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DD/S 71-1568

26 April 1971

Meeting of Deputies

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Deputies' Meeting Minutes of 15 April 1971:
Automatic Dissemination Activities

Present: Executive Director, DD/I, DD/P, DD/S, Mr. [redacted] for DD/S&T, Mr. Houston, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Messrs. [redacted]

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1. Mr. [redacted] gave about a 1/2-hour flipchart briefing on the current hardcopy manual and electrically transmitted document receipt picture in the Agency, plus a runthrough on automatic and semi-automatic dissemination efforts underway or planned. He noted that the Cable Secretariat handles 50% of the electrical traffic received (of which half is CIA Staff and the balance splits almost evenly between State and Military cables); Central Reference Service (CRS/DDI) gets 38% (all of the Special Intelligence: NSA and CIA); OSP's [redacted] receipts constitute 7% of the total; and the CS telepouch and Restricted Handling total is 4.5%.

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2. Recommendations were made concerning (a) organization and management; (b) future automatic dissemination efforts. With respect to (a), it was suggested that: substantive intelligence report dissemination (e.g., COMINT, State, military, CIA intelligence traffic) be centralized; CIA operational/administrative traffic options include: (1) retention under ExDir; (2) transfer to DD/P; (3) transfer to Commo. It was also recommended that more precision and standardization be applied to dissemination reading requirements. The advantages of these recommendations were said to include: one focal point for substantive reading requirements; integration of dissemination planning; increased flexibility; personnel savings. Mr. [redacted] acknowledged that the suggested split between the substantive and operational cable handling was political; from a technical standpoint, one organization could handle both.

3. As for future automatic dissemination, it was recommended that: a single system be developed; the same computer equipment and

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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programs be utilized; efforts be devoted also to automatic distribution development; CIA take the leadership in developing a message content code; experimental application of the content code be conducted in one or two field stations.

4. In the general discussion that followed, the historical rationale for the present organizational diffusion was recounted by ExDir and others. Colonel White questioned the current need to compartment [redacted] dissemination; he also noted that he is opposed to retaining any unit or activity as a function of the Office of the Executive Director which does not need to be there. The DD/S stated his strong conviction that there should be a single dissemination organization, and that in his view, Cable Sec and the CRS dissemination role should go to Commo. Or, he acknowledged in response to a question from the DD/I, to CRS-- noting, however, the affinity of the function with the communication process.

5. The DD/I and ExDir were answered affirmatively when they asked about the technical feasibility of including and protecting sensitive materials, including [redacted]. The DD/P made specific mention of the excellent rapport between the Cable Sec analysts and his people and would not want to see that relationship impaired. He said that live analyst involvement was critical to operational support. He was not inclined to favor putting content codes on CS reports in the field; the IG felt that placing a content code on the reports in the field need not necessarily be so involved as to tie down the operations people. The DD/S expressed skepticism about the feasibility of automatic distribution, saying that this needs further study.

6. ExDir said that he had not looked for a specific course of action to come from this meeting but had wanted general consideration of the subject. The IG suggested that we start with logic, even if we end up with politics. ExDir said of the three options mentioned for organizational location of the CIA operational/administrative traffic, he does not favor retention of that function under the ExDir. The DDP suggested that an outline of the briefing be distributed for the involved echelons in each directorate to consider [distributed separately]. It was also noted that the same briefing had been given separately to CRS, OCS, Cable Sec, Commo, RID/[redacted] and that each directorate Information Processing Coordinator had heard it.

[redacted]
Chairman, Information Processing Board

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DISSEMINATION STUDY OUTLINE

1. Study Objective - To examine the several independent automatic and machine-assisted dissemination projects underway in CIA and to present recommendations/options for a coordinated development effort.

2. Current Dissemination Scene

a. Dissemination Organizations

1) Central Reference (CRS), DDI

T/O - 51

Volume - 900,000 messages per annum (Average dissemination - 10 copies per message)

Number of dissemination points - 300

Nature of traffic - Manually received collateral intelligence reporting, e. g., State Airgrams, CS Reports, etc, plus NSA and CIA COMINT received in electrical and hard copy form.

2) Cable Secretariat, Ex Dir


T/O - 100

Volume - 750,000 messages per annum

Number of dissemination points - 125

Nature of traffic - Electrically received State, military, and CIA cables. State and military

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cables contain primarily substantive intelligence reporting. CIA cables (Staff Traffic) contain primarily CIA operational/administrative business.

3) OSP Registry, DDS&T

T/O - 4

Volume - 90,000 messages per annum (Average dissemination - 18 copies per message)

Number of dissemination points - 25

Nature of traffic - messages. This channel 25X1 is to DDS&T somewhat comparable to Staff Traffic for DDP and DDS. 20% of messages transmitted by utilizing this channel contain substantive intelligence.

b. Current Dissemination Characteristics

1) Compartmented

2) Multiple Reading Requirements - Partly the result of different requirements for different sources. Largely the result of having to deal with several dissemination organizations who disseminate to different levels of depth.

3) Multiple Secondary Reading Panels - When primary dissemination is made only to the office or division

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level, someone at that level must determine which branch or individual is the final recipient.

- 4) No Flexibility - CRS not trained to aid Cable Secretariat or vice versa.
- 5) It Works - Users are generally satisfied with dissemination service.
- 6) Uncoordinated Automation Efforts - The lack of a single, systematic approach to dissemination inhibits coordination.

3. Why Automatic Dissemination?

- a. It works.
- b. It effects personnel savings.
- c. It retains materials in electrical (machine) form providing capability to:
 - 1) Distribute messages electrically - Saves time.
 - 2) Reduce paper flow - If analysts view their mail on a television-like device, they will require hard copy only of those documents they wish to retain (currently 30% of receipts).
 - 3) Automatically index and store documents

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4. Automation Developments/Plans

a. FMSAC - Has operational automated system which disseminates electrically received COMINT to internal divisions/branches. System compares stored keyword lists of FMSAC interests against the keywords contained in text of incoming messages. Processed on OCS computers. FMSAC has expressed willingness to allow CRS to run FMSAC system.

b. Commo/Cable Sec. - Automated Communications Terminal (ACT)

ACT I - Automates Commo Center functions. No effect on Cable Sec. implementation this year. Cost 1.5 million.

ACT II - Machine-assisted dissemination in Cable Sec.

Documents would be read on a viewing device (Cathode Ray Tube) and dissemination would be keyed into a computer. The claim made for this system is that it will allow Cable Sec. to handle expected increases in traffic with no additions in T/O. Specifications for system set but Cable Sec. has been denied funds thus far to implement. Cost 1.5 million.

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ACT III - Would automate printing and/or distribution of cables. Cost 1.5 million.

- c. CRS - Has experimented with various automated and machine-assisted dissemination systems, including FMSAC's. Has concluded that a full automated system appears feasible if report producers will add a simple content/area code to their messages. This code plus keywords in text matched against requirements similarly coded and keyworded has in testing, disseminated documents as well as the CRS manual system. Without such a code, CRS expects to disseminate 50% of COMINT automatically and 50% utilizing a system like ACT II above. CRS plans to experimentally/operationally implement this latter system in June/July of this year. Cost of development of this system over past several years - \$100,000.

5. Characteristics of Auto Dissemination Developments thus far

- a. Independent, uncoordinated system designs
- b. Separate hardware/programming development
- c. Differing philosophy regarding automatic and machine-assisted dissemination and distribution

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6. Major Problems Identified by Study

- a. Current dissemination function is irrationally organized, i. e., several organizations are doing essentially the same thing, but utilizing different rules and procedures.
- b. As a result of above problem, we have no systematic approach to automatic dissemination, i. e., our efforts have been diffused. Continuation of current approaches will prove more costly and ineffective than a coordinated development effort.

7. Options/Recommendations

a. Organization/Management Options

1) Maintain status quo

a) Advantages

-- Current system works, why disrupt it?

b) Disadvantages

-- Systematic/coordinated approach to automation

difficult to obtain

-- Users must continue to relate to several reading panels

-- No flexibility among panels

-- Multiple secondary reading panels required for substantive intelligence

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- 2) Centralize the dissemination of substantive intelligence reporting in one organization. Utilize a separate reading panel for CIA operational/administrative traffic (Staff Traffic,)

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a) Advantages

- Operational/administrative traffic is sensitive; historic arguments for treating it separately.
- Different requirements apply to the two classes of material; some strong feeling that there are no real advantages in placing them under the same management.

b) Disadvantages

- Systematic/coordinated approach to automation difficult to obtain.
- All dissemination has basic similarities; it would be efficiently handled under a single management.
- More flexibility obtainable in further centralization of dissemination.

- 3) Centralize all dissemination in one organization

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a) Advantages

- Provides proper management setting for development of automated systems and for overall dissemination planning.
- Increases dissemination flexibility.
- One dissemination focal point for users.
- Saves most money/manpower of several options.

b) Disadvantages

- Increases non-DDP exposure to sensitive operational/administrative traffic.
- Different requirements apply to substantive intelligence as opposed to operational/administrative traffic; some strong feeling that there is no real advantage in placing them under the same management.

b. Recommendations - Automatic, Machine-Assisted

Dissemination (These recommendations are appropriate regardless of which of above organizational options is chosen)

- 1) Organize a systems team from appropriate dissemination and electronic data processing (EDP) organizations to examine the feasibility of:

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- a) Developing a single systems approach, which will
 - b) Utilize same computer equipment/programs.
- 2) Initiate a development effort on the feasibility of electrical distribution of machine-disseminated messages.
 - 3) Involve CIA Field Stations in an experiment to determine if content coding by report originators is feasible for substantive intelligence reporting.

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2 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Communications

FROM : Chief, [Redacted]

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SUBJECT : Comments and Recommendations on Information Handling

1. There are two main options for structuring the information handling system in the Agency. The easier path to follow would be to allow each Directorate to manage its own ADP systems, interfacing with each other as desired. The advantages are:

- a. Avoids controversial problems concerning reorganization, changes in space, personnel ceilings, etc.
- b. Decentralized ADP services are closer to and more responsive to users needs.

The disadvantages are:

- a. ADP services continue with inequalities in service, standards, careers of people.
- b. Management is less able to police abuses in decentralized system.
- c. Higher total costs in funds, personnel and space.
- d. Difficulty of DDS elements providing support and interfacing with a variety of systems and organizations.

2. The other option is to centralize the management and control of ADP services. The advantages are:

- a. Collects ADP expertise and skills together -- permits establishing truly professional, specialized staffs for R&D, liaison, planning.
- b. Provides more flexibility in assignment of personnel to tasks, and creates a better structure for career management of personnel.

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c. Permits optimum scheduling of machines and people. Does not preclude, but could control, dedication of machines for unique applications.

d. Will make it easier for OC and other Support Offices to interface with and support the ADP services.

e. Provides a solid foundation for tackling one of CIA's biggest problems, and one which is a major user of personnel. Most importantly, CIA would be structured to cope effectively with the change to electronic processing of data from the traditional methods of sorting, filing and retrieving information.

The disadvantages are:

a. Requires in-depth study of total problem -- which is huge, complex and locked-in with vested interests and tradition.

b. Requires changes in organization.

c. The choices will not be self-evident, there are no good precedents to follow, the conclusions and decisions will be gut-wrenching and replete with calculated risks.

3. The advantages of centralizing information handling outweigh the disadvantages. In the '40s, '50s and early '60s, information screening, indexing, storing and retrieving was largely a manual process. Although there was an increasing use of machines, the process was one which lent itself to decentralization and each activity could implement its own system. There were no major problems in transferring information from one activity to another, and the use of common but simple formats and procedures made inter-action and transferring feasible.

4. In the late '70s, and certainly in the '80s, the great bulk of our information will be processed by machines, often automatically, which will require standardization of languages, formats, and procedures. In the past the main concern of each activity was to have its files efficiently managed, and the efficiency of each semi-autonomous system was little affected by the manner in which others did their job. Conversely, the total information system of the future will resemble the classic communications network; one which will demand systems planning, one so complex that it will need skilled professionals to plan and operate, and one where inter-action will be continuous. It is predicted that the information handling system development will closely parallel the past development of our commo network.

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5. The need for a change is dictated not because there were failures in the past, but because we are moving into a new era wherein old methods and organizations will not be efficient. Many of our information handling processes grew up like Topsy; some roots go back to OSS. They have been influenced more by personalities than by systems planning. Perhaps as many as one-third of the people in the Agency are directly engaged in information processing, and the effectiveness of the other two-thirds is directly related to the efficiency of the system. Also we are in the midst of a transition from manual to electronic processing methods, from the King's English to machine language. All these considerations spell out a justification, almost a mandate, to tackle the problems and plan a suitable system for the '70s.

6. One approach which would insure inaction would be to establish an inter-directorate task force, especially if it is on a part time basis. Members would inevitably owe allegiance to their own directorate, placing each member in a protective role. Further it makes a member reluctant to tackle another's domain because of a quid pro quo relationship.

7. The approach most likely to insure progress is to establish a standing task force, removed from any directorate, staffed with officers possessing stature, skills and imagination, arm them with the backing of top management, provide them with money to obtain consultants, and give them a year to study the problem and submit conclusions and recommendations. The final decisions should be made collectively by top management, but the study must be done in an environment of objectivity, by qualified people, and on a scale commensurate with the problem.

8. Meanwhile, there is one aspect of the problem which demands immediate attention. This is the dissemination of cables. The urgency stems from the concurrent, parallel development of two automated systems (ACT and CRS), plus differences in concepts and procedures and standards throughout the Agency in disseminating cables. One solution (generally in line with the [redacted] report) would be to transfer State and Military cables to CRS since these cables have much in common with NSA cables -- i.e., they are informational reports, all non-Agency, with commonality in reading requirements and customers. Internal Agency cables, largely command and control, could continue to be disseminated by Cable Sec, OSP Registry, FI/D, CRS, and FMSAC until the longer range study on information handling is completed. This course of action would cause the least disruption, solve a problem of immediate concern, yet avoid precipitous action which might make a long range solution more difficult. CRS should be authorized to continue their efforts to automate the distribution of cables. They have already made considerable progress in this field and, without much more investment in dollars and time, the feasibility of their system should be evident.

The ACT II and III should be postponed until the results of the CRS experiment are available, a determination is made as to how much of the process can be applied to command and control cables, and there is a decision as to how the Agency is going to handle the total information handling problem. A small group, consisting of senior representatives from Cable Secretariat, OC and CRS could resolve the problems associated with the transfer of non-Agency cables to CRS.

9. While the small group is studying cable dissemination the larger, semi-permanent task force would study the whole problem. Conceptually it might be comprised of a steering group of 3 to 5 senior officers of varied backgrounds, and perhaps a half-dozen working groups each concentrating on selected problem areas -- intelligence production, inter-Agency problems, collection, support, etc. The steering group would define problems, direct and coordinate the working groups, and routinely keep management advised of problems and recommendations. Hopefully a master plan could be devised and, after approval, could be logically and sequentially implemented.



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17 March 1971

DD/S 71-1046

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Information Processing--Selected
Organizational Options

1. As a follow-on to the 24 February Deputies' meeting, and possible springboard for the next move on the information processing front, I have pulled together the attached 10 organizational options, plus a brief indication (last page) of how the five major Management Issues discussed in the ASPIN Report relate to the question of centralized vs. decentralized ADP organization.
2. The differences in the attached from that which was presented orally to the Deputies include: a) a more extensive list of pros and cons for each; b) more options than time permitted noting orally; c) three alternatives (second last page) addressed exclusively to ADP professional personnel. The Pros and Cons statements by themselves sound a little too dogmatic; they do require some discussion.
3. The range of options still goes from the most comprehensive (Option 1 - New Processing Directorate) to Option 3 (Status Quo). There are more options concerning ADP-focused changes, as there were in the Deputies' session. This is not only because there are many combinations if one focuses only on ADP, but because it is the computer growth which has seemed to cause the greatest management unease. Nevertheless, I urge top management focus on the whole problem, which includes communications interaction with computers in what they're calling tele-processing, when considering not only what changes, if any, should be made now, but what the longer range goal ought to be.
4. Obviously, IP&E organizational changes must be considered in context with other possible changes. It may be that incremental steps, focusing first on ADP, would be the most logical course to follow.

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SELECTED
INFORMATION PROCESSING ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT OPTIONS

OPTION 1 - New Processing Directorate

PRO

- Groups like activities - single management
- Groups increasingly interacting technologies
- Answers ADP organization question - promotes ADP management solution issues*
- Achieves fullest ADP resource savings
- Most logical in an overall Agency reorganization

CON

- Dislocations major in every directorate
- Removes processing support services from direct control of present parent
- No real proof we have management skill for consolidation if ability re the pieces is suspect

* ◦ How best organize ADP resources, minimize costs

- How develop skills
- How most effectively operate centers
- How minimize hardware redundancy, software duplication
- How assure adequate security

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OPTION 2 - Partial Transfer to DD/S (OCS, CRS, Cable Sec)

PRO

- Facilitates Commo/ADP interface
- Can resolve intelligence file roles between CRS and OCS
- Gives some resource advantage through partial ADP consolidation potential

CON

- Somewhat arbitrary (why not RID?)
- Possible exaggeration of Commo/ADP interface issue
- Is neither fish nor fowl in full consolidation of "processing" or ADP components

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OPTION 3 - Status Quo

PRO

- Centralization/decentralization compromise
- Politically acceptable
- OCS is highly centralized with:
 - a) High recruitment/training standards and work variety, therefore represents a superior skills bank
 - b) Centralized computing saves money
 - c) Space savings
- CRS, RID, NPIC under direct control of parents
- Multiple centers provide some backup insurance

CON

- Costs additional money/space/people
- Some duplication in software development
- Complexity of current organization makes central management difficult

OPTION 4: ADP Decentralization

A. TOTAL

PRO

- Ideal political solution
- Directorates concerned re cost/benefit analysis and alternatives
- Most responsive to parent
- Multiple center backup

CON

- Considerably more expensive
- Fairly extensive duplication in software development probable
- More complex to manage than status quo
- Requires new center construction for DD/S and enlargement of CRS and RID centers

OPTION 4: ADP Decentralization, cont'd

B. PARTIAL: OCS keep DD/S support role--others upgrade

PRO

- Does not require new DD/S Center as 4. A. does
- Other advantages essentially same as 4. A.

CON

- Two Directorates (DD/S&T and DD/S) vie for OCS service/priority
- Increased cost, space, duplication, complexity as in 4. A.

OPTION 5: ADP Centralization

A. ASPIN Recommendations: Stronger OCS, stronger centralized management

- OCS do all on-line development
- Full-time Advisor to ExDir and full-time staff
- ADP Career Service
- Limit CRS, RID, NPIC

PRO

- More centralized control without organizational upheaval
- Some centralization advantages: space and hardware costs; elite cadre in OCS
- Priority attention in CRS, NPIC and RID to DD/I and DD/P parents
- Multiple center backup
- User office budgeting--leads to more cost/benefit analysis
- Agency top management more involved in ADP affairs

CON

- Not as politically acceptable
- More centralization would mean more resource savings
- Still some software duplication probable
- Almost as difficult to manage as status quo
- Additional management mechanisms are necessary

OPTION 5: ADP Centralization, cont'd

25X1 B. Recommendation to ASPIN Report

- CRS to OCS; RID and NPIC continue
- Limit RID to namecheck and document finding
- Adopt same/all of the management choices in ASPIN (ADP Career Service, user budgeting, etc.)

PRO

- Same as Option 5. A. except abolition of CRS center is fairly major upheaval

CON

- Probably politically unacceptable to DD/I
- Otherwise, same disadvantages as Option 5. A.

OPTION 5: ADP Centralization, cont'd

C. TOTAL (Headquarters) in OCS

- Abolish RID, CRS; keep NPIC [or transfer its ADP component and provide communication link]
- Adopt ASPIN Management choices (user budgeting, etc)

PRO

- Significant savings in space/people/dollars
- Duplication of software development would cease
- Professional status of ADP personnel would rise
- Single center is more visible--easier to manage/control
- User budgeting tends to counter potential centralization weakness, i. e., inadequate project approval evaluation
- Terminal "personalizes" computer for user--not necessary to put computer itself under user management

CON

- Politically unacceptable ?
- Directorates compete for OCS support
- Less backup insurance
- Possible difficulty in understanding the problem potential vis-a-vis the user

OPTION 5: ADP Centralization, cont'd

D. Centralize Hardware - Decentralize People

- Abolish CRS and RID centers - add to OCS
- NPIC as above in Option 5. C.
- Keep small systems development staff in OCS (in addition to S&T); reassign the others to appropriate Directorate

PRO

- Space/hardware cost savings
- Possibly politically acceptable to all [People more important than machines]
- More attention given to cost/benefit analysis since design and programming would be done in Directorates

CON

- Centralized management almost as difficult as now
- Some duplication of software probable
- ADP professionalism would tend to decline
- Directorates would all vie for computer time

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ADP PERSONNEL OPTIONS:

Systems Designers and Applications Programmers

- 1 : Centralize in offices with the computers
- This is the present arrangement
 - Greater machine centralization would mean greater designer/programmer centralization
- 2 : Assign designers/programmers to offices with computers, but detail them for 1-2 year tours in user components
- This is the ASPIN recommendation
 - Also the recommendation to DD/S
- 3 : Assign designers/programmers outright to Directorates they are to serve

N. B. Little resource implication difference in the above, except 3 potentially leads to recruitment competition; less controlled growth; more complex training/career development planning.

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ASPIN Management Issues

Related to Centralization/Decentralization

1. User Office Budgeting - more important when computers are centralized
2. Central Project Review - important in either situation, but critical in decentralized world
3. ADP Career Service - possible need in a decentralized environment
4. Agency-Wide Technical Standards - greatest need in decentralized world
5. Full-time ADP Advisor & Staff - a requirement in a decentralized organization

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1. Information Management - IG Survey - Organization of Information Processing - Information Processing Career Service - briefing of Deputies. 10 options. 25X1 ✓

2. Dissemination - ACT vs. CRS ✓

3. Space - Must be ever-mindful that computers take great deal of space. Adequate planning avoiding redundancy. ✓

4. Computer Security - Consideration of EMSEC as well as active hostility against computers in present installations and in constructing new buildings housing computers.

5. Security - Must be ever-mindful of security in our effort to spread the word among the remainder of Intelligence Community, e.g. computer links with Ft. Holabird to pass clearance data. OS geared up to keep pacing with new developments - should not be pacing item or allowed to drag feet.

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6. Records Staff - Whether records management should be centralized or dispersed - staff in each component (very often a part-timer).

7. Reports Management - Fertile field for vast improvement - great many non-approved, locally produced forms in use.

8. Emergency Planning - Consideration of emergency records essential to operation, records to protect rights of individuals and their employers, and records essential to reconstruct normal functions after loss or disaster.

9. Vital Records - More emphasis on program.

10. Reconstitution - The question of how to reconstitute old paperwork - hard copy or microfiche. What records are necessary?

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11. Archives - A special facility to house the inactive 25X1 and archival records not needed in offices for current operations but which must be kept for legal, administrative, or historical values. Contrast present archival volume to present total capacity. Alternative solutions. Legal implications.

12. Historical Records - (Historical program of DDS lagging) Histories to be written by knowledgeable persons before retirement - planning for.

13. Presidential Libraries - Each President has established a Presidential Library after retirement. Suspect someone ought to be collecting, collating material for future Nixon Library - rather than wait for formal announcement and have everyone in a tizzy later.

14. Records Center Space - Before long Agency will have to face problem again. Temporary solution achieved several years ago by borrowing space in Federal Records Center at Suitland.

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15. Microfilm/Microfiche - New technological development involving miniaturizing paperwork. Key here will be to make sure future efforts are standardized.

16. Increasing Cable Volumes - Cable volumes are increasing in every Agency signal center. Data Comm traffic has tremendous increase. Personnel T/O's down due to budget cuts. Technology trying to fill the gap. (MAX, ACT)

17. Xerox - Entire reproduction capability of Agency unknown - lack of planning/system. Paperwork proliferates due to ease of reproduction via the xerox machine.

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