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Zimbabwe-Rhodesia: The Economic, Military, and Demographic Situations in Mid-1979

Intelligence Assessments

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*NI 79-10006
August 1979*


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Zimbabwe-Rhodesia: The Economic, Military, and Demographic Situations in Mid-1979




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Intelligence Assessments

The papers published here were prepared by the Offices of Economic Research, Strategic Research, and Geographic and Cartographic Research in the National Foreign Assessment Center of the Central Intelligence Agency, and by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Each paper has been reviewed at a working level in other agencies of the Intelligence Community. Information in each has been updated to 1 August 1979 where data has been available, but the basic situations and projections are based on materials from the first half of 1979.

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Zimbabwe-Rhodesia:
The Economic, Military, and
Demographic Situations
in Mid-1979 

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These three interagency papers examine the economic underpinnings and prospects for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the military forces of the Muzorewa regime and the guerrilla groups and the demographic base underlying economic, military, and political developments.

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Southern Rhodesia	<i>appended</i>
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The Economy of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia

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Recession

1. The Rhodesian economy, which had been a source of strength to the government of Prime Minister Ian Smith during most of the period since the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, has suffered a 13-percent drop in real output in the past four years. The economic slump reflects (a) the increasing burden of defense, (b) erosion of the middle class market by white emigration, (c) waning business confidence, and (d) weak international demand for Rhodesian products, which is due in part to economic sanctions. In addition to these demand-related factors, the economy is suffering from slowly mounting war damage and prolonged drought. (See figure A-1 for selected economic indicators.)


Defense Burden

2. The mounting diversion of resources into defense since 1975 has directly undercut economic growth, because Rhodesia buys most of its military equipment and supplies abroad, except for small arms and ammunition. Direct military, police, and internal security outlays in the fiscal year ending in July 1979 will reach an estimated \$400 million, 28 percent of total budget expenditures, as compared with only 17 percent earlier in the 1970s. If the defense-related expenditures of other ministries are counted—estimated at \$50 million in the current fiscal year—the cost of defense rises to nearly one-third of the budget.

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Rhodesia: Selected Economic Indicators
Percent of Change

Figure A-1



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
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
Rhodesia: Net White Migration

Figure A-2

1978 and 1979 (Monthly)



1967-78 (Annual)



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3. To help finance the domestic costs of the military buildup, the government has initiated programs to tap private savings and slow down the growth in nonmilitary spending. Under the latest mandatory bond purchase program, all white taxpayers and about 1,000 high-income blacks must buy government bonds equal to 12.5 percent of their income tax; although this is ostensibly a forced savings program, most Rhodesians do not expect the bonds to be redeemed. To help free foreign exchange for military imports, Salisbury has tightened quotas on imports of civilian goods including raw materials and capital equipment.

White Emigration ¹


4. Further dampening domestic demand has been an upsurge in white emigration in the past three years that is attributable to declining living standards, increasing war casualties, and mounting uncertainties surrounding the transition to black majority rule. On a net basis, an estimated 30,000 persons officially emigrated in 1975-78, a loss of about 12 percent of the white population. (See figure A-2.) Another 20,000 to 30,000 Rhodesians may have left on extended vacations. This drain, concentrated in the middle class, has reduced the demand for furniture, appliances, and other consumer goods and has contributed to a steep decline in housing construction. (See figure A-3.) Only increased purchases of light manufactures by South Africa arrested the drop in industrial output in 1978.

Sagging Confidence

5. Business confidence, of course, has suffered from the uncertainties associated with stepped-up guerrilla activity and black-led government. Planned industrial plant construction dwindled to \$9 million in 1978 from a peak of \$34 million in 1974. (See figure A-3.) Purchases of machinery and equipment also plummeted. As in the case of housing, most new business investment is apparently going into physical security rather than into the buildup of economic assets—an ominous sign for future economic growth

¹ See also *Key Ethnic and Demographic Factors in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia*, p. 19, paragraphs 8-10.

Rhodesia: Planned Construction Expenditures Figure A-3



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Exports and Sanctions

6. Weak international demand for Rhodesian commodities, in part because of economic sanctions, has reinforced the deterioration in domestic demand. Economic sanctions, although far from airtight, have probably caused Rhodesia to suffer disproportionately from the slump in world demand in the aftermath of the 1973-74 oil price hikes. This is especially true for

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mining volume, which dropped 9 percent during 1974-78 as many firms in developed countries turned to alternative suppliers of chromium, nickel, copper, tin, and asbestos. (See figure A-1.) In the particular case of chromium, the drop was reinforced by repeal of the Byrd Amendment in March 1977, a move that cut off the lucrative American market, and by a new metallurgical process that reduces the cost competitiveness of high-grade Rhodesian ores.

Light But Growing War Damage

7. Although on the rise, physical damage due to the war has been relatively light so far and concentrated in rural areas. In the zones with the highest guerrilla activity—along the Mozambique border and northeast of Salisbury—many small white-owned farms have been abandoned because of the constant threat to homesteads, cattle, crops, and vehicular traffic. In the tribal trust lands set aside for blacks, thousands of dip tanks used for control of tickborne disease have been destroyed. The ensuing spread of livestock diseases—nearly eradicated before the guerrilla war—caused an estimated \$80 million in cattle losses in 1978. Most large inland plantations, however, have not suffered much war damage yet, although present drought will cause substantial foreign exchange losses in tobacco and corn production this year.

8. The only major urban damage inflicted by guerrillas so far has been the destruction in December 1978 of roughly 300,000 barrels of oil—15 to 20 days' supply at estimated current consumption rates—at the Salisbury fuel depot. The replacement of the lost \$8 million worth of storage facilities and oil will prove difficult because of the country's foreign exchange bind and disruptions in South African oil supplies due to the cutoff of Iranian oil.

9. Other war-related problems affecting economic activity, particularly in rural areas, include:

- Closure of schools, clinics, and hospitals.
- Suspension of rail and bus services after dark, as well as intermittent daytime interruptions in these services.
- Population displacement, particularly of black farm labor to urban areas, further straining scarce social services.

- Supply disruptions for rural retail outlets.
- Suspension of mineral prospecting.
- Dampened tourist trade. (C)

Impact on Living Standards

10. On average, the blacks are suffering more from the recession than the whites. The number of black wage earners—who constitute more than half the estimated 1.6 million persons in the black labor force—has dropped by at least 49,000 since 1975. Heavy job losses have occurred in plantation agriculture and in construction, which traditionally provide employment for 40 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of the country's black wage earners. The 700,000 black subsistence farmers have also been hard hit by war-related cattle and crop losses and supply shortages. Many of these farmers as well as those who once worked on white plantations are flooding into the already overcrowded black townships in Salisbury and Umtali.

11. The remaining whites are also tightening their belts, largely because the prices of basic foodstuffs are rising while salaries stagnate. The most severely affected whites are those in the service sectors, such as salesmen, shopkeepers, and construction contractors, many of whom are joining the white exodus. The decline in real incomes among white farmers is lessened to some degree by high prices for key crops until this year and Salisbury's willingness to provide subsidies; the jobs of many white industrial workers are also protected by subsidies.

Impact on Balance of Payments

12. The drop in demand for most imported goods, caused by lower economic activity, has contributed to the current account shift from a \$210 million deficit in 1975 to a \$22 million surplus in 1978. (See table A-1.) In this period the import bill dropped an estimated 20 percent despite sharply higher military and oil purchases. Meanwhile, export sales are estimated to have increased only 6 percent because of weak international demand for most Rhodesian products. The deficit on

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Table A-1

Million US \$

Rhodesia: Balance of Payments

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Merchandise trade balance	159	98	58	259	215	259
Export *	702	820	870	905	865	919
Imports *	543	722	812	646	650	660
Services balance	-173	-216	-222	-208	-222	-216
Transfer payments	-12	-33	-46	-38	-25	-21
Current account balance	-26	-151	-210	13	-32	22
Net capital transactions	92	111	178	43	-36	24
Total current and capital transactions	66	-40	-32	56	-68	46

* Estimated.

invisible transactions also remained fairly stable, with the drop in tourist receipts matching any savings on freight and insurance. Salisbury was able to cover its current account deficits through loans and financial assistance from South Africa. Rhodesia was also reportedly able to secure a \$15 million Eurocurrency loan in July 1978.

Impact on the War Effort

13. Although the war effort has taken a major toll on the economy, the depressed economic situation has not yet seriously impeded Salisbury's ability to wage war. The economy can absorb the cost of the military effort provided a mass white exodus is avoided and South Africa continues its financial support. Direct budgetary grants from Pretoria reportedly have amounted to roughly half of Salisbury's direct defense spending. Increasing the effort on a sustained basis would require substantial belt tightening, and this in turn could spark a jump in white emigration. Both manpower and financial constraints would restrict the government's ability to react to an escalation of the war if the Soviets and Cubans were to provide large-scale materiel and troop support to guerrilla forces.

Regional Impact of Rhodesian Conflict

14. Neighboring countries are suffering from the Rhodesian conflict. Besides physical damage caused by cross-border raids, over 130,000 Rhodesian refugees are domiciled in Mozambique and Zambia, further aggravating their shortages of food and social services. Another 20,000 or so Rhodesian refugees have taken asylum in Botswana. Furthermore, animal diseases are spreading in these three Frontline States,² partly because of war-induced breakdown of veterinary services inside Rhodesia.

15. The war also threatens one of the three major interstate rail connections still operating in southern Africa. This southern rail link has taken on added importance in view of the present drought in the region, which has reduced the 1978/79 grain harvest by at least 25 percent and requires large imports of grain to be carried inland. Even before the drought, Zambia—hardest hit by grain losses—had resumed rail transshipments through Rhodesia after a five-year

² The so-called Frontline States include Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.

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hiatus because of rail and port bottlenecks in the Tarzara route. Zaire too would be hard hit by an interruption in Rhodesian rail service. It has rerouted half of its mineral exports through Rhodesia since the 1975 closure of the Benguela railroad. Moreover, Zaire's mining district relies heavily on the southern route for imports of food, consumer goods, fuel, and machinery. Mozambique severed transport and other economic ties with Salisbury in March 1976 and would not be affected. [redacted]

Outlook

16. Barring a mass white exodus, the rate of economic contraction this year will probably be no greater than last year's estimated 4 percent, because of strengthening international demand for Rhodesia's base metals and an apparent bottoming out of manufacturing and construction activity. This forecast assumes that the new government does not seriously threaten white economic interests and the security situation remains relatively unchanged. [redacted]

17. If the new government erodes minority rights and privileges without winning international support, it will eventually witness a stepped-up white exodus that would accelerate the economic decline. On the other side of the coin, ending of international sanctions would slow or possibly arrest the economy's slide. [redacted]

Lifting of Sanctions

18. Although we are unable to quantify them, economic benefits from an ending of the present international sanctions would probably be substantial. Such an improvement in Rhodesia's international standing would boost white morale, and this, at a minimum, would temporarily slow white emigration. The retention of white labor and purchasing power would bolster economic activity. Although the lifting of sanctions would be welcome news to local and foreign investors, a pickup in investment must await an improvement in the security situation, clarification of the economic policies of the new black-led government, and easing of exchange controls. [redacted]

19. The easing of economic sanctions would also allow Rhodesia to take full advantage of the current pickup

in world demand for base metals. Since January, prices for ferrochrome—Rhodesia's leading mineral export—have increased by 29 percent and those for copper by 40 percent. A jump in output of these metals would not significantly increase employment, however. Base metal production in Rhodesia is highly capital intensive. Only about 3,000 workers, for example, are employed in the mining of chrome. [redacted]

20. The ending of sanctions would sharply reduce the substantial sanction-busting fees being paid South African, [redacted] and other middlemen. If sanction busters take 20 percent of the value of trade, the economic sanctions are costing Rhodesia \$300-350 million annually. This estimate may be conservative, however, because tobacco farmers reportedly are forced to sell their high-quality crop at half price, losing over \$100 million in foreign exchange last year alone. On the import side, Rhodesia pays high premiums, particularly for petroleum and military supplies. Salisbury would also be able to reduce substantially the amount—up to \$200 million—it pays in direct government subsidies for mining, industry, and agriculture necessitated by the trade sanctions [redacted]

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5. The Air Force has been a key element contributing to Rhodesia's success against the guerrillas. Despite its aging fleet of approximately 130 aircraft, the Air Force provides the mobility and firepower that have assured the effectiveness especially of cross-border operations into Zambia and Mozambique. A predominantly white force of 1,500 personnel, many of whom were recruited in Western Europe, the United States, and South Africa, it is a match for any current opponent. There is also an active reserve force of 500. The Air Force's Canberra light bombers can reach anywhere in Zambia and Mozambique as well as portions of Tanzania and Angola. Continuing problems include difficulty in obtaining qualified pilots and technicians and in procuring spare parts and replacement aircraft. Few aircraft have been lost in combat, but as ZANU and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) acquire more air defense equipment and training, planes are likely to be downed or damaged at an increasing rate. Rhodesia's own air defense capability is marginal and of increasing concern to its military leadership [redacted]

6. Because of UN sanctions against Rhodesia, Salisbury has had a difficult time obtaining arms. Nevertheless, the Rhodesians have been able to acquire such items as 18 Cessna 337 aircraft and 11 Bell 205 helicopters. Presumably, these aircraft were acquired at a premium cost through international arms brokers using various subterfuges to conceal the source of the equipment. The price of most Rhodesian military equipment is undoubtedly high and presents a constant economic drain on Rhodesia and its benefactor, South Africa. [redacted]

Tactics

7. To organize the counterguerrilla effort, the Rhodesians have divided the country into five joint operations centers (JOCs). The activities of regular and activated reserve units, as well as Air Force assets, are coordinated by the respective JOCs. Company- and platoon-size units, aided by air and special police assets, conduct search and destroy missions throughout the operational areas. In recent months some Rhodesian security forces have been operating in units of larger size, designed to confront larger guerrilla units, but only at the cost of abandoning control of some areas to the guerrillas. Small unconventional warfare teams track insurgents and locate staging bases and

logistic facilities for strikes by highly mobile, combined-arms contingency units called fireforces. These units normally operate inside Rhodesia, but occasionally make cross-border raids into Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana to strike at guerrilla staging areas. In addition the Air Force conducts search and destroy missions against guerrilla installations in Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola [redacted]

Morale

9. Although there continues to be some disgruntlement among reservists because of frequent tours of active duty, the morale of whites in the Rhodesian armed forces is high. Moreover, the success in keeping incidents of violence to a minimum during the election period and the anticipation of at least some international recognition should keep military morale at a high level for a number of months. Furthermore, an incentive pay plan to keep whites in the security forces

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during the transition period will also have a beneficial effect on morale. The morale of black military personnel is harder to assess. In the coming months, the black casualty rate in the armed forces will probably increase as more blacks are involved in the fighting; this could cause deterioration in morale.

[Redacted]

10. If whites become discouraged to the point of emigrating in increasingly large numbers, the military would lose indispensable leadership and technical skills, which would sharply reduce the government's ability to meet the guerrillas' challenge. The security forces would almost certainly disintegrate if white officers and technicians were to leave on a wholesale basis

[Redacted]

[Large redacted area]

Effectiveness and Future Trends

12. The Rhodesian armed forces are more than a match for the guerrilla forces at this time. This superiority can be attributed to better tactics, weapons,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

and training as well as efficient use of available manpower. Major weaknesses of the armed forces are limited reserves, aging equipment, and uncertain sources of supply for spare parts and new equipment. Rhodesian superiority may diminish as more trained manpower and better equipment become available to the insurgents.

[Redacted]

13. For Rhodesia's armed forces the greatest possibility in overcoming major weaknesses lies in improving their sources of international supply—particularly if sanctions are lifted. Much more difficult to overcome is Rhodesia's shortage of skilled manpower. Even though there are numerous black recruits who can be taken into the military, a shortage of junior officers and experienced noncommissioned officers will inhibit the creation of additional military units.

[Redacted]

ZANU Guerrilla Forces

14. The military arm of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union has borne the brunt of the fighting in Rhodesia since the insurgency expanded in 1972. Of the two rebel groups, ZANU has the more guerrillas in Rhodesia and is responsible for most guerrilla incidents. On the other hand, it has suffered heavy casualties at the hands of the security forces and, despite its propaganda claims, has not produced any "liberated areas" inside Rhodesia. Nevertheless, the gradual escalation of the guerrilla effort against the Smith government helped force Salisbury to arrange the internal settlement and the transfer of power to the Muzorewa regime.

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are inadequately trained. Logistic support is inadequate, largely because of bad roads, a shortage of transport, the remote location of many of the camps (especially the new sites in the north), and the overall lack of resources and supplies. Thus, ZAPU is hard put to deal with the influx of refugees and recruits, and conditions in the camps remain primitive. [redacted]

52. ZAPU's relations with Zambia also show signs of strain. Zambian air defense, for example, has been almost totally ineffective against Rhodesian airborne attacks on ZAPU facilities. ZAPU personnel in turn have fired on Zambian aircraft and have terrorized civilians whom they suspected of aiding the enemy. Although these incidents are not likely to result in a complete break in the relationship, they have hampered and will continue to hamper ZAPU's programs and operations and detract from its credibility. [redacted]

53. Finally, ZAPU is confronted by formidable operational problems. One is the difficulty of transporting troops to the border area over bad roads, with too few trucks, and under the threat of Rhodesian raids, mines, and harassment. Infiltration itself is complicated by geography—the Zambezi River and Escarpment, Lake Kariba, and the brushland along much of the border that inhibits undetected movement, especially in the dry season. Because terrain along the Botswana border is somewhat more favorable, some ZAPU units have taken the long way around. Since the recent destruction of the Kazangula ferry, however, movement between Botswana and Zambia has proven more difficult. Once inside Rhodesia, communications, transportation, and resupply range from spotty to nonexistent. As a result, ZAPU has had little success in mounting and following through on planned, coordinated operations. [redacted]

54. The most important operational problem for ZAPU, however, is the cross-border raids into Zambia by the Rhodesians. Although costly in terms of casualties, the Rhodesian raids have had the even more serious effect of disrupting the ZAPU command structure, diverting personnel and resources to defending the camps, and demoralizing the organization from top to bottom. Frequently in the aftermath of raids, most recently in mid-April, ZAPU is paralyzed for a time. [redacted]

Prospects

55. Clearly ZAPU faces serious difficulties in the pursuit of its political and military objectives. Although it has grown in size and has infiltrated more troops into Rhodesia, most of its forces remain uncommitted. It has inflicted damage on western Rhodesia, in particular on government services, but has suffered significant setbacks as well. Most importantly it has shown little sign of being able to come to grips with, much less solve, its various internal difficulties. [redacted]

56. Nevertheless, ZAPU's resources, especially in the Rhodesian context, are considerable. It has managed to expand both its numbers and its operations despite casualties and desertions, and the USSR and Cuba remain committed to supporting it. As long as these trends continue and there is no negotiated settlement, ZAPU's place in the Rhodesian military balance of power is not likely to decline. On the other hand, ZAPU without substantially increased Soviet-Cuban support, is unlikely to achieve any decisive gains unless the Muzorewa regime in Salisbury collapses. [redacted]

57. Increased Soviet and Cuban aid could enhance ZAPU's position considerably. If an effective air defense network around ZAPU installations were established to reduce the threat of Rhodesian air raids, logistic and administrative arrangements could be simplified, movement and deployment of troops would be easier, and a greater proportion of personnel would be made available for offensive operations. Soviet-backed Cuban involvement in offensive operations could shift the military balance decisively in ZAPU's favor. Such an outcome, however, would depend on a number of key variables: the size and type of the intervention force (ground combat troops, fighter aircraft, or other), adequate logistic support for the force (no easy matter, because the bulk of it would have to be airlifted), the South African response, and whether or not and to what extent the Rhodesians could preempt such an attack. [redacted]

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Key Ethnic and Demographic Factors in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia

1. Most of the data in this paper are based on figures from Rhodesia's last census, in 1969, or on current statistics from the Rhodesian Central Statistical Office. [redacted]

Composition of the Population

2. We estimate that the population of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in July 1979 was 7,163,000.¹ About 96 percent of the population was black (6,876,000); about 3.5 percent was white (230,000 to 250,000²); the rest was Asian or Colored (persons of mixed race). Of the black population, about 71 percent (4,882,000) were Shona and 16 percent (1,100,000) were Ndebele. The rest comprised a miscellany of tribes—including Tonga, Sena, Hlengwe, Venda, and Sotho—that live in peripheral areas and have played only minor roles in the liberation moments or in black nationalist politics. Table C-1 shows the composition of the black population, including the major Shona tribes, and the distribution of each group. The percentages of the total black population were taken from the 1969 census. (See the appended foldout map.) [redacted]

The Tribal Factor

3. There is disagreement among observers on the contemporary importance of tribal differences in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as well as on the impact those differences will have on the stability of a black majority government. Observers who stress the tribal differences claim that postelection politics are certain to continue along tribal lines and that majority rule will almost automatically lead to serious tribal conflict—initially between the Ndebele and Shona, later

¹ This figure is based on the official estimate of the Salisbury government as of 31 December 1978 and is adjusted for growth at an annual rate of 3.5 percent. The estimate of the US Census Bureau is 7,560,000. [redacted]

² Officially, the whites numbered about 250,000 at the end of 1978, a decline of 27,000 from the maximum figure recorded in 1975 and 1976. The official figure, however, does not include some 20,000 to 30,000 whites on "extended vacation" outside the country who may not return if military and economic conditions do not improve. [redacted]

(after the Shona have defeated the Ndebele) between the Shona tribes themselves. Other authorities argue that the tribal discord has been exaggerated, that tribal differences have in fact been perpetuated by the policies of the white government, that those differences have been diminished by intermarriage, and that they could be less pronounced under majority rule than other observers have predicted. These authorities claim that ethnic differences are less related to tribalism than to geography, economics, and education. [redacted]

4. The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and its military arm, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), are predominantly Ndebele-Kalanga organizations, although several of ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo's top political aides are from other Shona tribes and there is a slender Shona minority in the rank and file. Within ZIPRA, clashes between Kalangas and Ndebeles have been reported at the military camps, and tensions have been reported between the Ndebele and Kalanga on the one hand and the few other Shona remaining in the movement on the other. Both the leadership and core membership of ZANU and its military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), are almost exclusively Shona. Tribal factionalism among the Shona tribes exists both in the leadership and in the ranks. Most of the conflicts are between the Karanga, who dominate ZANLA, and the Zezuru and Manyika. [redacted]

Population Density

5. Population density is 19 per square kilometer overall. Despite a rural black-to-white ratio of more than 150 to 1, land owned by whites is about equal in area to all the African tribal lands. The white-owned lands (now categorized as "nonracial") are generally lightly populated, whereas many of the tribal trust lands are heavily overpopulated. Overall, density of the tribal trust lands is 25 persons per square kilometer. Even though racially based land divisions were abolished in 1977, economic considerations—particularly

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Table C-1

**Tribal Composition of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
July 1979**

Tribal Group	Percent of Black Population	Approximate Number	Location
Shona ¹	71	4,882,000	North and east
Karanga	16	1,100,000	Southeast, centered on Fort Victoria
Zezuru	13	894,000	Around Salisbury
Manyika	7	481,000	East, centered on Umtali
Ndau	4	275,000	Southeast
Korekore	3	206,000	North-central
Kalanga ²	2	138,000	West, along Botswana border
Other Shona ³	26	1,788,000	
Ndebele	16	1,100,000	South and west
Others (includes Sena, Tonga, Venda, Sotho, Hlengwe)	13	894,000	Peripheral areas
Total black population	100	6,876,000	

¹ The Shona were among the waves of Bantu tribes that migrated from central to southern Africa several centuries ago. A series of Shona empires controlled much of Rhodesia before the Ndebele and white colonists arrived in the 19th century. The Ndebele first entered Shona territory from South Africa in the 1820s. They were better organized and militarily stronger than the more numerous but scattered Shona tribes. By the mid-1800s the Ndebele had subjugated, and in some cases absorbed, many of the Shona people.

² The Kalanga have maintained closer ties with the Ndebele than other Shona tribes. They are allied closely with the Ndebele in the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

³ This category designates blacks identified in the 1969 census only as Shona, not with a particular tribe.

the lack of funds to buy the land—currently prevent most blacks from moving from the tribal lands into the nonracial lands. White ownership of the large commercial farms in the nonracial sector presents the Muzorewa government with the dilemma of having to reallocate some of this land to the blacks in order to alleviate population pressures in the tribal lands without severely damaging the country's agricultural production. The new government has outlined a program that will, at least initially, limit nationalization to nonracial land that is currently unused by the white farmers.

(At this rate, if all factors remain stable, the population will double in only 20 years.) There are an estimated 47 to 50 births per 1,000 people annually, and 14 to 15 deaths. The United Nations, using a medium variant which projects a growth rate that declines to less than 3 percent by the end of the century, projects the population to 10.3 million by 1990, 14 million by the year 2000. The annual rate of natural increase of the white population is now estimated to be only about 0.5 percent—an extremely low rate and one which does little to offset population losses from emigration.

Population Growth Rate

6. The population growth rate is more than 3.5 percent annually for the blacks, one of the highest in the world.

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Age Structure

7. The black population is a youthful one with 48 percent of the blacks under 15, according to the census in 1969. The comparable figure for the white population at that time was 27 percent. Sixty-two percent of the whites were between the ages of 15 and 60, as compared with only 50 percent for the blacks. The figures for the blacks have not changed significantly during the 10 years since the census. The white population, however, has gotten older as births have been fewer and large numbers of young couples with children have emigrated. The white population under 15 years of age is probably currently near 20 percent.

White Immigration and Emigration ³

8. Net white immigration has waxed and waned over the past 20 years, reflecting political and economic conditions. (See table C-2.) The net loss of nearly 14,000 whites last year was the greatest on record, surpassing by 2,000 the number that left in 1963, the year that the Rhodesian Federation was dissolved.⁴ The number of departures during the first five months of 1979 (5,552) was nearly double the number for the same period in 1978 (2,933), but the greatest emigration in 1978 occurred during the last six months of the year. Even so, an overall increase over last year's total seems likely. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's Standard Bank Economic Bulletin published in mid-March forecast a net white migration loss in 1979 of between 15,000 and 20,000.

9. The economic effect of the loss through white emigration, which has contributed to a 13-percent decline in gross national product since 1975, has been magnified by the characteristics of the emigrants—predominantly professional, white-collar, and technical workers, largely in the 25-to-45 age bracket. Continued emigration will further retard economic growth and increase the black unemployment rate. The government has striven to discourage emigration by limiting the foreign exchange and value of personal

³ See also *The Economy of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia*, paragraph 4.

⁴ The Rhodesian Federation was formed in 1953 and included the neighboring states of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Nyasaland (now Malawi), and present-day Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Table C-2

Immigration and Emigration of White Rhodesians, 1959-79

	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net Migration
1959	9,000	5,000	+ 4,000
1960	8,000	7,000	+ 1,000
1961	8,000	10,000	- 2,000
1962	8,000	12,000	- 4,000
1963	7,000	18,000	-11,000
1964	7,000	15,710	- 8,710
1965	11,128	8,850	+ 2,278
1966	6,418	8,510	- 2,092
1967	9,618	7,570	+ 2,048
1968	11,864	5,650	+ 6,214
1969	10,929	5,890	+ 5,039
1970	12,227	5,890	+ 6,337
1971	14,743	5,340	+ 9,403
1972	13,966	5,150	+ 8,816
1973	9,433	7,750	+ 1,683
1974	9,649	9,050	+ 599
1975	12,425	10,500	+ 1,925
1976	7,782	14,854	- 7,072
1977	5,730	16,638	-10,908
1978	4,360	18,069	-13,709
1979			
January	325	1,398	- 1,073
February	311	903	- 592
March	304	1,555	- 1,251
April	237	1,865	- 1,628
May	283	1,291	- 1,008

belongings that families can take with them, by offering financial incentives to public and military personnel to stay on, and by delaying emigrant processing.

10. A majority of the white emigrants have resettled in South Africa, where terrain, climate, social customs, and standards of living for whites are similar and where ties are strong. Of the nearly 14,000 emigrants in 1979, 8,650 went to South Africa. About 20 percent of Zimbabwe-Rhodesian whites were born in South Africa and many retain South African citizenship.

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Many others are relatively recent arrivals in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, having fled other African countries when majority rule was adopted. Other likely targets for emigration which have sizable immigration quotas for Zimbabwe-Rhodesians and similar languages, customs, and living standards include the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Australia announced in January that it could process 10,000 Zimbabwe-Rhodesian emigrants

The Urban Population

11. About 20 percent of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian population—16 percent of the blacks, more than 85 percent of the whites, and the vast majority of the other two racial groups—lives in the 14 cities with populations of more than 10,000. Blacks outnumber whites in all urban areas—in Salisbury by more than 4 to 1, in Bulawayo by 5 to 1, in Umtali by nearly 6 to 1, and in Gwelo by nearly 7 to 1. Ratios are higher in the smaller towns. Table C-3, which provides official estimates as of mid-1978, probably does not accurately reflect the rapid (and largely unrecorded) increase in the populations of the urban townships in recent years as rural blacks have fled the unsettled security situations and stagnating economies in the tribal lands. University of Rhodesia researchers estimate that several hundred black refugees enter the townships around Salisbury daily, and squatters there have placed a serious strain on services. The office of the International Red Cross in Salisbury unofficially estimates that hundreds of thousands of rural blacks have fled to urban townships in recent years.

The Labor Force

12. The black labor force is currently about 1.6 million. This figure includes all males between the ages of 15 and 65 but does not include women, who comprise a large number of the close to 1 million black wage earners. Whites have held most of the skilled jobs in the modern sector, whereas most blacks have been confined to semiskilled or unskilled jobs in agriculture, manufacturing and construction, mining, retail businesses, and domestic and government services. The black labor force is increasing at an annual rate of

about 3.5 percent, a rate which adds some 56,000 males to the job roster each year.

Education

13. The literacy rate among whites, Asians, and Coloreds is nearly 100 percent, whereas only 30 percent of the blacks are estimated to be functionally literate.

14. The educational system has been segregated by race and designed to prepare whites for higher level managerial, administrative, professional, and academic positions while offering the blacks only basic literacy and technical training necessary for semi-skilled labor or low-level civil service or commercial positions. Education has been compulsory for whites, Asians, and Coloreds, but not for blacks. Total black enrollments in 1978 were 777,000 in primary schools and 45,000 in secondary schools—only about 35 percent of the children of school age (5 through 16). Although most black children receive some primary education, most do not finish; less than 20 percent enter secondary school; and fewer than 1 percent finish secondary school.

15. The University of Rhodesia is a multiracial institution, but the inferior quality of education in the black secondary schools and the limited number of openings in higher-secondary classes has put the blacks at a disadvantage in the competition for admission and limited their enrollment to about half of the total. More blacks have attended universities outside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia than the University of Rhodesia. Although official figures are lacking, probably more than 10,000 blacks currently hold university degrees, including those who have received their higher education by correspondence from the University of South Africa

16. Nevertheless, the country has fewer than 50 black doctors and only a handful of lawyers and engineers. Only 23 of the 250-person faculty at the University of Rhodesia are black. Of the 42,000 black civil servants, most hold low-level positions.

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Table C-3

**Populations of Principal Urban Areas
of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Mid-1978**

Urban Areas (including townships)	Blacks	Whites	Asians	Coloreds	Total
Bindura	16,000	1,100	17,100
Bulawayo	290,000	56,800	2,800	8,800	358,400
Fort Victoria	19,000	2,600	200	300	22,100
Gatooma	30,000	2,400	200	300	32,900
Gwelo	59,000	8,600	400	1,000	69,000
Hartley	13,000	700	13,700
Marandellas	20,000	2,200	22,200
Que Que	48,000	4,000	300	300	52,600
Redcliff	16,000	1,800	17,800
Salisbury	480,000	117,500	4,800	8,000	610,300
Shabani	18,000	1,900	...	100	20,000
Sinoia	23,000	1,800	300	100	25,200
Umtali	52,000	9,100	600	700	62,400
Wankie	29,000	2,700	...	100	31,800
Total	1,113,000	213,200	9,600	19,700	1,355,500

Ellipses indicate fewer than 50 persons.



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