

WRITTEN BY GSI PROBABLY IN 1949 - HERE  
REPRODUCED UNCHANGED. NEVER GOT BEYOND  
GSI'S DEEK - DO NOT KNOW FOR WHAT INTENDED  
GIVES A GOOD IDEA, THOUGH, OF WHAT GSI (SUCCESSOR  
OF SI) WAS UP AGAINST.

DIPE  
files

There can never be satisfactory production of Staff Intelligence by ORE

until one person is given full responsibility and authority for its production.

The nature of staff intelligence is always such that it is controversial.

Such intelligence contains an estimate; an estimate is an ~~own~~ opinion; opinions

~~cannot prevail unless they are overwhelmingly~~ never go unchallenged. Since  
many different estimates are always possible, there will always be disagreement as

to which is most needed at any given time. Even the form in which an estimate

is presented ~~is a controversial~~ creates a controversy which can be resolved only

in the best judgment as to what presentation most ideally fulfills the needs of

those reading the ~~finished~~ finished product.

It might be maintained, accepting the above, that the only single person

with competence to judge the value of a given estimate is the chief of the

producing unit, <sup>but</sup> In order to put this procedure into practice, it would be

necessary to remove all obstacles to the exercise of the chief's judgment and

to place upon him the full, undivided responsibility for the result. There would

then be eleven separate persons who could forward coordinated or uncoordinated

national intelligence to the official recipients. The judgment of each sep-

arate individual would be colored by events and requirements within his area

of competence and upon his estimate of the importance of these events in re-

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necessary to remove all obstacles to the exercise of the chief's judgment and to place upon him the full, undivided responsibility for the result. There would then be eleven separate persons who could forward coordinated or uncoordinated national intelligence to the official recipients. The judgment of each separate individual would be colored by events and requirements within his area of competence and upon his estimate of the importance of these events in relation to others. The result in terms of material received by officials, its relative usefulness for their purposes, and the form in which it was presented would be admirable from the point of view of variety and individuality but possibly bewildering in terms of the grim business of policy making. That it would lead to an abrupt demise of ORE is beyond question. There is, in short,

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nothing clearer than that there must be, in some form or other, a guidinghand

over the produ units of ORP

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should not be left to a committee or other group. Group action can be taken only by two means: majority vote or compromise. Majority votes have meaning only where majority interests are concerned: e.g. the election of officers who can presumably lead if their leadership is satisfactory to most of those led; the expenditure of funds jointly owned by the group. When the matter voted on represents a clear matter of judgment, the effect of which is absolute, the vote of the majority has no relevance: if more people are right than wrong a correct decision will have been arrived at, essentially by chance. If more are wrong than right, a mistake has been made, equally by chance. If, as is more likely, the decision is taken by compromise, where each side in the controversy ~~will~~ yields somewhat, the result is an intelligence estimate less satisfactory than either original proposal.

It might be maintained that the Assistant Director R&E already has and exercises this function. This is true, but the duties of the Assistant Director are such that he cannot give full time to this particular function and must delegate it. The only questions are to whom the function is to be delegated and the extent of the delegation.

As matters stand, the answer to the first question is clear: the function is delegated to the Staff Intelligence Group. The extent of delegation is less

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and the extent of the delegation.

As matters stand, the answer to the first question is clear: the function  
is delegated to The Staff Intelligence Group. The extent of delegation is less  
clear. While Staff Intelligence is somewhat vaguely charged with a part in  
the selection of intelligence, *and the review of it, and* is given relatively undoubted responsibility  
for seeing that reports are coordinated with the IAC agencies and finally  
reproduced.

Selection of material to be produced and finally production of it are  
inseparable. It could not be expected that an agency responsible for getting  
out a satisfactory finished product could do so if it had no control over  
the raw material to be produced, or, in terms of staff intelligence, if the

office responsible for it was allowed to work on nothing but such papers as producing units chose to send in. However much advice in the matter the responsible ~~unit~~ office sought or received, it would still have to make the final decision on what should be written and by whom if it is <sup>t</sup> expected to achieve the optimum in staff intelligence. At present, <sup>G/SI</sup> ~~staff intelligence~~, while allocated something resembling the function of selection can actually only suggest, and even this power of suggestion is resented in some quarters.

If, however, all power of ~~the~~ selection is taken away from Staff Intelligence, it will be forced to accept, for review, whatever comes to mind within an individual branch, passed on, <sup>^</sup> ~~possibly by a committee which is~~ ~~not~~ and endowed with "specifications" by a committee which is the worst possible agency either for selection or for direction. So long as this method or any modification of it is in force, the Staff Intelligence Group, or any group or individual having responsibility for production of satisfactory staff intelligence will be to that extent hampered from the outset.

if  
Even ~~with~~ this disadvantage ~~eliminated~~, ~~however~~ is overlooked, however, there are still serious obstacles in the way of production. Whatever may be said in miscellaneous directives, G/SI, ~~does not~~ while it must accept responsibility

authority commensurate with the responsibility. In a larger sense, G/SI does not have any authority at all.

To be specific, when a report is submitted to G/SI, G/SI is charged with exercising its "review" function, which is characteristically undefined in the directives. In absence of official definition, however, this function would seem to include either (a) sheer proof-reading with all the limitations implicit in that process; (b) proof-reading plus elementary editorial functions such as attempting rhetorical repair or revising paragraph structure; (c) making a general study of the piece to determine its success in presenting the point which is ~~submitted~~ submitted as its aim; (d) determining whether or not the estimate as written makes any point at all worthy of being called national intelligence.

Taking these functions in order, even the most elementary proof-reading of a paper will not always ~~pass~~ be acceptable to producing units. There are those whose very commas are so precious to them that they will complain of a change. The fact that such complaints are made is sufficient proof that branches are not willing to concede any authority at all to anyone.

Rhetorical changes of any type not only prick the vanity of branch authors and thus lead them to complain, but their complaints are invariably allowed, so

that implicitly, G/SI does not have simple editorial authority except by the merest suffrage. ~~When it comes to the exercise of editorial authority~~ In any matter that involves even minute changes of words, furthermore, there is always the cry that the "branch point of view" has been violated; that vital "emphasis" has been changed; that through the abysmal ignorance of the "editor", someone has been made to say something he never intended to say. Most of these arguments are specious and reflect nothing more than the ruffled feelings of analysts; yet they are inflated into alleged issues of real importance. In any case, the G/SI (and this would be true of any similar group or of a committee) is powerless in the face of such complaints.

When it comes to an actual exercise of judgment as to the value of a paper as a whole, no branch will allow authority in the matter to G/SI which has, according to present rulings, only the power to "recommend" to the assistant director.

This latter expedient, however desireable or inescapable it may seem, is actually a negation of the authority any reviewing agency would have to have in order to make <sup>its</sup> ~~their~~ function meaningful. The authority, in other words, is not actually delegated; it is only half delegated, which means, in point of fact, that it is not delegated at all. ~~xxxx xxxxxx~~ No ruling of G/SI has any validity, be it so little as an unoffending comma, if the author or his chief wishes to make an issue of it.

The actual result is that several decisions which should probably not be brought to his attention are forced upon the AD, the number of them varying according to the extent of stubbornness of those concerned. There is no safeguard against having the whole reviewing function added to the present burdens of the head of ORE.

It is not suggested that this function, obviously his by the nature of his office, be separated from the AD but only that the delegation of the function is defined in a way which will give those to whom delegated the authority they need.