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Item 7

Presidential statements concerning Cuba before the  
discovery of the missiles and the official text of  
the President's speech of 22 October 1962

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
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS  
OF THE UNITED STATES

# John F. Kennedy

*Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and  
Statements of the President*

JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1962

1962



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1963

[485] Oct. 22 *Public Papers of the Presidents*

485 Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba. *October 22, 1962*

[ Delivered from the President's Office at 7 p.m. ]

*Good evening, my fellow citizens:*

This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.

Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9 a.m., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail.

The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate range ballistic missiles—capable of traveling more than twice as far—and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base—by the presence

of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction—constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation.

The size of this undertaking makes clear that it has been planned for some months. Yet only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles and the existence of defensive antiaircraft missiles, the Soviet Government publicly stated on September 11 that, and I quote, "the armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes," that, and I quote the Soviet Government, "there is no need for the Soviet Government to shift its weapons . . . for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba," and that, and I quote their government, "the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." That statement was false.

Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive buildup was already in my hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said his government had already done, that Soviet as-

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sistance to Cuba, and I quote, "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba," that, and I quote him, "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive, and if it were otherwise," Mr. Gromyko went on, "the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance." That statement also was false.

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.

For many years, both the Soviet Union and the United States, recognizing this fact, have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which insured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history—unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II—demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's-eye of Soviet missiles located inside the U.S.S.R. or in submarines.

In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger—although it should be noted the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat.

But this secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles—in an area

well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy—this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil—is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.

The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere.

Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation, which leads a worldwide alliance. We have been determined not to be diverted from our central concerns by mere irritants and fanatics. But now further action is required—and it is under way; and these actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth—but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:

First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will

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be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.

*Second:* I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military buildup. The foreign ministers of the OAS, in their communique of October 6, rejected secrecy on such matters in this hemisphere. Should these offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that in the interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing this threat will be recognized.

*Third:* It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

*Fourth:* As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a standby alert basis.

*Fifth:* We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Organization of American States, to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to invoke articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. The United Nations Charter allows for regional security arrangements—and the nations of this hemisphere decided long ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies around the world have also been alerted.

*Sixth:* Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all

offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. observers, before the quarantine can be lifted.

*Seventh and finally:* I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction—by returning to his government's own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba—by refraining from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis—and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions.

This Nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum—in the OAS, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful—without limiting our freedom of action. We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms and military bases in a fair and effective disarmament treaty. We are prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides—including the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba, free to determine its own destiny. We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union—for we are a peaceful people who desire to live in peace with all other peoples.

But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why this latest Soviet threat—or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our actions this week—must and will be met with determination. Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed—including in particular the brave

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people of West Berlin—will be met by whatever action is needed.

Finally, I want to say a few words to the captive people of Cuba, to whom this speech is being directly carried by special radio facilities. I speak to you as a friend, as one who knows of your deep attachment to your fatherland, as one who shares your aspirations for liberty and justice for all. And I have watched and the American people have watched with deep sorrow how your nationalist revolution was betrayed—and how your fatherland fell under foreign domination. Now your leaders are no longer Cuban leaders inspired by Cuban ideals. They are puppets and agents of an international conspiracy which has turned Cuba against your friends and neighbors in the Americas—and turned it into the first Latin American country to become a target for nuclear war—the first Latin American country to have these weapons on its soil.

These new weapons are not in your interest. They contribute nothing to your peace and well-being. They can only undermine it. But this country has no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you. We know that your lives and land are being used as pawns by those who deny your freedom.

Many times in the past, the Cuban people have risen to throw out tyrants who destroyed their liberty. And I have no doubt that most Cubans today look forward to the time when they will be truly free—free from

foreign domination, free to choose their own leaders, free to select their own system, free to own their own land, free to speak and write and worship without fear or degradation. And then shall Cuba be welcomed back to the society of free nations and to the associations of this hemisphere.

My fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead—months in which both our patience and our will will be tested—months in which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing.

The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are—but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high—but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission.

Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right—not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace *and* freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

Thank you and good night.

#### 486 Proclamation 3504: Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba. *October 23, 1962*

*By the President of the United States of America a Proclamation:*

WHEREAS the peace of the world and the security of the United States and of all American States are endangered by reason of the establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers of an offensive military capability in Cuba, including bases for ballistic missiles with a potential range covering most of

North and South America;

WHEREAS by a Joint Resolution passed by the Congress of the United States and approved on October 3, 1962, it was declared that the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or

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subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

WHEREAS the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics meeting in Washington on October 23, 1962, recommended that the Member States, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, in accordance with the aforementioned resolutions of the United States Congress and of the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics, and to defend the security of the United States, do hereby proclaim that the forces under my command are ordered, beginning at 2:00 p.m. Greenwich time October 24, 1962, to interdict, subject to the instructions herein contained, the delivery of offensive weapons and associated materiel to Cuba.

For the purposes of this Proclamation, the following are declared to be prohibited materiel:

Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items; and any other classes of materiel hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of effectuating this Proclamation.

To enforce this order, the Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of prohibited materiel to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air forces of the United States in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other American States.

The Secretary of Defense may make such regulations and issue such directives as he deems necessary to ensure the effectiveness of this order, including the designation, within a reasonable distance of Cuba, of prohibited or restricted zones and of prescribed routes.

Any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to identify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call, to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed. Any vessel or craft which fails or refuses to respond to or comply with directions shall be subject to being taken into custody. Any vessel or craft which it is believed is en route to Cuba and may be carrying prohibited materiel or may itself constitute such materiel shall, wherever possible, be directed to proceed to another destination of its own choice and shall be taken into custody if it fails or refuses to obey such directions. All vessels or craft taken into custody shall be sent into a port of the United States for appropriate disposition.

In carrying out this order, force shall not be used except in case of failure or refusal to comply with directions, or with regulations or directives of the Secretary of Defense issued hereunder, after reasonable efforts have been made to communicate them to the vessel or craft, or in case of self-defense. In any case, force shall be used only to the extent necessary.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and cause the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE in the City of Washington this twenty-third day of October in the [SEAL] year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America

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*John F. Kennedy, 1962*

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JOHN F. KENNEDY

By the President:

DEAN RUSK  
Secretary of State

NOTE: On the same day the President issued Executive Order 11058 "Assigning authority with respect to ordering persons and units in the Ready Reserve to active duty and with respect to extension of enlistments and other periods of service in the Armed Forces" (27 F.R. 10403).

487 Letter to Secretary Hodges Allocating Funds for the Acceleration of Public Works. *October 24, 1962*

*Dear Mr. Secretary:*

Pursuant to the authority contained in the Public Works Appropriation Act, 1963, I hereby allocate from the appropriation for "Public Works Acceleration,"

<i>To</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Department of Agriculture.....	\$15,000,000
Department of Commerce.....	9,000,000
Department of Defense (Civil Functions) .....	9,000,000
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.....	40,000,000
Department of the Interior.....	12,000,000
Housing and Home Finance Agency.....	80,000,000
<hr/>	
Total .....	\$165,000,000

to be expended by said agencies for the initia-

tion or acceleration of public works projects as authorized by Public Law 87-658, approved September 14, 1962, and as set forth in your letter to me of October 24, 1962. The funds hereby allocated shall be available only for project expenses. Allocations for necessary administrative expenses of the agencies will be considered at a later date.

Will you please arrange for the necessary transfer of funds and advise the various agencies when this has been accomplished.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

NOTE: Secretary Hodges' letter of October 24, 1962, was released with the President's reply.

488 Message to the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations. *October 25, 1962*

*Excellency:*

I deeply appreciate the spirit which prompted your message of yesterday.

As we made clear in the Security Council, the existing threat was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons.

In your message and your statement to the Security Council last night, you have made certain suggestions and have invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured.

Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss these arrangements with you.

I can assure you of our desire to reach a satisfactory and peaceful solution of the matter.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

[His Excellency U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations]

NOTE: In his message the Acting Secretary General stated that he had been asked by the permanent representatives of a large number of the member governments of the United Nations to appeal to the President in the critical situation. They felt, he said, that in the interest of international peace and security all concerned should refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation and bring about a risk of war. In their view it was important, he further stated, that time should be given to the parties concerned to get together with a view to



## Text of Soviet-Cuba Report

**MOSCOW, Sept. 2 (Reuters)**—Following is the text of an unofficial English translation of a joint communiqué on Soviet military aid to Cuba, as made public by Tass, the Soviet press agency:

From Aug. 27 to Sept. 2, 1961, there were present in the Soviet Union members of the national leadership of the United Revolutionary Organizations of Cuba, the Minister of Production, Comrade Ernesto Guevara Serna, and Comrade Emilio Aragones Navarro.

During their stay in the Soviet Union Comrade Ernesto Guevara Serna and Comrade Emilio Aragones Navarro were received by the President of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R., Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, in a friendly, cordial atmosphere and in the spirit of full mutual understanding.

An exchange of views took place on a number of international questions of interest to both sides, and also on questions of further consolidation of the friendly, fraternal relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Cuba.

Comrade Ernesto Guevara Serna and Comrade Emilio Aragones Navarro also had discussions with the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R., Comrade A. N. Kosygin; with the President of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. for Foreign Economic Relations, Comrade S. A. Skachkov; Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Comrade S. A. Borisov, and with leading workers of the state plan of the U. S. S. R., and of the State Economic Council of the U. S. S. R., for questions of economic and technical cooperation.

### Plant Construction Settled

In the course of these friendly conversations the parties agreed on the construction in Cuba with the assistance of the Soviet Union of a metallurgical works of importance in the development of the economy of the republic of Cuba, foreseen in the Soviet-Cuban agreement of Nov. 16, 1960.

The parties agreed that Soviet organizations, in as short a time as possible, should work out a technical and economic report concerning the construction of a metallurgical factory with a complete metallurgical cycle on the basis of the iron ore reserves existing in the Republic of Cuba, and should present it for perusal by the Government of the Republic of Cuba in the middle of 1963.

At the same time, the parties recognized it as expedient, in connection with the additional possibilities that have been revealed, to carry out the reconstruction of three existing metallurgical factories, raising their total capacity from 110,000 to 350,000 tons of steel annually.

The parties also agreed to continue the exchange of experience between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Cuba in the sphere of agriculture by means of working out separate agricultural problems, and by sending specialists to Cuba for work

in the spheres of irrigation, melioration, hydro-technical construction and others.

Agreement was reached on practical questions of assistance by the Soviet Union to Cuba in agriculture, including the sending to the Soviet Union of Cuban citizens for teaching them about different sectors of agricultural production.

Both sides noted with great satisfaction that the successful completion of the discussions in Moscow will enable the further development of fraternal friendship and close economic cooperation between the U. S. S. R. and the Republic of Cuba.

### Cuba Appeals for Arms

During the stay in the U. S. S. R. of Ernesto Guevara Serna and Emilio Aragones Navarro, views were also exchanged in connection with the threats of aggressive imperialist quarters with regard to Cuba. In view of these threats, the Government of the Cuban Republic addressed the Soviet Government with a request for help by delivering armaments and sending technical specialists for training Cuban servicemen.

The Soviet Government attentively considered this request of the Government of Cuba and agreement was reached on this question. As long as the above-mentioned quarters continue threaten Cuba, the Cuban Republic has every justification for taking necessary measures to insure its security and safeguards its sovereignty and independence, while all Cuba's true friends have every right to respond to this legitimate request.

On Sept. 1, there took place in the Kremlin the signing of a document on the assistance of the Soviet Union to the Republic of Cuba in the construction and extension of metallurgical works. On the Soviet side the document was signed by the President of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. for Foreign Economic Relations, S. A. Skachkov, and from the Cuban side by Minister of Production Ernesto Guevara Serna.

Present at the signing of the document referred to were: First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R., A. N. Kosygin; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R., V. S. Semyenov; Deputy President of the State Plan of the U. S. S. R., S. E. Vasilenko; Deputy Chairman of the State Economic Council of the U. S. S. R., S. M. Tikhomirov; First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, S. A. Borisov; Deputy Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. for Ferrous and Non-ferrous Metallurgy, V. N. Kostin; Deputy Minister of Finance of the U. S. S. R., P. A. Maletin, and other official figures.

On the Cuban side were present the member of the national leadership of the united revolutionary organizations Emilio Aragones Navarro and the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Republic of Cuba in the U. S. S. R., Carlos Olivarez Sanchez.

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# Kennedy's Cuba Statement

Special to The New York Times.  
WASHINGTON, Sept. 4 — following is the text of President Kennedy's statement on Cuba, made public tonight by the White House:

All Americans as well as all of our friends in this hemisphere have been concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet Union to bolster the military power of the Castro regime in Cuba.

Information has reached this Government in the last four days from a variety of sources which establishes without doubt that the Soviets have provided the Cuban Government with a number of anti-aircraft defensive missiles with a slant range of twenty-five miles which are similar to early models of our Nike.

SAMS

Along with these missiles the Soviets are apparently providing the extensive radar and other electronic equipment which is required for their operation.

radar

We can also confirm the presence of several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles having a range of fifteen miles.

Komov

The number of Soviet military technicians now known to be in Cuba or en route—approximately 3,500—is consistent with assistance in setting up and learn to use this equipment.

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As I stated last week, we shall continue to make infor-

mation available as fast as it is obtained and properly verified.

There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance.

no offensive = 0

Were it to be otherwise the gravest issues would arise. The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the world-wide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace. It must be dealt with as a part of that larger issue as well as in the context of the special relationships which have long characterized the inter-American system.

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It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere.

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The United States in conjunction with other Hemisphere countries will make sure that, while increased Cuban armaments will be a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba themselves, they will be nothing more.

American if we did not feel frustrated by the uncertainties that we see around us. Yet we are living in a world of change—sometimes fearfully rapid change. It is not for us to fear change. We can have confidence that those ideals for which we stand are more closely attuned to the universal aspirations of mankind than any other system yet devised. The sterility of the Communist doctrine is increasingly being exposed. As Secretary Rusk has said:<sup>4</sup>

Successful societies do not have to build walls and string barbed wire against their own people. The Berlin wall . . . is a monument to failure—the failure of a “competitive coexistence” that dared not compete.

What is required of us? That we remain true to those concepts that have made us great, faithful to those ideals that have made us good; and that we carry on in concert with other free men the great unfinished business of building the kind of world of order and peace sought by all men of good will.

### President States U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

13 Sept 62

Statement by President Kennedy<sup>1</sup>

There has been a great deal of talk on the situation in Cuba in recent days both in the Communist camp and in our own, and I would like to take this opportunity to set the matter in perspective.

In the first place it is Mr. Castro and his supporters who are in trouble. In the last year his regime has been increasingly isolated from this hemisphere. His name no longer inspires the same fear or following in other Latin American countries. He has been condemned by the OAS [Organization of American States],<sup>2</sup> excluded from the Inter-American Defense Board,<sup>3</sup> and kept out of the [Latin American] Free Trade Association. By his own monumental economic mismanagement, supplemented by our re-

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 3, 1962, p. 343.

<sup>1</sup> Read by the President at his news conference on Sept. 18.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1962, pp. 267 and 270.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 281.

October 1, 1962

usal to trade with him,<sup>4</sup> his economy has crumbled and his pledges for economic progress have been discarded, along with his pledges for political freedom. His industries are stagnating, his harvests are declining, his own followers are beginning to see that their revolution has been betrayed.

So it is not surprising that in a frantic effort to bolster his regime he should try to arouse the Cuban people by charges of an imminent American invasion and commit himself still further to a Soviet takeover in the hope of preventing his own collapse.

Ever since communism moved into Cuba in 1958, Soviet technical and military personnel have moved steadily onto the island in increasing numbers at the invitation of the Cuban government. Now that movement has been increased. It is under our most careful surveillance. But I will repeat the conclusion that I reported last week,<sup>5</sup> that these new shipments do not constitute a serious threat to any other part of this hemisphere.

If the United States ever should find it necessary to take military action against communism in Cuba, all of Castro's Communist-supplied weapons and technicians would not change the result or significantly extend the time required to achieve that result.

However, unilateral military intervention on the part of the United States cannot currently be either required or justified, and it is regrettable that loose talk about such action in this country might serve to give a thin color of legitimacy to the Communist pretense that such a threat exists. But let me make this clear once again: If at any time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

We shall be alert to, and fully capable of dealing swiftly with, any such development. As

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 283.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1962, p. 450.

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President and Commander in Chief I have full authority now to take such action, and I have asked the Congress to authorize me to call up reserve forces should this or any other crisis make it necessary.

In the meantime we intend to do everything within our power to prevent such a threat from coming into existence. Our friends in Latin America must realize the consequences such developments hold out for their own peace and freedom, and we shall be making further proposals to them. Our friends in NATO must realize the implications of their ships' engaging in the Cuban trade.

We shall continue to work with Cuban refugee leaders who are dedicated as we are to that na-

tion's future return to freedom. We shall continue to keep the American people and the Congress fully informed. We shall increase our surveillance of the whole Caribbean area. We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.

With this in mind, while I recognize that rash talk is cheap, particularly on the part of those who did not have the responsibility, I would hope that the future record will show that the only people talking about a war and invasion at this time are the Communist spokesmen in Moscow and Habana, and that the American people, defending as we do so much of the free world, will in this nuclear age, as they have in the past, keep both their nerve and their head.

## **Realism, Responsibility, and Respect—Three R's for the United Nations**

*by Harlan Cleveland*

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On Tuesday next, as the 17th U.N. General Assembly begins its work, the U.N. goes into its 18th year of operation. Seventeen, going on eighteen, is a wonderful age. We know that from rereading Booth Tarkington, even if all we can remember ourselves is how hard it seemed to be to grow up convincingly, with all those adults looking on and criticizing. We know as parents that 17 is also an exasperating age—not so bad as 14 or 15, perhaps, but still full of uncertainties. Yet as all almost-eighteeners know, 17 is an age of great glory. The awkwardness of early adolescence is being left behind; the mind and spirit make new discoveries; more and more freedom is being achieved, with greater and greater measures of responsibility; and adventure lies in wait behind every door.

Like all young things the U.N. is still growing—in size, in strength, and, we hope, in wisdom. As Adlai Stevenson has said, the U.N. was built for trouble and thrives on trouble. And all of

its members have been learning some of the facts of life—about money and finance; about the relationships between calling tunes and paying pipers; about reputation, especially the reputation of those who cry “wolf” too often; and about the difference between wanting something badly and working for it hard.

The U.N. is even old enough now to get into politics, the domestic politics of the member countries. In our case the dramatic events in the Congo brought out that most natural of American cultural traits: the desire to choose sides when we see a fight going on. The interest in the Congo's civil disturbance became an American problem when Congress, and the people at large through polls and letters to Washington, had to decide whether to buy \$100 million worth of U.N. bonds. You can all feel pride and a stake in the American response to the first real “crisis of confidence” over U.S. policy in the U.N. Both in the Senate, by 70 to 22, and in the House of Representatives, by a vote of 256 to 134, America's political leadership has responded to a deep conviction widely shared by most Americans: that

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Association for the United Nations at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 16 (press release 561 dated Sept. 15).