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
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Namibia: A Handbook



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Namibia: A Handbook

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Namibia: A Handbook

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Introduction

*Information available
as of 30 June 1982
was used in this report.*

Namibia is a country that has been long in the making. The only African territory yet to gain independence, Namibia, also known as South-West Africa, was turned over to South African control—but not ownership—through a League of Nations mandate in 1920, after more than a quarter century of German rule. Pretoria ruled the territory without criticism until the establishment of the United Nations after World War II. Since then South Africa has faced increasing opposition to its rule from within Namibia, the Third World, the Soviet Bloc, and the West. These developments have led to the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) undertaking a Soviet-backed insurgency that has disrupted northern Namibia, drawn South Africa into a military conflict, and contributed to Pretoria's increasing international isolation.

After resisting the mounting pressure in a variety of ways, Pretoria began in the late 1970s to cooperate—albeit hesitantly—with the UN-backed effort of the Western Contact Group to negotiate internationally acceptable terms for Namibian independence. The prospect now looms that some time in 1983 South Africa will divest itself of legal responsibility for Namibia, either through an internationally accepted formula or through an “internal settlement” that would almost certainly lack foreign recognition.

An independent Namibia, no matter who comes to power in Windhoek or how, will be shaped in large measure by the nature of its economy and political life. Control over Namibian investment, foreign trade, transportation, and skilled manpower gives South Africa a virtual stranglehold on the narrowly based modern sectors of the Namibian economy. These sectors—mining, fishing, and agriculture—are vulnerable to events beyond Namibia's control because of their heavy export orientation. There has been no economic growth for three years; the key sectors have declined sharply and output remains depressed as a result of political uncertainty, weak world markets, and drought. Public and private investment have all but ceased, and most foreign enterprises are loathe to increase their stake pending the outcome of the protracted international deliberations on independence.

Namibia's internal politics are not in bloom either. The territory at present has about 45 political parties, some of which are joined in loose, shifting coalitions. Some parties participate in the South African-sponsored “interim” government. Most parties have a base only in one or another of

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Namibia's 11 officially designated ethnic groups, and none can claim the loyalty of more than a fraction of the territory's more than 1 million inhabitants. Most parties spend their time jockeying against each other, sharing the few political responsibilities Pretoria grants the territory, and posturing against SWAPO in preparation for an eventual UN-sponsored election.

While the economy falters and the politicians scramble, the insurgency waxes and wanes. To defend the territory, South Africa has mounted an aggressive defense that carries the war into SWAPO's Angolan sanctuary but has failed to prevent the insurgents from making northern Namibia a theater of terrorist activity or from blocking occasional forays farther south.

SWAPO, meanwhile, anxiously waits in the wings—in camps in Angola and Zambia, in small terrorist groups operating inside Namibia, and as a legal but suppressed political force within the territory. Its exiled leaders have become more radical in recent years, more indebted to the Soviets, and more out of touch with their constituency in Namibia. At the same time they remain, above all, opportunists, who say they want to follow a nonaligned course when they come to power.


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Figure 1



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
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34. Namibia (*map*)

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Geography

Natural Geography

Area, Location, and Boundaries. Namibia's vast, thinly populated, and largely arid territory covers an area of about 824,000 square kilometers (including Walvis Bay) extending along southern Africa's Atlantic seaboard for about 1,500 kilometers and straddling the tropic of Capricorn. About four times the size of the United Kingdom, Namibia is bordered by South Africa on the south and southeast, by Botswana on the east, and Angola on the north. In addition, the narrow Caprivi Strip in the northeast extends between Botswana and Angola, providing Namibia with access to the Zambezi River and a common border with Zambia.

The port of Walvis Bay—a natural, oval-shaped harbor—and a surrounding zone totaling 1,124 square kilometers are claimed by South Africa and administered as part of Cape Province. Without the use of Walvis Bay, Namibia is for all practical purposes landlocked. Walvis Bay is the only deep-water port between Lobito in Angola and Saldanha Bay to the south.

A dozen small, South African-claimed islands are scattered for more than 180 nautical miles (nm) along the southern portion of the Namibian coast, north and south of Luderitz. The most northerly of these lies about 6 nm off the coast, but most of the others are less than one-half nm offshore. All are uninhabited, but South Africa has claimed 12 nm extending seaward from these islands as territorial waters and 200 nm as fishing zones.

Topography. Namibia was once described as a dry place between two deserts. While not entirely accurate, the statement is a fair generalization. About one-fifth of the total area is covered by the barren and inhospitable Namib Desert. Varying between 80 km and 120 km in width and stretching along the entire coastline, the Namib is an area of coarse, shifting sands, weathered rock, and salt pans. The sandy portion is highlighted by long lines of towering dunes that can reach over 300 meters (about 1,000 feet) in

height—the highest in the world. Except for isolated populations at the diamond mining sites in the south, the ports of Walvis Bay and Luderitz, and the town of Swakopmund, the coast is uninhabitable.

Another desert, the Kalahari, covers a large part of the eastern areas. Here the chief characteristics are thick layers of sand and limestone and an absence of surface water. The landscape is less stark but much more monotonous than the Namib, broken only by 100-meter-high sand ridges. The area is inhabited primarily by Bushmen who are hunters and gatherers.

Sandwiched between the two deserts and stretching from the South African border in the south to the Etosha Pan region in the north is the better watered Central Plateau. It is here that most of the whites have settled. The plateau varies between 1,000 and 2,000 meters in altitude, with an average of 1,200 meters, and comprises more than one-half the total area of Namibia. The highest point is a peak of over 2,600 meters near Uis.

The Central Plateau itself has three separate zones: the arid, hilly lands in the south, where sheep are raised; the semiarid, mountainous cattle and sheep area around Windhoek; and the wide, wooded savannas (flat to rolling terrain) of the north. Traditional farming and livestock raising are practiced in the north, where most of the blacks live and where population density is the highest in the territory. Also in the north is the large, flat, swampy Etosha Pan, which boasts concentrations of African wildlife and is one of the oldest animal preserves in the world.

There are no perennial rivers within Namibia proper, but four such rivers form parts of the territory's boundaries. The Orange River sets the southern border with South Africa, while the Kunene, Okavango, and Zambezi Rivers form much of the northern borders with Angola and Zambia.

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


Figure 2. Windhoek, capital of Namibia United Nations

Climate and Vegetation. The availability of water is a major constraint on human settlement and economic activity in Namibia. The territory has distinct seasons: the winter season (May-October) is dry and summer (November-April) is the wet season. Average annual rainfall across 70 percent of the territory is under the 400 millimeters that is considered a minimum for dryland agriculture in a hot climate. The average can be misleading, however; there is wide variation in rainfall across regions. In much of the territory, moreover, rainfall is not particularly effective because of the intense rate of evaporation.

In the Namib Desert, annual precipitation averages less than 25 mm (1 inch), and vegetation is totally lacking over most of the region. Years may pass with no rain at all. Despite its scanty precipitation, the coast is chilled by cold sea winds, and thick nocturnal fogs drift inland during the early morning hours, supporting the few plant forms that have adapted to the harsh environment. The coastal islands are also virtually barren of plant life, but the drenching mists allow sparse grasses to grow.

The Kalahari Desert receives up to 400 mm of annual rainfall. Because of its porous soils, however, vegetation is confined to sparse desert grasses and shrubs.

Precipitation in the Central Plateau ranges from a low of 150 mm in the south to over 500 mm in the north, and vegetation varies accordingly—scrub and sparse grasses in the south, lush grasses and scattered trees

in the north. The northern vegetation includes scattered stands of deciduous forest, cultivated fields of millet and sorghum, and even a few palm trees along the streams. It is the only region suited to crop cultivation, especially in Ovamboland and Caprivi, which normally receive the greatest rainfall—up to 700 mm yearly. The rains are unpredictable, however, and serious droughts are frequent. At other times the rains are so intense that vast areas are flooded.

Temperatures are moderated by sea breezes on the coast and by altitude in the plateau region. Only in the Namib Desert are temperatures likely to be extreme, and even there they rarely exceed 38° C (100.4° F) during the day or drop below freezing at night. In Windhoek, daily temperatures range from a high of 29° C (84.2° F) to a low of 16° C (60.8° F) in summer, and a high of 21° C (69.8° F) and a low of 7° C (44.6° F) in winter.

Natural Resources. Namibia's rich mineral reserves—diamonds, uranium, copper, lead, tin, zinc, salt, vanadium, and others in smaller quantities—support a mining industry that is the linchpin of the economy. The world's largest uranium mine is near the coast at Rossing. Alluvial diamond deposits along the coast south of Walvis Bay are among the world's richest, with an output consisting almost entirely of high quality gemstones. Copper, lead, and zinc are extracted from one of the world's unique geological formations at Tsumeb. Both industrial and consumable salts are "harvested" at low cost from natural and man-made evaporite deposits on the coast north of Walvis Bay.

Commercial agriculture is a small but important part of the economy. The southern and central portions of Namibia's Central Plateau cannot support crops but are well suited to ranching of the prized karakul sheep and of cattle. These support an export industry of pelts and beef, respectively. Plateau woodlands permit a very small lumbering industry.


The better watered north supports subsistence cultivation and traditional livestock raising. In addition, the northern border rivers represent a significant but largely unexploited potential for hydroelectric power generation, as well as for irrigation.

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Figure 3
Namibia and Walvis Bay



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



Figure 4. Diamond mine on the southern coast

Bannister, Namibia ©

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**Figure 5
Vegetation**




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Figure 6
Population and Ethnic Composition



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Table 1
Namibia's Population: Ethnic Composition ^a

Group/Subgroup	Percentage of Tribe	Total Population	Percent of Total ^b
Ovambo		516,600	51.2
Kwanyama	37		
Ndonga	28		
Kwambi	12		
Ngandjera	8		
Mbalantu	7		
Kwaluudhi	5		
Nkolonkadhi-Eunda	3		
Kavango		98,000	9.7
Herero		77,600	7.7
Damara		76,800	7.6
White		75,600	7.5
Nama		49,700	4.9
Colored (mixed race)		43,500	4.3
Caprivian		39,500	3.9
Rehoboth Basters (mixed race)		25,800	2.6
Tswana		6,800	0.7
Total		1,009,900	100.0

^a Percent totals are blacks, 85.6 percent; whites, 7.5 percent; and mixed race, 6.9 percent.

^b Due to rounding, components do not add to total shown.

Note: Source is South Africa Press Association report of the May 1981 population, based on the official May 1980 census, as reported to the Namibian National Assembly. Earlier press reports of the census gave the Bushman figure as 27,000 and "other" as 9,500. These figures were not included in the report of the final census totals, nor was an explanation given for their apparent omission. Namibian population figures have long been controversial, with SWAPO and the UN accusing South Africa of underreporting the black population. Independent estimates have ranged as high as 1.5 million.

The officially reported total for whites is an increase of almost 4,000 over an unofficial account of the census carried in press reports in December 1981 and may have been inflated for political reasons. It nevertheless represents approximately a 20-percent drop from the 1971 census. The nonwhite figures are probably understated, especially for Ovambos. Moreover, official statistics do not include the sizable exile population that includes SWAPO freedom fighters. Our estimate is that the total population approaches 1.25 million, including about 71,000 whites.

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Human Geography

Differences in origin, race, and language have long fragmented Namibia's population into many cultural groups. According to official South African classifications, there are nine African, one white, and two Colored "groups." Although the group divisions have deep historical roots, South African policy through

the 1970s accentuated the distinctions by assigning most of them to distinct "homelands" with separate government administrations. The trend in current Namibian domestic policies is slowly away from an apartheid system, but the ethnic divisions are still dominant in the country's social and political life.

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Figure 7. Ovamboland: huts and fields



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Richter, Southwest ©

Africans. The African population is composed of two broad ethnic groups: Bantu-speaking peoples (Ovambo, Kavango, East Caprivian, Herero, Kaokos, and Tswana) and Khoisan tribes that speak distinctive "click" languages (Nama, Damara, and Bushman).


The *Ovambo* comprise over half of Namibia's population and are concentrated in Ovamboland; another large group lives across the Angolan border. According to 1978 figures, about 85 percent of the Namibian Ovambos live in the 56,000-square-kilometer homeland, with the rest serving as contract laborers—mainly in mining—in other parts of the territory. In Ovamboland the chief occupation is farming and livestock raising.

The Ovambos are divided into seven subtribes that live in distinct areas but speak a mutually intelligible language. As a group they remained largely aloof in the 19th century from white settlers and the tribal wars that afflicted other tribes in Namibia. They were, however, subject to a strong missionary movement with the most successful effort made by the Finnish Lutherans starting in 1870. Today the most powerful church in Ovamboland is the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Ovambokavango Church.

Ovamboland eventually fell under white control, although it was never an area of significant white settlement. Ovamboland is the prime battleground in

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Figure 8
Ethnic Groups



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the South-West Africa People's Organization insurgency against South African control of Namibia. While the bulk of the population appears to cooperate with the local authority, which is backed by a heavy South African military presence, most informed observers believe that SWAPO has the support of about 70 percent of the Ovamboland population.

The *Kavango* occupy a 270-mile strip along the south bank of the Okavango River. They are closely related to the Ovambo, and share a similar subsistence economy supplemented by river fishing. About 12 percent of the Kavango are employed in mines and jobs outside their homeland.

The *East Caprivians* are composed of two tribes which speak a common language and are related to tribes in Zambia and Botswana. Largely excluded from the territory's modern economy, they are cultivators and stock farmers living in groups of about 30. Because of the marshy nature of the area, villages are often laid out on high ground, with huts and granaries raised on platforms.

The *Herero*, taller and more slender than other Bantu groups in Namibia, are noted for their education and independence, as well as their arrogance toward other groups. A pastoral people, they originally occupied Kaokoland and then moved into the central part of Namibia. Those who stayed in Kaokoland evolved into two tribes, the Himba and the Tjimba. Those who moved fought and defeated other tribes—first the Bushmen and the Damara and then, after a century of warfare ending about 1900, the Nama. Having emerged as the strongest force in the area, the Herero rebelled against German rule between 1904 and 1907. The rebellion was put down with much cruelty, resulting in the near extinction of the tribe. Of those who survived, some fled to Botswana and most returned to Kaokoland.

Today those Herero who returned to Kaokoland, together with the Himba and the Tjimba subtribes, are classified as Kaoko, although their population numbers are combined with the Herero. Those few Herero who stayed in central Namibia were left without land, cattle, or leadership, and much of their traditional social structure was shattered. In the long




Figure 9. Digging for water in Kaokoland Bannister, 25X1³

period of disorientation following the rebellion, missionary activity also undermined many traditional values and beliefs. The Herero nevertheless displayed unusual resiliency, and, although adapting to change, they have refused to accept permanent loss of their confiscated land in the desirable central portion of Namibia.

The homeland assigned them by Pretoria—in the northern Kalahari Desert in eastern Namibia—is inferior and only about half the Hereros live there.

Hereros have long been in the forefront of the movement for an independent Namibia, with their effort predating that of the Ovambo by at least a decade. Some Hereros hold senior positions in SWAPO, but the focus of their political effort has been on internal politics.

The *Tswana* are an extension of a tribe of the same name living in Botswana. Living in a homeland on the fringe of the Kalahari Desert, they have little interaction with other Namibian tribes.

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
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The *Damara*, of unknown origin, are found only in Namibia. Before the establishment of white authority, these short, extremely dark people were either enslaved by the Herero and the Nama or led a precarious existence as fugitives in marginal lands, living as hunters and gatherers. They have no knowledge of their original language but have adopted that of the Nama.

In 1870, at the request of missionaries, a tract of semiarid land was granted to a group of Damara at Okombahe in the central highlands, where they engaged primarily in animal husbandry. In the 1960s South Africa enlarged and set aside Okombahe as the Damara homeland. Only about 12 percent, however, live in the area, according to 1978 figures. More than other tribes, the Damara have fared better under South African rule than at any previous time. They are active in the modern economy as herders, servants, or handymen. Considerable numbers are employed at the Uis tin mine situated in their homeland.

The *Nama* are relatively short, yellowish-brown-skinned people, probably related to the Bushmen. After years of devastating warfare between the Nama and the Herero, the Germans imposed an uneasy peace. Today they live mainly on several large reservations—consolidated into “*Namaland*,” in the arid southern part of Namibia—where they graze their flocks of sheep and goats. Some have been absorbed into the modern economy, working as herders and laborers on white and mixed-race farms or as workmen in the towns. They are not a united group and have not agitated for a return to their traditional lands to the north, nor have they been leaders in the independence struggle.

The *Bushmen* are Namibia’s most ancient inhabitants. They are short in stature—males average 1.47 meters (4 feet 10 inches)—with a light yellowish-brown skin and peppercorn hair. In the 19th century the Nama and Herero regarded the Bushmen as a danger to life and property, and killed them or drove them into more inaccessible desert regions. During German rule, a judge ruled that the Bushmen were, in fact, human, and that it was illegal to kill them.

Figure 10. *Bushmen*

Richter, Southwest ©

The Bushmen are organized into small bands, whose size depends on the availability of food. Roaming bands of Bushmen erect temporary shelters of grass or branches, which they occupy until the game, seeds, and berries in the vicinity are exhausted. Personal possessions consist only of bow and arrows, skin garments and adornments, and a few utility articles. The Bushmen are divided into three main groups living mostly in the northern Kalahari Desert from the Etosha Game Reserve to the Botswana border, an area that includes their official homeland.


Coloreds and Basters. Both the Coloreds and the Rehoboth Basters are of mixed racial origin and share a Christian heritage and the Afrikaans language. Historical factors, however, have molded them into separate communities. Most Coloreds are former South African Cape Coloreds who emigrated from South Africa within the past few decades. They reside in urban centers for the most part and do not occupy any specific area of their own. They are employed mainly as factory workers, craftsmen, and traders; some operate their own businesses.

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Figure 11. Rehoboth,
Basterland



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Richter, Southwest ©

Originally, the Rehoboth Basters were one of several scattered groups residing in the northwest part of the Cape Colony. Displaced by white expansion, some 800 Basters crossed the Orange River under the leadership of Hermanus van Wyk, who negotiated with Herero and Nama chiefs for title to the area around Rehoboth in 1869. The Basters have retained their exclusive identity and have traditionally had greater local autonomy than other nonwhite groups. Today they are engaged mostly in animal husbandry, and their land, around Rehoboth, is among the best in South-West Africa. Many have large incomes, as their personal possessions, such as cars and homes, reflect.

Whites. Although officially a single population group, whites are in practice divided by language and culture into three groups. Approximately 60 percent speak Afrikaans, almost one-third speak German, and the remainder speak English. Afrikaans and English are official languages; German is not, although it has a privileged status and its use is furthered by the dominant role that ethnic Germans play in Namibia's cultural life. Most whites are to some extent trilingual.

The first white settlers came from South Africa and from Germany during the 19th century. Most of the present population, however, are recent immigrants

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Agricultural Potential of Ethnic Homelands

The South African administration in Namibia has created 10 ethnic homelands for the nonwhite population. These are located primarily in the northern half of the territory.

Ovamboland. *Periodic droughts and famine are common due to rainfall that, although substantial on average, is irregular. Land along the Kunene and the Okavango could be irrigated, as some near the Kunene already is.*

Kavangoland. *The population is concentrated almost entirely in a strip adjoining the Okavango River, where subsistence farming can be practiced. Away from the river, the dry-forest country yields only wild fruits. Diseases appear to bar satisfactory pastoral development.*

Caprivi. *A considerable area in the south is swamp-land, while the northern part has sandy or loamy soils and is well watered. Subsistence agriculture is successful in the northern part with maize, millet, pumpkins, and watermelons the chief crops. The grazing is relatively good.*

Kaokoland. *Arid climate, scanty ground-water resources, and meager pastures characterize the region, which is isolated by desert from the other homelands. Little prospect of agricultural development exists.*

Bushmanland. *This is an area with plentiful game and suited to hunting and gathering. Present natural resources, however, will be insufficient for the growing population. The sandy terrain is ill-suited to cultivation and settled pastoral use.*

Hereroland. *Surface water is almost nonexistent except for one perennial spring. In the extreme west, where the sand cover is relatively thin, ground water is more plentiful than farther east. Although cattle raising is the traditional occupation of the Hereros, only one-fiftieth of the homeland can at present support stock.*

Damaraland. *About one-third of the homeland is suitable for stock; two-thirds is desert.*

Tswanaland. *Located in the Kalahari Desert, its potential for any use is limited by the very deep ground-water level that makes boreholes expensive and difficult.*

Namaland. *The area has limited suitability for small stock (goats and sheep). Underground water is brackish; in many cases, borehole water is too highly mineralized even for stock to drink. There is slight potential for irrigation of small areas.*

Rehoboth (Basters). *Unsuitable for agricultural cultivation, but grazing is equal or superior to the white area in the south.*

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from South Africa who live primarily in the larger urban areas, although some have established large farms. Socially, culturally, and politically they are very close to the white community in South Africa.

On the basis of language, whites tend to form separate cultural communities, each with its own schools, newspapers, clubs, and other institutions, and there is some sense of social distinction based on differences in occupation and lifestyle. Class consciousness is less

pervasive than is usual in modern Western society, however, because the white community is relatively small, because all its members have a privileged status in relation to nonwhites, and because each of the three components of the white community has a high degree of social cohesiveness. Family institutions and relationships follow the general patterns prevalent in any advanced Western country.

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Political and social roles among the white groups differ considerably. Afrikaners are politically powerful, their numerical strength assuring them electoral victory. To this group belong almost all white civil servants, who come generally from South Africa; the lower strata of the white population, concentrated in railroad and similar employment; and most of the white farmers of the territory. White farmowners and renters are scattered over the central area of the territory on large farms ranging in size up to 28,000 hectares (70,000 acres). Because the government regards them as the backbone of the country, they have long been the recipients of extensive public financial assistance. This and other privileges provoke the resentment of the general community. German speakers are engaged mainly in business and commerce, and they dominate the white community in a cultural sense. German architecture is pervasive in many towns and many festivals with a German theme are celebrated. The English-speaking sector plays an important role in the financial and business life of the community, but its numerical weakness renders it politically weak.

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Economy

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Economy

Structure of the Economy

South African investment, technology, and management have built an economic beachhead for whites in Namibia that is narrowly based in mining, fishing, and ranching. Beyond this beachhead, the Namibian economy—despite rich natural resources—is characterized by a variety of weaknesses that dampen prospects for growth and development.

Key among Namibia's limitations is the lack of a skilled nonwhite labor force. This results from policies imposed by South Africa that fail to provide education and job training to blacks, restrict black labor mobility, and make the economy dependent on South African and other white, skilled manpower.¹

The modern sectors draw cheap, unskilled labor from rural areas, where the majority of the more than 1 million nonwhites live. Unskilled black workers, mostly from Ovamboland in the north, are permitted to work only on short-term contracts as temporary migrants. These workers account for about half of the roughly 200,000 workers in the nonagricultural labor force.

Along with their dependents, the South African civil servants and skilled technicians who run the government bureaucracy and operate and maintain the infrastructure comprise nearly half of Namibia's 75,000 whites. Most of the other whites provide the managerial and technical expertise to run the modern sectors of the economy, including commercial agriculture.

Sustaining the narrowly based, white economy, administering the rest of Namibia, and providing bases for operations against the insurgency of SWAPO have entailed substantial increases in Namibian public spending. Its share of total expenditure has increased even more rapidly over the last few years as recession

¹ A Western authority on Namibia has estimated that there are, at most, 300 university graduates, including five lawyers and five doctors, among nonwhite Namibians; many of these reside outside the country.

has taken its toll on the modern economy. At present, public spending probably accounts for over 60 percent of gross national expenditure.

Key Sectors

Mining. Mining of extensive reserves of diamonds, uranium, copper, lead, tin, zinc, salt, and vanadium is Namibia's leading industry, accounting for at least two-thirds of total exports and 60 percent of all domestic tax revenue. Despite its capital intensity, which causes it to offer proportionally less employment than most other nonagricultural sectors, mining provides employment for about 20,000 black workers. The wages of the workers, in turn, contribute significantly to the cash income of more than 100,000 of Namibia's 1.25 million inhabitants, primarily in Ovamboland.

The mining industry, which includes various processing facilities, has benefited from substantial private investment by South African and Western interests. The investments are primarily in diamond and uranium production, the most important mining activities. Namibia produces an average annual output of 1.5 million carats of gem diamonds. Its alluvial diamond deposits are among the world's richest, with 98 percent of the recovered stones being of gem quality and commanding a higher average price per carat than any other diamonds in the world. Namibia's uranium production—nearly equal to that of South Africa and entirely from the world's largest uranium mine—is shipped to South Africa for reexport. Namibia produces about one-sixth of the world's uranium, but the ore is of low grade and is relatively costly to extract.

Agriculture. Namibia's farming and animal husbandry, which employ about 60 percent of the labor force, do not yield enough to feed the population adequately. As a result, Namibia relies heavily on South Africa for cornmeal and wheat flour, dietary


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Figure 12

Namibia: Economic Comparisons

Note change in scales



^a For blacks.
^b Estimated.

Footnote: Namibia's GDP per capita is about one-third higher than the GNP figure because it includes repatriated profits, royalties and other foreign remittances by the large international business sector.

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staples of the nonwhite population. Subsistence agriculture—primarily cultivation of millet, sorghum, and corn, with some livestock raising—suffers from the tribal homelands policy imposed by Pretoria. Most areas designated for nonwhites have poor soil and little water, although some areas in the better watered and fertile northeast are often self-sufficient in grain crops. The Kunene River in the northwest supports a trial irrigation scheme in Ovamboland that could be expanded when peace returns to the region. Only limited grazing land exists within most homelands—Basterland is an exception—and this seriously constrains livestock raising by Africans.

Commercial agriculture is limited to the white-controlled ranching sector which, except during periods of drought, is highly productive. Livestock raising provides beef for export, 75 percent of which is usually shipped on the hoof to South Africa, with the rest processed for export to Western Europe. The arid regions of southern Namibia are ideal for raising the hardy karakul breed of sheep; this, however, is the only economically viable form of agriculture for the


region. Namibian pelts usually supply over 50 percent of the world market for luxury karakul skins.

Fishing. Although depressed in recent years, fishing has historically been Namibia's second-leading industry. Lobstering and a few fisheries are located at Luderitz, but most of the fishing and fish processing industry is located within the South African enclave at Walvis Bay. Virtually all of the catch is taken from Namibian coastal waters. A 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zone was enacted in 1981 but never enforced because of an inability to mount effective patrols.

South African-owned fish factories at Luderitz and Walvis Bay generally employ up to several thousand nonwhite migrant workers during the fishing season, but employment is dependent on the annual catch. Very little fish is consumed locally and most fish products are exported to South Africa, Europe, and the United States.

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**Figure 13
Economic Activity**



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Table 2
Namibia: Leading Mineral Investors ^a

Enterprise	Major Owners (<i>percent share</i>)	Nationality
Consolidated Diamond Mines of South-West Africa	DeBeers Consolidated Mines (100)	South Africa
IMCOR Zinc (lead, zinc)	ISCOR ^b (100)	South Africa
Klein Aub Copper Co.	General Mining and Finance Corp./Federale Mynbou (100)	South Africa
Oamites Mining Co. (copper, silver)	Falconbridge Nickel (75)	Canada
	Industrial Development Corp. (25) ^b	South Africa
Rossing Uranium, Ltd.	Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. (55.5)	United Kingdom
	Industrial Development Corp. (13)	South Africa
	General Mining and Finance Corp. (7)	South Africa
	Minatome, SA (10)	France
South-West Africa Co., Ltd. (lead, vanadium, zinc)	Anglo-American Corp. (44)	South Africa
	Consolidated Goldfields, Ltd. (43)	United Kingdom
Tsumeb Corp. of South-West Africa, Ltd. (copper, lead, zinc)	Newmont Mining Corp. (30)	United States
	American Metals Climax Corp. (30)	United States
	Union Corp. (9.5)	South Africa, others
	O'Kiep Copper Co. (9.5)	South Africa, others
Uis Mining Corp. (tin)	ISCOR ^b (100)	South Africa

^a These enterprises represent most of the foreign investment in Namibia. In some cases total shares may not add to 100 percent because minor owners are omitted.

^b State corporation.

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Transportation and Utilities. Namibia's transport, electric power, water, and communications facilities are among the most sophisticated in Sub-Saharan Africa. They were designed, however, to serve only the major towns and economically productive regions and are inadequate for the economic and political integration of the widely scattered population.

Rail and road transport is especially deficient in the relatively populous north, but some road improvements have been made by the South African military to support its numerous installations along the Namibia-Angola border. The Caprivi region in the northeast, however, is virtually inaccessible by land from the rest of Namibia.

Electric power for the national grid has been obtained increasingly from hookups to the South African grid. Local generating capacity consists primarily of a coal-fired thermal station in Windhoek, operated by a parastatal corporation. This is supplemented by diesel generators in some towns. In addition to those facilities, private mining companies retain some auxiliary capacity for their own use. All of Namibia's power facilities are designed and situated to support the modern sector and have had little or no direct impact on nonwhite living standards.

The Kunene hydroelectric project on the Angolan border near Ruacana could provide all of Namibia's electric power needs—as well as a surplus for sale to

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South Africa. The project, however, remains an unreliable power source so long as the SWAPO insurgency and troubled relations with Angola continue.

Manufacturing. Namibia's highly developed modern sectors mask serious gaps—beyond those in public works and services—that limit its growth potential. Most important among these is the small size of the domestic market, which tends to discourage any broader industrialization.

Manufacturing industry today consists almost entirely of food processing—primarily fish oil and fish meal production and beef and lamb packing—and has never contributed more than about 5 percent of national output. With a population of about 1.25 million, most of whom earn less than \$300 a year, there is little incentive to develop new product lines for domestic sale. As a result, up to one-fourth of Namibia's gross domestic product is repatriated by foreign producers as profits, royalties, and other remittances—mostly to South Africa—and is not reinvested.

The problems of the small domestic market are exacerbated by the dominance of nearby South African producers in a wide range of manufacturing activities. Indeed, Namibian domestic commerce consists largely of the retailing and servicing of South African and other imported goods. Imports account for up to 95 percent of all goods consumed and invested in Namibia.

Dependence on South Africa

The territorial government in Namibia depends on South African aid to help defray the considerable costs of administering the vast territory and of construction and development programs. Pretoria's budget assistance to Namibia has risen sharply in recent years. In 1981/82 (1 April to 31 March) Pretoria contributed at least \$650 million—over 70 percent of Windhoek's budgeted revenue.² Details of Namibia's

² About two-fifths of this assistance was allocated from revenues of the South African Customs Union (SACU), which includes Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Although Namibia is not an official member of this union, for revenue-sharing purposes Pretoria treats it like one. In recent years, Pretoria has used artificially inflated shares of SACU revenue as a hidden form of foreign aid to member states, thereby encouraging their continued membership.

South Africa's Economic Assistance

Namibia's budget for fiscal year 1981/82 contained several revenue items that Pretoria claimed as budgetary assistance to Windhoek:

	<i>Million US \$</i>
Share of SACU receipts	260.0
1981/82 transfer from Pretoria	83.2
Transfer remaining from 1980/81	41.6
Compensation for services taken over from Pretoria	139.4
Loans guaranteed by Pretoria	128.8
Total	653.0

In addition to such budgetary assistance, Namibia benefits from South African subsidies for post and telephone services and for the operations of the South African Railways and Harbors Administration in Namibia. All such parastatal services are reported to operate at a loss but, except for postal services, no data are available to confirm this or to indicate the exact size of the next subsidy involved. It may amount to several tens of millions of dollars. Documentary sources for South African transfers are often contradictory and incomplete because government reports on financial relations with Namibia are closely held.

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fiscal year 1982/83 budget are incomplete, but Pretoria's contribution appears to again exceed \$600 million. The cost of South African counterinsurgency operations, not included in the Namibian budget, may exceed an additional \$400 million annually. An unknown but probably large portion of defense expenditures is for military construction, which almost certainly provides substantial employment and income opportunities for Namibians.

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
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Figure 14

Namibia: Economic Indicators^a


Note change in scales

Real GDP Growth
Percent




GDP, by Sector, 1980
Percent

Other-10.7
Mining-47.7
Agriculture
and Fishing-9.6
Government-32.0




Inflation Rate^c
Percent




Employment, by Sector, 1980
Percent


Mining-6
Government-7
Services-8
Industry and
Commerce-19
Agriculture-60



Uranium Oxide Production
Thousand Short Tons



Budget Assistance From South Africa^d
Million US \$



^aMost data are estimated.

^bPreliminary data.

^cBased on an implicit GDP deflator compiled by US Embassy, Pretoria.

^dData are for fiscal years beginning 1 April of the year stated. Not including spending for police.

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Table 3
Namibia: Annual Mineral Production

Thousand tons
(except where noted)

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Gem diamonds ^a (<i>million carats</i>)	1.7	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.6
Copper	43.5	49.2	37.7	41.9	38.6
Lead	46.4	41.2	38.6	50.0	37.0
Tin	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.1
Zinc concentrates	26.9	38.3	36.6	29.0	27.6

^a 1981 output was about 1.2 million carats.

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Besides South African money, food, and manpower, the Namibian economy depends on close ties to South Africa that will probably continue after independence:

- Walvis Bay, which will at least initially remain under South African control after independence, is the only deepwater port on the Namibian coast, and access to it is crucial for mineral exports. The small port of Luderitz, which will belong to independent Namibia, can only handle shallow-draft vessels, is poorly equipped, and is distant from most mining centers.
- Namibia's rail network, which is owned and operated by Pretoria, is connected only to South Africa. Other existing or proposed regional transport links offer no foreseeable prospects for easing Namibia's trade and transport dependence on South Africa.
- South Africa supplies about 90 percent of Namibia's imports, acts as an entrepot for about two-thirds of all Namibian exports, and is the final destination for about 10 percent of Namibian sales. Freight cost advantages alone will continue to make South Africa the most attractive trading partner and conduit for most Namibian trade.

Namibia, moreover, depends on South Africa for commercial fuels and vital electric power hookups. Exploitation of Namibia's coal deposits is thus far uneconomic. No domestic petroleum reserves have been found, although offshore areas have not been

fully explored. Namibia has no refinery, so all petroleum products must be imported. Partly for security purposes, southern Namibia is linked to the South African power grid. An additional link will be established this year, which will allow local thermal stations to be held in reserve for emergency use.

Recent Performance

Since the late 1970s, the Namibian economy has suffered from a virtual cessation of private investment (prompted by uncertainty over the outcome of international negotiations for independence), a severe drought, steadily rising import unit costs, and slack world markets for primary commodities. The result has been declining real output and increased inflation. Average annual growth of over 4 percent in the 1970s on the basis of a mineral boom gave way to an average annual decline of over 8 percent after 1978. Meanwhile inflation continued to range between about 10 and 20 percent. The post-1978 recession was especially important because an annual growth of 6 to 8 percent is estimated to be necessary simply to employ blacks entering the labor market. As a result of these adverse trends in modern sector performance, unemployment has now reached over 15 percent of the total labor force, according to Namibian press reports.

Weak world markets have especially hurt the mining industry. The depressed world demand for diamonds, especially for stones of gem quality, has caused

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Table 4
Namibia: Fish Catch

Thousand metric tons

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981 ^a
Sardines	545.4	447.3	194.3	45.2	27.7	10.2	51.4
Anchovies	194.4	94.1	124.5	355.1	272.7	164.0	
Other	19.4	31.0	83.5	9.2	25.0	37.7	196.4 ^b
Total	759.2	572.4	402.3	409.5	325.4	211.9	247.8

^a Preliminary.^b Includes anchovies.

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DeBeers to reduce its Namibian output. Mineral earnings would have been even worse if uranium production had not begun in 1976 and accelerated thereafter. Only the fulfillment of long-term, fixed-supply contracts has made uranium production profitable in the face of a depressed world market. Prior to the recent slide, minerals often accounted for well over 40 percent of national output—a proportion that has now fallen to about one-third.

Fishing has also suffered. During the 1970s, overfishing by foreign fleets and local mismanagement reduced the catch that supports the domestic canning industry. During 1981, the Namibian fishing fleet was largely idle, most canneries were closed, and several thousand migrant workers were unemployed. The catch showed some signs of recovery in early 1982, but fisheries experts have warned that a sustained recovery to former catch levels is still uncertain.

Commercial and subsistence farming have been hit hard by prolonged drought and by the sharp drop in world prices for karakul pelts. Farm output, which fell by nearly one-third during 1976-80, continued to slide in 1981. Namibia's cattle herd fell by one-third last year alone, while the number of sheep and goats dropped by one-fourth, because of drought-induced slaughter and the transfer of some livestock and herds to South Africa for grazing. In March, rains returned to the northern cattle-raising regions, bringing the prospect of some return of stock from South Africa. The drought continues in the south, however, and by the end of this year's dry season karakul herds are likely to be at less than half the level of two years ago.

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Politics
(SWAPO)

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Politics (SWAPO)

From Moderation to Radicalism

Leaders reflecting a variety of political views have dominated the South-West Africa People's Organization from its birth in 1960 through the mid-1970s. Since then, however, SWAPO has undergone a transformation in which moderates have been driven out or pushed aside, and radicals—representing especially one subtribal group of the dominant Ovambo tribe—have solidified their position at the top. [redacted]

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Moderate Origins. SWAPO's origins can be traced to the Ovambo Peoples' Congress, an organization formed in 1957 in Capetown, South Africa, to assist migrant workers from South-West Africa's large Ovambo tribe. Two years later South Africa deported its founder, Herman Toivo ja Toivo, to Ovamboland in Namibia's far north, and Sam Nujoma, the present leader of SWAPO, took control. [redacted]

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In 1960 the Congress tried to broaden its appeal by claiming to represent all of the South African protectorate's diverse multitribal population. It changed its name to SWAPO and moved its headquarters from Capetown to Windhoek. SWAPO's announced goals, which were then free of Marxist dogma, called for an end to South African rule and apartheid, and for the establishment of a unified state. [redacted]

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In 1960 Nujoma fled Namibia into exile, first to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and later to Lusaka, Zambia, where he established SWAPO-in-exile. He left behind an internal wing, which continued to operate in Windhoek. For the next six years, SWAPO attempted to cultivate support both internationally and inside Namibia, while it optimistically waited for international pressure to force South Africa to vacate South-West Africa. When the World Court ruled in 1966 that the Namibia issue was outside its jurisdiction, SWAPO began its "liberation" struggle. [redacted]

Initially, the focus of the campaign was to gain international political support. SWAPO soon obtained recognition by the OAU and later the United Nations as the sole representative of the Namibian people. It

also began a military campaign, aided by weapons and training from both China and Soviet Bloc countries. The results, however, were meager; SWAPO forces through the mid-1970s probably numbered only several hundred. [redacted]

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Despite growing Communist influence, geography and the multitribal makeup of SWAPO's leadership continued to encourage moderation prior to 1976. From camps in Zambia—swelled by Ovambos fleeing South African repression—SWAPO guerrillas were forced to infiltrate Namibia through territory dominated by the Caprivi tribe. Use of this route through the Caprivi Strip made it necessary for SWAPO to emphasize its multitribal composition, despite dominance by the Ovambo in its ranks. [redacted]

In addition, while SWAPO's rhetoric grew increasingly radical, a significant degree of ideological diversity existed at all levels of the organization. The inherent conservatism of the Namibians who filled its ranks and SWAPO's exposure to Western as well as Communist influence in Zambia contributed to its moderation. [redacted]

Radicals Gain Control. SWAPO began to transfer its operations from Zambia to Angola following the victory in 1975 by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. This move emboldened the radicals, who by 1976 were able to solidify their power in both the Central Committee and throughout the rank and file. In addition, bases in Angola enabled SWAPO guerrillas to infiltrate directly into Ovamboland and diminished the Ovambo-dominated organization's incentive to accommodate other Namibian tribes. [redacted]

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The shift to an Angola dominated by Cuba and the Soviets and away from the more Western-oriented Zambia also placed SWAPO under the more direct influence of the Soviet Bloc. The Soviets compelled

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SWAPO to forego assistance from the Chinese, and Moscow and its allies began to provide dramatically increased amounts of arms, money, and training. Soviet influence was also reflected in the sharp radicalization of SWAPO rhetoric, which now emphasized the socialist goals of its future regime.

Lusaka, Zambia, to Luanda, Angola, because it made the eastern Caprivi Strip, his tribal homeland, less important to SWAPO.

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Moreover, turmoil within SWAPO's leadership eventually strengthened the authority of Nujoma and his radical clique. The first upheaval came in 1976 when Andreas Shipanga, a relative moderate who was then third in line in the command structure, and several of his supporters in the SWAPO Central Committee were ousted after challenging Nujoma's leadership.

Although there have been no major internal conflicts since Muyongo's ouster, a number of moderates, most of whom also were non-Ovambos, have been gradually squeezed out of positions of power since 1979:

- Information Minister Peter Katjavivi, a moderate Herero, and for many years a widely respected SWAPO spokesman in London, was compelled in 1979 to return to Lusaka and give up his portfolio. Ovambos assumed his London post and his information position; he now holds a seat on the Central Committee but has no title.

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The Shipanga controversy changed the subtribal relationship of the Ovambo peoples who dominate SWAPO. The Ovambos, who comprise over half of Namibia's nonwhite population, are divided into seven sometimes competing subtribes. Shipanga and his followers were largely from the powerful Ndonga subtribe.

- Ernest Tjiriange, the Herero Secretary for Legal Affairs, was replaced by a more radical Ovambo from Nujoma's inner circle in 1981.

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- Ben Boys, a Nama, was removed in 1981 as SWAPO's chief representative in Lusaka and replaced by Nujoma's brother-in-law Aaron Mushimba, a half Kwanyama, half Herero.

- Lucas Pohamba, a Kwanyama stationed in Lusaka but a competitor with Nujoma and another key member of the senior leadership, lost his finance portfolio in 1981 to Mushimba and, along with Ben Boys, was sent to Eastern Europe for "political education."

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The SWAPO hierarchy's growing indifference to non-Ovambo tribes became evident in another major upheaval in 1980. The organization's vice president, Mishake Muyongo, a Caprivian, was replaced following a long period of isolation during which he found his power eroded by Ovambos. Muyongo had resisted the shift of SWAPO headquarters that year from

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The Inner Circle

[redacted] a small clique of five senior figures around Nujoma appears to hold the real power and operates as a collective leadership. Nujoma's ultimate authority is unclear. He is held in low regard by many African leaders, by SWAPO's Central Committee, and probably even by members of his own inner circle [redacted]

A fifth member of the inner circle is Hiuanua Shihepo, formerly Mueshihange's deputy in foreign affairs and recently elevated to Secretary of Legal Affairs at the expense of a Herero moderate. A Kwanyama, we believe that he is one of the most leftist of the senior SWAPO officials. [redacted]

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he has been shrewd enough to retain power since SWAPO's formation, mainly by exerting his influence cautiously through a process of consensus decision-making. [redacted]

One potential SWAPO leader outside the inner circle, Toivo ja Toivo—founder of SWAPO's parent organization—has been in a South African prison since 1968. Toivo's prestige probably surpasses that of Nujoma in the eyes of many Namibians. He belongs to the Ndonga subtribe, and the Kwanyama-dominated SWAPO leadership probably views him as a threat. Toivo has refused a South African offer of release on the condition that he participate only in South African-sponsored internal Namibian politics. After independence, or perhaps before, his unconditional release would in our view be potentially destabilizing to the present SWAPO leadership. [redacted]

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In the inner circle that surrounds Nujoma, Hidipo Hamutenya and Kapuka "Niki" Naujala probably wield the greatest influence, both on Nujoma and on SWAPO policy. Hamutenya, the Secretary for Information and a member of the Executive Council, is a Kwanyama and one of the few Ovambos with a higher education.



SWAPO Internal

Moderates have also been purged from SWAPO's "internal wing" inside Namibia, although the ideology of their successors is not known. As a result of the purge and South African harassment, the internal organization has been moribund since 1979. Until then, it had operated like some other internal Namibian parties, maintaining an active political organization but refraining from participation in South African-sponsored elections or government. [redacted]

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Defense Secretary Peter Nanyemba and Foreign Relations Secretary Peter Mueshihange also have high level influence. Nanyemba is a longtime associate of Nujoma; his strength in SWAPO derives from his power base, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). Although PLAN has done little more than plant landmines and stage infrequent terrorist attacks inside Namibia, his colleagues apparently consider him an effective military leader. [redacted]

The internal wing's main contribution to the movement has been to develop support for SWAPO outside of Ovamboland in Namibia, both among Ovambo contract laborers and non-Ovambos. It succeeded, for example, in organizing a successful boycott of the 1978 election among the Ovambos living in the Windhoek area. [redacted]

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Figure 15. Police break up SWAPO demonstration against 1978 elections



Gamma ©

SWAPO's internal wing also has produced nationally well-known leaders including Daniel Tjongarero (Herero) and Mokgane Thlabanello (Tswana), both articulate moderates and Lutheran clergymen. After a South African campaign in 1979 against the internal wing and the detention of a number of its members, Tjongarero closed the main internal office in Windhoek on his own initiative, declaring that henceforth SWAPO would operate from regional offices.

The response of SWAPO's external wing to Tjongarero's unauthorized closure of the national office was to sack both him and Thlabanello. Its main motive probably was to jettison two men who were both too moderate and rivaled the external leadership for popularity in Namibia. Tjongarero subsequently took a church position in Namibia and Thlabanello went to school in the United States. Other members of the internal wing fled Namibia, went underground, or tried to pick up the pieces of the organization. Since 1979 the South African Government has arrested several other members, and the current leadership of SWAPO's internal wing is largely unknown.

Role of the Churches

Churches in Namibia have long been SWAPO's main source of support. Lutheran and Anglican missionary movements have been especially active among the Ovambos—the largest church in the territory is the 270,000-member Evangelical Lutheran Ovambokavango Church. This church and its sister Lutheran churches have to some degree diminished the Ovambos' strong subtribal identification and have encouraged Ovambos to object to their second-class status in Namibia.

Both in Ovamboland and among other tribal groups, church leaders have worked quietly but effectively to assist SWAPO, which has placed religious as well as political figures from various tribal groups on the SWAPO "council of elders." For their part, the South African security forces have harassed the clergy with physical intimidation and deportation,

Although worried by SWAPO's radical rhetoric, most church leaders apparently accept Nujoma's private assurances that once in power, SWAPO will eschew radicalism and promote church interests.

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SWAPO Representatives Abroad

<i>Addis Ababa</i>	<i>Jesaya Nyamu</i>
<i>Algiers</i>	<i>Nora Appolus</i>
<i>Belgrade</i>	<i>Estory Embumbulu</i>
<i>Berlin</i>	<i>Obed Embula</i>
<i>Cairo</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
<i>Dakar</i>	<i>Edwin Amon Rongo</i>
<i>Des es Salaam</i>	<i>Netumbo Nandi</i>
<i>Gaborone/Francistown</i>	<i>Andrew Ngihiginua</i>
<i>Havana</i>	<i>Helmut Angula</i>
<i>Helsinki</i>	<i>Niki Iyambo</i>
<i>Lagos</i>	<i>Philemon Kambala</i>
<i>London</i>	<i>Shapua Kaukungua (Representative) Peter Manning (Information Officer)</i>
<i>Lusaka</i>	<i>Aaron Mushimba</i>
<i>New Delhi</i>	<i>Frederick Matongo</i>
<i>Paris</i>	<i>Ndugu Kalomo</i>
<i>Stockholm</i>	<i>Jimmy Joseph</i>
<i>United Nations</i>	<i>Theo-Ben Gurirab (Representative) Lucia Hamutenya (Adviser)</i>

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clique staged a tightly controlled congress that reaffirmed their hold on power. Reports of dissatisfaction among the refugees persisted through the late 1970s as lower ranking officials expressed disapproval of their leaders' increasingly radical stance.

No dissent is now evident among the approximately 60,000 SWAPO members in refugee camps in Angola or the 4,000 in Zambia. Since SWAPO's move to Angola, however, information from inside the camps has been sparse. SWAPO youth are thoroughly indoctrinated in Marxist ideology and are taught to revere their leaders. "We are determined that Namibia must be free," goes one camp song that a Western journalist heard last year. "Marxism and Leninism is our ideology, founded on scientific socialism."

Foreign Support

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Without foreign support, SWAPO and its entrenched leadership could not survive. Along with Cuban and Soviet Bloc military aid, SWAPO receives crucial assistance from the Frontline States, which provide camp sites, money, advisers, and political backing.⁴ Frontline leaders have consistently—if somewhat reluctantly—backed Nujoma and his clique against 25X1 challengers from within SWAPO.

Though representatives stationed abroad, SWAPO solicits and also receives political and economic support from a wide variety of other sources: West European and Middle Eastern countries, international church groups, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the UN. The UN runs the Institute for Namibia in Lusaka—a school for future Namibian bureaucrats—that SWAPO dominates.

⁴ The six Frontline States are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

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SWAPO's Rank and File

The radicalization of SWAPO's membership and the stifling of dissent below the Central Committee appears to parallel the radical trend and consolidation of power in the senior leadership. While they still resided largely in Zambian camps, at least 1,000 SWAPO refugees supported Shipanga's call in 1976 for a party congress. After Shipanga's arrest, SWAPO leaders, with Zambian assistance, confined the lower ranking dissidents to special camps while Nujoma and his

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**Table 5
SWAPO Central Committee**

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Name ^a	Tribe (Subtribe)	Position	Comments
1. Sam Nujoma	Ovambo (Ngandjera)	President	The clique surrounding him limits his real authority [redacted] enough cunning to survive as president since 1959.
2. David Merero	Herero	National Chairman	Fled Namibia in 1975. [redacted] Not a key decisionmaker.
3. Moses Garoeb	Damara	Administration Secretary	Reportedly a doctrinaire Communist without influence. [redacted]
4. Riundja A Kaakunga	Herero	Deputy Administration Secretary	Young, highly dedicated. Regarded as a rising star.
5. Peter Nanyemba	Ovambo (Ndonga)	Secretary for Defense	Inner circle. Described as competent administrator, military hardliner.
6. Richard Kapelwa	Caprivian	Deputy Secretary for Defense	Loyalist who stayed behind after fellow Caprivian Muyongo left. Reportedly a leftist, criticized by SWAPO's internal wing.
7. Peter Mueshihange	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Secretary for Foreign Affairs	Inner circle. [redacted] loyal leftist. Against current Western negotiations but perhaps eclipsed in foreign affairs role by Hamutenya (see 15 below).
8. John Ya-Otto	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Secretary for Labor	Articulate, said to have charisma, and a possible competitor of Nujoma.
9. (Hifikepunye) Lucas Pohamba	Ovambo (Kwanyama)		Reportedly at odds with Hamutenya. Left of center but moderate. Lost treasury post [redacted]
10. Aaron Mushimba	Ovambo (half Kwanyama, half Herero)	Chief Representative in Lusaka	Nujoma's brother-in-law.
11. Dimo Amambo	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Commander of the Armed Forces	Has been at odds with Nanyemba. Received military training in Moscow.
12. Helao Nafidi	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Political Commissar (Armed Forces)	Reportedly influential. Received military training in Moscow.
13. Kaveke Anthony Katamila	Tswana	Organizing Secretary	Teacher. Trained in East Germany.
14. Theo-Ben Gurirab	Damara	SWAPO Representative at the UN	[redacted]
15. Hidipo Hamutenya	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Secretary for Information	Inner circle. Leftist, but pragmatist. Studied in Canada; has advanced degree. Forceful personality and may rival or surpass Nujoma in real power.

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Name ^a	Tribe (Subtribe)	Position	Comments
16. Hage Geingob	Damara	Director of United Nations Institute for Namibia, Lusaka	without talent. Increasingly militant since 1976. Admits that he is outside inner circle. 25X1
17. Salomon Hawala	Ovambo	Deputy Commander, Armed Forces	No discernable political ambition.
18. Peter Katjavivi	Herero		Moderate. Former information secretary and London representative; stripped of post in 1979. Now shunted aside.
19. Maxton Mutongolome	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Secretary for Transport	Owes position to long service to SWAPO and Nujoma's loyalty. 25X1
20. Ben Amathila	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Secretary for Economic Affairs	Moderate by SWAPO standards and likely to be downgraded. 25X6
21. Nahas Angula	Ovambo (Ndonga)	Secretary for Education/Culture	Removed from information post in 1981. 25X1
22. Lucas Stephanus	Nama	Deputy Secretary for Education	Joined Central Committee in 1979 as reward for recruiting work in Namibia. 25X1
23. Iyambo Indongo	Ovambo (Ndonga)	Secretary for Health and Social Welfare	A medical doctor, poor administrator. 25X1
24. Dr. Amathila Libertine	Damara	Deputy Secretary for Health and Social Welfare	Wife of Ben Amathila. 25X1
25. Jiunaja Jesaya Nyamu	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Chief Representative to OAU, Addis Ababa	25X6
26. Nharikutuke Tjirange	Herero	Secretary for Legal Affairs	Returned to Luanda from Lusaka after being replaced by a more radical Ovambo. 25X6
27. Kapuka "Niki" Naujala	Ovambo (Ndonga)	Secretary to the Office of the President	Inner circle. Reported rival of Hamutenya. Close to Nujoma. pro-Soviet opportunist. 25X1
28. Helao Ndadi	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Director, Voice of Namibia	25X6
29. Tuli Hiveluah	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Secretary for Youth	
30. Hiuanua Shihepo	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Deputy Secretary for International Relations	Inner circle. Uses leftist rhetoric but lacks substance. 25X6
31. Ben Boys	Nama	Chief Representative in Lusaka	Lost post in Lusaka to Mushimba. Sent to Eastern Europe for political education. 25X6
32. Kimon Kaukungwa	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Secretary for Elders Council	
33. Helmuth Angula	Ovambo (Ndonga)	Chief Representative in Cuba	Marxist, trained in USSR.

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Table 5
SWAPO Central Committee (continued)

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Name ^a	Tribe (Subtribe)	Position	Comments
34. Ananias Angula	Ovambo (Ndonga)		
35. Netumbo Nandi	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	SWAPO representative in Dar- es Salaam	Close to her benefactor, Nujoma, and resented by some older SWAPO members.
36. Ndali "Che" Kamati	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	SWAPO Representative to International Students' Union, Prague	
37. Tauno Hatuikulipi	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Chief Administrative Officer, Defense Headquarters	Chief adviser to Secretary of Defense Peter Nanyemba. Director of political affairs at defense headquarters in Lubango. In charge of publishing SWAPO's magazine, <i>Combat</i> .
38. Ben Namalambo	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Chief Security Guard at UN Institute for Namibia in Lusaka	Has little influence.
39. Putuse Apollus	South African origin	SWAPO Representative to Women's League, OAU	Respected in SWAPO.
40. Rev. Festus Naholo	Ovambo (Kwanyama)		Lutheran pastor. Former official of SWAPO's internal wing. Fled Namibia in 1979.
41. Dr. Nickey Iyambo	Ovambo (Kwanyama)		
42. Mose Tjitendero	Herero	Senior lecturer, UN Institute for Namibia	
43. Mrs. Kaulinga	Ovambo (Kwanyama)	Head, Women's Section	

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^a The first 17 members constitute the Executive Committee.

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Politics
(Internal)

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Politics (Internal)

Even as South Africa participates in the international effort to negotiate terms for Namibian independence, it is trying to develop an internal political structure that it hopes will be sturdy enough to compete successfully against SWAPO in UN-sponsored elections. By creating an interim government and fostering a broad-based alliance to run it, Pretoria has attempted to create a political force that at once protects white interests and attracts black votes. Although the experiment has given the trappings of democracy to the black majority, it denies blacks access to real power and maintains de facto apartheid. Consequently, while the political consciousness of blacks throughout Namibia has been raised, the South Africans have not yet produced a political alternative capable of blocking the election of a SWAPO majority in an independent Namibia.

Interim Government Structure

The current interim Namibian Government, set up in 1980 by the South African-appointed Administrator-General in consultation with the Namibian National Assembly, is largely a perpetuation of previously existing political institutions. Its most prominent feature is a three-tier system of elected representatives that divides—indeed, compartments—governing responsibility between central, tribal, and local authorities. The power of the elected authorities in the first tier, or central government, is highly circumscribed, however, and the Administrator-General remains the dominant governing force over all levels of government in the territory.

At the central level, the Administrator-General has granted the Council of Ministers—a 15-plus member body drawn from the National Assembly—what he describes as “full executive authority.” These powers, however, do not extend to foreign affairs, defense, or the pace of “constitutional development.” The main function of the central government is to allocate money for national-level development projects and services such as police, post and telecommunications, university education, health care, conservation, and

tourism. It also allocates funds to second-tier authorities in lump sum grants. For revenue, the central government levies taxes on corporations, general sales, diamond exports, and corporate dividends to nonresidents. It has come to rely increasingly, however, on various forms of budget assistance from South Africa.

Even within their limited scope of responsibility, the central government representatives are weakened because of the semiautonomous power of the second-tier authorities—separate bodies representing 10 of the 11 officially designated population groups.⁵ At his discretion, the Administrator-General can grant these authorities control over land tenure, agriculture, preuniversity education, health services, housing, social welfare, pensions, local security, and tribal courts. Although second-tier representatives also have direct income taxing authority over their population groups, this produces only trivial sums in nonwhite areas. They do, however, control how money allocated to them by the central government is spent.

Whites prosper under this system. They control their own sizable tax revenue base and receive a highly disproportionate amount of redistributed national-level revenues. By pressing the Administrator-General to maintain the status quo, the representatives of the white community have thwarted attempts by the National Assembly to shift some of the second-tier power to the central government.

The 10 other groups, consisting of Coloreds and blacks, fare poorly in comparison. They lack sufficient revenue, physical infrastructure, or managerial talent to meet the rising expectations of their constituents. In addition, because the Administrator-General has the right to determine the functions of the second-tier


⁵ The Bushmen are administered directly by the central government. In addition to the officially designated ethnic groups, a 12th group, classified as “other,” is not accorded an opportunity for political representation.

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Figure 16

Structure of Namibia's Interim Government



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authorities, not all of them have equal power. Moreover, second-tier authorities may designate the central government as their agent to perform social services; the Ovambo, for example, have done this with education.

The third-tier authorities—local governments, village management boards, and the like—provide local services and can tax property.

Internal Political Flux

The present political scene has been largely shaped by the reaction of tribal and political groups to a constitutional conference, held under the auspices of the South African Government, that met intermittently from September 1975 until October 1977. The conference—known as the Turnhalle Conference—produced

a plan for achieving independence through an internal settlement, which Pretoria eventually accepted and still retains as an option. It led to the formation of the multiethnic Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, a coalition of political parties and groups that would dominate the political scene in coming years. The conference also, however, polarized preexisting white and nonwhite political groups and further alienated SWAPO, which has been excluded.

The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. The DTA, composed of ethnic parties from among the officially designated population groups, remains the major force in domestic Namibian politics but has lost significant support in recent months. Although

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Kuaimo Riruako, a Herero, is its president, the DTA is still controlled by its founding father, white Republican Party leader Dirk Mudge. It no longer includes the full spectrum of prominent figures from the white, Herero, Ovambo, Colored, and Baster power structure. Such persons represented a moderate to conservative cross section of Namibian society—whites and nonwhites with enough stake in the existing order not to want it swept away through a SWAPO victory, but with enough vision to realize that Namibia will eventually have independence and racial integration thrust upon it, either violently or through gradual change.

The Alliance had hoped to become a credible political force capable of competing successfully against SWAPO in a UN-sponsored election.⁶ So far, the Alliance has only partially achieved its objective of dominating all three tiers of Namibia's interim government. It was swept to power in national elections in December 1978 but failed to gain control of the important white, Damara, and Baster second-tier authorities in elections in November 1980. Although the Alliance continues to hold a position of apparent responsibility because of its majority in the central government, its lack of significant power has lessened its popularity.

The Alliance has suffered not only from its impotence, but also from championing certain government actions offensive to blacks, such as universal male conscription. It has also been connected with the indigenous territorial military forces that [redacted] have committed numerous depredations against the Ovambo. Overall, we believe the Alliance has become identified in the minds of most nonwhite Namibians with the South African Government and apartheid.

The erosion of the Alliance's prestige increased dramatically in February 1982, when it lost one of its major components, the Ovambo-dominated National Democratic Party headed by Alliance president Peter Kalangula. Kalangula, one of the few non-SWAPO

⁶ Member parties compete in second- and third-tier elections, but combine in first-tier voting.

Ovambo politicians with any credible following, bolted—ostensibly because of Dirk Mudge's determination to maintain the Alliance's ethnic differentiation. More generally, however, Kalangula was reacting to the Alliance's growing unpopularity by seeking his political fortune independently.

As of June 1982, only five of the 10 second-tier representative authorities were in the hands of the DTA. The white, Ovambo, Damara, Colored, and Baster authorities were in anti-DTA hands.

Other Parties. Other political coalitions and parties, following the 1975-77 conference, coalesced in opposition to the emerging Alliance. Some, generally white parties, believed that the Alliance was moving too quickly toward independence and a multiracial state. Others, generally black or Colored parties, thought that the Alliance was not going far or fast enough. Although they rejected the South African-sanctioned political structure, they organized politically for the day of UN-sponsored elections.

The conservative opposition is dominated by the National Party, which has severed its formal ties with the South African party but still has indirect influence in South African politics, a factor that gives it political clout with the Administrator-General. The party represents largely rural-based Afrikaans speakers. Working through a front group, the Action Committee for Retention of the Turnhalle Principles (AKTUR), it initially held the support of some nonwhite ethnic groups that feared assimilation in a multiracial Namibia, especially one controlled by the powerful Ovambo tribe. These groups, however, have largely drifted away to other coalitions or have remained independent. Through its control of the white second-tier government, the National Party has successfully resisted the efforts of the Alliance-controlled central government to end many lingering manifestations of racial segregation.

Farther to the right is the Namibian branch of South Africa's arch-conservative Herstigte Nasionale Party. Attracting only a small percentage of the white vote,

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it campaigns for undiminished white supremacy and continued South African control of Namibia.

The "middle parties"—to the left of the Alliance—have largely untested followings. Most are not willing to participate in South African-sponsored balloting, but are ready to compete in a UN election. Many of their leaders—drawn typically from the Herero and Colored intelligentsia—have been associated with anti-South African Government activities since at least the early 1970s.

The Namibia National Front was once the most important middle-group coalition but is now largely a paper organization. Although the Front has been dominated by the mainly Herero South-West Africa National Union (SWANU), it once shared its leadership with the liberal, largely white Federal Party, which gave the organization significant financial support. Another party in the Front, the Damara Council of Chiefs, dealt a serious blow to coalition unity in 1980, when it violated the Front's principle of nonparticipation in internal elections; it took part in—and won—a second-tier Damara-authority election. The Front has recently made an effort to reactivate itself, and currently appears to consist of SWANU, the National Independence Party (a Colored splinter group), the Mbandero Hereros (Herero subtribe), and probably the Damara Council.

One party that the Namibia National Front had counted on to join it was the SWAPO-Democrat (SWAPO-D). This party is headed by former senior SWAPO official Andreas Shipanga, who left SWAPO after he failed in an attempt to oust SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma in 1976. Following two years in Zambian and Tanzanian jails, Shipanga, an Ovambo, returned to Namibia to form SWAPO-D to compete with SWAPO in Ovamboland and elsewhere. The National Front and SWAPO-D, however, could not agree on merger terms in 1980, and efforts by other Namibian political groups to court SWAPO-D have failed. Shipanga, while remaining active, has yet to attract a noticeable following.

A number of other political parties, generally reflecting ethnic interests, also dot the landscape of Namibian domestic politics, but they generally either lack a significant following within their ethnic group, or their group is too small to have much impact on the political scene.

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Table 6
Internal Namibian Political Groups ^a

Coalitions/Member Groups	Remarks
The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)	Political alliance formed in 1977; it dominates the interim government.
Republican Party	Formed from the rump of the National Party, the party is led by Dirk Mudge, who also serves as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Moderate, largely white, it lost the second-tier election in November 1980 to the National Party, 42 percent to 48 percent.
National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO)	The dominant political group among Hereros; it also has some Nama support. Led by Herero tribal chief Kuaima Riruako and by Katuutire Kaure, a firebrand speaker and leading spokesman. Formed in 1964, NUDO supports a multiracial state with a federal system based on area rather than population—a system designed to afford protection to the minority tribes against the Ovambo.
South-West Africa People's Democratic Unity Front (SWAPUF)	Damara party, headed by Englehard Christie, who is not highly respected by other DTA colleagues. SWAPUF lost second-tier elections in 1980 to the Damara Council, a political party in the Namibia National Front.
National People's Liberation Front	Splinter Damara group, Windhoek based. Led by political veteran Kefas Conradie. The Front is a newcomer to the DTA.
Rehoboth Baster Party	Headed by Ben Africa, who lost the "Kapteinship"—the head of the unique Baster state—in 1979. The party lacks majority following even in Rehoboth, the home of the Basters.
Christian Democratic Union	A new Colored party and the latest political vehicle of veteran politician A. J. F. Kloppers, who occupies a seat in the National Assembly. Recently formed with defectors from the Colored Labor Party.
Other DTA members	The DTA also has parties and individual representatives from other smaller ethnic groups in Namibia. Some lack significant following in their constituencies while others appear to enjoy some local support.
Namibia National Front (NNF)	Its current status is unclear. Once a political alliance to the left of the DTA and the right of SWAPO, it had some promise as a political third force. Currently, it exists largely on paper, although it is attempting to make a comeback. Member parties once prominently associated with it are listed below. They operate today as individual parties.
South-West Africa National Union (SWANU)	Largely Herero, but trying to project a multiracial image. Currently headed by Moses Katjuongua and Nora Chase, a veteran Colored politician. SWANU was formed in 1959 and was initially more radical than SWAPO. It has become more moderate in recent years, but still describes itself as "socialist." Maintains a small, nonviolent external wing that has infrequently worked with SWAPO in the UN. Resents UN's exclusive recognition of SWAPO.
Federal Party	Largely white, English speaking, liberal. Led by Bryan O'Linn. Represents some significant local business interests; once a major funder of the NNF. Calls for South African talks with SWAPO. Currently outside NNF.
Damara Council of Chiefs	Contrary to NNF principles, participated in second-tier elections in 1980 and won, thus becoming the controlling Damara authority. Led by Justus Garoeb, who is also the NNF president of record, although Garoeb quit the NNF in early March 1982. Reported negotiating with Peter Kalangula.
National Independence Party	Largely Colored and Namas, it is a splinter of Federal Party. Led by Charlie Hartung and Otilie Abrahams, both Colored. Seeks Lancaster House-type settlement.
Mbandero Hereros	Led by Munjuku Nguvauva II, represents a subtribe of Hereros that wants separate status from dominant Herero group.
Action Committee for the Retention of the Turnhalle Principles (AKTUR)	Formed in 1977 to compete against the DTA, its current composition is unclear. Initially it had some nonwhite support, but it is now largely a front for the National Party.

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Table 6
Internal Namibian Political Groups ^a (continued)

Coalitions/Member Groups	Remarks
National Party	Led by Kosie Pretorius. This white, largely Afrikaner party dominates the white second-tier government, which is still a major power throughout Namibia. Ready to accept Namibian independence, but only with powerful, entrenched second-tier government. Its political strength comes, in part, indirectly through its informal ties to South Africa's National Party.
Nonaligned Parties	
Herstigte National Party (HNF)	Ultraright, white, the HNF has the support of about 10 percent of the white community. Headed by Sarel Becker, it opposes Namibian independence and is suspicious of a South African "sellout" of Namibia's whites.
Namibian Deutsche Interesse Gemeinschaft (IG)	German interest group; provides money to AKTUR, and perhaps to other groups. A point of contact with the West German Government (most Namibian Germans hold West German passports).
SWAPO-Democrat (SWAPO-D)	Built around Andreas Shipanga, a former senior SWAPO official who fell out with other SWAPO leaders in 1976. Despite its early promise and the fact that Shipanga is an Ovambo, SWAPO-D has not been able to attract a significant following.
Christian Democratic Action Party	Formerly the National Democratic Action Party, it was renamed by its leader, Peter Kalangula, shortly after he pulled the NDA out of the DTA in February 1982. The NDA had dominated the Ovambo ethnic government since its founding in 1973.
Caprivi African National Union	Led by former SWAPO Vice President Mishake Muyongo. Wants independence for Caprivi strip and its dominant tribe.
Namibia Democratic Coalition (NDC)	A small umbrella group that serves as the vehicle of Mburumba Kerina, a political opportunist seeking ties and financial support in the West.
United Namibia's People's Party	Splinter group of SWAPO-D.
Rehoboth Liberation Party	Conservative Baster group with a fashionable leftist name. Its leader, Hans Diergaard, as "Kaptein" of the Basters controls Baster government.
Colored Labor Party	The apparent major political group among the dispersed Coloreds, who lack a designated "homeland." It split from the DTA in March 1982. It is dominant in the Colored second-tier government, headed by Barney Barnes.

^a Due to the ephemeral nature of these political groups [redacted] some of the splinter groups may have vanished, merged with others, or shifted in or out of a coalition. There are about 45 such groups in all.

[redacted]

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Insurgency

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Insurgency


Guerrilla Force

SWAPO's leaders, exiled since a South African crackdown in the mid-1960s on the organization's political activities inside Namibia, have relied primarily on their externally based guerrilla force—the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN)—in their bid to force Pretoria to cede control over Namibia. [redacted]

The withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola in 1975 and the emergence of an independent black government with Soviet and Cuban backing opened the way for a major buildup of PLAN in southern Angola. [redacted]

[redacted] the total of trained and armed guerrillas increased from a few hundred in 1975 to about 8,000 by 1982. With its operational and logistic headquarters in Lubango, Angola, PLAN also uses as rear bases other sites along the Mocamedes-Menongue rail line in Angola and near Senanga in Zambia. [redacted]

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Figure 17. SWAPO guerrillas doing weapons maintenance [redacted]

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Cautious Strategy

PLAN has seldom followed an aggressive strategy. The bulk of its forces have been held in reserve in Angola or Zambia. Guerrilla bands usually travel in groups no larger than 15 and have avoided contact with South African troops except for ambushes of patrols and infrequent mortar or rocket attacks on military bases. Most guerrilla attacks have been on black Namibians who have collaborated with the South Africans and, to a lesser extent, Namibia's white residents. We believe their aim has been not only to intimidate civilians but to compel Pretoria to spread its limited military resources over an increasingly wide area. The strategy of prolonged attrition also motivates the many incidents of small-scale sabotage, such as mining roads and rail lines or cutting telephone lines and water mains. [redacted]

SWAPO's military activity has also been responsive to shortrun political objectives in recent years. In July 1978, when SWAPO leaders agreed in principle to the Western proposal that a UN task force monitor a

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truce and conduct a preindependence election, they stepped up guerrilla infiltrations in order to bolster their claims of territorial control and to prepare for increased political proselytizing. Later, in order to disrupt territorial elections held by South Africans in December 1978, SWAPO leaders sent sabotage teams into white urban areas to place bombs at polling stations. When UN Secretary General Waldheim set a cease-fire target date of February 1979, infiltration was again increased.

War in Ovamboland

For the most part, the insurgency has been restricted to the four ethnic "homelands"—Kaokoland, Ovamboland, Kavangoland, and Caprivi—that make up northern Namibia. Ovamboland has been the prime area of guerrilla activity since 1976, when SWAPO gained access to the adjacent sector of Angola for staging purposes. We believe that PLAN has seldom had more than a few hundred active guerrillas inside Ovamboland, although a peak of some 1,000 may have been attained in early 1979, when implementation of the UN truce plan appeared imminent. There is no solid evidence that even the all-out effort in 1979 to establish an effective presence resulted in the guerrillas holding any fixed bases in Ovamboland—or anywhere else inside Namibia.

Nevertheless, guerrilla incidents reported by the South African authorities increased in frequency from only nine in August 1977 to 93 in April 1979. During the same period, guerrilla action spread from the immediate border area throughout most of Ovamboland. South African statistics indicate that assassinations of "collaborators"—from village headmen to policemen, schoolteachers, and senior officials of the autonomous Ovambo government—may have peaked in 1979.

South African officials claim that civilian casualties inflicted by landmines are a critical reason for the purported disillusionment with SWAPO among the Ovambos. The South Africans also assert that the substantial social services provided by their military personnel stationed in Ovamboland have increased popular tolerance for the South African presence. However, Ovambo clergymen and European missionaries maintain, we believe accurately, that resentment

**Table 7
Deaths Resulting From
the SWAPO Insurgency^a**

Number of persons

	1978	1979	1980	1981
Security forces	30	31	87	56
SWAPO guerrillas	900	1,000	1,470	1,500 ^b
Local inhabitants	90	157	99	94
Assassination	24	102	21	30
Landmine explosions	66	55	78	64

^a Based on announcements by South African military spokesmen.
^b Excludes SADF's rough estimate of 500 guerrillas killed in the course of "Operation Protea."

of SWAPO violence is more than offset by brutal behavior on the part of the South African—recruited local black troops and occasionally harsh treatment from the South Africans themselves.

Beyond dispute is the fact that the South African administration has failed to provide Ovamboland with basic physical security—except for the tiny elite group of Ovambo officials who reside in the conspicuously fortified areas of the principal towns. A wide variety of sources indicate that the majority of the Ovambos are continually harassed by both security forces and guerrillas. Significantly, Ovamboland was excluded from the elections of "second-tier" legislatures held in November 1980 in the homelands of seven tribes and in the white areas. SWAPO had called for a boycott of the elections, and the South African authorities, we believe, expected that fear of guerrilla reprisals would have resulted in an embarrassingly low voter turnout.

Activity Outside Ovamboland

One of the most notable SWAPO operations—a hit-and-run mortar attack on the South African base at Katima Mulilo—occurred in Caprivi in 1978, but little guerrilla activity has occurred in this homeland since then. We believe this reflects the tightened control that Jonas Savimbi's South African-backed

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Figure 18. White farmers patrol against SWAPO insurgents. Liaison ©

Small guerrilla teams have occasionally penetrated white areas of Namibia since 1978, but their actions have not yet appreciably affected the modern sector of the economy despite occasional instances of railway sabotage. The only apparent results of SWAPO's efforts to intimidate whites during the election in December 1978 were three bomb explosions in Windhoek and one in Swakopmund; none of these caused serious injuries. Guerrilla bands have also periodically infiltrated the white farming area south of Tsumeb and killed white civilians. After a year's respite from this type of activity, SWAPO infiltrated another group, estimated by South Africa to be at least 100, into the Tsumeb area in April 1982. This operation suggests that SWAPO has overcome to some degree the disruptive effect of South Africa's continuing presence in southern Angola, and we believe the main purpose of this offensive was to demonstrate that PLAN could still operate in Namibia.

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National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has exerted over adjacent areas of Angola, as well as the restrictions that the Zambian Government has placed on SWAPO's use of Zambian territory.

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In early 1981 small guerrilla bands for the first time began operating for extended periods in Kaokoland and Kavango, leading the South Africans to augment their counterinsurgency forces in the two homelands. One probable reason for this new theater of PLAN operations was the stepped-up South African disruption of PLAN infiltration routes in Angolan territory opposite Ovamboland.

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Chronology

- 1486 Portuguese navigator Diego Cao first reaches Cape Cross on coast of South-West Africa (SWA).
- 1487 Angra Pequena (now Luderitz Bay) discovered by Bartholomew Diaz.
- 1840 Namas conquer Hereros. First permanent settlement at Windhoek.
- 1845 Settlement of Walvis Bay and Rehoboth.
- 1861 Hereros begin successful revolt against Nama rule.
- 1866 Britain formally claims Penguin Islands, which are then annexed to Cape Colony.
- 1870 Peace between Hereros and Namas made at Okahandja.
- 1878 Walvis Bay annexed by Britain.
- 1880 Ten-Year War begins between Hereros and Namas.
- 1883 Rhenish missionaries ask for German protection. German traders active in area.
- 1884 German Protectorate declared.
- Walvis Bay annexed by the Cape of Good Hope Colony.
- 1886 Border with Angola defined by agreement between Portugal and Germany.
- 1890 Present boundaries fixed by treaty between Germany and Britain. Small changes made by international arbitration in 1928.
- Caprivi Strip defined—provides German access to the Zambezi River.
- 1892 German Imperial Commissioner appointed.
- 1904-07 Herero and Nama uprisings crushed by Germans, ending decades of warfare.
- 1906 Compulsory education introduced for white children.
- 1907 Karakul sheep introduced from Germany.
- 1908 Discovery of diamonds in the Namib Desert.

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- 1914 Outbreak of World War I.
- Invasion of German SWA by South African troops under General Louis Botha.
- 1915 Surrender of German forces. South Africa begins occupation on behalf of the United Kingdom.
- 1919 South Africa granted mandate over SWA following Treaty of Versailles, at which South Africa's proposal that territory be made its fifth province is rejected.
- 1920 SWA becomes a League of Nations Mandated Territory of Union of South Africa.
- 1922 Walvis Bay placed under control of the Administration of SWA, although legally part of Cape Province.
- 1925 South-West Africa Constitution Act provides measure of autonomy to territorial government by creating a Legislative Assembly for whites.
- 1926 Settlement of Angola Boers in SWA.
- 1939 South-West African Police merged with South African Police.
- 1945 Caprivi Strip administration taken over by South Africa. United Nations Charter enters into force, providing for establishment of International Trusteeship System.
- 1946 UN refuses request for incorporation of SWA into South Africa; proposes that SWA be placed under trusteeship system and that South Africa submit such an agreement.
- 1947 South Africa informs UN it will continue to administer territory in "spirit of mandate." SWA eventually becomes only mandated territory not brought under International Trusteeship System.
- 1948 Fishing industry established at Walvis Bay.
- 1949 SWA receives six seats in South Africa's House of Assembly.
- 1950 International Court of Justice issues advisory opinion that South Africa cannot modify the status of the mandate over South-West Africa and, although South Africa has no obligation to place SWA under a UN trusteeship agreement, that the General Assembly is competent to supervise the administration of the mandate.
- 1955 Trade statistics of SWA are incorporated into those of South Africa.
- United Nations holds debate on SWA.

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- International Court of Justice rules that the UN can supervise the administration of SWA without South African cooperation.
- 1957 Ovambo People's Organization formed in Cape Town.
- 1959 Forced relocation of blacks to new townships in Windhoek provokes demonstrations resulting in killings by police.
- 1960 South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and South-West Africa National Union (SWANU) founded.
- 1961 Proceedings begun by Liberia and Ethiopia before International Court of Justice challenging South African administration of SWA.
- 1962 Odendaal Plan calls for strategy of ethnic homeland development in SWA.
- 1963 Successful offshore diamond mining begun.
- 1966 International Court of Justice decides that Liberia and Ethiopia are not entitled to bring action for revocation of South African mandate over SWA.
- UN General Assembly terminates South Africa's mandate and assumes direct responsibility for the territory.
- SWAPO begins guerrilla war.
- 1967 UN Council for South-West Africa established as only legal authority to administer the territory until independence.
- 1968 UN delegation attempts to enter SWA and fails.
- Limited self-government for Ovambos.
- Terrorist attacks on northern boundary.
- Name *Namibia* given by the United Nations to South-West Africa; not recognized by the South African Government until 1978.
- UN Security Council declares South African presence in Namibia is illegal.
- 1969 UN General Assembly orders South Africa to evacuate Namibia. UK, US, and other powers abstain from vote. Ignored by Pretoria.
- South Africa creates South-West Africa Account to function as Namibia's central budget under Pretoria's control.
- Namibian economic statistics are increasingly merged with those of South Africa.

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- 1970 The United States adopts policy of official discouragement of new US private investment in Namibia. EXIM Bank credit guarantees no longer available. UN adopts similar position by calling on member states to direct their nationals to cease commercial activity in Namibia.
- 1971 International Court of Justice upholds UN authority over Namibia and declares South African presence to be illegal. The territory becomes an international political problem more than a legal one.
- 1971-73 Strikes and associated riots produce sizable exodus of persons destined to become future guerrillas and nationalist politicians.
- 1972 UN officials, including Secretary General Waldheim, visit Namibia, marking the beginning of direct negotiations on the future of the territory.
- 1973 The UN General Assembly recognizes SWAPO as the "authentic representative" of the Namibian people and appoints Sean MacBride as the first UN Commissioner for Namibia. Security Council ends negotiations between Secretary General and South Africa.
- 1974 UN Security Council Resolution 366 demands withdrawal of illegal South African administration from Namibia. UN Institute for Namibia created, to be established in Lusaka.
- South African Army units begin to supplement and replace police along Namibia's northern border.
- 1975 Western veto blocks Security Council motion to "force" South African withdrawal from Namibia.
- South Africa opens its so-called Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, which gives itself three years to draw up a constitution for "independence." Conference is condemned by Trusteeship Committee of UN General Assembly.
- Angola granted independence from Portugal.
- UN General Assembly again adopts resolution demanding South African withdrawal from Namibia.
- 1976 UN Security Council Resolution 385 condemns South African military presence in Namibia, demands free elections under UN supervision.
- Cuban-backed movement wins civil war in Angola.
- Kavangoland, Caprivi, and Ovamboland are declared "security districts" by South Africa and are placed under a form of martial law.

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Turnhalle Conference sets end of 1978 as target for Namibian independence and calls for interim government to hold power during the two intervening years. These proposals are denounced by SWAPO and the UN Council for Namibia.

Uranium production begins.

Andreas Shipanga arrested in Lusaka.

UN General Assembly recognizes SWAPO as the "sole and authentic" representative of the Namibian people. SWAPO accorded observer status.

Martti Ahtisaari appointed to succeed MacBride as UN Commissioner for Namibia.

1977

Completion of Turnhalle discussions resulting in draft constitution for interim government.

South Africa agrees to participate in Namibian independence negotiations with five Western powers (United Kingdom, United States, Canada, France, and West Germany).

Appointment by South Africa of Judge M. T. Steyn as Administrator-General—the chief executive authority in the territory.

Return of Walvis Bay to South African jurisdiction under Cape Province authority.

West German Consulate in Windhoek closed.

1978

South Africa and SWAPO accept proposals by Western Five for SWA/Namibia settlement, involving UN-supervised elections.

Security Council Resolution 431 embodies Western Five proposal. Resolution 432 calls for reintegration of Walvis Bay into Namibian territory.

At Security Council request, the UN Secretary General appoints Martti Ahtisaari as his Special Representative for Namibia.

Security Council Resolution 435 provides for a UN Transition Assistance Group to ensure free and fair Namibian elections, and declares unilateral, internal electoral measures in Namibia to be null and void.

South Africa proceeds with internal Namibian election for a constituent assembly, but agrees to cooperate in achieving implementation of Resolution 435.

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1979

Namibian Constituent Assembly proposes and South Africa creates a National Assembly to serve as interim government in Namibia, based on ethnic representation and with wide legislative powers, but with no power to change international status of the territory.

UN General Assembly rejects South Africa's credentials and denies it participation.

South Africa plays for time and blocks further progress in the UN negotiations.

Gradual transfer of budget responsibility, from South-West Africa Account to Central Revenue Fund under Namibian authority, begins.

Dr. Gerrit Viljoen replaces Steyn as Administrator-General.

SWAPO shifts operations largely from Zambia to Angola.

1980

The National Assembly elects a Council of Ministers, under the chairmanship of Dirk Mudge, which holds limited executive powers. Interim Constitution introduced.

South Africa accepts, in principle, Security Council Resolution 435 as the basis of a Namibian settlement.

Danie Hough replaces Viljoen as Administrator-General.
First major South African operation against SWAPO in Angola.

1981

South Africa undermines "preimplementation" talks in Geneva in January.

Three major South African ground attacks in Angola.

Western Contact Group launches new, phased-negotiation attempt at settlement.

Ahtisaari resigns as UN Commissioner for Namibia, but retains position as the Secretary General's Special Representative for Namibia.

1982

Brajesh Mishra is appointed UN Commissioner for Namibia, over objections of Western Five powers who feel post should remain vacant.

South Africa stages minor raid on SWAPO base in western portion of southern Angola.



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Statistical Summary

This summary is based on data available as of 31 July 1982.

Land

Area: including Walvis Bay, 824,269 square kilometers (318,261 square miles); twice the size of California and roughly 3 percent of the African continent.

Coordinates: Between 17° and 29° south latitude and between 12° and 25° east longitude.

Land Boundaries: 3,798 kilometers.

Coastline: 1,489 kilometers.

Territorial waters (claimed): 12 nautical miles, plus 200-nautical-mile fishing zone.

Rivers (perennial): Kunene (325 km), Okavango (400 km), Orange (500 km), Zambezi (100 km).

Climate: Basically subtropical with dry, sunny winters and warm summers. Tropical in extreme north and progressively drier to the south. Annual rainfall averages range from 25 millimeters in Namib Desert to 400 mm in central plateau region and as much as 700 mm in Caprivi. The overall mean is 273 mm. Main rains occur from December to February.

Vegetation: Mostly desert except for wooded savanna on interior plateau and tropical areas along northern border and in Caprivi in the northeast.

People

Population: 1,009,900 (May 1981, official estimate). Independent, unofficial estimates are higher; for example, 1,250,000 (for mid-1982). Over half of population is under 16 years old.

Population density: Approximately 1.5 per square kilometer.

Average annual growth rate: 3 percent.

Urban population: 15 percent.

Geographic distribution: Over 60 percent of population in Ovamboland, Kavangoland, and Caprivi.

Ethnic divisions (percent): White (7.5), mixed race (6.9), black (85.6). Over half of the nonwhites belong to the Ovambo tribe.

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Religion: Whites predominantly Christian, nonwhites either animist or Christian.

Language: Several African languages. Afrikaans is principal language of about 60 percent of the white population (and of most Coloreds), German of 30 percent, and English of 10 percent.

Adult literacy: Approximately 28 percent for blacks.

Schools: No universities, two teacher training colleges, one music conservatory, and one college for vocational education. Department of National Education is responsible for nationwide syllabuses and inspections for 12 ethnically based school systems. Private companies operate technical training institutions.

Medical facilities: 152 doctors, 16 dentists. Ethnically based provision of services. South African military doctors provide virtually the only medical care to many rural blacks. Over 70 hospitals of all types provide roughly 7,000 beds.

Government

Legal name: Namibia

Capital: Windhoek

Political subdivisions: 10 tribal homelands, with the remainder of the territory open to white settlement; administrative subdivisions according to tribal group.

Type: Former German colony of South-West Africa mandated to South Africa by League of Nations in 1920; UN formally ended South Africa's mandate on 27 October 1966, but South Africa has retained administrative control. Interim government composed of national, second-tier tribal, and local levels. South Africa retains ultimate authority.

Legal system: Based on Roman-Dutch law and law of custom.

Government leaders: Danie Hough, Administrator-General appointed by South Africa, has wide executive powers. Dirk Mudge heads the national-level Council of Ministers of the "interim government."

Suffrage: Ethnic groups have adult franchise for national-level election and for elections in their own second-tier government.

Elections: Election of Namibian National Assembly, December 1978. Second-tier elections for some groups held in 1980. National Assembly elections proposed for March 1983.

Political parties and leaders: The dominant national-level coalition is the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). There are approximately 45 tribally based parties. The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), led by Sam

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Nujoma, maintains a foreign-based guerrilla movement as well as a legal political structure in Namibia, is predominantly Ovambo but has some influence among other tribes, and is the only Namibian group recognized by the UN General Assembly and the Organization of African Unity.

Communists: No Communist party; SWAPO guerrilla force is supported by USSR, Cuba, and other Communist states as well as the UN, OAU, and various Western private groups.

Economy

GDP: (1981, preliminary) \$1,494 million; \$1,195 per capita.

GDP breakdown: (1980) Government, 32 percent; mining, 47.7 percent; agriculture and fishing, 9.6 percent; other, 10.7 percent.

Agriculture: Commercial livestock raising (cattle and karakul sheep) predominates. Subsistence crops (millet, sorghum, corn, and some wheat) are raised, but self-sufficiency has not been achieved and food must be imported.

Fishing: Catch of about 212,000 metric tons (1980), processed mostly in South African enclave of Walvis Bay. Lobstering at Luderitz.

Mining: Exploitation of diamonds, uranium, copper, lead, tin, zinc, salt, and vanadium. Largest uranium mine in world at Rossing. One of the world's leading producers of gem diamonds.

Major industries: Meatpacking, fish processing, (fish oil, fish meal, canned fish), copper and lead smelting, uranium processing, dairy products.

Electric power: Annual demand requires only about 140 megawatts (MW) of generating capacity. Existing capacity of over 400 MW includes the Van Eck coal-fired thermal station at Windhoek, for standby use (120 MW), Kunene hydroelectric scheme (240 MW), and emergency diesel at Walvis Bay (45 MW). In addition, powerlines from South Africa provide at least 160 MW because capacity of the Kunene River fluctuates widely with seasonal rainfall and is vulnerable to sabotage.

Economic aid: South Africa is the only donor. Assistance exceeds \$600 million annually.

Fiscal year: 1 April–31 March.

Budget: 1982-83 expenditure estimated at \$825 million against revenue of \$627 million, plus borrowing of \$198 million.

Monetary unit: South African Rand.

Monetary conversion rate: 1 South African Rand = 87 US cents (as of 31 July 1982); 1.15 SA Rand = US \$1.

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Inflation rate: (1981) More than 15 percent.

Labor force: Approximately 500,000 (1981), of whom about 75,000 are unemployed; employment consists of 60 percent agriculture, 19 percent industry and commerce, 8 percent services, 7 percent government, and 6 percent mining.

Organized labor: No trade unions, although some white wage earners belong to South African unions.

**Transportation and
Communications**

Railroads: 2,607 kilometers of 1.067-meter (narrow gauge) single track connecting Windhoek and Walvis Bay to the mining centers and integrated with the South African system.

Bus service: 9,400-kilometer network, serving 105 points.

Roads: 54,500 kilometers; 4,079 kilometers paved, remainder gravel and dirt roads and tracks.

Ports: Walvis Bay and Luderitz. Walvis Bay is claimed by South Africa and is the only deepwater port, handling the bulk of exports. It has almost a mile of wharf space, 110,000 square feet of storage, and 33 harbor cranes. Luderitz has an artificial harbor suited only to small vessels.

Civil air: Namib Air, a national airline, operates three modest-size passenger aircraft and several smaller craft on domestic routes and to South Africa. International carriers provide flights connecting Windhoek to South Africa, Zimbabwe, Germany, and Britain.

Airfields: 102 usable; 17 with permanent-surface runways. One with runway over 4,500 meters; three with runways over 2,500 meters; 45 with runways 1,000 to 2,500 meters.

Water resources: Over 1,600 boreholes and 600 dams, plus a 300-kilometer canal system in Ovamboland.

Telecommunications: Undersea cables to Cape Town and London; good urban, fair rural services. Microwave relay connects major towns, with wire to other population centers. 50,300 telephones linked to South African network. One local TV station and 10 FM radio stations—under the control of the South-West African Broadcasting Corporation. Radio services are in English, German, and Afrikaans. Shortwave broadcasts are provided by the SWABC in the languages of the Ovambo, Herero, Damara, and Kavango.

Newspapers: Six local, in English, German, and Afrikaans.

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Defense Forces

Military manpower: Compulsory conscription for blacks introduced in 1980, but excluding Ovamboland, Kavangoland, and Caprivi.

Major ground units: South-West Africa Territory Force (SWATF) was established in 1980.

Personnel: Total active duty composed of about 3,000 SWATF and about 18,000 South Africa Defense Force (SADF) personnel in Namibia.

Ships: No navy separate from the SADF.

Aircraft: No air force separate from SADF.

Supply: From South Africa.

Military budget: For fiscal year 1981/82, about \$63 million. Annual expense of South African operations in Namibia is well hidden in the SADF budget but is estimated at about \$400 million.

Intelligence and Security

As of 1 September 1980, an independent police force was created for Namibia. It has its own budget and all the traditional national police functions except for security (Special Branch) and intelligence which remain under the control of the South African Government.



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