

National Intelligence Council

9 June 1982

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

Bob:

Here's a way to deal with the Director's proposal in his 7 June memo, "Aftermath of the Falklands." I propose to assign it to [redacted] who will need support from DIA and other parts of the DoD as well as from your people. However, I believe that a formal Community product is not appropriate.

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
Henry S. Rowen
C/NIC

Attachments

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DDI- 471282

7 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI
Chief, C/NIC

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Aftermath of the Falklands

1. In the aftermath of the Falklands, a number of lesser powers will be reevaluating their security position in terms of their force-structure, particularly in terms of the value of smart weapons, their access to these and other weapons, and economic opportunities afforded by this development.

2. I have already suggested looking ahead to evaluating the present prospective position of Brazil, Israel, Korea, Japan, Argentina and other countries with the economic strength and technological capability to enhance their role as arms suppliers. It is perhaps more important to look at the other side of this equation to find the types of weapons and missions to which these lesser powers may turn to deter larger powers. For that matter, the demonstration of the value of a potency of smart bombs may place a new premium on close-in launching sites and arrangements for using them in the defense and deterrence planning of larger powers. These factors are relevant obviously in the terms of ships vs. aircrafts, the tendency of air to air missiles to make air combat suicidal to both parties, and to guided missiles to tank equation.

3. Will you give this some thought and evaluate our capability to deal with what I see is an important intelligence problem coming over the horizon and let's discuss what we should be doing about it.

C
William J. Casey

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