



**Director of  
Central  
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# National Intelligence Daily

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25X1

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25X1

**Page Denied**

Top Secret



25X1

Contents

25X1

Poland: *Kania Continues Tough Line* . . . . . 1



Angola: *MIGs Move South*. . . . . 3

Egypt: *Repercussions of the Crackdown*. . . . . 4

Lebanon: *Conciliation Committee Meeting*. . . . . 5

USSR-Iran: *Status of Relations* . . . . . 6

UK: *Trades Union Congress Meeting*. . . . . 7

Kampuchea: *Tentative Coalition Agreement* . . . . . 8

Southern Africa: *More Anti-US Incidents Possible* . . . . . 8

Bolivia: *New President* . . . . . 9

Czechoslovakia: *Husak's Travels*. . . . . 9

Special Analyses


Poland: *Solidarity's First National Congress* . . . . . 10

EC: *Prospects for Political Cooperation*. . . . . 13

25X1




Top Secret



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
5 September 1981



25X1

POLAND: Kania Continues Tough Line

*Party leader Kania's warning on Thursday that the government would not rule out implementing a state of emergency in the event of a strike by radio and television workers underlines his determination to prevent disruption of the electronic media.*



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This is the first time that Kania has publicly referred to a state of emergency. In late August he said that the regime would not allow a radio and television strike. In the face of a nationwide strike of radio and television, the government might initially declare a state of emergency only in that industry.



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Solidarity has not yet reacted to Kania's statement. Pressure for a strike has come from the Solidarity chapter of radio and television technicians and not from the national leadership. On Thursday Solidarity chief Walesa said that the union would use all legal means to gain access to the media.



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The union's national leadership may have difficulty, however, in controlling the technicians. In addition to their general complaint about limited union access to the media, the technicians believe that the government has not negotiated honestly and are angered by restrictions on their use of telex facilities.



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
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25X1

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Top Secret

25X1

ANGOLA: MIGs Move South

*Angolan fighter aircraft have been moved closer to the scene of the South African incursion in southern Angola.* [redacted]

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Satellite photography of yesterday showed that 13 MIG-21 fighters have been moved from Luanda to Lubango, some 240 kilometers from the Namibian border. The Lubango airfield is defended by SA-3 and possibly SA-9 surface-to-air missiles, as well as ZSU-23/4 anti-aircraft guns. Angolan MIGs had not been seen at Lubango since October 1979; until then, 5 or 6 fighters were usually stationed there. [redacted]

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Cuban pilots generally operate Angolan MIGs and probably are manning these aircraft. While they could pose a hazard to unescorted South African transports and attack aircraft, they would be outmatched in a clash with South African Mirages, which are based at Ondangua and Grootfontein. [redacted]

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Elsewhere, Angolan charges that the South Africans have entered Cuando Cubango Province in southeastern Angola could indicate that UNITA guerrillas have stepped up fighting in the wake of the South African incursion to the west. The South Africans would be less likely to advance into this largely roadless province, where SWAPO is not located, but they could be resupplying UNITA. The guerrilla organization reportedly was preparing last week to increase its operations. South Africa has supported UNITA over the past five years. [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

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5 September 1981

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

EGYPT: Repercussions of the Crackdown

*The demonstrations in Cairo yesterday are likely to be followed by additional protests as opposition forces regroup in the aftermath of the government's crackdown.*

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Muslim fundamentalists staged limited demonstrations in several parts of the capital to protest the arrests of government critics ordered by President Sadat on Wednesday. At least 60 demonstrators were detained. Security forces also closed the offices of Egypt's small pro-Soviet leftist party. The Egyptian press indicates that more than 1,000 people have been arrested since Wednesday.

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The US Embassy reports that even some of Sadat's supporters are questioning the extent of the crackdown. Many Egyptians are worried that Sadat has abandoned his commitment to liberalize the political system.

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Although virtually every major leader of the fundamentalist opposition apparently has been arrested, the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups retain the ability to cause more serious trouble. The opposition probably wants to learn what further steps Sadat will reveal in his speech today and how long the regime plans to hold those arrested before it considers more violent protests. In the past, most dissidents have been freed after questioning or eventually released by the courts for lack of evidence.

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Sadat has considerably strengthened Egypt's internal security forces since the riots in Cairo in January 1977, and he can count on their loyalty for the time being. He also retains substantial popular support among Egyptians who oppose religious extremism. Widespread and prolonged unrest would test the allegiance of his security units, however, and could force him to back away from the crackdown.

25X1

Top Secret

5 September 1981

25X1



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LEBANON: Conciliation Committee Meeting

*The Arab Conciliation Committee on Lebanon continues to focus, at Syrian insistence, on the issue of Christian Phalange ties with Israel and has again deferred efforts to get a dialogue started between the Lebanese factions.* [Redacted]

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The committee ended two days of meetings in Beirut yesterday by calling for a ban on the import of weapons into Lebanon for all armed factions and by announcing its intention to form a group to monitor the Lebanese coast and ports. The committee is not scheduled to convene again until early November, when it hopes to begin talks on fostering a national dialogue. [Redacted]

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The decision to establish the monitoring group is meant to meet Syrian demands for a mechanism to ensure that no weapons or ammunition from Israel reaches the Phalange. Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, and the Arab League Secretary General will be represented on the group. [Redacted]

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Phalange militia chief Bashir Jumayyil agreed to the plan after meeting with the Syrian representative to the committee's ambassadorial group Thursday, his first direct contact with the Syrians since the committee began its current efforts early this summer. Jumayyil told the US Ambassador that he and the Syrian representative had agreed to renew the "media truce" between the two sides and to open all five major crossings between Muslim West and Christian East Beirut. [Redacted]

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Jumayyil also told the Ambassador he had held off demands by the Syrians that their troops be allowed to patrol Christian-controlled ports. Nevertheless, Damascus probably still hopes to use the monitoring arrangement eventually to insert some Syrian military personnel along the Christian-controlled coast. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The Christians are likely to stall, however, on allowing the inspections because the monitoring group's mandate apparently fails to address the issues of arms shipments across the Syrian border--a major transshipment route for Lebanese Muslim factions--and arms delivered to the Palestinians. [Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

5 September 1981

Top Secret

25X1

USSR-IRAN: Status of Relations

*Moscow is citing increased instability in Iran as evidence of the need for the regime to rely on the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party.* [redacted]

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On Monday, the National Voice of Iran, the Soviet-sponsored Persian-language radio, stated that the recent bombings indicate that the government is "not in control." It urged the regime to divorce itself from blind fanaticism and to rely on "Sincere Loyalists"--the Soviets' catchword for Tudeh. [redacted]

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Since the revolution, the Soviets have encouraged Tudeh to align itself with the Khomeini regime in order to protect itself and to improve its political standing. They may now hope that the deteriorating situation will lead the fundamentalists to seek additional support and that Tudeh will gain influence as a result. Moscow also may hope that domestic turmoil will induce Tehran to request more Soviet economic assistance and perhaps political support. [redacted]

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The Soviets, meanwhile, continue to emphasize the alleged US role in the bombing last Sunday. TASS has replayed Iran's charges of US complicity, and *Pravda* yesterday paraphrased claims made by Iran's new Prime Minister Mahdavi-Kani that "foreign agents" were responsible for the bombing and quoted an Iranian Government statement that the US is Iran's "greatest enemy." [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

5 September 1981

Top Secret

25X1

UK: Trades Union Congress Meeting

*The British Trades Union Congress, which meets next week, is likely to move to the left on defense policy and to intensify criticism of Prime Minister Thatcher's economic program.* [redacted]

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The unions appear ready to endorse unilateral nuclear disarmament; they are particularly unwilling to support the expenditures for nuclear weapons at a time of high unemployment and social spending cuts. Unions affiliated with the Labor Party cast bloc votes that are usually decisive at party conferences, and an endorsement of disarmament would thus be a victory for Labor leftists, who will push for a similar resolution at the annual party conference later this month. [redacted]

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The Congress also will debate important Labor Party organizational and leadership questions. Union votes will be decisive later this month, for example, in the contest between moderate Denis Healey and leftwinger Tony Benn for the deputy leadership of the party. Most union leaders are worried that a victory by Benn would further split the party and cause more defections to the new Social Democratic Party, but Benn is working hard to bring rank-and-file pressure on leaders who oppose him. [redacted]

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The unions will find it easier to unite in criticizing Thatcher. The Congress will reject wage restraint, demand massive reflation of the economy, and oppose restrictions on the closed shop. [redacted]

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The Congress probably will not be able to back its words with action. Divisions among member unions and the debilitating struggle within the Labor Party probably will hamper efforts to mobilize for more effective action against the government. [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

7

5 September 1981

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

KAMPUCHEA: Tentative Coalition Agreement

The joint statement signed yesterday in Singapore by Prince Sihanouk, Khmer People's National Liberation Front leader Son Sann, and Democratic Kampuchea leader Khieu Samphan is unlikely to lead to an effective coalition. The agreement merely expressed a desire for a coalition government and set up a committee to explore the prospect. Nevertheless, the agreement--achieved only after intense pressure from ASEAN--probably will keep the lid on public rivalry, at least temporarily, and allow the three groups to pursue their separate interests. ASEAN will use the agreement to help Democratic Kampuchea retain its seat at the UN and as a basis for obtaining wider material and political support for anti-Vietnamese resistance forces.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA: More Anti-US Incidents Possible

The bomb that caused minor damage to the US cultural center in the capital of Lesotho on Thursday may have been set off to protest the US veto of the UN Security Council resolution condemning the South African move into Angola. The potential for an anti-US backlash is growing throughout black Africa and is particularly high among South Africa's immediate neighbors because of the presence of South African refugees and insurgents. The media in these countries--and in South Africa--are claiming that the US has an implicit partnership with South Africa.

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

5 September 1981

Top Secret

25X1

BOLIVIA: New President

The government of newly installed President General Torrelío probably will be weak and will not last long. Torrelío lacks the support of several Army units as well as the Air Force and the Navy. He is fronting for more powerful--but internationally unacceptable--officers loyal to deposed strongman General García Meza. The officers believe that Torrelío's relatively clean record will help secure foreign financial aid, which they see as crucial for avoiding economic collapse.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Husak's Travels

On Monday, Czechoslovak leader Husak begins a one-week visit to Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen to promote closer political and economic ties. He probably will be the ranking Soviet bloc representative at the celebration of the seventh anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution on 12 September and is likely to endorse the tripartite alliance concluded by these countries last month. The Czechoslovaks hope the visit will facilitate new trade and arms agreements. Since the late 1970s, Prague has provided weapons and military training to Libya and other radical Arab states.

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

5 September 1981

Top Secret

25X1

SPECIAL ANALYSES

POLAND: Solidarity's First National Congress

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The congress is a small but important step in the gradual transformation of a revolutionary social movement into a more coherent organization. Although it will not change the heterogeneous nature of the 10-million-member union, the congress will help create greater consensus on union goals and a firmer institutional base from which to press for reforms. Solidarity's lack of coordination between national and regional leaders will persist, however, and the country's economic problems will cast a shadow over the gathering. The delegates probably will advocate a far-reaching form of worker self-management as a solution to the crisis. Solidarity leader Walesa will be reaffirmed as the union's chief spokesman despite some criticism of his leadership.

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The first session opens today, as more than 900 delegates gather in Gdansk for three days of debate on organizational and substantive issues. A second session at the end of September will elect union officials and adopt formal policies. Between the two sessions, working groups will draft recommendations on organizational and substantive problems.

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Union activists are likely to do a great deal of electioneering. The leadership wants this period to be one of relative calm, but militants may try to work for favorite candidates or causes by pressing disputes with the regime.

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The Issues

The most controversial organizational issue will be the authority of the national union leadership in Gdansk. Walesa has previously criticized excessive centralization, but he now believes that the center needs more power to focus union strength on key issues and to prevent local

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concerns from dissipating the union's strength. He and his adherents believe that unsanctioned local strikes provide the government an opportunity to divide Solidarity. 25X1

Strong regional bosses such as Zbigniew Bujak, the militant head of the Warsaw chapter, are not willing to relinquish their authority to the center, arguing that the regional organizations are closer to workers and can be more responsive to their needs. The congress will not resolve this debate. The national leadership may be given additional power, but the regional chiefs will retain considerable influence and the union's behavior will continue to be erratic. 25X1

The delegates will be asked to adopt official positions on numerous issues, ranging from the need for more hospitals to whether the union should create a political party. Walesa will try to steer a middle course but may have trouble reining in the militants. Although the union seems prepared to push especially hard for a far-reaching system of worker self-management, there is growing pressure from local activists who want to assert the authority of the workers in the factory without waiting for a union-government accord. 25X1

The congress will for the first time elect the union's national leadership. The current leadership includes many of the strong regional leaders, and most will probably be returned to office. 25X1

There are no serious challengers to Walesa, who is still seen by most Poles as the embodiment of Solidarity, but he probably will be criticized as too autocratic and too willing to compromise with the regime. Some also dislike his close ties with the Church and his reliance on Catholic advisers. Several regional leaders are especially unhappy about his habit of bypassing them and appealing directly to workers. 25X1

Both the Church and the government would like the moderates in the union to have the upper hand. They have little ability to influence events directly, although influential members such as Walesa are willing to listen

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Top Secret

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to Church advice. The close ties between the Church and Solidarity will be symbolized by the celebration of an opening mass for the congress by Archbishop Glemp. [ ]

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### Soviet Concern

Soviet leaders are worried that the congress will make Solidarity institutionally more capable of challenging the authority of the Communist Party. The Soviet trade union newspaper *Trud*, for example, on Wednesday attacked Solidarity's proposed charter, contending that the union has transformed itself into an opposition force and that its "extremist wing" aspires to destroy "socialism" in Poland and seize power. The Soviets will be quick to note any signs that Solidarity is moving in this direction and to demand that Polish leaders oppose such trends firmly. [ ]

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Moscow still hopes that Solidarity's political influence will gradually be reduced and that the regime will eventually get control of the union. The Soviets have tried to avoid alienating Solidarity's rank and file by focusing its harshest criticism on "extremist" leaders, and they have refrained from attacking Walesa by name. This restraint suggests that the USSR is resigned to the continued existence of Solidarity and sees Walesa as a moderating figure. [ ]

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### Outlook

The congress will not change the dynamics of the Polish "revolution from below." The union may come out of its month-long introspection with a better sense of mission, but it will still face a government intent on preserving its own prerogatives and treating Solidarity as an adversary to tame. The pattern of alternating periods of tension and relaxation established over the past year probably will continue to dominate politics in Poland. [ ]

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
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EC: Prospects for Political Cooperation




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*EC Foreign Ministers will meet outside London this weekend for discussions on international problems, including revitalizing the Middle East and Afghanistan initiatives. They also will consider other proposals to improve foreign policy coordination. The most far reaching of these is an informal plan by West German Foreign Minister Genscher to incorporate the loose hierarchy of committees that handle foreign policy coordination into the formal EC apparatus and to formalize cooperation on security matters.*



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Relations with the US have provided the major impetus to the increase in EC foreign policy cooperation. The EC-Ten believe that the US is not providing strong leadership, and they hope to put some distance between themselves and certain US policies and to apply pressure on Washington. They want to increase their political leverage in NATO on arms control and defense spending.



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In addition, EC members want to end instability in the Middle East and foreign occupation of Afghanistan and Kampuchea. Although they aim to encourage the peaceful establishment of democratic governments in Latin America, secure independence for Namibia, and preserve detente, their differences on how to achieve these goals limit the EC's ability to act as a bloc.



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
The EC took well over a year to submit a demarche to Moscow on Afghanistan, and its plan for peace in the Middle East has gone nowhere. The EC finally managed to produce the initiative on Afghanistan because the UK was determined to use its proposal for an international conference to launch its EC presidency and to bring Afghanistan back into the international spotlight. None of the major EC members have developed the same level of commitment to devising a detailed Middle East initiative, although they share a common concern about the US stance on the issue.



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Top Secret



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5 September 1981

Top Secret

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West Germany, the UK, and France

Genscher's plan has yet to be officially adopted by Bonn, but it reflects both the Schmidt government's stake in EC political unity and uneasiness over US security policy. Genscher maintains his plan would put Western Europe on an equal footing with the US, especially in Alliance consultations. [redacted]

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The Thatcher government sees cooperation with its EC partners as a way to regain a measure of its former influence, particularly among Arab and Commonwealth states. By pursuing a vigorous foreign policy in both the national and EC contexts, London hopes to divert attention from its domestic problems, counter the UK's image as a reluctant "European," and offset public disenchantment with the Community. Moreover, through political cooperation, the UK can try to strike a balance between its traditional close relationship with the US and its much more recent EC ties. [redacted]

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The UK does not support Genscher's plan and suggests instead creating a small secretariat that would remain in the capital of the EC president during its six-month term. Although the British also would prefer that only the larger members hold the presidency, the smaller states are opposed to such an arrangement. [redacted]

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Despite the French Socialists' public support for European unity, the government of President Mitterrand has undertaken a series of major unilateral foreign policy moves. It has recognized the leftist opposition in El Salvador, endorsed PLO participation in a Middle East peace settlement, and voted to condemn South Africa in the UN Security Council. [redacted]

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Previous French governments have strongly opposed altering the informal character of foreign policy cooperation, and Mitterrand may follow suit. While he may be willing to discuss certain security issues within the EC and to create a small secretariat to handle administrative duties, he would not support Genscher's plan. [redacted]

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Italy and the Smaller States

Cooperation with its larger EC colleagues offers Italy an opportunity to foster the image of a major European power and to avoid committing itself to US policies it is wary of supporting. The Italians would favor the Genscher plan if they were assured that they would not be excluded from decisionmaking and that their relationship with the US would not be adversely affected. They would oppose any strengthening of EC foreign policy coordination that allowed the UK, France, and West Germany to control EC affairs. [redacted]

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Participation in EC political discussions allows Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg to exert influence on key international issues. They also would welcome improving political cooperation but fear domination by the larger EC members. [redacted]

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Greece, Denmark, and Ireland are much more concerned with protecting their economic positions within the Community than in strengthening foreign policy coordination. All are wary of Genscher's plan. [redacted]

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Prospects

EC members increasingly will turn to the EC forum to coordinate their foreign policies. The effectiveness of political cooperation, however, will depend on the balance between their motives to join forces and dissension caused by differences on how to achieve mutual goals. [redacted]

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More than any other factor, US actions will determine which way the scale will tip. Even if the EC members' ability to reach common foreign and security policy decisions does not progress much beyond the current level of development, their tendency to try to take joint positions will complicate US policymaking. [redacted]

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
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5 September 1981



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