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National Intelligence Daily

Tuesday 3 March 1981

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
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	BRIEFS AND COMMENTS			t
ą.	ITALY: Political Maneu	vering		
₹	Political parties are the belief that the government election.			25X
	The fragility of P was underlined two week procedural votes in Parall the coalition partiwon five confidence votion this past weekend, parties are not prepareing out their election	s ago when it los liament because m es were absent. es on the same fi however, indicat d to risk a showd	t six successive nany members of The government nancial legisla- ing that the	25X
	apparently hope to expa perhaps even capture th gains in an election. however, at least until when the leadership and during the last year ar	and their role in the Prime Ministry They probably wil after their congle policies of partice expected to gaing the Socialists seled Italy would be partical would be partically with the partical way	by scoring new l support Forlani, ress in mid-April, y chief Craxi n formal endorse- em determined to be a loyal ally,	25X
î	Because of charges the Christian Democrats recently but they are tas Washington's principties to persuade the Socontrol. The Communist elections, if the Forlatin office long enough that the Christian Demogovern without Communist	have been on the rying to exploit al interlocutor a cialists to postpus probably would in government can contact and Sociali	their long history mong Italy's par- one their bid for welcome new first be kept the electorate	25X
	The timing of any on the outcome of import controversial of which elections scheduled for	tant referendums concern abortion-	in Maythe most	25X
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	SOUTH AFRICA: Economic Leverage on Neighbors	
ì	The imposition of economic sanctions against South Africawhich will be proposed in UN meetings on the Namibian issuewould have serious economic repercussions for Botswana. Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.	25X
5→	The seven states are deeply aware of their vulnerabilities to South African retaliation and remain reluctant to see sanctions imposed. They may find it hard, however, to deflect pressures from states farther north, which have little to lose from such a move. A call for sanctions probably would be backed by the Soviets and their allies.	25X
	Sanctions, unless total and long term, would have minimal impact on South Africa but would do serious damage to the economies of the seven black states. Pretoria would not hesitate to use its substantial leverage.	25X
	South Africa supplies 27 percent of the goods imported by these states, and transships all the oil imported by Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Five of the states derive 35 percent of their aggregate foreign exchange earnings from South Africa.	25X
	Zaire and Zambia ship half of their copper exports from South African ports. Even Marxist Mozambique depends on South African technicians to keep its ports and railroads running.	25 X
	The alternatives available to the black states are few and unattractive. Port and rail facilities in Angola, Zaire, and Tanzania are already overburdened, poorly run, and in some cases, inoperable.	25X
♠	The loss of South African technicians would soon result in the deterioration of Mozambique's facilities. The region's poorly maintained road network could not handle a large traffic increase.	25X
	Even if the black African countries were able to secure the \$2 billion needed to put their road, rail, and port systems in working order, a lack of managerial talent and technical expertise and the South African - supported insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique would continue to prevent their full use.	25)
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EL SALVADOR: Results of Socialist International Meeting

The Socialist International, which met in Panama over the weekend, reiterated its solidarity with the leftist opposition forces in El Salvador and said it considers the Revolutionary Democratic Front the legitimate representative of the Salvadoran people. The final communique's call for a political solution—presumably involving negotiations between junta President Duarte and the leftist opposition—is a moderation of the earlier Socialist International position. In addition, the group said that it would request its leader, Willy Brandt, to approach President Reagan on ways to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict. Many of the organization's Latin American and West European notables did not attend the session but did send representatives.

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USSR: SA-X-10 Deployment

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newest s	trat	egic	c surfac	ce-to-	-air m	issile	system,	the	,
SA-X-10,	at	two	former	SA-2	sites	near	Novosibi	rsk	in
Siberia.									

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PAKISTAN: Poor Response to Strike Call

Lawyers boycotted the courts and doctors continued their week-long strike, but otherwise the opposition's call to observe yesterday as a "day of protest" went largely unheeded. The opposition coalition will be disappointed at this lack of response and disturbed that the only clerical party to join the coalition is backing Tensions remain, however, and the opposition grouping--which includes the popular People's Party-hopes to build momentum for protests throughout Pakistan on 23 March, a major national holiday, and 4 April, the second anniversary of former Prime Minister Bhutto's execution.

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ISRAEL-LEBANON: Raids Against Palestinians

Israeli airplanes attacked Palestinian querrilla bases northeast of Tyre in southern Lebanon yesterday. This was the seventh Israeli military action in southern Lebanon this year and the first airstrikes since late January. Since early last year the Israelis have followed a policy of conducting periodic strikes against Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon in an effort to throw the guerrillas on the defensive and prevent them from organizing attacks against Israel.

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Shortly after the Israeli airstrikes, the Palestinians retaliated by shelling Kiryat Shemona with rocket fire. Palestinian reporting late yesterday indicated that Palestinian refugee camps near Tyre were shelled by Israeli or Lebanese Christian forces.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS	
SPAIN: Assessing the Coup Attempt	
The attempted military coup last week to succeeding than the government has been wassault on Parliament probably has not taken ultraconservative officers, whose deep conceleading them to try to intervene again. The the attempted coup will depend largely on ho handled and on how successful Prime Minister government is in recognizing and addressing	illing to admit. The the heart out of rns are capable of immediate impact of w the investigation is Calvo Sotelo's new
Spaniards remember that their Circently, the revolution in Portugal coup attempts that failed. In each obenefited from lessons learned the firm this knowledge, combined with almost that yet another senior military officated in the "incident of 23 February initial reactions of relief.	were preceded by case, the plotters rst time around. daily revelations cer has been impli-
The Spanish military considers is arbiter of the nation's destiny, and of intervening in the political process 19th century to the Civil War, militally took the form of a "pronouncement authorities by a small segment of the would then hope for enough support to on the government.	it has a tradition ess. From the early ary pressure generate against the earmed forces, who impose its will
Lieutenant Colonel Tejero's assawas in this tradition.	ult on Parliament
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The plot failed because King Juan Carlos acted
promptly.
Three Army GeneralsMilans del Bosch, Armada, and Torres Rojashave been arrested, another has been dismissed. The King reportedly believes that two or three other military region commanders were ready to declare
a state of alert. Some 20 additional middle-grade officers, mostly civil guard lieutenants and captains, also have been detained along with the civil guards who occupied Parliament.
Strengths and Weaknesses
In the face of mounting evidence of military complicity, Spaniards are analyzing the strengths and weaknesses surrounding the failed coup. The young democratic system withstood its first serious test, and Juan Carlos has emerged with enhanced authority.
The King and a makeshift government of assistant ministers ran the country until the political leaders were freed. Moreover, the political parties, the trade unions, and the vast majority of security and military forces rallied to the crown.
Although the public was initially apathetic or apprehensive, an estimated 3 million Spaniards turned out last Friday in support of democracy. The demonstration in Madrid probably was the largest in Spanish history.
A new spirit of unity prevails in the ruling Union of the Democratic Center. In addition, the leftist opposition and the regional parties, realizing that they have most to lose from a military takeover, are
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now less apt to challenge the new government at least in the near term. One Basque terrorist organization also has declared a temporary truce.	25X
On the other hand, the King was forced to display his democratic colors once and for all. Future plotters will remember his comment to Armada that the coup would only succeed "over my dead body."	25X
Ultraconservative officers believe that the King betrayed the Army. Since the concerns of those ultraconservatives are shared by much of the officer corps, many other officers may feel divided loyalties. This could limit the King's ability to perform one of his most important tasksacting as a sympathetic listener	
to military grumbling.	25 X
The morale of the security forces, already shaken by terrorist attacks and by a recent police scandal over the alleged use of torture, has suffered another setback. Police, despondent over the lack of government support, fear that they will all be blamed for the revolt of some	
200 civil guards.	25X
Calvo Sotelo's Task	
A witch-hunt to root out all vestiges of Francoism in the upper ranks of the military would have a devastating impact on morale and would heighten the chances of another intervention. If the military is allowed to clean its own house, pockets of ultraconservatism will be left untouched, but the prospects of keeping the lid	05.0
on would improve.	25X
Most officers remain deeply conservative and favor strong, centralized authority. They see the government as increasingly powerless to prevent the dismemberment of Spain by regional separatists and the destruction of the basic Spanish value system.	25X1
Calvo Sotelo's most urgent task, therefore, will be	20/
to establish an image of firmness. There are already signs that he plans to accommodate the military by shelving indefinitely such contentious issues as the	
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university autonomy and divorce legislation. He also may call a halt to the further devolution of power to the regions.

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Impact on Foreign Relations

Spain's efforts to enter the EC and to negotiate a renewal of the bilateral treaty with the US are not likely to be affected. The pace of the government's pursuit of its commitment to join NATO, however, will depend at least in part on the reaction of the leftist opposition to the coup attempt. If this brush with militarism persuades the left that entry into NATO might help to restrain military adventurism, the government might push ahead quickly.

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