




Director of  
Central  
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# National Intelligence Daily

*Thursday*  
*3 December 1981*

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
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POLAND: Response by Solidarity

*Solidarity leaders probably will issue a strong condemnation today of the regime's use of force yesterday against cadet fire-fighters in Warsaw but are likely to opt for more moderate counter-measures to discourage such actions by the government.*



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Union leader Walesa yesterday apparently postponed a meeting of the union's leadership for a day in order to allow tempers to cool. He also may have needed time to determine how strongly Solidarity chapters throughout the country objected to the government's action.



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The meeting today of the leadership will be heated, and Walesa probably will have to fend off demands from militants for a counterreaction stronger than he is willing to accept. All the union leaders will agree that some response is necessary in order to maintain their credibility and not to give the regime the impression it can use force against other strikers with impunity.



The union's response could take the form of a work stoppage limited to the Warsaw area or a more general strike of short duration. The Warsaw branch may take action independent of the national Solidarity response because it has been directly involved from the outset with the protesting cadets and thus has more at stake.



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The regime may have decided on its first major use of force to demonstrate to the population, to Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting in Bucharest, and to Pact Defense Ministers meeting in Moscow its resolve to oppose future strikes. The government also has been sensitive to Solidarity activities in the Ministry of the Interior and probably felt compelled to resist the cadets' demand out of fear of setting a bad example.



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Conservatives in the regime may have pressed for the use of force in the hope that Solidarity would react with a strike. Such a counteraction could be used as additional justification by parliament to adopt an anti-strike law, which the party's Central Committee endorsed last week.




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
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


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For the longer term the government's action seems likely to sour the atmosphere at the working level in negotiations between the regime and the union. Solidarity probably will be even less responsive to party leader Jaruzelski's call for a Front of National Accord. 

Troops Not Used


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There is no evidence that Polish military troops actively participated in the assault by Polish riot police on the firefighters' academy. Polish military police did, however, assist in blocking streets around the academy. Some 12 truckloads of internal security troops subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, moreover, also were at the scene and available if needed.   


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


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ITALY: Peace Movement Grows

*The peace movement has developed into a substantial political force since last summer, but the government's commitment to deploy cruise missiles remains firm.* 


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The demonstrations over the past few days in Palermo and Florence are the latest of a series that began two months ago and have surprised many politicians and labor leaders by their size. Although the Communists have played an important role in organizing most of these demonstrations, non-Communist support also has been widespread. Many Socialists and Christian Democrats have joined the campaign in an effort to control it and to prevent the Communists from monopolizing the peace issue. 


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This strategy of leading the demonstrations in a less radical direction has had only limited success because Communist participants are exploiting public interest in various versions of the "zero option." Many of the slogans at demonstrations portray prevention of INF deployment in Italy and dismantlement of Soviet SS-20s as separate goals. 

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Government supporters, on the other hand, contend that INF deployment should be canceled only if all the SS-20s are dismantled first. The Communists, who are using the peace issue to embarrass the Christian Democrats and Socialists, tend to emphasize the need to stop INF. 

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Despite the gains by the peace movement and the desire of politicians to become part of it, it has not had as strong and immediate an impact on security policy in Italy as in the Netherlands and Belgium. The commitments of the Christian Democrats and the Socialists to INF are based primarily on their determination to prove their loyalty to NATO--a factor each hopes will strengthen its prospects for leading future governments. Peace activity could threaten these ambitions and weaken the commitments to INF only if such activity intensifies substantially and the government parties can no longer draw much attention to Soviet armaments. 

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
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FRANCE-CHAD: Concerns in Paris

*French officials are concerned that the recent successes in Chad of the forces under insurgent leader Habre and the continuing differences over the role of the OAU peacekeeping force may offer the Libyans a new opportunity to intervene militarily in Chad.*



Units loyal to former Defense Minister Habre are the best led, most disciplined force in the country. They have taken advantage of the Libyan withdrawal to occupy several towns in eastern Chad.

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The French Government is trying to restrain Habre because it fears the impact of these successes on the delicate political balance between Habre and President Goukouni.

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The French may hope that these efforts, combined with increased aid for Chad and the appointment of a new ambassador to N'Djamena, will seem responsive to Goukouni's rising concerns about Habre and encourage the two factions to negotiate.

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The prospects for a reconciliation, however, remain bleak.



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
The French also are worried by a growing controversy between Goukouni and the OAU peacekeeping force. Goukouni wants the force to maintain the security of the entire country, to reorganize Chad's Army and establish legitimate government, and to replace the Libyans as a military counterweight to Habre.

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**GUATEMALA: Counterinsurgency Successes**

*The largest offensive conducted to date by the Guatemalan military apparently has disrupted a major guerrilla front in the Western Highlands.* [Redacted]

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Army Chief of Staff Lucas recently initiated a major sweep operation in response to increased guerrilla attacks on population centers in the departments of Chimaltenango and southern Quiche. The Army claims to have killed 55 guerrillas and reportedly dismantled several base areas that included large food and arms caches and extensive underground tunnels. [Redacted]

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Army officers, surprised by the scope of the insurgent network, now believe that they have seriously underestimated guerrilla potential. The pattern of recent guerrilla raids, coupled with the materiel found in the insurgent bases, suggests that the guerrillas' strategy of isolating part of the Western Highlands by cutting the Inter-American Highway was making headway. The fact that the guerrillas have a communications capability was revealed for the first time when the Army captured three radios. [Redacted]

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To gain backing for its counterinsurgency program, the Army is continuing to try to improve its image with civilians. This effort is being aided by guerrilla violence, which is causing peasants to look increasingly to the military for help. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The military, however, still has to overcome major shortcomings in training, transportation, and communications. In addition, the recent sweep underscored deficiencies in the coordination of infantry, artillery, and air forces. [Redacted]

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
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JAPAN: Addressing the Trade Issue

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Prime Minister Suzuki is moving swiftly, now that his new cabinet is in place, to demonstrate his desire to tackle the trade problem before the opening of US-Japanese talks next week. He has instructed his cabinet to agree by 21 December on a plan for unilaterally implementing in April 1982 all tariff cuts agreed to in the Tokyo round that are scheduled for fiscal 1982 through 1984.

In addition to convening a cabinet council to seek solutions for trade issues, Suzuki has established an ad hoc group of senior members within the Liberal Democratic Party to build a consensus in favor of easing nontariff barriers. He also has involved business representatives--who constitute a major pressure group in the party--by asking a commission headed by a business leader to examine ways to reduce the barriers. These measures may reduce Japan's trade imbalance in the longer term, but they will have no effect in 1982.


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USSR-NAMIBIA: Concern Over Movement Toward Settlement


The Soviets appear concerned about an apparent shift among black Africans in favor of a Namibian settlement.



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as part of a settlement, a SWAPO-led independent Namibia would not allow South African dissidents to have bases on its territory and would maintain economic links with South Africa.


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Moscow apparently is also encouraging others in the area to oppose a compromise settlement. A visit by a high-level Soviet party delegation to Mozambique last month was at least partly intended to encourage Maputo to resist the Western initiative on Namibia.




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SPAIN: New Cabinet


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The cabinet reorganization announced by Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo on Monday probably will strengthen his hold over the ruling Center Democratic Union Party. Personal rivalry and policy conflicts between Calvo Sotelo and former Prime Minister Suarez recently have become more serious. Although the Prime Minister has made some concessions to Suarez and the Center Democratic left, the new cabinet lineup does not eliminate the party's deep divisions. No changes were made in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, which are overseeing Spain's accession to NATO and bilateral treaty negotiations with the US.



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
AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: Border Incident

Two Afghan helicopter gunships reportedly attacked several targets in Pakistan's Baluchistan Province yesterday, killing five persons and wounding others. Islamabad, in its strongest protest so far of such border violations by Afghan or Soviet aircraft, has indicated that it is considering "retaliatory steps." President Zia's government recently liberalized its standing rules for challenging intruding aircraft to permit engagements closer to the border. The change may have been in response to growing public indignation in Pakistan over increasingly frequent border incidents.




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### South Africa: Homelands



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SOUTH AFRICA: "Independence" for Ciskei

Ciskei will become South Africa's fourth "independent" black homeland tomorrow. By declaring homelands such as Ciskei independent, Pretoria hopes to silence black demands for a share of power. Such independence will be largely nominal, however, for the new government will remain highly dependent on white South African advisers and resources. Ciskei will be the legal home of 2.1 million blacks, although about two-thirds of them will for now remain in white South Africa. Pretoria will continue to provide 85 percent of the new government's operating revenues, but these funds will do little to improve Ciskei's meager economic prospects.


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SOUTH AFRICA - SEYCHELLES: Release of Mercenaries


South Africa's decision to release outright 39 of the 44 mercenaries detained following the coup attempt in Seychelles will be widely viewed as proof of Pretoria's involvement in the operation. The remaining five, including the group's alleged leaders, face provisional charges of kidnaping--not hijacking--and are free on bail. The quick release of the mercenaries underscores Pretoria's disdain for world opinion.

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PAKISTAN: Student Unrest

Government authorities are having to deal with growing clashes between Islamic and leftist student groups. The most serious trouble is in Sind Province, where student issues are colored by growing regionalist sentiments and strong support for the opposition Pakistan People's Party.

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The authorities appear to have the current unrest under control, but the regime could become hard pressed if student disturbances spread to Karachi and Punjab Province.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS


USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Military Balance Sheet

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*The USSR can claim few military successes for the second year of its occupation of Afghanistan.*

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Afghan Army forces continued to perform poorly. Efforts to extend enlistments and recall former servicemen resulted in a higher desertion rate and yielded only 18,000 reinductions from a pool of about 300,000 veterans.



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The Insurgents

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The guerrillas are better armed than they were a year ago and are making better use of their weapons. Antitank rockets and plastic mines were especially effective against Afghan and Soviet supply columns.



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[redacted] the insurgents dominated over 60 percent of the country's districts, compared to about 40 percent last year. The insurgent movement remains fragmented, however, and there have been occasional armed clashes between rival groups. While their differences show no sign of diminishing, some groups have been willing to submerge them temporarily to attack Soviet and Afghan units. [redacted]

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Outlook


The stalemate probably will continue during the winter, when bad weather will hinder military operations. If the pattern of last winter is repeated, insurgent activities will decrease in the eastern and northeastern provinces and increase in the areas of lower elevation in the western and northwestern provinces. [redacted]

A substantial increase in Soviet forces on the scale needed to crush the insurgency seems unlikely. Evidence suggests that the Soviets are searching for a successful political/military strategy that will allow them to wear down the insurgency without large-scale reinforcement. [redacted]


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