


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ANNEX TO ENCLOSURE A

IAC REPRESENTATION IN THE PROPOSED
COORDINATION AND LIAISON STAFF

The concept of IAC representation within the proposed Office of Estimates is difficult to convey and has previously been rejected on theoretical grounds. It has, however, worked in practice, in the British JIC and in the wartime US JIC. The present lamentable state of inter-agency coordination is in large measure a consequence of the subordination of practical cooperation to abstract and theoretical considerations and ultra-formal procedures.

The following excerpt from a memorandum of 15 April 1947 may serve to explain and justify the concept. Certain out-of-date references must be excused inasmuch as time was not available for revision in contemporary terms. The basic argument is no less valid in present circumstances.




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3. The essentials of an effective procedure. From the experience of the U.S. and British J.I.C.'s, the essentials of an effective procedure may be deduced. They are:

a. That the system be based on direct and informal consultation to the maximum practicable degree, with a minimum of procedural formality and indirection.

b. That coordination with each departmental agency be accomplished through an officer permanently and exclusively charged with that function, directly responsible to the chief of that agency and authorized, on due consultation, to express concurrence or dissent in his name.

c. That each such representative, although necessarily a person of broad experience in strategic appreciation rather than a specialist in any particular subject, be competent and authorized to enter into substantive discussion and to exercise substantive judgment.

d. That each such representative have direct and informal access to the chief of the agency represented by him and to its substantive specialists.

e. That each such representative participate directly in the final formulation of the estimates to be coordinated, so that he may not only represent therein the departmental point of view, but also represent, in departmental consideration of the estimate, the joint (or central) point of view.

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4. C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 3. Simultaneously with the drafting of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 it was planned to meet the requirement of paragraph 6 therein by providing in the Central Reports Staff an agency for the determination of departmental concurrence or dissent in conformity with the principles indicated above. This plan was formulated in C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 3 (Revised), paragraph 3, which follows in abbreviated form:

3. One Assistant to the Chief, C.R.S., shall be designated by each permanent member of the Intelligence Advisory Board. In distinction from other C.R.S. personnel ... these Assistants shall be assigned to the offices of the permanent members of the I.A.B. and responsible to them, although detailed to serve full time with the Chief, C.R.S. They shall:

a. Represent the interests of their respective members of the (I.A.B.) in the operations of the (C.R.S.).

b. Represent the (C.R.S.) in its relations with their respective agencies.

c. Assist the Chief, C.R.S. in: (1) The formulation of directives to the subdivisions of C.R.S. and of requests upon departmental agencies for essential information; (2) The review of summaries, estimates, and studies prepared by the subdivisions of C.R.S....

This concept had been explained to the members of the I.A.B. and the provision of such personnel had been agreed to by them when the draft of N.I.A. Directive No. 2, Appendix "A", was before them for consideration. The plan was never put into effect, however, because the C.R.S. never reached the stage of producing estimates.

5. C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 32. The language of C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 32 does not preclude the establishment of an effective system of coordination, but neither does it describe such a system and require its implementation.

The actual implementation of this Order to date constitutes the most formal, indirect, cumbersome, and inefficient procedure ever devised for the purpose. This situation is obviously attributable to the fact that, in this context, the interest of the departmental intelligence agencies is essentially negative, to prevent any action possibly prejudicial to them, rather than positive, to contribute toward and expedite the production of acceptable central intelligence estimates.

The actual practice under C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 32 stands in contrast to the essentials of an effective procedure indicated in paragraph 3 as follows:

a. It is extremely indirect and formal. In general,

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intelligence through the constructive reconciliation of

the officers designated by the members of the I.A.B. pursuant to the Order act only to transmit written memoranda without concern to understand and influence the substance and reasoning of either C.I.G. estimates or departmental comment thereon. In consequence they constitute a barrier to the true coordination of/ divergent (or only apparently divergent) interpretations.

b. The function of these officers with respect to C.I.G. is incidental to other, departmental duties. None of them feels any responsibility for a constructive contribution to central intelligence.

c. Whether or not these officers are competent to enter into substantive discussion, they will not do so. They function only as post offices for the transmission of papers between C.I.G. and departmental specialists. In this they constitute a barrier to the direct discussion of points at issue and possible reconciliation of apparently opposing views.

d. In general these officers communicate with the chiefs of the agencies they represent and with its substantive specialists only through written memoranda (at least so far as the subject of this paper is concerned). Being thus uninformed regarding the reasons for a departmental dissent, they obviously cannot discuss the issue or even explain the dissent, but can only transmit it as they have received it.

e. These officers have rarely, if ever, visited ORE, much less participated in the preparation or review of C.I.G. estimates. Consequently they are incapable of presenting the C.I.G. point of view or even of interpreting a C.I.G. draft to their principals or to the departmental specialists concerned. For lack of discussion with anyone qualified to inform them on these points, departmental specialists often base their formal comments on misconceptions or address them to issues that could have been resolved in a moment of informal discussion.

The existing procedure is not only an obstacle to the true coordination of intelligence through substantive consultation and agreement, but it also entails unacceptable delay in the publication of completed C.I.G. estimates. For specifications on this latter point see the Appendix. Even with the most thorough prior coordination on the working level two to three weeks are required to obtain final action through the departmental representatives designated under C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 32. The average time required for this purpose is 17 days. Experience has shown that resort to the escape

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clause in paragraph 4 of the Order produces more difficulties than it avoids.

6. Conclusions.

a. That the existing procedure for the final coordination of C.I.G. estimates with the departmental agencies hinders substantive agreement and entails unacceptable delays.

b. That the procedure for that purpose should conform to the specifications in paragraph 3 above.

c. That the members of the I.A.B. should be requested to detail to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff, ORE, full-time representatives qualified and authorized to function in conformity with paragraph 3 above.

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