SUBJECT: (Optional)  Release	of Polygraj		DD/A Registry - Information 72-2315/
William R. Kota Director of Sect 45-60, Hdgs.	oish * irity	EXTENSION	OSA-2489/A-83 PATE 2.8 SEP 1982
TO: (Officer: designation; worm number; an building):		OFFICER'S VAROED INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom Draw a line across column after each comment.
7D-24, Hdqs.  ExDir 7E-12, Hdqs.	305P	SEP (1982)	The attached memorandum, prepared at the request of the Executive Director, clarifies for the DNC + the DN
DDGI 7E-12, Hdqs	0 6 OCT 198	&35 2;	the DDCI the existing policies concerning the release of polygraph-derived information. The memorandum also requests the
5.3			approval of the DDCI to continue these policies.
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DD/A Registry
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

Executive Director

Acting Deputy Director for Administration

FROM:

Director of Security

SUBJECT:

Release of Polygraph-Derived Information

REFERENCE:

Memorandum from DCI Helms to D/Security, dated 21 February 1970, subject: Polygraph Program

- 1. Action Requested: Your approval of the following policy concerning the release of polygraph-derived information.
- 2. <u>Background</u>: The referenced memorandum formalized policy for the use of the polygraph by the Agency and invested responsibility for polygraph activities exclusively with the Director of Security. It further prohibited the release of polygraph-derived information outside the Agency "unless the Director of Security makes a determination, concurred in by the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, that such action is in the interest of national security."

This 1970 statement was reaffirmed by Deputy Director Inman in July 1981 as he also endorsed Office of Security policy that refined and interpreted the original 1970 directive. The Office of Security position then and now emphasizes the indispensability of the polygraph to this Agency and the absolute necessity of avoiding any dissemination of information so derived which might serve to generate undeserved and potentially harmful attacks on the polygraph itself. The loss of the polygraph would, without question be extremely harmful to the national security.

ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE CLASSIFIED SECRET

SECRET

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The current Office of Security policy specifies that, subject to DCI or DDCI approval on a case-by-case basis, the following guidelines are to be followed with respect to the dissemination of polygraph-derived information:

- We will provide to any Federal agency with which an individual holds an active clearance (at any level) any disqualifying polygraph-derived information of a clear counterintelligence nature, such as disloyalty, unauthorized contact with a foreign intelligence service, mishandling of classified information, etc.
- We will cooperate fully with the Secret Service and provide polygraph-derived information that relates to that agency's primary protective function.
- We will provide to other Intelligence Community agencies holding an active SCI access on an individual any polygraph-derived information that resulted in a decision for disapproval of that person for SCI access at CIA.
- No other department or agency of government not included above is to receive polygraph-derived noncounterintelligence information unless specifically proposed by the Director of Security.
- Nothing above is intended in any way to affect the Agency's obligation to report possible violations of law to the Office of General Counsel for referral to the Department of Justice.
- Any passing of polygraph-derived information in accordance with any of the above provisions is understood to be for <a href="lead"><u>lead</u></a> purposes only.

In making release decisions, other aspects of the matter are considered. For example:

- Why does the other agency need the information?
- ° What is the other agency's record in protecting such data? (The FBI and Secret Service have excellent records.)
- What is the basic mission of the receiving agency and how will release of the information enhance the mission?

Will national security really be affected if the information is not released?

We have found that information considered disqualifying by this Agency, specifically in the lifestyle area, has tended not to be viewed in the same light by other agencies. While we have no desire to impose our clearance standards on other agencies, there is a need to ensure Sensitive Compartmented Information is afforded generally uniform protection by generally uniform standards.

It should be stressed that in each case the subject volunteers the polygraph information. The specific questions are reviewed before the test and he/she is explicitly informed that we have an obligation to pass to other agencies derogatory counterintelligence or other significant information. The subject signs a "Consent for Polygraph Examination" which stipulates this requirement (see attachment). A similar consent form is used for industrial contractor employees.

These guidelines are intended to ensure that the national security is considered in decisions to release as well as to withhold such sensitive information. Further, these guidelines support the concept of consistency in security procedures governing Sensitive Compartmented Information.

policy concerning the release other government agencies.	hat you approve the above-describe se of polygraph-derived information	ed on to
Attachment		

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SUBJECT: Release o	of	Polygraph-Derived	Information
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CONCUR:

9/24/82

Acting Deputy Director for Administration

Executive Director

(see attach & note)

APPROVED:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date

Distribution:

Orig - Return to D/Security

- DCI
- 1 DDCI
- 1 ExDir
- 1 ER
- 2 ADDA

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## CONSENT FOR POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION

(Applicant or Staff-Like Access)

l,	,	consent to polygrapi
testing administered by examiners of the Central employment with the CIA or for staff-like access to polygraph testing and periodic retesting is required access.	Intelligence Agency. I am to Agency information or factors	under consideration for cilities. I understand tha
I have received an explanation regarding procedures to be followed during the examination. I examination will be limited to those necessary to recentral Intelligence, such as loyalty, compromise exification of personal history documents and vulne reviewed with me, at least in general, prior to the examination.	I understand that the question esolve security issues, as apposed of classified information and the cability to blackmail, and the	ns to be asked during the roved by the Director of counterintelligence, fal-
I am aware that information obtained in the controlled within the Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Agency except when necessary in the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	y and may not be released e interest of national securit	outside of the Central
I have been further advised that any inform the Attorney General as required by Section 535 of Order 12036 or its successors, and also may be government agencies for administrative, investigat rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth Ar also understand that the session with the polygraph purpose of clarity and accuracy.	of Title 28 of the United Stareported to appropriate law ive or legal action. I have a nendment to the Constitution	ates Code and Executive venforcement or other also been advised of my on of the United States. I
I have read the foregoing and understand its	s import fully.	
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I place my signature be	elow, this day of	19
		•
	SIGNAT	URE
The above was read and signed in my presence this -	day of	19
	SIGNATURE	

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