

INTELLIGENCE FOR THE FUTURE

A Distillation of Views

by the

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

2 December 1976

Report

NSC review completed.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

General

The report does not present a prioritized inventory of intelligence requirements for the future. It is, rather, an overview of the problems, potentials and prospects which lie ahead for the intelligence community and derivatively, for those whom intelligence serves.

Conceptions of the future being fallible, judgments in the report must be subjected to extensive, critical evaluation. We view this process, wherein certain perceptions will be discarded and others modified, as a proper utilization of a report of this nature. Further, we hope that similar endeavors will be repeated at regular intervals to keep pace with the dynamics of change.

Observations

The Board rates of overriding importance, the development of initiatives to restore public understanding and trust in intelligence and intelligence institutions. This can be an important adjunct to security legislative and fiscal support for intelligence programs; to the passage of legislation for the protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods; to the maintenance of security discipline by personnel within the intelligence community; and to sustain the ability to recruit people of integrity and high competence.

Strategic weapons intelligence and the Soviet Union will remain predominant targets. However, the role of tactical and technical intelligence in support of military commanders must continue to be given adequate attention in the decade ahead. In particular, as the U.S. faces a growing need to import critical commodities, maintenance of unhampered sea lines of communication will be essential. Fulfillment of this mission could be jeopardized by a Soviet naval threat of growing sophistication. Effective intelligence is the first step towards coping with this threat.

The future significance of economic intelligence will be dependent upon several factors: refinement of analytic techniques which minimize the flow of redundant and irrelevant data; sharpening of requirements so that the policy-makers' genuine needs are addressed; recognition

by producers that comprehensive analysis must incorporate all relevant disciplines -- political, military, technological, as well as economic; and improved means of tapping the economic expertise of the private sector. We underscore the need for a continuing, close working relationship between principal users and producers to assure that these factors are given proper consideration.

The Board has reviewed and references in its report several recently published studies by the intelligence community which contain a number of innovative and technological approaches aimed at improving intelligence for the future; certain of these approaches are very encouraging and will be given detailed consideration by our successors. Also enclosed with the report is a two-page summary of Findings and Recommendations from an April 1976 report by a Board subcommittee which assesses National Intelligence Estimates and makes suggestions for their improvement.

Among the most important innovations to pursue, we believe, are:

-- a breakthrough in automating the processing of foreign language voice intercepts to aid in reducing voluminous data collected without loss of important intelligence;

-- [redacted] space reconnaissance system to avoid loss of intelligence capabilities at critical intervals;

-- means for reducing the vulnerability of our space reconnaissance systems by "hardening" existing systems and by developing the capability to produce greater numbers of less sophisticated, less expensive systems;

-- comprehensive examination of the government's responsibility to make the public aware of, and to provide the means of thwarting, intrusions to privacy by foreign intelligence services and the illegal efforts of private citizens intercepting communications and computer data links;

-- refinement of the concept of "competitive analysis," following completion of the experiment being conducted under the auspices of the DCI concurrent with production of this year's NIE on Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict;

-- a means of seeing that which is hidden, as we face increasingly sophisticated efforts to conceal and deceive.

iv

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The concept of "streamlined" management, born 20 years ago with the inception of our space reconnaissance program and employed since in the operation of that program, needs to be carefully preserved. The imposition of layers of administrative and budgetary review will ultimately prove more costly, less effective and potentially destructive of the unique capabilities of this program. To preserve streamlined management the issuance of new guidance from the President will be required.

Recommendations

As an aid in determining future capabilities and limitations in the intelligence system, we recommend that 3 to 4 models of the world 20 years hence be developed, under the auspices of the National Security Council so as to reflect a senior, policy-level consensus of the ranges of probabilities in world relationships, and that the Director of Central Intelligence undertake a community-wide estimation of the intelligence system's performance under each of the projected futures.

Crises stemming from nuclear weapons proliferation and acts of terrorism will involve the Chief Executive more frequently in the decade ahead and effective intelligence in these areas will be vitally important. To assure its availability and utility, we recommend that the subject and structure of intelligence support to crisis management be given the most thorough review. This review should be directed by the National Security Council.

Concealment and deception by the Soviets require greater attention and novel approaches to better understand and cope with the serious vulnerabilities they pose to U.S. security interests. We believe a major contribution toward greater understanding could be achieved by a 1-2 year study effort conducted by a "tiger team" of highly competent analysts, insulated from daily bureaucratic life, and given access to all relevant intelligence and operational data. We recommend that the Director of Central Intelligence evaluate such a proposal with a view towards its early implementation.

With respect to certain kinds of intelligence such as weapons systems, the decision-makers' real need is for a "net assessment" of the opposing forces. Issues such as capabilities of Soviet ICBM, and

v
SECRET

25X1

the Soviet air defense system really ask whether U. S. MINUTEMAN missiles are vulnerable to Soviet attack and whether the B-52 will be effective against Soviet defenses. Net assessments will grow in importance and a renewed effort is required to determine how they can be performed and within what institutional framework; a proposal is currently before the Board.

Soviet technological innovations, especially in their military and economic applications, warrant the keenest attention by the intelligence community. As the USSR breaks new ground, unfamiliar to the U. S., the prevention of surprise will become more difficult. Special efforts at targetting Soviet research and development are warranted. We urge that the DCI take a new look at this problem with the view of recommending a more intensive and more imaginative effort in the future.

How the U. S. is perceived by others, both adversaries and allies, will remain a key issue for intelligence, and grow in importance as the U. S. continues efforts to rely on credibility, rather than force, as the means of sustaining foreign policy relationships. Previous intelligence community efforts to assess foreign (USSR) perceptions of the U. S. are applauded; we urge that they be made more comprehensive and that they be kept current.

The past decade has seen an emphasis on technological improvements in intelligence collection systems. Human source collection and analytic processes have not experienced corresponding advances. A vigorous effort needs to be undertaken to achieve major improvements in these human aspects of intelligence: the recruitment of agents; the management of data; and in-depth understandings of foreign relationships.

There are nearly 2,000 Communist bloc officials resident in the United States; each year, in excess of 4,000 Soviets enter the United States as commercial or exchange visitors; and 200 Soviet ships call at 40 U. S. deep-water ports. [redacted]

[redacted] a high percentage of the individuals in each category are intelligence or security officials. Currently, five separate agencies engage in foreign counterintelligence activities, each on its own. There is no U. S. counterintelligence policy and no coordinated statement of counterintelligence objectives. A Presidential review of the U. S.

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counterintelligence policy is required as a basis for the formulation of a national counterintelligence policy and a statement of counterintelligence objectives.

Security discipline of personnel within the intelligence community has been difficult to maintain in the face of a culture which has come to abjure secrecy; we endorse Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth's suggestion that a blue ribbon commission examine these changed values in American society with a view to determining how to restore adherence to the principles of confidential service to the government.

vii

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