 45 and from GS grades 12 through 16. Members have had experience in Agency-wide issues and activities or strong interest in these areas. The group meets for one all-day session and one or more evening sessions per month. MAG is free to request any speaker or written material pertinent to its work.

ADMINISTRATIVE
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

4. MAG solicits the views and suggestions of Agency employees. MAG is not the appropriate body to hear specific personal employee grievances since there are grievance procedures already available. Rather, MAG seeks ideas which would improve the quality of the Agency's performance by affecting its personnel, its structure and methods of operation, or its external relations. An employee wishing to make a suggestion should send it to MAG, 7D-59, Headquarters, or contact a MAG member from his directorate. All contributions and their authorship will be kept confidential to the extent that the contributor desires.

5. Anyone interested in membership on MAG or anyone interested in contacting MAG members from his directorate can obtain additional information from his component administrative officers, ~~or by calling~~

6. Operating officials and supervisors are urged to circulate this notice among their employees.

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ADMINISTRATIVE
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

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Executive Registry

12-5701

1 November 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Personnel Development Program

General

1. The Management Advisory Group views the Personnel Development Program memorandum submitted by the Office of Personnel as an excellent first step in a long, overdue systematic approach to executive and personnel development. The Program is extremely ambitious but is vitally important to developing personnel to meet the future needs of the Agency. The plan, for the first time, will force management to make projections regarding headroom, will require components to program personnel to move upward to fill vacancies, and should ensure that the personnel have been adequately prepared so that they will be ready to move into the increasingly responsible positions.

2. This plan, or any similar plan, will undoubtedly have many "bugs," but these will best be handled as they arise since it is impossible to see them all now. To ensure that they are so identified and that action is taken to correct them, it is imperative that the Program retain considerable flexibility for future amendment. It is even more important, if the Program is to be more than a show piece for the Civil Service Commission, that top level management make clear its commitment to the Program, and that this commitment be sustained over time.

Probable Effectiveness

3. Given the full support of upper level management, there does not appear to be any reason to doubt that the Personnel Development Program should be reasonably effective. At a minimum, the Program has the merit of instituting a systematic process through which promising officers can be identified and, hopefully, better prepared for their prospective upward movement within the Agency. The major advantage of this

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

approach is the establishment of procedures to replace what is now largely an ad hoc process. In short, the Program forces present management to consider more formally the very important question of an individual's -- and by extension, the Agency's -- future development.

4. The effectiveness of the Program will be enhanced by the development of a mechanism of impartial review and evaluation of personnel designed to reduce the effect of personalities on the advancement ladder. A panel system, such as the Clandestine Services', should ensure that personnel are selected because of merit and potential rather than by being a member of an "old boys' club." Each component or office will, of course, have to develop its own method of selection but efforts must be made to ensure that the cry of "cronyism" cannot be attached to the process.

5. While the overall reaction to the Program is favorable, it may have certain built-in problems, some of them stemming from the early identification of "comers." The danger of "elitism" exists along with its potential effect on overall Agency morale. The existence of such "comer" rosters could not be kept secret and there could be the problem of how those not on the list reacted. Favoritism and arbitrariness are charges that could arise due to the Program. This possible drawback should be attenuated, but perhaps not removed, by the issuance of explanations about the Program and its purpose as required by the memorandum.

6. A related problem might be described as the "self-fulfilling prophecy dilemma." That is, once management has gone on record as tapping an individual as a "comer," there could arise a tendency to push that person along regardless of his or her actual performance. Otherwise, it might reflect "badly" on someone's initial choice. There is no iron-clad way around this potential problem except to be aware that it exists. Some sort of continuing review will aid in keeping excesses of this type to a minimum.

Probable Acceptance

7. As is the case with any major change, it is assumed that there will be some initial resistance to the acceptance of such a wide ranging revision in the system of vertical movement within the Agency. To be really effective, the Program must have the strongest support possible from the highest levels of the Agency so that there is no question as to the need for all to accept the Program and to work for its proper implementation. When the Program is fully explained and its

benefits to the individual, management, and the Agency are made clear, the chances of the Program being completely accepted seem promising.

8. Some managers will, however, doubtless see the Program as infringing on their individual prerogative. Thus, there might be the tendency in some quarters to make a "best effort" approach without any real commitment to the purpose of the Program. This can only be avoided by continuing pressure by top management to see that the Program is implemented in good faith. Flexibility within the Program should also serve to enhance its acceptability. Lower level acceptance of the Program would rest largely on how it is presented and implemented. The nature and purpose should be made clear to lower level officers. Otherwise, misapprehension and suspicion will tend to surface.

Reasonableness of the Effort

9. The effort which will be required to organize and manage such a Program would appear, on the surface, to be monumental. In practice, however, throughout the components there are various official or ad hoc mechanisms in existence which serve to select "comers" and/or plan for personnel development. Many of these systems probably can be converted for use in the Program. A great deal of work will be required initially but once the Program is in operation, its maintenance should be easily manageable. Although the Program creates more bureaucratic paper work, career development and the identification and training of promising individuals are the life blood of the Agency's future. To make these tasks more systematic and coherent is worth additional effort. It is ironic that this effort comes so late in the Agency's development.

Individual Comments

10. While the Program is described as one for personnel development, the memorandum appears to be devoted almost entirely to executive development. It is unclear whether the many Agency employees who do not possess executive potential but are excellent officers who need to develop other strengths will be included in the Program. Their career development requires augmentation by specialized training or assignments to better prepare them to perform their important but non-managerial tasks. Additionally, the proposed Program does not take into account employees until they have reached the GS-11 level. For many employees, this is too far along in their career to be very effective.

11. Personnel planning of the magnitude suggested by the Program requires much tighter controls over retirement. During

the Youth Survey last spring, many young professionals argued that supervisors were not giving more responsibility or encouragement to "comers" because this might hasten their own retirement. "Prolong one's career by becoming indispensable!" The suggestion was made that a stricter age/service retirement program might encourage officers to train comers as their "proteges."

12. In some people's minds, the two-headed retirement program of the Agency hampers personnel planning. Declining overseas slots impedes those shooting for the more attractive Agency plan in preparing for their own retirement. At the same time, sympathetic managers may opt for the man needing one more tour over the man with superior skills in filling overseas slots. Thus again the "comer" is thwarted.

13. Accurate or not, many young professionals speak of "cronyism" keeping capable people from advancing. A very bright young [redacted] back-ground has stated that he was very much impressed with those at his level, but equally distressed with the substantive knowledge and managerial skills of those above him. He blamed this on what he perceived as an "old boys' club" atmosphere allowing division chiefs to bring in outsiders to senior management slots regardless of their qualifications.

14. The proposed Program appears to be really two ambitious programs in one: an executive development program and an executive replacement program. The distinction between these two is that an executive development program would be for CIA employees, whereas an executive replacement program should be of wider scope. An "Executive Candidates Roster" should include non-Agency and non-Government personnel. Not only is this desirable to prevent inbreeding, but it is representative of the current status in DD/S&T where the Deputy Director and the majority of the office directors had substantial careers prior to Agency employment.

15. The Program appears to reflect a 9-1 approach that would be improved with provision for more input from the individuals who comprise the rosters, at whatever grade level. A modification to PMMP Forms 2, 4, and 5 that would include an employee's plan for himself, such as a rotational assignment outside his immediate parent organization, a sabbatical year, specific courses, etc., would ameliorate this problem. Lacking this, there may be too strong a tendency for managers to

perpetuate their own images -- and to impose their own prejudices -- in a manner that will in the long run tend to defeat the admirable goals of the whole Program.

Management Advisory Group

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Executive Registry

72-5461

11 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller

SUBJECT : Improving the Role of Training
in Personnel Management

I. MAG believes that training is a key tool in preparing Agency personnel both for their immediate responsibilities and for their long-term career goals. At the present time, we think that management is not effectively utilizing that tool. Without a basic and continuing commitment to training on the part of management, the Agency's training programs will inevitably fall short of their objectives. We question whether there is such a commitment amongst management within the Agency today. Our concern stems from a belief that the Agency is specifically remiss in the following:

A. fully utilizing programs available through Agency and other U.S. Government facilities

B. encouraging a continuing dialogue between components and the Office of Training to facilitate the development of new courses or the refinement of current programs

C. developing plans and allocating resources for training as an integral part of personnel management and career development

D. exploring new training requirements in operational, analytical and managerial areas evolving from changing Agency missions and the impact of "the computer and systems revolution." The latter has created urgent needs for broader understanding of the applications of systems analysis and evaluation, program review, opportunities for multidiscipline team applications, and so forth.

MAG therefore recommends fundamental changes in the concept of "training officer," management's role at all levels, and the role of the Office of Training (OTR).

ADMINISTRATIVE
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II. The Role of the Training Officer

The training officer (TO), who must be aware both of operational needs and training programs available, is the continuing link between the various components and OTR. Frequently, however, a component personnel or support officer has "training" added to his other responsibilities and thus has little time to devote to the immediate and developmental needs of component personnel. A survey of component training officers in 1968 produced the following profile (based on a questionnaire sent to 47 TOs, with 44 responding):

The average TO is a male GS-13 with over ten years Agency service, and is in his forties. He spends 25% or less of his time in training duties. Grades ranged from GS-08 to GS-15 (currently there is one GS-07 TO). Time on board extended from only eight months to over twenty years. The duration of their TO "training" is an annual one-day briefing given by OTR.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. The directorate (senior) training officer should be an OTR careerist -- a practice followed in the past. He should be slotted in an administrative staff position and directly involved in personnel management and career development planning. He should meet regularly with all training officers in his directorate. He should take the TO training course outlined in D.

B. Component TOs should also be slotted at the administrative staff level, including those who have the TO designation as a collateral responsibility. From that vantage point, the TOs could survey the immediate and developmental needs of the component generally and could effectively contribute to plans for relating training to personnel management and developmental planning procedures. In recognition of the fact that most non-routine training requests arise at the employee and first-line supervisory levels, the TOs should be in a position to know both the advantages to be gained and the exigencies of policy and funding governing subsequent action.

C. TOs should be encouraged actively to fulfill their training role, even when this is a collateral one. Similarly, management should ensure that they have sufficient time to so act. In some cases, an OTR careerist should be assigned to component TO slots. All TOs -- senior and component -- should be required to take the training program outlined below.

D. The training program, to be developed by OTR, should include orientation to:

1. OTR organization and courses
2. courses available in other U.S. Government facilities
3. OTR resources for providing factual and evaluative data on non-Agency courses
4. OTR resources for lecture and course development and review, instructor training, OTR support for component training, and so forth
5. principles of course development and evaluation
6. development of component training policies

E. Regular meetings -- at least quarterly -- should be held by supervisors and component TOs in each directorate with appropriate OTR personnel.

III. Management Role

Management has been inconsistent and ambivalent in its attitude towards training as an integral part of developing effective officers. A case in point is the Intelligence and World Affairs course, required for all new professionals within their first eighteen months in the Agency. Despite this statutory requirement, only about 50% of Agency professionals are ever enrolled, and many take the course after several years on board. Budgetary restrictions have prevented professionals from receiving needed and valuable external training -- restrictions that more effective planning may have averted. Imaginative training policies have been developed by CRS and OL and should be explored in terms of broader applicability.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. Mandatory component training policies should be established. These policies should include: realistic assessments of the kinds of training recommended and courses available for all personnel as they progress upward; consideration of rotational assignments and academic sabbaticals; TDY familiarization trips where applicable; budgetary considerations. The policies should be coordinated with the senior TO and OTR. They must be flexible, and should be reviewed annually by the component supervisors and TOs. The results of this review, particularly recommendations for further action,

should be forwarded to the appropriate Deputy Director and the DTR.

B. Implementation of the recommendations on selection, utilization, and training of TOs.

C. Supervisors, in conjunction with component TOs, should be specifically charged with disseminating information on training opportunities on a regular basis.

IV. OTR's Role

The ability of OTR to respond to Agency needs depends upon effective communications between that office and users. This brings us full-circle -- back to the training officer. The newly-instituted Board of Visitors hopefully will serve as a bridge, critically assessing component needs and OTR's capabilities. But the Board cannot replace the working-level contacts between components and the appropriate elements of OTR for developing critical inputs into improving the role of training in personnel management and, indeed, overall Agency effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. develop the TO training course outline

B. expand the present capacity for course and curriculum development and evaluation. OTR can play a greater role in improving component training, including support for the development of courses in collaboration with outside contractors.

C. expand the dialogue with component chiefs and TOs to keep abreast of changing Agency training needs. Component training policies should surface new needs, and OTR must be flexible and innovative in responding. One recent positive example was OTR's role in designing the one-day seminar on "New Directions in CIA's Support of U.S. International Economic Policy."

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D. use of regulatory power and responsibility contained in [redacted] which give OTR the right to sign off on Agency training expenditures. Resort to these powers should encourage components to undertake careful study of training as it relates to immediate and long-range needs for personnel management and career development. The DTR's position as Chairman of the Training Selection Board, responsible directly to the Executive Director/Comptroller, enables him to encourage utilization of senior-level external training opportunities as part of

an overall development plan rather than as a temporary and convenient means of disposing of unwanted senior officers.

E. maximum exploitation of OTR's control of the Information Sciences Center to educate appropriate elements of the Agency in the diverse applications of information science and computer technology.

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