

NOTED BY DLT
11/18/50

~~SECRET~~

16 November 1950

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SMITH

In CIA 11-50, "REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES," dated 13 November 1950, the last sentence on page ii of the Summary reads:

"Containment of Ho's forces presently depends almost exclusively on U.S. aid, and even with such help (short of direct ground, air, and naval support) the French probably cannot hold northern Indochina for more than six months, nor all of Indochina for more than eighteen months."

This somewhat definite statement derives from "PROSPECTS FOR CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTION IN INDOCHINA DURING 1950" (ORE 50-50 Supplement). This paper is based on information available to CIA as of 5 September 1950, and it is concurred in by the Departments of State, Navy, and Air Force. There is a dissent by the Department of Army (G-2), but not in relation to the following pertinent paragraph (Page 9, Section 1, paragraph 2):

"Despite this general capability and despite the existence of Chinese Communist military concentrations along the Indochina border, adequate for the task, it is estimated that an open Chinese Communist invasion—while possible and capable of being launched with little or no preliminary warning—is improbable in 1950 because considerations (from the standpoint of Ho Chi Minh, the Chinese Communists, and international Communism) favoring such action appear to be outweighed by considerations opposing it. It is highly probable, however, that the Chinese Communists will continue to expand military assistance to the Viet Minh forces (by measures short of open invasion) on a scale sufficient to provide those forces with the capability of achieving significant, but limited, objectives in 1950 and, assuming that the French receive no more aid than is presently programmed, of eventually expelling the French without the aid of a Chinese Communist invasion."

This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 1-16-91
HRP 89-2

JL

*Mr. Babbitt
Our review should be
corrected to indicate that
the contingency is a probability.
by [unclear] a number of
centuries H. Prof.*

HS/TC-112
10m39

~~SECRET~~

000293

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Mr. Montague		
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	[Redacted]		11/20/50
2			
3			

25X1

- APPROVAL INFORMATION SIGNATURE
- ACTION DIRECT REPLY RETURN
- COMMENT PREPARATION OF REPLY DISPATCH
- CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION FILE

REMARKS: Monty: Please note General Smith's
 remarks at the bottom of the page.

*No further action
 necessary.*

14 Dec/50.

25X1

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
 SEP 1947

This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT
 only, for the use of DCI/HS.
 The record copy has been
 released to National Archives
 under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.

Date 1/18/91 HRP 89-2

000293