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Date 10 JAN HRP 89-2

Chief, Plans & Policy Staff

1 February 1949

Chief, Global Survey Group

Monthly Report (Ref. S/PP memo. 29 Jan. 49)

1. Recommended changes in the ORE Intelligence Plan. The quarterly Plan, as adopted at the 18 January meeting of the IPB, is not representative of the actual and projected activities of the Global Survey Group, inasmuch as it is limited to a listing of specific projects in the NIS, CIA, ORE, and SR Series. The greater portion of the work of the Group is directed toward satisfaction of the specific intelligence requirements of such bodies as the NSC Staff and the NSRB as they arise. This production cannot be scheduled on a quarterly basis in terms of specific projects. Moreover, much of it falls outside of the established Series. It can, however, be projected in general, but definite terms. G/GS, which was not consulted in the preparation of the current plan, in either its original or its revised form, is prepared to submit such a statement and requests that such production receive notice in the next quarterly plan.

It may also be noted that the current Plan does not describe the IM-Series, which is the vehicle for an increasing volume of ORE intelligence production. It is suggested that any Plan which fails to mention any considerable volume of ORE intelligence production, at least in general terms, is not only imperfect, but may prove dangerously misleading.

2. Special intelligence produced by G/GS (outside of the CIA, ORE, and SR Series).

a. For the Director: briefing notes to accompany CIA 1-49, with reference to the Director's briefing of the NSC.

b. For the JCS: material to be used in the briefing of the Secretary of Defense on 15 January. The general and conclusions sections of the briefing were based primarily on G/GS drafts.

c. For the NSRB: with reference to the NSRB's "Basic Security Resources Assumption's" project, G/GS has prepared and submitted texts on the probability of war before 1953 and on enemies, allies, and neutrals in the event of war before 1953. Pursuant to NSRB instructions, these texts are in process of coordination with the designated representatives of State and the Joint Staff. (The first study is also being adopted for publication in the ORE Series.)

3. Adequacy of coverage of global aspects.

a. By ORE: We feel that the foregoing studies, in conjunction

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with CIA O-49 and I-49, afford a reasonably adequate coverage of the global situation as such. At the same time we feel, as a broad generalization, that production by other components of ORE tends to be undesirably parochial in point of view. In this connection we note that the Group is rarely, if ever, consulted in the formulation of either Branch production programs or specific projects. We become cognizant of the production of other components only as it is submitted to IAC coordination, when it is already too late to influence its general character.

With particular reference to the SR Series, G/GS has a special interest in Section V, "Strategic Considerations Affecting U.S. Security," in which the specific situation is related to the global situation. We note that almost invariably these sections fail to serve their purpose, being merely summaries of the other sections rather than the fresh and specific analysis called for by the title. A fault so general should be corrected by general indoctrination.

b. By the IAC agencies. Either there is no relevant intelligence production by the IAC agencies, or we are denied access to it. Except for the Army's SID Series (which is basic intelligence of very low quality), the only production of the Service agencies available to us is of that ephemeral type found in current periodicals. OIR production reaches us only in large batches, at least a month old, and generally consists of voluminous studies relatively narrow in scope. On this showing we would say that there is no appreciable treatment of the global aspects of the situation in the intelligence production of the IAC agencies.

4. Functioning of ORE. It is our well known view that the existing organization of ORE is too complex, ill defined, and cumbersome to function efficiently. We have nothing to add to that generalization and to observations in paragraphs 1 and 3 a above, except with respect to the IPB. Although it is admittedly too early for conclusive judgment, so far that game has not been worth the candle. The time of the Broad has been taken up, for the most part with nitpicking on inadequately prepared or overtaken papers, very little being devoted to the discussion of problems of any real import.

5. Functioning of CIA. G/GS has had no contact with other offices of CIA during the month, other than the office of the Director.

6. Relations outside of CIA. As reported in detail in a memorandum to the Assistant Director, the procedure devised by JIG for the preparation of the Forrestal briefing was appallingly cumbersome and wasteful of the time of the ORE personnel involved. Subject to the correction of that fault, however, CIA participation was beneficial for all concerned.

Relations with NSC Staff and the NSRB continue to be excellent.

LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE

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