

File

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~~SP-~~ INDIA

COMMENTS

GENERAL

Congratulations to the American Indians: Chief Big Oakes et al.

Just on a basis of apparent bulk, it seems impossible that such an intricate subject as India could be covered in such a short space, but so far as a non-expert can see anyway, this appears to fill the bill just as well as if it were ten times as long. There is, of course, a relative sparsity of detail, but it could be covered in the appendixes. (The paper would seem to call for unusually good appendixes for this reason.)

Section VI however, aroused some misgivings regarding not only itself, but the paper as a whole. Briefly, forecasts are made here which don't seem to be especially supported in the body of the report.

You want to know in the first place if India and Pakistan are going to fight. Section VI says they may and may not, which doubtless is as far as you can go with an answer, but it would seem that if the factors underlying this continuing and ineradicable strife had been more fully analyzed elsewhere in the report and then had been recapitulated here, one could come up with a clearer impression of what will happen.

Similarly, Section VI says that India will continue unstable and therefore a source of weakness to US security. Presumably this refers mainly to the fact that under these conditions, we shan't be able to make use of India's resources. Other than brief mention in Section V

however, is there enough in the report to furnish full justification for such a phrase as "a source of weakness to the security of the United States."

One learns here for the first time that in event of the collapse of Pakistan, princes might try to seize territory. Nothing in the paper had prepared one for the emergence of such ambitions, nor is one informed about princely capabilities in this regard.

It is stated that Indian instability is desirable from a Soviet point of view. Why exactly? If they don't have any agitators in the country, how can they ever perform the usual trick of exploiting unrest? Why shouldn't they just as readily support a strong, stable India whose resources they would be in position to exploit about as readily as anyone else?

It is explained that there isn't more Soviet activity in India because India is low among Soviet priorities, but not why it is low. Here is a country in so pitiful a state of disorganization that it ought to be ripe for Communism; it ought to be one of the cheapest, easiest, and most profitable fields in which the Soviets could possibly work. India is just as strategically important for them as it is for us—perhaps more so, because conceivably, India could become a base for attack on Soviet Russia; not for Soviet attack against us. In short it appears that the Russian angle deserves a good deal more discussion in the paper as a whole. Possibly EE/USSR could help.

Says Russians would apparently move into India only if they were disappointed in their Western European schemes, implying thus that if

they failed in Western Europe, they would very probably turn at once to India. Maybe so, but there are a good many contingencies as well as other possibilities that should be included in the discussion.

If they moved on India (says Section VI) they would take in "South Asia." What is South Asia? Is it Southeast Asia? Near East? Both? Why should they want to do this? What consolation would it give them for Europe which they had at this point apparently given up on?

Other than what is implied in the above and some marginal trivialities, there is no comment of any importance on Sections I, II, or V.

(NOTE: Don't forget the summary)

SECTION III

Section III leaves an impression of incompleteness. Even though you can't really discuss Indian foreign affairs because there isn't any such thing, the paper says there are enough indications to permit speculation. If so, why not fuller speculation? Also more background information to support it?

The Pakistan discussion, for instance, seems to say that the Pakistanis, with a religious bond to the Arabs, aren't necessarily going to entirely solid with them; that the Pakistanis aren't particularly hostile to the UK or US and see obvious advantages in playing the US game; yet they are in a way hostile to all whites and will support pan-Asianism. This isn't awfully conclusive. It's not made quite clear what the Pakistan-Afghanistan trouble is, but it would seem to be leading to possible war which makes one want to know all about it. The discussion of Pakistan-India relations doesn't seem to go far enough, considering its importance. This presumably gives the main factors underlying possible Indian civil war, but possible civil war seems something that ought to be treated at considerable length, perhaps elsewhere as well as here.

The discussion of the Dominion of India seems rather an analysis of the psychology of the typical Indian than an analysis of foreign policy or probable foreign policy. Granted, nothing can be too specific at this juncture, this discussion unnecessarily vague in parts, as for

example, the statement that India will play a "negative role" in international affairs.

One would suppose that the most, or at least one of the most important points that could be brought out on this report would be an estimate of India's role in the UN and its position in international affairs in general. It is all very well for the Indian governments to say that they will stand aloof in the current East-West unpleasantness, but obviously they can't do it forever unless things change a good deal more than one suspects they will. In the event of actual war, or if India found itself in something like Denmark's position of having to abandon traditional neutrality, what would the two dominions do? Would they join us because they thought we were a better bet, or the Soviets because they were closer and more dangerous, or would they try to get up an Asiatic bloc of their own?

On a few details, it would seem that one might hear something about India's relations with the nearby and equally new government of Burma. Aren't the Indians among those from whom the Indonesians hope for diplomatic support? Haven't they backed Indonesia in the UN? Aren't they a major force in Pan-Asiatic conferences for what these are worth?

A good deal more needs to be said about Afghanistan in view of its possibility of becoming embroiled in an Indian war and of its buffer position against Russia.

(The chapter lacks some headings it ought to have)

MILITARY

There are a few more questions that might be answered.

1. The military forces of the Princely States come up as a sort of afterthought; yet the Nizam's army at least is described as of some consequence. Wonder if it might not be worth while to give some military details for each prince who's got any army at all.

2. The factor of internal security isn't as fully treated as it might be. In the event, for example, of intensified warfare in Kashmir, have the Sikhs enough power to be beyond India's control? In event of full-scale civil war between the two dominions, would Pakistan be eventually conquered? To what extent can the armies control communal rioting?

3. Things being what they are, it is possible that more ought to be said about capabilities against the Soviets. If they decided to absorb all Asia, (a) would the Indians resist at all; (b) if they resisted, how long could they hold them off, given rugged terrain and the assumption that the Soviets would be greatly extended elsewhere; (c) what would it take in the way of support to keep the Soviets out, and how feasible would this be?