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# **Kampuchea: Famine, Fighting, and Refugees**

**An Intelligence Assessment**

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*NI 79-10007  
September 1979*

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# **Kampuchea: Famine, Fighting, and Refugees**

## **An Intelligence Assessment**

*Information available as of 31 August 1979 has been used  
in the preparation of this report.*

This assessment was prepared in the office of the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the Pacific and was based on reports submitted by analysts of the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research and the Office of Political Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center, and of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Contributions were also received from analysts in the National Security Agency. The assessment was requested by the United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Ambassador-at-Large Dick Clark. It was coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, National Foreign Assessment Center, and the National Intelligence Officers for USSR-Eastern Europe and China.

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**Kampuchea: Famine, Fighting, and Refugees**

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**Key Judgments**

We estimate that the Kampuchean population has been reduced over the past decade from more than 7 million to around 5.8 million. At the same time, the amount of farmland in crop production has been severely reduced.

[Redacted]

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The estimated numbers of persons facing starvation is in the range of 2.25-3.5 million. The brunt of this disaster will be borne by those living in or near towns and cities.

[Redacted]

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Estimates of food assistance needed through December to prevent mass starvation range between 150,000 and 200,000 metric tons of grain. A substantial amount of medical supplies will also be required. The picture over the longer term is no less gloomy, although the amount of external assistance needed is as yet undeterminable.

[Redacted]

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Many factors will influence the refugee flow, but, should famine become widespread, tens of thousands each month may try to cross into Thailand.

[Redacted]

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Heng Samrin/Vietnamese authorities will probably allow large amounts of relief supplies to enter but will try to impose conditions.

[Redacted]

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The Heng Samrin/Vietnamese administrative infrastructure in Kampuchea is not adequate for the distribution of relief supplies and cooperation by the Vietnamese military will be required.

[Redacted]

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Thailand will permit the passage of relief supplies both by air to Heng Samrin authorities in Phnom Penh and overland to civilians under Pol Pot's control at the border, but may change this policy if it should be criticized publicly by Vietnam.

[Redacted]

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In the event of a new surge of refugees, the Thais will probably maintain a hardline policy and try to deny entry. They may also forcibly repatriate refugees unless prompt guarantees of permanent resettlement are forthcoming from the international community.

[Redacted]

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The fighting will intensify in the dry season due to start in November, and will adversely effect the security and food supplies of the civilian population. There is little prospect for a negotiated peace at present.

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## **Kampuchea: Famine, Fighting, and Refugees (U)**

### **Discussion**

#### **Status of Population**

1. A decade of civil war, oppression, and invasion in Kampuchea between 1970 and 1979 has made it difficult to assess population figures with accuracy. The figures that follow represent our best estimates, but should be treated with appropriate caution.

2. **Population Size.** Published estimates of the Kampuchean population range between 4 million and 8 million. The latter estimate is a UN figure and undoubtedly is too high, whereas the lower figure is used by the Heng Samrin regime. The UN estimate assumes a normal growth rate and does not consider the effects of war, mass executions, and emigration. Our estimate is 5.8 million, but the actual population could be well below this. Clearly the difference between our figure and that of the United Nations—well over 2 million persons—illustrates the possible extent of the disaster visited upon the Kampuchean people. (See the appendix for methodology and detailed figures.)

3. **Conditions in First Half of 1979.** The Heng Samrin government is unable to provide the basic necessities of life nor is it able to guarantee physical security for the people under its control. The Vietnamese reportedly distributed small amounts of rice in Kampuchea's eastern provinces between January and March, but this supply soon ran out and people were compelled to

forage in nearby forests for roots and tubers. In the west, near Battambang, a rice-growing area, no rice ration was provided and people reportedly lived on scavenged rice.

4. During and after the Vietnamese invasion, much internal movement again took place; displaced peasants were urged to return home and grow food, while the Pol Pot forces removed large numbers to their mountain retreats. As many as 1.5 million may have been involved in internal migration between January and July. Reentry to the cities is apparently forbidden, but some citydwellers remain. Large numbers of people—perhaps as many as 600,000—reportedly cluster on city outskirts to gain increased security, and many of these undoubtedly anticipate reentry to their former homes.

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5. **Population Distribution.** We speculate that the most realistic of several possible patterns of population distribution is the following (see map and appendix for detailed figures and alternative scenarios):

### Estimated Population Distribution Kampuchea, Summer 1979

Region	Distribution (Percent)	Population (Millions)		
		High Series	Medium Series	Low Series
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>5.3</b>
Central rice-growing region	56.0	3.4	3.2	3.0
Northwestern rice-growing region	19.0	1.2	1.1	1.0
Eastern border region	8.0	0.5	0.5	0.4
Phnom Penh City and immediate environs	5.0	0.3	0.3	0.3
Southwestern mountain and seacoast region *	2.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Northeastern provinces	5.0	0.3	0.3	0.3
Major towns in rice regions (excluding Phnom Penh)	5.0	0.3	0.3	0.3

\* Includes an estimate of 40,000 for Pol Pot troops and other resistance forces.

NOTE: Because of rounding, figures may not add to totals.

### Food Situation

6. UN and Red Cross officials reported in August 1979 that 2.25 million people in Kampuchea were facing starvation, but we estimate the figure could be as high as 3.5 million under present conditions. An envoy of the UN Food and Agricultural Organization described conditions in Phnom Penh and environs as "grotesque," with clear evidence of malnutrition. If news spreads that emergency food aid is available near major cities, people from rural areas might try to evade Vietnamese controls and converge on these supply points. This would further disrupt agricultural production. We believe that those in or near urban areas are worse off than rural residents.

7. **Rice Production.** Kampuchea has about 4 million hectares of land cleared for farming. Some 3.2 million hectares are normally cultivated; of that, about 2.7 million hectares are planted in single-cropped rice harvested in two main crops. The August crop (30 percent of national production) comes mostly from the southeast and the December crop (55 percent of national production) comes mostly from the northwest. The balance comes from scattered low-yielding crops of upland rice and floating rice. Before 1970, Kampuchea produced roughly 3 million metric tons of paddy rice each year, yielding about 1.2 million metric tons of milled rice, of which up to 200,000 metric tons were exported. The excesses of the Pol Pot regime significantly reduced rice production and consumption, but at the same time the number of people consuming food was greatly reduced.

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**8. Current Conditions.** [redacted]

[redacted] indicates that as of early August only about 440,000 hectares—about 11 percent of the potential farmland—was under cultivation. Most appeared to be growing rice; few row crops like maize and cassava were in evidence. The cultivated fields were scattered around close to small populated centers. Significantly, the pattern was the same in the northwest and southeast. In both regions crops appeared to be mature—that is, both seem to be growing August rice. [redacted]

9. In April, Heng Samrin claimed that 1.8 million hectares had been planted with rice and secondary crops, but this claim was an obvious exaggeration. Not only is the planted area much reduced; yields are likely to be 25 percent below average because of pests, inefficient farming and irrigation practices, and the harvesting of the crop short of full maturity to fulfill urgent food needs. [redacted]

10. We estimate that the area now under production can produce around 180,000 tons of milled rice under optimum conditions. The pattern of cultivation suggests that the Kampuchean have reverted to subsistence-level farming, each settlement growing only enough for itself. The 180,000 tons will thus probably be consumed locally. [redacted]

11. **Prospects.** From mid-August to mid-December, when the next harvest would be expected, 180,000 tons of milled rice would supply 5.8 million persons with only about 50 percent of their daily caloric requirements, and it is unlikely that the balance could be found from alternative domestic food sources. Furthermore, as suggested above the rice probably will not be distributed evenly; it will be consumed by those in the small rural settlements who produce it. There might also be fighting over areas to be harvested, and this could lead to crop destruction and/or confiscation. Those living in larger population concentrations face starvation unless they receive aid from abroad. Since the August harvest would normally produce about 360,000 tons of milled rice, the shortfall is thus 170,000 metric tons for 5.8 million people. If the population is 6.1 million, the shortfall could be as much as 200,000 metric tons; for 5.3 million people, 140,000 more tons would be needed. [redacted]

12. Food imports, largely from the USSR, have eased some of the pressure on food stocks. Vietnamese troops are mostly supplied from Vietnam, although there have also been reports of Vietnamese looting Kampuchean food supplies. Small amounts of food have been provided by Laos, and a small cross-border trade exists between Thailand and Kampuchea. If these imports continue, provided they are supplemented by significant amounts of aid from Western sources, mass starvation can be averted over the next two to three months. [redacted]

13. After that the picture remains gloomy. Normal farming practices seem to have been abandoned in favor of multiple cropping in small areas around the villages. Land away from these population centers appears to be fallow, and the December harvest, like that of August, will probably be small. Considerable outside aid will again be required if starvation is to be avoided. [redacted]

14. **Soviet Aid.** Recent Soviet food aid to Kampuchea reportedly amounts at least to 209,000 metric tons. TASS reported in July that 159,000 metric tons of “bread products” had been delivered to Kampuchea during 1979. The Soviets are also reported by an unverifiable source to have provided 50,000 metric tons of rice to Kampuchea this year. Some of the food grain supplied to Kampuchea probably comes from India under the terms of a recently signed Indo-Soviet agreement. [redacted]

15. In addition, the Soviets and others have provided Vietnam with some 1.5 million tons of food so far to meet Vietnam’s chronic annual shortage of some 2 million tons of grain. Some is known to be going to Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. Vietnamese trucks and aircraft, as well as Soviet aircraft, are transporting food to Vietnamese occupying forces. Some of this may find its way to Kampuchean civilians, although apparently not in significant amounts. [redacted]

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16. **Potential Refugee Trends.** It is difficult to estimate the refugee flow if famine becomes a reality. The distribution and physical condition of Kampuchea's population, as already noted, cannot be precisely assessed. People living in northwestern and western areas are best situated geographically to flee; distances to the Thai border are the shortest and there are many routes. As many as 1 million people may live in this area and thus constitute a pool of potential refugees.

[redacted]

17. Several factors, apart from efforts by the Vietnamese and Pol Pot forces to control population movement, will affect the flow of refugees:

- Most inhabitants of the areas easiest to flee—that is, near the Thai border—live in subsistence-farming villages, with access to limited food sources. Unless they are compelled to flee by the fighting or other factors, they will probably stay where they are as long as some food remains available.
- The danger of crossing the border, which is heavily patrolled and mined on both sides, is probably the major deterrent.
- Geographical distances and physical debilitation may deter those suffering most from food deprivation from making a long and arduous trek to the Thai border. [redacted]

18. In sum, December harvest prospects, and the likelihood of heavy fighting during the dry season, will determine the refugee exodus. The August harvest normally provides food to last until the December crop, which should be planted in June. Such planting, however, is not evident. Unless a 90-day rice crop is planted in September/October for a late-December/early January harvest—and, because of many adverse circumstances, this may not be possible—widespread famine conditions will occur unless massive amounts of external aid are provided. If aid is not forthcoming, we foresee vast numbers of deaths from starvation and disease; in addition a hunger-induced refugee outflow could start, the monthly rate into Thailand possibly reaching tens of thousands [redacted]

**Political and Economic Factors**

19. **Heng Samrin/Vietnamese Infrastructure.** The ability of the Heng Samrin/Vietnamese infrastructure to distribute relief supplies is marginal. Certainly in Phnom Penh eyewitnesses attest that the general administration of the city is poor. There is little evidence of civilian administrative authority in the countryside. There are apparently few serviceable vehicles, most able-bodied men are in military service, and food and supplies cannot be protected effectively from foraging troops of either protagonist. In the absence of civilian authority, the Vietnamese military is the only organization capable of providing logistic services. [redacted]

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20. Even if food aid arrives safely, the lack of normal markets and currency and the probability of hoarding would also impede food distribution. There are four routes available for the processing of relief supplies: by air into Phnom Penh, by boat up the Mekong River to Phnom Penh, by ship into the port of Kompong Som, and across the Thai border. In the countryside, the lack of information about the distribution of people would hamper relief efforts. Continuing military operations make travel difficult, and fuel is not readily available. Draft animals are reportedly scarce, and human transportation, using bicycles, carts, etc., may be the only mode available. [redacted]

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21. **Heng Samrin/Vietnamese Reactions to Relief Efforts.** Plans to facilitate emergency relief deliveries have made slow progress. Hanoi probably favors relief operations because they would reduce demands on its own limited resources and bolster Heng Samrin's claim to legitimacy. The Heng Samrin/Vietnamese authorities have moved slowly, however, apparently in an attempt to maximize political advantages gained from international concern over the plight of the Kampuchean people [redacted]

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22. Their options are limited. The Heng Samrin ambassador to Hanoi said recently that his government ranks aid offers, responding first to bilateral approaches, then to international organizations, and finally to private voluntary agencies. There is little likelihood of much increased bilateral aid from the Soviet bloc. Fewer than 20 governments recognize the Heng Samrin regime, and most others would prefer to provide assistance through international groups, since they fear Heng Samrin would insist upon prior diplomatic recognition.

23. Phnom Penh delayed from April to August before allowing international relief officials to visit Kampuchea, and subsequent negotiations have made little headway. Red Cross and UN officials arrived in Phnom Penh in mid-August, two subsequent shipments of relief supplies have been made, but Phnom Penh has yet to authorize a large-scale relief effort. There are several possible explanations for procrastination by Heng Samrin/Vietnamese officials:

- Bureaucratic inefficiency. Although Vietnam dominates decisionmaking, negotiations have had to be conducted with Heng Samrin officials who are not well informed about relief procedures or the amounts of aid required.
- Reluctance by the Heng Samrin/Vietnamese authorities to let outsiders see the limited extent of their control, their inability to restore agricultural production and basic social services, and the extensive role played by the Vietnamese.
- Heng Samrin/Vietnamese officials want to control relief supplies themselves and are resisting distribution schemes proffered by international organizations. They may feel that delaying until the food situation is even more desperate will enable them to avoid strict monitoring.
- They may be trying to play off the various relief organizations against each other. They have apparently attempted to obtain aid from French Communist Party groups and others who would demand less strict monitoring, even though these could not provide assistance of the magnitude needed.

24. Some sort of agreement for a large-scale relief operation will, however, probably be reached in the next few weeks. Red Cross and UN officials have indicated that because of the lack of an efficient infrastructure they may have to bring in their own logistical support equipment, but Phnom Penh will probably try to keep the foreign presence to a minimum.

25. A serious problem could also arise from plans to carry out simultaneous relief programs for both the areas under Heng Samrin/Vietnamese control and those controlled by Pol Pot. Pol Pot officials have reportedly agreed to a relief program for civilians under their control, starting with food deliveries to some 80,000 people near the Thai border south of Aranyaprathet. Although international organizations have informed Heng Samrin/Vietnamese authorities that they intend to provide relief to civilians in both regimes, they are concerned lest the premature disclosure of their talks with Pol Pot leaders might cause Heng Samrin to balk. Heng Samrin officials reportedly have already insisted that they will not accept aid from organizations helping civilians under Pol Pot's control.

#### **The Vietnamese Military Presence: Fighting and Insecurity**

26. **The Military Situation.** This has not changed significantly since the Vietnamese drove Pol Pot's forces from bases in western Kampuchea at the onset of the rainy season last June. Vietnamese troops have had difficulty extending their control to the countryside, which is still being contested. Most of the 150,000 to 200,000 Vietnamese troops still in Kampuchea are involved in protecting major cities and towns, the ports at Kompong Som, railheads, roads, bridges, and military installations, and in keeping open the major routes between Kompong Som, Battambang, Siem Reap, and Phnom Penh.

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27. Pol Pot and other resistance forces are believed to total some 40,000 combat troops, operating in small groups which seem able to move freely through much of the countryside. They may be attempting to expand their operations and establish new bases in central and northern Kampuchea. Operating from sanctuary bases in the Cardamom Mountains of the southwest and along the Tonle Sap Lake, resistance forces are attacking and inflicting casualties on the roadbound Vietnamese forces, which are staying close to their garrisons. [redacted]

28. When the dry season arrives in November, Vietnamese forces will be able to use effectively their superiority in armor, artillery, and aircraft. They will undoubtedly launch another major dry season offensive against Pol Pot forces in an attempt to eliminate them, and this will result in further civilian casualties and may disrupt food distribution, especially that coming across the Thai border. We estimate that Pol Pot and his guerrillas will survive and the fighting continue in view of the logistical assistance provided by the Chinese and the latter's strategy of maintaining tensions along the China-Laos and China-Vietnam borders. The brunt of the fighting will likely be concentrated in the west and southwest, but other areas in the central and northern provinces may also be affected. [redacted]

29. **Prospects for Peace.** There is little chance for a negotiated settlement at present. All the protagonists—China, Vietnam, and Pol Pot—are opposed to an international conference, especially one involving Sihanouk in a leadership role. A negotiated settlement will not be possible until the Vietnamese are convinced they cannot win in Kampuchea and domestic sacrifices are raised to an intolerable level. At present Hanoi is convinced it has the upper hand in Kampuchea and seems implacable. As long as the situation seems favorable, and the Soviet Union continues to provide military supplies and to defray some of Vietnam's economic burden, Vietnam will probably pursue a military solution. [redacted]

**Thai Attitudes and Policy**

30. Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and its installation of a puppet government threaten Thai security. The subsequent refugee influx, when added to large numbers from Laos already in Thailand, is both an economic burden and a potential security threat. Bangkok is also concerned over the possibility of conflict with Vietnamese troops in the border area. A number of small-scale incidents have already occurred.

[redacted]

31. The forthcoming Vietnamese dry season offensive worries Bangkok because it heightens the possibility of border clashes and could lead to a new refugee influx. More than 80,000 Kampuchean refugees have entered Thailand since January 1979: about 40,000 of these were forcibly repatriated in June, 17,000 remain in refugee camps, and the rest were Pol Pot's guerrillas and their followers who have since returned voluntarily to Kampuchea. Few refugees have entered in recent months, because of increased Thai preventive efforts and a reduction of Vietnamese military operations because of the wet season. [redacted]

32. Although the forced repatriation provoked much international criticism, Prime Minister Kriangsak was compelled to take these measures because of domestic pressure and he can be expected to act similarly in the future. Disappointment over the failure of the July meetings in Geneva to solve the problem of land refugees made Thai officials skeptical of the international community's willingness to accept these and thus reinforced Thai resolve to pursue an independent refugee policy. [redacted]

33. The deteriorating situation in Kampuchea has prompted Thailand to try to focus world attention on it and on the need to force Vietnam to resolve it. Bangkok was the motivating force behind the recent decision by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to request inclusion of the problem on the UN General Assembly's September agenda. In the meantime Bangkok is cooperating with international organizations and for-

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eign governments in sending food and medicine to Kampuchea, and will probably continue to do so to prevent a further refugee influx. It may, however, reverse this policy if Vietnam makes a strong public attack.

34. Kriangsak has permitted use of Bangkok as a stopover for planes carrying supplies from the Red Cross and UN Children's Fund to Phnom Penh. He has also promised to facilitate further relief efforts, providing the supplies are distributed by international organizations. Since June, Bangkok has allowed the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) to send supplies to Kampuchean civilians under Pol Pot's control with the provision that the Thai military make the cross-border

deliveries and no publicity is given. Thailand has also demanded that the CRS supply assistance to locally displaced Thais.

35. In the event of a further refugee influx domestic political pressure would compel Kriangsak to assume a tough policy. He would probably try to deny entry to refugees and, failing this, repatriate forcibly those who entered. Pledges from countries of permanent resettlement to take additional refugees would probably not dissuade the Thais from trying to deny entry, but might prevent forced repatriation.

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## APPENDIX

## DEMOGRAPHIC METHODOLOGY

1. The methodology used in computing demographic statistics, leading to the totals given in tables 1 and 2, is described in the text that follows.

Table 1

## Population Estimates for Kampuchea, 1970-79

Mid-year	High Series		Medium Series		Low Series	
	Total Population (thousands)	Growth Rate (percent)	Total Population (thousands)	Growth Rate (percent)	Total Population (thousands)	Growth Rate (percent)
1970	7,060	1.03	7,060	1.03	7,060	0.72
1971	7,133	0.95	7,133	0.95	7,111	0.64
1972	7,201	0.95	7,201	0.95	7,157	0.65
1973	7,270	0.88	7,270	0.88	7,204	0.57
1974	7,334	-6.43	7,334	-8.65	7,245	-13.04
1975	6,877	-4.96	6,726	-8.29	6,359	-8.98
1976	6,544	-2.12	6,191	-2.85	5,813	-3.25
1977	6,407	-1.94	6,017	-1.91	5,627	-2.14
1978	6,284	-2.30	5,903	-2.26	5,508	-3.14
1979	6,141	—	5,771	—	5,338	—

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**Table 2**

(In Thousands)

**Population Estimates for Kampuchea by Period**

Estimation Series	1 July 1970	17 April 1975	1 January 1979	1 July 1979
<b>Population</b>				
High series	7,060	7,384	6,225	6,141
Medium series	7,060	7,384	5,849	5,771
Low series	7,060	7,279	5,453	5,338

**Period Change**

	Lon Nol Period		Pol Pot Regime		Vietnamese-Heng Samrin	
	1 July 1970 to 17 April 1975		17 April 1975 to 1 January 1979		1 January to 1 July 1979	
	Absolute (in thousands)	Percent	Absolute (in thousands)	Percent	Absolute (in thousands)	Percent
High series	324	5	-1,159	-16	-84	-1
Medium series	324	5	-1,535	-21	-78	-1
Low series	219	3	-1,826	-25	-115	-2

**The Lon Nol Regime, July 1970-April 1975**

2. The population as of July 1970 was estimated by the United Nations as 7 million, and we estimate 7.4 million on 17 April 1975. The slow growth seems reasonable because of the effects of civil war, the disruption of family life, the breakdown of food distribution networks, the failure of health delivery systems, and the general inability of the government to provide for its people. [redacted]

**The Pol Pot Regime, April 1975-January 1979**

3. Information on this period is fragmentary at best. We assess the population as of April 1975 as 7.4 million, and as of January 1979 as 5.8 million [redacted]

4. We presume that, on attaining power, the Pol Pot regime repatriated all Vietnamese residents in Kampuchea, together with those Kampuchean associated with them, back to Vietnam: estimates of numbers involved in these repatriations range from 200,000 to 500,000. [redacted]

5. Thereafter the population was divided into two groups: urban and rural. The urban population was probably around 4 million, a high figure caused by the flow of people from the war zones to the comparative security of the cities. After April 1975, the Pol Pot regime stigmatized urban dwellers as decadent and westernized, classified them as "new people," and forcibly relocated them in the countryside. They had to subsist largely on foraged food and surface water, and were sent to work in designated farming areas. In September 1975 a second migration to interior rice-growing areas was ordered, to include remaining urban residents and those living in rural areas bordering on Vietnam. [redacted]

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
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6. These "new people" suffered abominably in their alien environment: heavy labor, inadequate diet, no medical care, and constant physical and psychological terror. Infectious diseases spread rapidly; malaria became endemic, cholera appeared, and parasitic diseases common. This combination of malnutrition and disease, together with mass executions and a refugee exodus, exacted a tragic toll on the population.



7. The rural population—the "old people"—fared better, but nevertheless were also subject to food shortages, lack of medical care, and forced labor. We estimate that for this group population growth rates for the 1975-79 period probably averaged around 0.5 percent



**Estimated Population Distribution**

8. Alternative estimates for population distribution in Kampuchea as of summer 1979 are shown in table 3 (scenario A has also been included in the text proper following paragraph 5).



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Table 3

**Estimated Population Distribution  
Kampuchea, Summer 1979**

Region	Distribution (Percent)	Population (Millions)		
		High Series	Medium Series	Low Series
<b>Scenario A—Most Likely</b>				
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>5.3</b>
Central rice-growing region	56.0	3.4	3.2	3.0
Northwestern rice-growing region	19.0	1.2	1.1	1.0
Eastern border region	8.0	0.5	0.5	0.4
Phnom Penh City and immediate environs	5.0	0.3	0.3	0.3
Southwestern mountain and seacoast region*	2.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Northeastern provinces	5.0	0.3	0.3	0.3
Major towns in rice regions (excluding Phnom Penh)	5.0	0.3	0.3	0.3
<b>Scenario B—Possible</b>				
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>5.3</b>
Central rice-growing region	43.0	2.6	2.5	2.3
Northwestern rice-growing region	19.0	1.2	1.1	1.0
Eastern border region	15.0	0.9	0.9	0.8
Phnom Penh City and immediate environs	5.0	0.3	0.3	0.3
Southwestern mountains and seacoast regions*	3.0	0.2	0.2	0.2
Northeastern provinces	10.0	0.6	0.6	0.5
Major towns in rice regions (excluding Phnom Penh)	5.0	0.3	0.3	0.3
<b>Scenario C—Possible</b>				
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>5.3</b>
Central rice-growing region	57.0	3.5	3.3	3.0
Northwestern rice-growing region	15.0	0.9	0.9	0.8
Eastern border region	5.0	0.3	0.3	0.3
Phnom Penh City and immediate environs	3.0	0.2	0.2	0.2
Southwestern mountains and seacoast region*	2.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Northeastern provinces	15.0	0.9	0.9	0.8
Major towns in rice region (excluding Phnom Penh)	3.0	0.2	0.2	0.2

\* Includes an estimate of 40,000 for Pol Pot troops and other resistance forces.


NOTE: Because of rounding, figures may not add to totals.



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Estimated Population Distribution in Kampuchea, Summer 1979



- Central rice-growing region** Contains 43 to 57 percent of population, or 2.3 to 3.5 million people. Rice and some other crops being cultivated on a small portion of the fields. Vietnamese/Heng Samrin forces garrisoned in major towns, providing security to immediate environs, rest of region insecure with peasants harassed by Pol Pot forces.\* Control by Vietnamese/Heng Samrin forces relatively stronger nearer to Phnom Penh.
- Northwestern rice-growing region** Contains 15 to 19 percent of population, or 0.8 to 1.2 million people. Crops cultivated on a small portion of the fields. Vietnamese/Heng Samrin forces garrisoned in major towns, rest of region insecure and quite accessible to Pol Pot forces.\* Peasants severely harassed.
- Eastern border region** Contains 5 to 15 percent of population, or 0.3 to 0.9 million people. Almost no land in cultivation, although this was a major rice-growing region before 1975. Vietnamese/Heng Samrin influence strong, and peasants are reportedly returning to this region.
- Northeastern provinces region** Contains 5 to 15 percent of population, or 0.3 to 0.9 million people. Scattered fields in cultivation. Region is forested, providing cover for marauding Pol Pot forces. Vietnamese/Heng Samrin's influence weak.
- Phnom Penh City and immediate environs** Contains 3 to 5 percent of the population, or 0.2 to 0.3 million people. Severe starvation and epidemic disease. Vietnamese/Heng Samrin forces in control.
- Southwestern mountain region** Contains 2 to 3 percent of the population, or 0.1 to 0.2 million people, including most of Pol Pot forces. Region is mostly forested, has scattered fields of cassava, dry rice or other crops. Pol Pot forces control town of Pailin and limited other areas; they can move relatively freely and have strong influence throughout the region.
- Lake and marsh region** Uninhabited.

\*Within the rice-growing regions, major towns and their immediate environs (excluding Phnom Penh) contain 3 to 5 percent of the population, or 0.2 to 0.3 million people. Severe food shortages for civilian population, who are thought to be camped around deserted town centers. Vietnamese/Heng Samrin forces in control of most major towns.

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