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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> Director, Office of External Affairs	EXTENSION	NO.	
			DATE 16 December 1982

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1 DCI				<p>On Tuesday, 14 December Ambassador Nitze briefed the SSCI on the INF negotiations and at the Ambassador's request, <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> C/ACIS, participated to help answer intelligence-related questions. Following the briefing, staffer Steve Flanagan requested, in Moynihan's name, a brief discussion of the contribution</p> <p><span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 200px; height: 40px; vertical-align: middle;"></span></p> <p><span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> has prepared the one-page briefing enclosed which was coordinated with the DDI, the NIO for Strategic Programs, the Intelligence Producers Council, and the ICS.</p> <p>We have drafted a brief note from you to Senator Moynihan. The Senator would like to have this in hand as soon as possible.</p> <p><span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 250px; height: 80px; vertical-align: middle;"></span></p>
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21 December 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[Redacted]

Director, Office of External Affairs

25X

Bill:

The Dodd amendment vote is a sobering barometer of the Senate's attitude toward the Administration's foreign policy in Central America.

An analysis shows that support for the Administration position is a scant 50% and very tenuous. In the prevailing political climate, an anti-Administration vote is possible.

Faced with this, may I suggest you direct appropriate parties prepare viable alternatives to present policy for consideration prior to being confronted with an embarrassing Sense of the Senate Resolution.

[Redacted]

25X

DeYoung article re Nicaragua

# Envoy Quits, Says Reagan Policy Helps Radicals in Nicaraguan Government

## Envoy Calls Nicaragua 'Tyranny'

By Karen DeYoung

Washington Post Foreign Service

Nicaragua's ambassador to the United States said yesterday that he has resigned from his government, and from the Sandinista National Liberation Front that runs it, because "radical" Sandinistas are turning the leftist government into a "tyranny" that no longer listens to its own people.

Francisco Fiallos, 36, said he made his decision after failing at numerous attempts to persuade the Sandinistas that they are "losing public support" because of their increasing authoritarianism under "state of emergency" regulations imposed in March.

"There is growing discontent" in the country, he said. "Production is bad, and there is no feeling among the people that they are living under a system of law and judicial protections. Decisions are made by ever fewer people, with ever less consultation." At first, he said, "they listened to me. But then they lost interest in listening. Now, they hear, but they do not listen."

Fiallos is one of a growing number of high-level Nicaraguan officials—and the second ambassador to Washington in little more than a year, to resign because of political differences with the Sandinista government. His predecessor at the Ni-

**NICARAGUA, From AI** caraguan Embassy here, banker Arturo Cruz, has since joined a group of Nicaraguan exiles opposing the Sandinistas on grounds that Sandinista Marxists and their Cuban and East Bloc allies have perverted the democratic goals of the Nicaraguan revolution.

Fiallos, a Harvard-trained attorney who joined the Sandinista Front in 1977 as an underground supporter in its struggle to overthrow dictator Anastasio Somoza, said in an interview yesterday, "For the moment, what I want to do is rest and think." But he acknowledged that he has been in touch with Cruz and others of his group, led by former Sandinista guerrilla hero Eden Pastora, and sees joining them as "an option."

The Nicaraguan government, in a brief announcement Saturday, said that Fiallos was being reassigned along with a number of diplomats. But Fiallos said that he had informed Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto of his decision to resign on Dec. 12, two days after the government prohibited publication of remarks calling for political pluralism and free elections he had made to La Prensa, the country's only wide-circulation opposition newspaper.

Fiallos' resignation is likely to weaken further the Sandinistas' credibility among a diminishing group of supporters in the West who see them as increasingly authoritarian and unwilling to allow political freedoms.

Much of what remains of their support among Socialist governments in western Europe and among some Latin American countries, according to officials of those governments, is more a reflection of those countries' opposition to Reagan administration hostility to Nicaragua than active support for the Sandi-

nista Front. The Europeans, who support some aspects of Sandinista policy, argue that there is no possibility of tempering the Nicaragua government's militarism as long as it is threatened by armed opposition groups supported by outside powers.

Like Cruz, Fiallos coupled his criticism of the Sandinistas with a denunciation of Reagan administration economic and political pressure against them, as well as covert support for exile groups led by defeated Somoza soldiers trying to overthrow them militarily.

"I stand by everything I ever said about U.S. policy," Fiallos said. The Sandinista "radicals," he said, "have Ronald Reagan and this administration on their side" because Reagan support for the hated *Somocistas* strengthens the radicals' hand.

"This is the most important point," he said. "The Reagan policy has to change, and let Nicaragua alone to solve its own problems. It is a Nicaraguan problem, a Sandinista problem. The Sandinista government repeatedly has charged that its increasing militarization and centralized control is a response to what they see as a security threat from the Reagan administration."

As have other Sandinista dissidents and defectors, Fiallos also said he was disturbed by the strong presence of Cuban and other East Bloc advisers in Nicaragua. These include what other informed Nicaraguan sources have said are as many as two dozen Bulgarians.

The Bulgarians, according to these sources, work as advisers in the planning and economy ministries. Presumably sent by the Soviet Union, their task is believed to be as much to watch the Cubans, whose independent intentions in Latin America the Soviets sometimes mistrust, as the Nicaraguans.

But Fiallos also said that while direct Cuban contribution in high-

level government decisions was often talked about, especially in the United States, he had not seen it. He gave some credence to reports that Cuban President Fidel Castro, at times had sought to be a moderating influence among the Sandinistas.

In describing the current internal political balance within the Sandinista Front and its nine-man directorate, Fiallos said he believed there is a division between what he called the "radicals" and the "pragmatists."

He declined to comment "at this time" on which Sandinista leaders he would put in each category. Other Nicaraguan dissidents have listed Planning Minister Henry Ruiz and legislative leader Bayardo Arce, as well as Interior Minister Tomas Borge, as "radicals," and have named Agriculture Minister Jaime Wheelock as the chief "pragmatist" among the nine.

But, according to Fiallos, "they all have the same line" while seeing different ways of achieving the same goal. "Some of them are more pragmatic, but none has the power to act alone. They are prisoners of themselves."

When confronted in private meetings with their apparent loss of domestic and international support, he said, "They make excuses. Some of them deceive themselves, others have a scenario in mind but refuse to see that reality is different than what they believe."

"No revolutionary process is perfect," he added. But beginning with the postponement of promised elections until at least 1985, and "problems with the emergency law" that prohibits activity by non-Sandinista political parties—decreed after a series of exile raids—"things got worse."

Fiallos arrived in Washington last February, after serving as deputy foreign minister following the July 1979 Sandinista victory and later as



FRANCISCO FIALLOS

"the Reagan policy has to change"

Nicaraguan ambassador to Canada. In June, he returned to Nicaragua for a visit, he said, and was shocked by increasing press censorship and an incident in which a Managua priest was beaten by "revolutionary" youths and his church closed.

"There were always more doubts about elections, and the political system was ever more closed. There were confrontations everywhere and, like little boys, [the Sandinista leadership] kept falling into traps set for them by the Reagan administration."

Last month, Fiallos said, he visited his home town of Matagalpa, in north central Nicaragua, and found the peasants afraid and anxious over "the increasing arbitrariness" of local government representatives. He decided to answer a request from La Prensa for a written interview, which he sent from Washington. "I decided that if they wouldn't let them print it, I would resign."

Fiallos said he had planned to return to Nicaragua last Saturday, but was advised by friends of "some dangers" including what he said was the arrest for "counterrevolutionary activities" of a deputy justice minister who resigned several weeks ago.

"What is important for Nicaragua," Fiallos said, "is that everyone leave us alone. The Cubans, the Soviets, the Bulgarians, the Americans. Everyone should get out and leave us alone."

1982

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 15365

Mr. President, let me... A parliamentary incident. I would request a... what the time agreeing... which the Senator from... propounds an amendment... Senator from North... to for about 2 minutes... the rest of the time... to propounding of an... that amendment by the... New York and Rhode... of understand how there... or proportionality with... kind of issue being dis... it seems that although... ation may support one... re points of view here... egative. There is no pro... to the representation... the procedure... PRESIDING OFFICER: There... an order for 30 minutes... d. After the amendments... then there was an order... be abrogated and no pro... ed for divided time... ON. May I suggest to the... er that perhaps some... truisitic and useful unani... agreement can be ob... AN. Mr. President, will... be in order? We cannot... ator from Alabama... PRESIDING OFFICER: Will... please suspend. Can we... in the Chamber? Will all... rs of the staff in the back... and conversations. All Sen... main quiet so we may hear... anagers and the Senator... a. The Senator from Con... the floor... AN. I want to respond to... from Alabama as the... manager. Let me point out... ed here was that amend... proposed by the Senator... plicit which was opposed... or from New York; the... man of the Intelligence... and joined in by the rank... can, the Senator from... d. They opposed that, and... rute, and thus when the... ent was made it was divid... y between those two par... ten among themselves de... gregate their time. That... usual but it was probably... nder the circumstances... Mr. President, I ask for... order... SIDING OFFICER: The... r is a half-minute remain... ator from Connecticut... D. Thank you. This hap... ight when we were work... unanimous-consent agree... allocations. Objection was... an extension of the time... my amendment was sug... then tried to work out... ment between the respect... ere, and it was finally un... at there would be 30 min...

utes for both amendments and we tried to equally divide the time which we have done fairly well.

Let me finally say in support of my amendment, I am not here this morning or this afternoon to support the Sandinistas or other groups or the Hondurans, for that matter, or the groups residing in their country at this time.

What I am concerned about is our foreign policy, and all I am suggesting by this amendment is that we have a better understanding of what we are starting. If we do not have a sense of what we are doing when we start, we inevitably run into the problem of how we deal with events as they overtake us.

All I am concerned about here is I believe, based on information I have outside of the intelligence community, that we are encouraging certain paramilitary groups operating in Central America, particularly on the border of Honduras, to conduct certain forays into Nicaragua to overthrow that government. That is what they want to do.

Whether or not that is our intention is irrelevant at this point. We are supplying and supporting those elements and they are provoking a conflict.

All I am suggesting here is, if that happens, if, in fact, the conflict develops, are we then prepared to follow up with what we have started?

The PRESIDING OFFICER: All time has expired.

Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER: The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I move to table the underlying amendment and I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER: Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER: The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. HELMS) to table the amendment of the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. DODD). The yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. STEVENS. I announce that the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. BRADY), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. HEINZ) are necessarily absent.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that if present and voting, the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) would vote "yea."

I further announce that if present and voting, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) would vote "nay."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber wishing to vote?

The result was announced—yeas 56, nays 38, as follows:

(Rollcall Vote No. 445 Leg.)

YEAS—56

Abdnor	Ford	McClure
Andrews	Garn	Murkowski
Armstrong	Grassley	Nickles
Baker	Hatch	Nunn
Bentsen	Hatfield	Packwood
Boren	Hawkins	Percy
Byrd	Hayakawa	Pryor
Harry F. Jr.	Heflin	Quayle
Chiles	Helms	Roth
Cochran	Hollings	Rudman
Cohen	Huddleston	Schmitt
D'Amato	Humphrey	Stennis
Danforth	Jeppen	Stevens
DeConcini	Johnston	Symms
Denton	Kasten	Thurmond
Dole	Laxalt	Tower
Domenici	Long	Wallop
East	Lugar	Warner
Exon	Mattlingly	Zorinsky

NAYS—38

Baucus	Glenn	Pell
Biden	Gorton	Pressler
Boschwitz	Hart	Proxmire
Bradley	Inouye	Randolph
Bumpers	Kassebaum	Riegle
Burdick	Leahy	Sarbanes
Byrd, Robert C.	Levin	Sasser
Cannon	Mathias	Simpson
Chafee	Matsunaga	Specter
Dixon	Melcher	Stafford
Dodd	Metzenbaum	Tsongas
Durenberger	Mitchell	Welcker
Eagleton	Moynihan	

NOT VOTING—6

Brady	Goldwater	Jackson
Cranston	Heinz	Kennedy

So the motion to lay on the table (UP amendment No. 1541) was agreed to.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the motion was agreed to.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER: Will the Senate please be in order?

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, when we began debate on this measure, I asked unanimous consent that an explanatory statement in lieu of a report be printed in the RECORD. For some reason, this was not done. This statement includes all our guidance and direction to agencies with the full force and effect of that usually included in the form of a formal written report.

It is most important, therefore, that this statement be printed in the RECORD.

I ask unanimous consent that the statement of the floor managers be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS ON H.J. RES. 631, MAKING FURTHER CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS AND PROVIDING FOR PRODUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1983. The Committee on Appropriations, to which was referred the joint resolution