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REMARKS OF
JUDGE WILLIAM CLARK,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
TO THE PRESIDENTCenter for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University

3:05 P.M. EDT

JUDGE CLARK: Thank you, Dave. Thank you for the invitation to be here and thank you for inviting this very distinguished group of people. I should say another thank you, and at certain risk to your reputation, and to that of Joe Jordan.

Speaking of the Senate hearings a moment ago, I should state, probably for the first time, that within hours after those hearings I sought them both out to become low-paid, low-key consultants, and they have been that during critical times in the past 15 months. Believe me, I have certainly benefited by their advice during those times and, even more importantly, their friendship.

Today's remarks or announcements, however you may wish to characterize it, I'd hope would be those of the President, because I'm discussing today his personal study, his personal program, his personal decision, the decision directive having been issued within our organization just this morning.

However, the first of the year the President announced that he was becoming far more involved in foreign affairs, foreign policy, defense, and would be speaking far more frequently in the area, and that is what he has done. Within a five or six-week period he will have given almost as many addresses, starting with the Eureka address. He then has a foreign policy, defense address -- or certainly within that realm -- before the Parliament, on to Rome, and back to the NATO conference in Bonn. And certainly a shorter address, but in the same category, in Berlin. Then back to New York where he addresses the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. So, what I guess I'm suggesting is that the staff upstairs -- so, Bill, you, as did the President, play proxy today and go into the matter we consider a very important one, and that is our national security strategy.

I would begin by saying that the pace of national security affairs has seldom been faster than during the past one year and a half. The initial release of our strategic arms reduction proposals, the present crisis over the Falkland Islands, the upcoming summits in Versailles and Bonn, are but the latest in a series of scheduled and unscheduled events that have seized the attention of the national security community.

We have seen the return of the Sinai to Egypt and the regular launches and recovery of the Space Shuttle Enterprise. We have witnessed, in grief, the brutal murder of Anwar Sadat, General Dozier's kidnapping in Europe, war in the Middle East, and attempted guerrilla insurrections in the Caribbean.

We have begun intermediate range nuclear force negotiations in Geneva, participated in the Ottawa and Cancun summits, and met with 76 heads of state or government. I'm speaking now that the President has personally met 76 heads of state -- unprecedented, I might add, in this period of time.

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We have watched democracy at work in El Salvador, Jamaica. We have seen tyranny in Afghanistan and in Poland. It is a complex, interdependent world with opportunities often disguised, as the President has said, as challenges.

The pace is not likely to relent and in the rush of events it is easy to lose sight of the forest, given the trees we deal with are as ambulatory as Macbeth's Birnam Wood.

For these reasons, in early February of this year -- February 5, to be exact -- the President directed a review of our national security strategy. At that time our strategy was a collection of departmental policies which had been developed during the Administration's first year in office. The President wanted to review the results of that first year with decisions often being made at the departmental level, to see where we were, to make sure our various policies were consistent and to set the course for the future.

In particular, he wanted to make sure that any discussions we had with the leadership of Congress on reductions in our defense budget, any discussions with the leadership of the Soviet Union regarding arms reductions, were based both on a well thought-through and integrated strategy for preserving our national security.

The President's involvement in this study is a good example of how he involves himself in national security affairs. As a former governor, President Reagan's past experience more clearly lies, as I think you would agree, in economic and domestic policy areas. But a lifetime of interest in and concern for, and debate of, national security issues, has built a framework of philosophy which Ronald Reagan articulated to the American people, and which they endorsed, a year and a half ago.

The conversion of that philosophy to policy has been one of the president's major efforts since January. He views national security as his most compelling responsibility. He has come to treat it accordingly.

In the past four months about a third of the President's office time -- as I'm so often reminded by Mike Deaver as we attempt to schedule another appointment -- has been devoted to national security work -- more than any other area or endeavor. He has already signed 35 National Security Directives, 19 of them this year; a pace that compares favorably with his predecessors.

There have been 57 meetings of the National Security Council during this Administration, nearly one a week. The President has personally chaired each and every one of them. Few Presidents -- certainly none in peacetime -- have paid as much attention to national security problems or issues.

In this particular security review that we discuss today, as I mentioned, the decision or directive having been issued this morning, the President played an extraordinarily active role. He progressively reviewed, and he commented, on all nine interagency draft segments as they were prepared. Sometimes we returned to the drawing board.

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Sometimes our fuzzy language was sharpened by the presidential -- first-person singular.

The NSC staff led the effort in its role as the broker of those ideas coming from the interagency efforts and beyond such as Don Regan, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Mac Baldrige, participated as well, even though not within the formal NSC process when issues pertaining to their areas arose.

And certainly Secretary Weinberger's 1982 defense policy provided an excellent foundation for the military portion of this study. The senior leadership at Defense, State, CIA, as I mentioned, were totally involved. JCS met 12 times, consider the various parts of their portion of the study. When it was done, the study and decision, as they must be, were the President's.

Now that the work is done or at least the first major portion and we're at a plateau here today. We have come to several conclusions, I believe, seven.

First, the purpose of our strategy should be to preserve our institutions of freedom and democracy -- to protect our citizens, to promote their economic well-being and to foster an international orderliness supportive of these institutions and these principles.

Second, we're confident that the policies of our first year have been internally consistent and that they do lay the groundwork for a strategy that will protect the security of the United States.

Third conclusion, a successful strategy must have diplomatic, political, economic, informational components built on a foundation of military strength.

Fourthly, our strategy must be forward looking and active. We must offer hope. As the President said last year at Notre Dame, collectivism and the subordination of the individual to the state is now perceived around the world as a bizarre and evil episode of history whose last pages are even now being written. We have something better to offer -- namely freedom. To secure the America we all want and the global stability and prosperity we all seek, we cannot sit back and hope that somehow it all will happen. We must believe in what we're doing and that requires initiative, patience, persistence. We find we must be prepared to respond vigorously to opportunities as they arise and to create opportunities where they have not existed before. We must be steadfast in those efforts.

The fifth conclusion, ours must be a coalition strategy. We, together with our friends, our allies, must pull together. And that effort will certainly be evidenced as we mentioned a moment ago, the President proceeds on the third of June to Versailles, Rome, London, Bonn, Berlin, New York.

There's no other way, we must achieve an even closer linkage with regional allies and friends. Next month's NATO summit is a case in point, of course. There may be a vocal minority questioning the basic assumptions of the Atlantic Alliance. It's not the first time, nor will it be the last. But when President Reagan and other NATO leaders meet in Bonn, there should be a strong reaffirmation of Alliance unity, vitality, and resolve. A strong, unified NATO remains indispensable for the protection of all of our Western interests.

The differences among NATO members involve shaping NATO, not whether there should be an Alliance. At Bonn, we will witness fundamental agreement on the need to strengthen our deterrent posture. We will see a balanced approach to arms control and NATO remains dedicated to the common task of preserving democracy.

Sixth, the economic component of our strategy is particularly important. We must promote a well-functioning international economic system with minimal distortion to trade and broadly agreed rules for resolving differences.

The summits at Ottawa and Cancun played a positive role in the search for a cooperative strategy for economic growth. The Caribbean Basin Initiative is a further contribution, offering a constructive, long-term commitment to countries in our hemisphere. Next month's Versailles Summit will be another step. We anticipate an atmosphere of realism at Versailles. We hope it will inspire new thinking while deflating outworn concepts. We must also force our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings.

The seventh and final conclusion, the maintenance of peace requires a strong, flexible, and responsive military. The rebuilding of our nation's defenses is now our urgent task.

For obvious reasons, I cannot discuss the defense portion of our review in the detail that I did to select members of Congress this morning or perhaps in the detail that you might desire. I will try, however, to provide the highlights where I can, some degree of specificity.

Our interests are global and they conflict with those of the Soviet Union, a state which pursues worldwide policies, most unfriendly to our own. The Soviet Union maintains the most heavily armed military establishment in history and possesses the capability to project its military forces far beyond its own borders. It's a given that, of course, we have vital interests around the world, including maritime sea lanes of communication. The hard fact is that the military power of the Soviet Union is now able to threaten these vital interests as never before. The Soviet Union also complements its direct military capabilities with proxy forces and surrogates with extensive arms sales and grants by manipulation of terrorist and subversive organizations, and through support to a number of insurgencies and separatist movements -- providing arms, advice, military training, political backing.

Our military forces and those of our allies must protect our common interests in our increasingly turbulent environment. We must be prepared to deter attack and to defeat such attack when deterrence fails.

In this regard, the modernization of our strategic nuclear forces will receive first priority in our efforts to rebuild the military capabilities of the United States. Nuclear deterrence can only be achieved if our strategic nuclear posture makes Soviet assessment of the risks of war, under any contingency, so great as to remove any incentive for initiating attack.

The decisions reached on strategic nuclear forces, which the President announced last fall, remain the foundation of our policy. The highest priority was to be accorded to survivable strategic communications systems.

In addition, we plan to modernize the manned bomber force, increase the accuracy and payload of our submarine launched ballistic missiles, add sea launched cruise missiles, improve strategic defenses, and deploy a new larger, more accurate land based ballistic missile.

The latter decision was reaffirmed by the President last Monday. He views the production of a modern ICBM, with the earliest possible introduction into the operational force, as absolutely essential.

The President provided some guidance to the Department of Defense on priorities he wished accorded to various basing and defense schemes, but he essentially asked Defense for their recommendation on a permanent basing mode by early fall so that he could comply with congressional desires

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for an administration position, well before the end of this year.

At the same time, the President made it clear that until a more survivable basing mode has been selected, funded, cleared for construction, he wishes to retain the option of deploying a limited number of MX and Minuteman silos as an integral part of the overall MX program.

The silo basing option provides a hedge against unforeseen technical developments, program changes. It is a clear incentive to the Soviets to negotiate arms reductions, and even in silos, MX gains in survivability as all three legs of the strategic triad are modernized.

The MX program, the President has said, is too important to allow the risk of technical environmental or arms control debates to delay introduction of the missile into force.

While the failure to strengthen our nuclear deterrent could be disastrous, recent history makes clear that conventional deterrence is now more important than ever. Current overseas deployments will be maintained to provide a capability for timely and flexible response to contingencies and to demonstrate resolve to honor our commitments. Ground, naval and air forces will remain deployed in Europe, in the western Pacific, in Southwest Asia and elsewhere as appropriate. In this hemisphere, naval forces will maintain a presence in the North Atlantic, the Caribbean Basin, the Mediterranean, the western Pacific and in the Indian Ocean. Forward-deployed forces will be postured to facilitate rapid response. Intermittent overseas developments from the United States will be made as necessary.

Now, our strategic reserve of U.S.-based forces, both active and reserve components, will be maintained at a high state of readiness and will be periodically exercised. Last year's Bright Star exercise in the Middle East, last month's Ocean Venture 82 in the Caribbean provided a valuable experience for those forces. They also demonstrated a multi-national, multi-force capability to defend our interests and those of our friends worldwide. Our need to swiftly re-inforce worldwide means that improvements in our strategic mobility and in our reserve structure are terribly important.

Although the most prominent threat to our vital interests worldwide is the Soviet Union, our interests can also be put in jeopardy by actions of other states, other groups. In contingencies not involving the Soviet Union, we hope to rely on friendly regional states to provide military force.

Should the threat exceed our capabilities within regional states, we must be prepared within the framework of our constitutional processes to commit U.S. forces to assist our allies. This, of course, does not mean that we must push ourselves into areas where we are neither wanted nor desired or needed. What it does mean is that we cannot reject in advance any options we might need to protect those same vital interests. To do so is to invite aggression, undermine our credibility and place at risk all global objectives.

Now, this highlights the importance of security assistance. By this term we mean military sales, grant assistance, international military education and training, economic support funds and peacekeeping operations. If we do not assist our allies and friends in meeting their legitimate defense requirements, then their ability to cope with conflict goes down and the pressure for eventual U.S. involvement goes up. Yet today security assistance is not doing the job it should, as discovered by these same studies.

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Resources are inadequate, often of the wrong kind.

During the 1950s, the security assistance budget ranged from 5 to 10 percent of the defense budget. But today, it's about 1.5 percent. While it is not necessary to return to the post war levels that re-armed and secured Western Europe, some steady growth in security assistance can be our most cost-effective investment. Again, found by our studies.

The annual budget cycle constrains long-range planning.

Countries participating in our security assistance program and procurement officers at the Defense Department both need to plan ahead. Procurement lead times limit the responsiveness of the overall program. And, finally, legislative restrictions reduce the ability of our government to react appropriately to emergency conditions.

An effective security assistance program, again, is a critical element in meeting our security objectives abroad. At times recently, have had difficulty explaining that on the Hill. Thus, it is a real compliment to our own force structure. Security assistance can help deter conflict, can increase the ability of our friends and allies to defend themselves without the commitment of our own combat forces. Effective programs can establish a degree of compatibility between U.S. forces and the forces of recipient countries so we can work together in combat if necessary. Not only does security assistance offer a cost-effective way of enhancing our security worldwide but it also strengthens our economy in general and our defense production base in particular. In short, a little assistance buys a lot of security.

For these reasons, we are planning a priority effort to improve the effectiveness, the responsiveness of this vital component of our national security strategy. We will be looking at ways of reducing lead times. We will take a hard look at existing legislation future resources. Programs require predictability. This points toward more extensive use of multiyear commitments and a larger capitalization of the special defense acquisition fund.

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In sum, security assistance needs fixing and we have a plan to fix it.

No one should mistake the main goal of American global strategy. The goal, of course, as the President has said over and over again, is peace.

We have devoted too large a portion of our national resources and emotion over the past 40 years to the alleviation of want, hunger, suffering and distress throughout the world, to want anything but peace in every corner of the planet. And those who slander the United States with charges of warmongering can barely paper over their own guilty consciences in this very regard.

In particular, the record of the Soviet Union in armed suppression of popular movements since 1945 is unparalleled among modern nations. To maintain peace with freedom, therefore, we are forced, reluctantly, to plan carefully for the possibility that our adversaries may prove unwilling to keep that peace. And when we turn to a strategy for our military forces, we enter the world of assumptions, scenarios, and hypothetical projections. It would be our strategy to employ military force to achieve specific political objectives quickly on terms favorable to the United States and our Allies.

We need a better, more detailed strategy in order to buy the right equipment, develop forces, and lay detailed plans. This strategy must provide flexibility and yet allow preplanning. In trying to solve this problem we have looked at such strategy as a planning continuum over the last four months. At the lower end of the spectrum our guidance emphasizes the integration of economic aid and security assistance, foreign military training, and supplementary support capability.

At the higher end our strategy guidance takes into account the global military capabilities of the Soviet Union and the interrelationship of strategic theaters. We recognize that in spite of our efforts to preserve peace, any conflict with the Soviet Union could expand to global dimension.

Thus, global planning is a necessity. This does not mean that we must have the capability to successfully engage Soviet forces simultaneously on all fronts. We can't, simply can't. What it does mean is that we must procure balanced forces and establish priorities for sequential operations to insure that military power would be applied in the most effective way on a priority basis.

It is in the interest of the United States to limit the scope of any conflict. The capability for counteroffensives on other fronts is an essential element of our strategy, but it is not a substitute for adequate military capability to defend our vital interests in the area in which they are threatened.

On the other hand, the decision to expand a conflict may well not be ours to make. Therefore, U.S. forces must be capable of responding to a major attack with unmistakable global implications early on in any conflict.

The President has established priorities in the way our forces would be used in combat, in terms of geography, in terms of force development. We must ask, what do we fix first?

We have tried to analyze the risks we face. We cannot fix them all at once, in part because things take time, and in part because the Soviet military advantage results from a whole decade of investment and top priority. There is not enough money available to eliminate the risks we face overnight.

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What we have tried to do is analyze those risks, put first things first, and develop for how we will conduct ourselves if the worst comes to worst.

On the other hand, we want to hope for the best, and we want to offer that hope to others, our Allies, our friends, the Third World, and especially to the citizens of the Soviet Union.

It is our fondest hope that with an active yet prudent national security policy, we might one day convince the leadership of the Soviet Union to turn their attention inward, to seek the legitimacy that only comes from the consent of the governed, and thus to address the hopes and the dreams of their own people.

Now, I've attempted to give an overview of four months of work, and at this point suggest that Tom Reed, sitting at my left, a colleague of fifteen years and an advisor to the Governor now President for the same period, and Col. Al Myer over the next several days will be extending this study as far as it can go short of classified material in all of its aspects and in much greater explanation. But if we have time, Dave, I'll entertain a question or two, whatever your custom is here.

MR. ABSHIRE: Good. Before calling on Jim Woolsey, let me say that, for the background discussion, the attribution should be to a senior White House Official, and I would ask you to please identify yourself when you ask the question, in the interest of Judge Clark.

JUDGE CLARK: Yes, sir?

Q Jim Woolsey. I want to ask a political question, if I might. The 1950s are sometimes looked back upon fondly as a period of bipartisanship in foreign policy, the late '40s and '50s. And in the last few months we've seen some examples of some what might be called 1950s-style liberalism in the foreign policy area service. You've seen both the New Republic and the Washington Post editorially critical of the nuclear freeze and the no-first-use proposal by former Secretary McNamara and others, you've seen Congressman Les Aspin admittedly propose defense budget cuts but significantly less in cuts than the outgoing president of the Chamber of Commerce, and you've seen the AFL-CIO rather more supportive of the Administration's defense program than the Business Round Table, and you've even seen Susan Sontag apparently somewhat more able to distinguish between General Jaruzelski and Lech Walesa than any random collection of New York bankers. (Laughter.)

And I wonder if you could suggest to us, in light of the potential positive impact of rebuilding a 1950s-type consensus toward at least some major foreign policy and national security issues, what specifically the Administration is doing now

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and is planning to do in the future to give its hand in a positive and affirmative fashion to those people who may disagree with it on some things but on a number of important issues are clearly willing to be helpful in support of it.

MR. ABSHIRE: Jim Woolsey is a Democrat, I should --

JUDGE CLARK: I have not seen all the premises of your question, but I have seen the issue, Mr. Woolsey, and I think that the answer is fairly clear, that -- and we've reminded ourselves within the NSC process that our approach, more than at any other time in recent times, must be that; that we are admonished to -- by Senator Vandenburg, and that is that this area of activity must be nonpartisan and broadly based.

As I mentioned earlier, this morning's activities in between NSC meetings included my going up to the Hill before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and before the Defense subcommittees of both the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees to go into far more detail for a couple of reasons. One, I think that's our duty to consult; and, secondly, we're going to need an awful lot of help, particularly in the area of security assistance -- and our MX, "the problem of the moment." But -- so I think that both custom usage and success require a total nonpartisan approach. I would hope that my experience on the bench the last 12 years, which also was nonpartisan, might assist in this approach. And plus I guess I could end my answer by saying that, pragmatically, one of the first things that we learn back here, particularly, the novices, is how to count. So I think -- (laughter) -- from that standpoint alone we'll continue being as nonpartisan in our approach as we try to realize our national interests in the new directive that was signed this morning.

Q Bob Kupperman of CSIS.

When the administration first came into office and suggested that the National Security Council staff and the Security advisor would assume a lesser role than carried in the past administrations, I wonder, particularly in light of the INF and START talks and the tremendous need for coordination, how the Security Council is going to behave now coordinating these efforts by contrast with the less diminished role than was assumed in past administrations?

JUDGE CLARK: Well, I would hope that whatever the role of the National Security staff -- or from the standpoint of prominence about town, the height or depth, would not really play a part or in any way suggest what the success or its opposite is going to be in the area of which you speak. I, so far for the last 15 months, find that area of activity to be well coordinated, act -- reporting as it must by statute through the State Department and on up the inverted funnel through the NSC staff and directly to the President. I know a couple of recent articles that have been thrust on my desk certain mornings -- that there might be an indication that within the arms control community there has been some give and take. Without commenting on the accuracy of any such articles, I look upon that give and take as being healthy in our democratic process and I think we're on track. Certainly Ed Rowny, Paul Nitze, Gene Rostow and on the conventional side, Mr. Starr -- General Starr, have all been in to see the President numerous times as part of that process. But again reporting upward, and then as the decision-making, including instructions -- ground-level instructions, going right in and -- as part of the briefing now with the President, which occurs on one or more times a day, they've come in, particularly as they report in from overseas. Paul Nitze's arrival each time has been marked by going into the Oval Office within 24 hours upon arriving home. So I hope it's working.

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Yes.

I am sorry. I am getting ahead of you. I'd better go back to my MC.

Q Judge Clark, Joe Mayer with Senator Jay Garn's office. You talked about strategy and arms control. One of the major criticisms that was made of the Carter administration's Nuclear Targeting Doctrine for example, PD-59, was the fact that we did not have the forces to execute the policy. Now the President has called for negotiations seeking to reduce, substantially, our nuclear arsenals on both sides. And I was curious as to what extent an assessment of our Nuclear Targeting Doctrine or strategy was taken into account in designing our START negotiating positions? And can we expect a major review of this issue in the future?

JUDGE CLARK: There has been a continuum. And I think I am going to refer the specifics to Tom Reed whose particular area you are in.

Tom, what part did it play in your studies?

MR. REED: That part of the security studies or part of the things that occurred this spring was a review of the targeting doctrine that had its origin in PD-59. We are short of forces to execute all the sorts of strategies that the Judge has talked about. That is one of the things that we have ascertained, that there are risks. We have tried to allocate those. And decide what we would do if worst comes to worst.

JUDGE CLARK: Thank you, Tom.

By the way, I failed to mention not only was Tom point man in these studies for the past four months, but also, as Special Assistant to the President, he will be overseeing the really important part. The part that has been too often forgotten in past administrations. And that is implementation.

MR. ABSHIRE: Jack Nelson.

Q Jack Nelson of The Los Angeles Times, Judge Clark. I realize this is a session mostly as an overview and maybe longer range. But can you tell us something about the Falkland crisis today, and how you see it developing, and how much aid we are giving to the British?

JUDGE CLARK: Well, there are two or three points a little outside the scope of direct examination, but just let me say for the moment that, as I'm sure you've already determined, the situation there is at a very critical stage when weighed against what is or is not happening in New York. I'd say that, as from the beginning of the situation, the President has watched it very closely on into the night, as required, and the situation group, as in all such situations, is watching it on a 24-hour basis, keeping us all apprised.

MR. ABSHIRE: Allen?

Q What about the other part of the question? How much aid are we giving to the British? Can you say something about that?

JUDGE CLARK: At this time I can say that we are keeping our traditional commitments to Britain which, as we know, go back to 1914, without going into any

MR. ABSHIRE: Allen Weinstein?

Q Judge Clark, Allen Weinstein, the editor of the Washington Quarterly here at CSIS. There's been some talk in your -- today, in your remarks, and Jim Woolsey's, and others, about presenting a blueprint for some new broad, strategic consensus. Not -- presumably, that the Administration hopes to persuade a bipartisan majority of the Congress to support, but also a majority of the American people.

Are there any plans afoot at this point that you can share with us to explain more carefully, perhaps more systematically than in the past, what the Administration has been doing in the area of strategic planning, if only to try and convey, not simply the details and the broad outlines, but to convey a sufficient sense of coherence and purpose to achieve the kind of support that certainly the Administration wants to gain from the American people?

JUDGE CLARK: You're referring, what do we have planned? To be sure of your question, that question being, how do we plan to implement whatever we have been studying and whatever the President has directed this morning?

Again, this has been part of the overall study that Tom and Col. Myer will be going into over the next week and I would like to let them, in what will be an evolutionary stage, explain that as they take these steps. But it comes under that old word, implementation, that I find so often lacking in the studies I've seen in my short time here. But I think the President has been assured that that will begin, come Monday morning.

MR. ABSHIRE: Thank you very much, Judge Clark. We hope we've set a precedent here that we can get you back soon. We're delighted you've been with us.

JUDGE CLARK: Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.
(Applause.)

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3:53 P.M., EDT