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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE	3 Nov 82
TO:			C/IAD/DDO
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE	3 Nov 82
TO:		Walt Raymond, Senior Staff Of/NSC	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
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REMARKS:			
FYI			
FROM: Harry Rowen, Chairman/NIC			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
7E62	Hqs./CIA		

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE	2 Nov 82
TO: NIO/WE		

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE	2 Nov 82
TO: 		

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE	2 Nov 82
TO: NIO/LA		

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE	2 Nov 82
TO: NIO/USSR		

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE	2 Nov 82
TO: VC/NIC		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
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REMARKS:		
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FROM: C/NIC		
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FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

George Agree,
President,
The American Political Foundation,
2100 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 716,
Washington D.C. 20037

October 8th 1982

Dear George,

This is a summary of the ideas which we can discuss in Washington when we meet:

- 1) The problem: how best to conduct a programme of activities in Europe to counter the present trends and the climate of opinion which favours neutralist and Soviet propaganda and, however indirectly, facilitates Soviet policies of dividing the West, and of exploiting US-European differences.
- 2) The Western focus: the situation in Western Europe now differs fundamentally from that of the 1950s when NATO could count on European solidarity and the hope was for European unification. Today there is insecurity in Western Europe and the cohesion of NATO is undermined by fear and lack of solidarity. The prospect of unification has gone. There is little cooperation and a reluctance to face the dangers arising out of the increasing Soviet might and the increasing dangers which this implies. How can the resistance posture be revitalized? The old principles of the defence of freedom and Western civilization are of course as valid as they always were, but we must be more specific in the context of the European political struggles about not only what is desirable but how to go about it in individual European countries. We have to appeal to the new generation which has not had the experience of the last war, which is more parochial, more ignorant, and often concerned with issues which in a wider historical perspective and with better comparative knowledge are simply pseudo-issues. But this new generation must be reached to secure the basic continuity of Western policies for the survival of the West.
- 3) The Eastern focus: there is an astonishing decline in Western interest in what is happening in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This is clearly not true with regard to the news coverage. The Western press is generally very vigorous in reporting events there but it does so on a very superficial level. It focusses attention only on the dramatic and the moment the news is no longer sensational it quickly forgets about the country in question. In short, there is hardly any attention given to the ideological struggle, to the moral and political significance of the events in a wider context. But there is a difference between a "story" and an intellectually serious analysis of the meaning of the continuing East-West conflict underlying the events reported. As a result of this intellectual and ideological vacuum which is created by such disregard for these deeper perspectives, the field is left open to the shifting of the focus of Western attention away from the communist countries to Chile or Nicaragua. A sort of spurious equivalence is created between the oppression and

repression in countries to the East and to the West of the Great Divide. But in practical terms it means that the indignation and critical fire are increasingly concentrated Westward rather than Eastward. This of course violates all the canons of moral and intellectual equity. It also ignores the historical experience of communist countries and its lessons for the West. The moral, political and economic bankruptcy of the utopian perspective which used to be the justification for all the repressions and sacrifices imposed on these countries is now increasingly obvious to their populations but also tends to be increasingly ignored in the West as a factor in the "ideological struggle". There is a curious discrepancy here. The West is not inclined to use the most important weapon in its armoury. In the best case, if it is not turning its head away from these problems it indulges in the old anti-communist clichés without realising that we are now facing the irony of the juxtaposition of, say, the continuing resistance in Poland with the crumbling spirit of resistance in Western Europe.

4) That is not to say that this observation applies to the totality or even majority of the population of Western European countries. But it is a question of the vigorous militant minorities who play havoc, and the passivity of the political elites and of large sections of the populations of Western European countries. Potentially there is quite a number of people in Europe who are dissatisfied with this situation and who can be "mobilized". The question is how best can we promote and stimulate cooperation with people who are basically on our side both East and West. There should be an interchange between people of ideas in order to help create a new climate of opinion in Western Europe in general, but taking into account the specific situation within individual Western European countries. It must be intellectually adequate to the present situation in these countries, and must try to influence the younger generation, some of whose activists are already undergoing the (usual) cycle of disillusionment with the radical utopianism (of the 1960s). Ideally, such effort should include all kinds of activities (articles, pamphlets, documentaries, protest on the European scale about single events). Cultural retrenchment in all the western European countries and the growing inward-looking attitude there results in an increased parochialism and ignorance about developments in Eastern European countries and their attitude towards the US.

- 5) Specific operational ideas about what should be done: they include shorter- and longer-lasting issues and the development of methods and instruments of influence. Examples of the first category are, for instance,
- a) the forthcoming trial in Poland of the leaders of KOR. A vigorous campaign of protest and a counter trial should be launched in the West to compromise the perpetrators of this new juridical farce in Eastern Europe;
 - b) the juxtaposition of the Russian submarines and of Swedish neutralist illusions;
 - c) a proper effort to enlighten the public about the story of terrorism, its character, links and purposes. There is much sensational treatment of it but serious analyses of its significance are few and far between;
 - d) the European public has been completely bamboozled about the question of the Yamal gas-pipeline. The argument against helping the Soviets to build it has hardly been voiced or adequately presented in the European press. Nor was there a proper analysis of the interests involved in the individual countries (USSR, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy), except in the most general terms;

- e) the issue of nuclear pacificism. The case against unilateralism in Europe has never been properly argued or presented, although some poorly publicised attempts were made. In the USA there was a more vigorous debate between the advocates and the opponents of the "freeze", but in both cases the "anti"-arguments suffer from a certain degree of parochialism; for instance exposing the very difference between the tactics of the European and the American disarmers can indicate both the political significance of these parallel movements and their essential intellectual dishonesty. Because, although their essential motivation is the same, their arguments are in fact incompatible: a bona fide European unilateralist should logically be against the American freeze (even as a stop-gap) and a genuine American advocate of the freeze should by all logic condemn the stand-point of European unilateral disarmers. But it is not so. They go along together fabulously because in fact they basically share a common attitude which is tantamount to capitulation to the Soviet Union, and the differences in tactics are adapted to local political circumstances to facilitate and maximise their local influence. As it happens, they also facilitate the Soviet political exploitation of such movements. All these tricks and stratagems should be properly exposed and the systematic case against European nuclear pacificists should be stated in a basic text and published in a pamphlet of, say, 48 pages containing all the fundamental "anti"-arguments. The essence of the pamphlet should be summarized in the form of an article which can be placed in many journals and provide the stimulus for a general public debate on the subject in Europe;
- f) a similar thing should be done about the connected topic of European neutralism, exposing the fallacies of many arguments which are swallowed whole by a lot of people in Europe who are not genuinely neutralist at all.

These are examples of the current issues which should be handled. One can of course mention more and anyway new ones will emerge with the passage of time.

This leads me to the second specific operational category -- that of the development of methods and instruments of influence:

- a) the pamphlets I mention in the last two points should be made into a regular series of publications (called perhaps "Searchlight Papers") which will deal with the issues of the day in a systematic form providing basic arguments for the case we are making which can be used by writers, journalists, speakers etc. and which can anyway stimulate further public discussion by placing summaries in the press;
- b) a slightly different form of doing the same thing, sometimes in conjunction and sometimes separately, would be to commission articles, pamphlets and books in which the authors could produce somewhat more in-depth analyses than the usual ephemeral journalism, say for instance, sending a person to Sweden to carry out an investigation into Swedish-Soviet relations, Soviet submarines, and Scandinavian neutralism in historical perspective so as to neutralise Olaf Palme's neutralism. All these things, incidentally, may have wider repercussions as they tend to have a spill-over effect and if one consciously tries to maximise them by establishing a "multiplier effect" mechanism, one can have "feed-backs" in various countries (including the USA). Commissioning books and booklets of more permanent value on subjects of current significance

- may often be money better spent than that on some of the specialist conferences which usually leave no trace. This can be done in conjunction with publishers and facilitated by a "fund for advanced royalties" as has been done in the past by the Philip Stern Foundation;
- c) another variation on the theme of a) and b) would be a series of what can be called "Truth Kits". As a concrete implementation of the idea of "Operation Truth" these should vary in length, but generally they would expose lies and distortions in the Soviet propaganda, including methods and tactics used by it, so that not only are separate cases of such disinformation highlighted but the pattern of bamboozlement is shown. They can range from a book giving the historical exposé of violations of international agreements by the Soviet Union, to shorter pamphlets dealing with, say, Soviet duplicity on the non-alignment movement;
 - d) connected with it there should be a monthly bulletin covering in a snappy form the treatment of current events in the Soviet and communist press which would give an idea of the twists and turns of the various Party lines, and also point out their contradictions as well as convergences with the attitudes and arguments employed by the "liberal" and "progressive" press in the West and in the Third World;
 - e) the next sphere is that of the press and the media in Europe. Here one should regularly expose bias and distortions, and sometimes even omissions and lies which often creep into them, but unlike in the context of the communist rule they can be exposed and nailed. For that one should have a bulletin like Reed Irvin's "Accuracy in Media" in individual European countries. It can have, however, a greater impact here; we have better access to some of the major European papers than Irvin can have vis-à-vis The Washington Post or The New York Times. Also no major European journal has such a commanding position as these two American papers and therefore one can always approach their competitors if a journal in question misbehaves through distortion of facts. Also to deal with these matters one can have regular, special seminars for journalists and broadcasters in various European countries;
 - f) for the same purpose one should have groups of our friends who would regularly write Letters to the Editor on matters of current interest to different European newspapers -- a sort of "Committee of Correspondence". In doing this they can benefit from the proposed publications (mentioned above) but will react to issues, articles and editorials immediately, and will basically rely on their own wit and knowledge;
 - g) for all these activities, groups in individual European countries should be established, carrying out their own analyses and investigations, and engaging in public debates. These local committees should join the general European and international protest campaigns and provide a mechanism facilitating mobilisation for such protest. They would also organise their own regular meetings, seminars and conferences to which they would occasionally invite participants from other European countries and the US (one such project, about which I will tell you when I see you, is a meeting on US-European relations which the Italian Social-Democrats want to organise /at their own expense/ and want some American and European participants to be sent to it by us /at our expense/).

h) for all these activities, autonomous in nature, a kind of "federal" clearing-house is needed in London with its own bulletin and facilities to coordinate to a certain extent local efforts, and to use the existing outlets (such as the magazines Encounter, Survey, Commentaire, and Tempo presente, or journals such as Il Giornale Nuovo, Neue Frankfurter Zeitung, and Neue Zurcher Zeitung, etc.). It will also have to deal on a general European basis with campaigns and occasional conferences. We are already organising, together with Gerald Frost, the Director of the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, a regular meeting of our local group (I will show you a list of the participants when we meet) which will gather every month for a discussion on some topical subject (including those mentioned above) as well as to exchange ideas about what can be done and how best to do it. It is meant to be a combination of a "brain trust" for the proposed clearing-house in London and a "ginger group" to act on the British political-intellectual scene. Apart from "ideological" activities (i.e. the struggle of ideas) one must be involved with the general issues of freedom and human rights and cooperate with various existing organisations concerned with such questions as censorship, political prisoners, etc.

These are some of the specific operational ideas which I have discussed with Mel and which we would like to discuss with you, Walt Raymond and Mark Palmer. Of course not all of them can be launched at the same time. One has to proceed step by step according to the means available. But that is, we believe, what should be aimed at, however modest the beginning. In any case, one should begin somewhere and the sooner the better, because political morale in Europe has been crumbling for a long time and one should try to counterract it as effectively as possible.

I hope to see you soon.

Yours,



Leopold Labedz.