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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON



OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

November 1, 1982

Dear Bill,

The true faith is making progress, as you will see in the enclosed. Now all that remains is a small matter of detail - to convert it into policy.

Your sincerely,

Gene

Enclosure:

UN Speech of Oct. 27, 1982

The Honorable
William J. Casey,
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.

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State Dept. review completed

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STATEMENT

BY


THE HONORABLE EUGENE V. ROSTOW

UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE

TO THE 37th SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE

OCTOBER 27, 1982



ARMS CONTROL BULLETIN

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C., 20451

STATEMENT

BY

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OCTOBER 27, 1982

Mr. Chairman:

The United States Delegation is gratified to welcome you, Ambassador Gbeho, as Chairman of this important Committee. We congratulate you warmly on your election. I wish, as well, to congratulate the Vice Chairmen and the Rapporteur. It is a pleasure also to congratulate Ambassadors Alva Myrdal and Alfonso Garcia-Robles, the recipients of this year's Nobel Peace Prize. We and the two laureates share a common, fundamental objective -- a peaceful world. We have not always agreed as to the best means of attaining this objective, but we have always respected their devotion and their views.

It is an honor for me again to present the views of my government on the issues before the First Committee.

I start with a proposition some may find paradoxical -- the thesis that the last year has been one of singular achievement in the quest for peace. You may well ask how we can claim progress towards peace for a year during which there were so many acts of aggression and so many stormy exercises of the inherent right of self-defense protected by Article 51 of our Charter; a year which witnessed so many episodes of frustration and failure in the functioning of the Security Council and other systems of collective security.

We make this paradoxical assertion because the climate of world opinion on the vital questions of war and peace has changed profoundly during the year, in response to the impact of events and the leadership of many who have spoken before the Security Council, the General Assembly, and this Committee. In this connection I refer particularly to a number of important statements made at the Second UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, and to the Secretary General's significant and forward-looking Report to the General Assembly of 7 September 1982, A/37/1, and his fine statement before this Committee on 26 October 1982.

During the last year there has been a mutation in the way the people of the world perceive what is happening. They have come to realize that the Secretary General is right in pointing out that "we are embarked on an exceedingly dangerous course", which he characterizes as "perilously near to a new international anarchy". He reminds us that the failure of the League of Nations to develop an effective system of collective security was a major cause of the Second World War, and that we are moving along the same path again. "Governments that believe they can win an international objective by force are often quite ready to do so," he writes, "and domestic opinion not infrequently applauds such a course. The Security Council, the primary organ of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, all too often finds itself

unable to take a decisive action to resolve international conflicts and its resolutions are increasingly defied or ignored by those who feel themselves strong enough to do so." The Secretary General reminds us that "our Charter was born of six years of global agony and destruction. I sometimes feel," he writes, "that we now take the Charter far less seriously than did its authors, living as they did in the wake of a world tragedy. I believe, therefore, that an important first step would be a conscious recommitment by governments to the Charter."

The Government of the United States supports the thrust of the Secretary General's analysis and of his prescriptions for improving the effectiveness of the peace-keeping institutions of the United Nations. As President Reagan said before the General Assembly on June 17 of this year:

"I have come to this hall to call for international recommitment to the basic tenet of the UN Charter that all members practice tolerance and live together in peace as good neighbors under the rule of law, forsaking armed force as a means of settling disputes between nations. We ask you to reinforce the bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and to rededicate yourselves to maintaining international peace and security, and removing threats to peace.

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"We who have signed the UN Charter have pledged to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory or independence of any state. In these times when more and more lawless acts are going unpunished -- as some members of this very body show a growing disregard for the UN Charter -- the peace-loving nations of the world must condemn aggression and pledge again to act in a way that is worthy of the ideals that we have endorsed. Let us finally make the Charter live."

"A conscious recommitment" to the principles of the Charter cannot in our view be achieved merely by passing resolutions, however worthy. Simple resolutions endorsing the Secretary General's recommendations could be of utility. But what is needed now, far more than resolutions, is the will to enforce the Charter as it is. The Charter is a document of constitutional character. Its commandments do not need clarification; they need to be obeyed. Resolutions attempting to restate or amplify the key provisions of the Charter might well dilute their authority. As I was privileged to point out in this Committee on October 21, 1981, "unless we restore general and reciprocal respect for the principles of Article 2(4) of the Charter, the slide towards anarchy will engulf us all". To make the Charter effective, I said then, will not be a simple matter to be settled on the cheap, and

without tears. It will require effective steps to see to it that the Charter, the arms control treaties and the legally binding decisions of the Security Council are carried out and that we can verify compliance with their terms.

The first step back from the edge of the abyss is to achieve a change in the minds of men. That change -- the change that must precede effective action -- has begun to happen. Necessarily, the focus of that process must be a crusade to mobilize support for the Secretary General's thesis that we must do more than condemn aggression; we must actually -- and actively -- enforce the rules of the Charter against it. As the Secretary General points out, we must undertake to deter aggression; to seek peaceful solutions for crises in their incipency; and to defeat aggression if, despite all precautions, it should occur. Conventional war has gravely wounded civilization many times during this turbulent century; in a nuclear environment, the impact of conventional force aggression could well become unthinkable.

The Secretary General's Report and the statements of many leaders which preceded it dispel a series of illusions which have done a great deal of harm in recent years. Those fallacies and illusions are all associated with the view, frequently put forward by the Soviet Union, that peace is threatened primarily by an "arms race", and that peace can be attained by arms control agreements even though Article 2(4) of the Charter is allowed to wither away. This familiar

error puts the cart before the horse. As Prime Minister Thatcher said last summer during the Second Special Session on Disarmament, "It is not merely a mistaken analysis but an evasion of responsibility to suppose that we can prevent the horrors of war by focussing on its instruments. They are more often symptoms rather than causes." For too many people, the complex rituals of arms control diplomacy have become a convenient escape from the central problem -- the decline in the influence of the Charter on the behavior of States, and the fear to which this trend has given rise throughout the world. Arms control agreements can be useful in reinforcing a regime of peace; they can never be a substitute for the harsh and unremitting effort to sustain peace directly. This is the sobering and important lesson of the First and Second Special Sessions of the General Assembly on Disarmament: that arms control agreements can be of value only if they are conceived, planned, and carried out as part of an overall strategy for establishing and maintaining peace.

II.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has set into motion during the last year a dynamic program of initiatives in the field of arms control and disarmament. In each case these new initiatives are based on a thorough review and evaluation of the past history of the subject, and dominated by the proposition that arms control and disarmament efforts are

an integral part of foreign and security policy. In his speech of November 18, 1981, President Reagan outlined our approach to four important items on the agenda -- the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, known as INF, and those on strategic nuclear arms reductions, known as START; the negotiations on mutual and balanced reductions of conventional forces in Europe, generally called the MBFR talks; and the continuing process of discussion and negotiation stemming from the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In addition, the United States has revised and revitalized its unilateral and multilateral programs for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; eliminating the menace of chemical weapons; studying the feasibility of imposing further limits on the military use of outer space; and developing new and more effective measures to assure confidence and minimize the risks of war by miscalculation.

I shall now comment briefly on each of these aspects of the arms control program of the United States.

III.

The place to begin, manifestly, is with the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States

on the reduction of nuclear arms through verifiable agreements which strengthen security and help to make stability possible. The outcome of these negotiations will affect the prospects for many other arms control efforts and, indeed, the prospects for peace itself. Success in the effort to curb and confine the nuclear weapon is indispensable to the possibility of peace. Under present circumstances nuclear arms agreements must be shaped by the principle that nuclear arsenals can be justified only if they are confined to the function of deterring aggression. To put the proposition another way, useful and constructive nuclear arms agreements presuppose that the Soviet Union commit itself to obey the rules of world public order embodied in the Charter, as the Secretary General has recommended.

It is the view of the United States Government that achieving true nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States on the foundation of the principle I have just stated is the most important challenge before us in the field of arms control. We must reduce our dependence on these dangerous weapons. We must seek a more stable balance at lower levels of armament. The present situation is unacceptable to us.

How did the present situation arise? The answer is as regrettable as it is simple. It arose as a result of the expansionist foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the arms

build-up on which it is based -- an unprecedented increase of both conventional and nuclear military forces sustained over a period of more than 25 years. During that period, the Soviet Union claimed immunity from the Charter rules against aggression, and the rest of the world tacitly accepted its claim. That course is no longer tolerable. The process of Soviet expansion and the menace of the Soviet Union's growing military power have come to threaten the foundation of the state system. That system cannot continue to accept the Soviet practice of aggression through the use of its own forces and those of its proxies and satellites, whether organized as armies, guerrillas, armed bands, or terrorists, backed by the implicit threat of its growing nuclear forces. During the 1970s, a period when the United States nuclear arsenal was held relatively stable, the Soviet Union expanded both its intermediate range and intercontinental nuclear forces far beyond any conceivable requirements of deterrence and defense.

The size, scale and structure of the Soviet nuclear arsenal; its steady growth; and, above all, its emphasis on intermediate range and intercontinental ground based ballistic missiles are the source of the nuclear anxiety which haunts the world. Ground based ballistic missiles are swifter, more accurate, and more destructive than other nuclear weapons, and far less vulnerable to defenses. The Soviet advantage in this category of nuclear weapons

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creates the potentiality for a disarming first strike. And the consciousness of that possibility is generating currents of fear which have great political importance throughout the world.

The purpose of the American nuclear arsenal is to deter aggression against the supreme interests of the United States. The implacable growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal suggests that the Soviet Union looks upon nuclear weapons as instruments of intimidation and coercion precisely because such weapons, if they are sufficiently numerous, create the capacity to execute a preemptive first strike. This is why the Soviet advantage in ground based ballistic missiles is politically destabilizing. And this is why the first objective of the United States in the field of nuclear arms policy is to eliminate this factor of instability in world politics, preferably by reasonable INF and START agreements, but by force modernization if necessary.

The START and INF negotiations must be viewed together, because the weapons with which they deal are closely related. Intercontinental weapons can, after all, be fired from the Soviet Union not only against New York or Washington, but against targets in Europe, Japan, or other places vital to the security of the United States and its allies as well.

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The INF talks have now been going on for 11 months. They have been conducted in a business-like and professional atmosphere. Much progress has been achieved by the two delegations in sorting out what is important to each side, and illuminating the way to possible solutions. It is clear that a potentiality exists for accommodating the analytic concepts used by both sides. What is not yet clear is whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept an agreement based exclusively on the principle of deterrence.

In INF, the United States has proposed the complete elimination of an important class of nuclear weapons on both sides; the Soviet Union, in response, urges the elimination only of the United States weapons of comparable military significance. Under the Soviet proposal, the Soviet Union would be permitted to have up to 300 launchers for its mobile SS-20 systems in the European part of the Soviet Union, and an unlimited number in the Far Eastern portion of that country, while the United States would be forbidden to deploy any equivalent systems in the European area. The Soviet Union also proposes a moratorium for the duration of the negotiations -- a feature of its plan designed to preserve the Soviet advantage in ground based ballistic missiles, and to remove any Soviet incentive for agreeing to serious reductions in the most destabilizing class of weapons.

The Soviet Union defends its proposal by contending that there is in fact a balance at the moment in intermediate range nuclear weapons in and near Europe, at least, and that the deployments planned by NATO would disturb that balance. The Soviet negotiators achieve this remarkable feat of arithmetic by counting all British and French nuclear weapons with the American forces; treating American bombers, submarine-launched missiles, and cruise missiles as equivalent to the SS-20; counting all American weapons as relevant, including American dual purpose aircraft located in the United States; and excluding many categories of the Soviet arsenal.

The Soviet Union has so far refused to negotiate about its mobile intermediate range ballistic missiles in the Far East; the United States, to the contrary, insists that the negotiations must deal with all such Soviet and American weapons, wherever they are located. After all, the world is round, and nothing can be gained by exporting a security problem from Europe to Asia.

On October 21, 1982, President Brezhnev commented, according to TASS, that the INF talks were making "difficult progress", and that "these difficulties are rooted in the unwillingness of the United States to reach agreement . . . on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security".

The United States notes with interest President Brezhnev's statement that the INF talks are making progress. As I remarked a few moments ago, the United States agrees with

President Brezhnev's assessment in the sense that the negotiating process is clarifying the concepts used by both sides, and revealing patterns of possible congruence in their positions. Furthermore, we welcome the fact that both sides accept the principle of equality as the basis for a fair agreement.

But we cannot agree with President Brezhnev that the present position of the Soviet Union in the INF talks is one based on the principle of equality.

The American concept of equality is defined with precision -- zero on both sides for the most destabilizing intermediate range ground based missiles.

The Soviet Union, however, uses at least four quite different definitions of equality simultaneously -- equal reductions on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States; an equal level of force, measured in packages of weapons of different destructive capacities, sometimes between the Soviet Union and the United States, sometimes between the Soviet Union and NATO. Most often, the Soviet Union uses the term "equal security" to mean that the world must acknowledge its claim of a right to possess a nuclear arsenal equal to the sum of all the other nuclear arsenals in the world. This is a claim for hegemony, not equality. The nuclear arsenals of Great Britain, France, and China exist to protect the ultimate sovereignty of those nations. They are not under

American control and they are entirely defensive in character: given their size, they could not be used for any conceivable act of aggression against the Soviet Union. There is no basis, therefore, for the claim that such arsenals have any role in bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Sometimes representatives of the Soviet Union say that "the mutual security of the Soviet Union and the United States is indivisible". This is a suggestive formulation of the problem of defining equality. Thus far, at any rate, it turns out to be as elusive as the others.

Achieving equality between the Soviet Union and the United States on the basis of the principle of deterrence, with primary but not exclusive emphasis on equality in the most destabilizing categories of weapons, would in itself be a major political event, and a step of genuine importance in the quest for peace.

The Soviet-American talks on intercontinental nuclear weapons are, of course, at an earlier stage than the INF talks. Their atmosphere is also serious and business-like.

The United States position was outlined in President Reagan's speech at Eureka College on May 9, 1982. Its essential idea is that of equal ceilings at much lower levels of force -- ceilings that would strengthen deterrence and promote stability by significantly reducing the Soviet lead in ICBMs. Coupled with the elimination of the existing intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as proposed in the

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INF talks, such a result would enable the United States to maintain an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, safeguard our national security, and meet our commitments to allies and friends.

To achieve this goal, the President announced a practical, phased approach to the negotiation, like the procedure being used in the INF talks. It is based on the principle that the two arsenals should be equal both in the number of weapons and in their destructive capacity. "The focus of our efforts," the President said, "will be to reduce significantly the most destabilizing systems -- ballistic missiles, the number of warheads they carry and their overall destructive potential." While no aspect of the problem is excluded from consideration, and the United States will negotiate in good faith on any topics the Soviets wish to raise, the United States proposes that the first topic to be considered in the negotiations should be the reduction of ballistic missile warheads to equal levels at least one-third below current numbers. Both ground-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles are included in this proposal. No more than half these warheads would be deployed on land-based missiles. This provision alone should achieve substantial reductions in missile throw-weight, a reliable measure of the destructive power of nuclear weapons.

In a second phase, closely linked to the first, we will seek equal ceilings on other elements of United

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States and Soviet strategic forces, including equal limits on ballistic missile throw-weight at less than current U.S. levels.

In both START and INF the United States has made it clear that verification measures capable of assuring compliance are indispensable. For those provisions that cannot be monitored effectively by national technical means of verification, we will be proposing cooperative measures, data exchanges, and collateral constraints that should provide the necessary confidence in compliance. The Soviet Union has indicated that it will be prepared where necessary to consider cooperative measures going beyond national technical means. This is an encouraging sign. Without satisfactory verification provisions, meaningful agreements will be impossible to achieve.

The Soviet Union has attacked our START proposals as unfair, on the grounds that they call for unequal reductions -- indeed, that they call for "unilateral Soviet disarmament". This is not the case. Each side now has approximately 7500 ballistic missile warheads. Under the American proposal, each side would have to reduce to no more than 5000, of which no more than 2500 could be on ICBMs. True, the Soviet Union would have to dismantle more ICBMs to comply with the ICBM sub-limit, while we might have to dismantle more submarine-based missiles. But that is the point. There is nothing inequitable about an equal ceiling which strengthens deterrence and stability.

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The Soviet position in START, as Soviet spokesmen have made clear in public statements, consists of two parts, a proposal for a moratorium, and a series of reductions and restrictions on modernization which would result in preserving the present Soviet advantage in heavy, accurate, swift, and extremely destructive ground-based missiles. The Soviet Union seems to treat "stability" as a quantitative, not a qualitative problem; its proposal offers no incentives to move away from destabilizing systems, and it would not lead to substantial reductions in the key indicators of destructive potential.

If the INF and START talks are successful, the huge Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles will be eliminated. These alone are the weapons which "defy deterrence". In addition, it would eliminate the menacing Soviet lead in throw-weight, which is equally important. If the Soviet Union accepts nuclear arms control agreements based on the principle of "deterrence only", which is the heart of our negotiating position, a Soviet first strike would be impossible. Then -- but only then -- nuclear tension would diminish.

IV.

In President Reagan's statement on arms control of November 18, 1981, he spoke of the importance which we attach to progress in the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe -- the so-called MBFR negotiations.

As all of you know, these negotiations, underway for almost a decade, have been bogged down primarily as a result of Soviet intransigence over acknowledging exactly how many Warsaw Pact forces there are in the area of reductions to be covered by a treaty. The Soviet view applies the principle of caveat emptor with a vengeance. Meaningful progress toward the established goal of reductions to equal levels is hardly possible if we cannot agree on the number of forces now deployed by each side -- the basis needed to negotiate the reductions. Unless both sides are satisfied about the adequacy of the data used in the negotiation, it is hard to imagine how an atmosphere of trust can be expected to develop.

The West has taken a new initiative in moving the MBFR negotiations forward. In July the West formally tabled a draft MBFR treaty, embodying a new, comprehensive proposal designed to give renewed momentum to the negotiations. The new proposal highlights the primary Western objective in these negotiations, which is the lowering of tensions in Central Europe through a reduction in conventional forces, and the establishment of parity at lower force levels in the form of common

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collective ceilings on the military manpower of each side. This proposal, tabled as a draft treaty, goes far to meeting Eastern concerns, and underscores Western seriousness and willingness to bring about militarily significant reductions in Central Europe. We can only hope that the Soviet Union and its allies will understand the significance of the Western draft treaty and respond in a positive way.

At this point, let me add a brief note about CSCE and the Madrid Meetings, since the CSCE process is decidedly relevant to the overall climate for arms control efforts. Like the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act recognizes that basic human rights and fundamental freedoms are an essential element in the overall equation that defines security and cooperation between States. The United States is committed to the Helsinki Final Act and to the CSCE process in its entirety. As part of this commitment, we seek balanced and substantive improvements both in the implementation of previously made agreements and in strengthening their provisions. That was our intent when the Madrid Meeting first convened two years ago, and that will be our intent when it resumes on November 9. Unfortunately, however, events in Poland and the brutal

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intensification of repression in the Soviet Union clearly indicate that other States do not share our commitment to the integrity of the process begun at Helsinki. This will make progress at Madrid extremely difficult.

Another important arms control challenge facing the international community is the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union have assumed special responsibilities to work together in order to limit and reduce nuclear arms. The United States has been trying to carry out that responsibility through a long series of nuclear arms control proposals, starting in 1946. It will continue to do so. But the problem of non-proliferation is not merely one of negotiating nuclear arms control agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States. The issue runs deeper. Every State, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, has the same interest in preventing nuclear proliferation. A world of numerous and dispersed nuclear weapon States would be unstable and unpredictable. As Secretary Shultz said to the General Assembly a month ago, "The threat of nuclear proliferation extends to every region in the world and demands the attention and energy of every government." International cooperation in non-proliferation is essential if we are to confront this major threat to international peace.

The IAEA and the NPT are the most universally accepted instruments of non-proliferation policy and deserve continued broad support. They cannot alone guarantee the world against nuclear proliferation. But they are indispensable weapons in the effort.

Like a number of other international institutions, IAEA has recently been made the victim of a damaging attack. Some member States have attempted to use the agency as a forum for political warfare. The procedures used in these deplorable episodes are contrary to the Charter and the statutes of each of the agencies involved. The United States and a number of other nations are resolved to resist this trend as a major threat to the efficacy of our international institutions. All that has been achieved in nearly 40 years of devoted effort is imperilled by such short-sighted and illegal behavior. The United States calls on all members of the United Nations to join in protecting -- and strengthening -- these invaluable international resources, which are and must remain universal in their reach.

The U.S. continues its efforts to seek wider acceptance of the NPT, and earlier this month in Washington we were pleased to welcome Uganda into the ranks of NPT parties -- the 119th country to recognize the NPT as an important element of international security.

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The United States continues to believe that nuclear weapon-free zones can, under appropriate conditions, enhance regional security. The Treaty of Tlatelolco has contributed significantly to the prospects for long-term security in Latin America, and we remain hopeful that progress can be made towards its full entry into force throughout the region. We believe that nuclear weapon-free zone arrangements could contribute to the security and peace of other regions as well. We commend efforts toward this end, and would urge the relevant countries to explore more actively the possibilities for progress in this area.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to turn now to a subject to which my Government attaches major importance -- the matter of chemical weapons, their use, and efforts to ban them. When I spoke to this body last year, I underlined the deep and continuing concern of my Government over the use of chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Since that time even more compelling evidence of this activity has come to light. The United States brought this new evidence to the attention of the United Nations in March of this year in the form of a report which compiled all of the evidence we had before us into a single document. The conclusions contained in that report are unassailable: that selected Lao and Vietnamese forces, under the direct supervision of Soviet personnel,

have used lethal chemical weapons -- including prohibited toxins -- since 1976 at least; and that Soviet forces in Afghanistan have used a variety of lethal and non-lethal chemical agents since the December 1979 invasion.

Since the release of this report, others have conducted their own investigations and have come independently to similar conclusions. The Canadian Government, for example, recently submitted a report to the United Nations which cited further evidence of the use of such lethal chemical substances in Southeast Asia. I regret to say that such use continues. My own government has obtained further significant evidence of such use, which we will shortly submit to the United Nations. Finally, there is the United Nations' own group of experts, whose report on this subject we expect before the end of this Assembly session. Their task is not an easy one. As President Reagan stressed this summer in his address to SSOD II, therefore, we urge the governments of the Soviet Union, Laos, and Vietnam to grant full and free access to the areas in which chemical attacks have been reported. Ending the use of these horrible weapons should be given the highest priority by the international community. Violations of existing legal constraints have a negative impact on the entire arms control atmosphere.

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It is against this backdrop that efforts have continued in the Committee on Disarmament to develop a convention which would ban the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Is it any wonder that the United States, along with many other delegations, insists that such a convention contain effective verification provisions? Is it any wonder that the Committee is devoting so much careful consideration to this critical aspect of a convention? We only wish that it had been possible to make more progress on the matter this year.

Many of you, no doubt, recall that in June, when Foreign Minister Gromyko appeared before the General Assembly's Second Special Session Devoted to Disarmament, he unveiled a new Soviet proposal on chemical weapons, in the form of "basic provisions" for a draft convention. Part of that draft convention addressed the issue of verification in terms which suggested that the Soviet Union might now be prepared to accept systematic international on-site inspection in certain circumstances. This appeared to be an interesting and constructive step. Most of us believe that systematic international on-site inspection, which cannot be vetoed, is essential to the verification of a ban on chemical weapons. But when our delegation to the Committee on Disarmament's summer session -- together with many others -- sought to obtain elaboration from the Soviet delegation about their own

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proposal, we were met with equivocation and evasion. We hope and expect that a more constructive attitude will prevail at the next CD session.

Mention of the Committee on Disarmament leads me to discuss another issue, important to all of us, which has preoccupied the Committee for many years. This is the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The United States does not believe that, under present circumstances, a comprehensive nuclear test ban would reduce the threat of nuclear war because such a ban could not reduce the threat implicit in the existing stockpile. Furthermore, the verification of a CTB would remain a serious problem. As yet, we see no definitive solution. However, I want to repeat here what I said earlier in the year to the Committee on Disarmament: a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a long term United States arms control objective. With that objective in mind, we proposed that the verification aspects of the nuclear test ban problem be discussed in a working group of the Committee on Disarmament, a proposal which ultimately won the approval of the Committee. What happened next is instructive. The Soviet Union and its allies, having agreed to the mandate for the working group, sought to obstruct effective work in the group. Then it put forward the proposition that the working group had fulfilled its mandate.

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In his speech before the General Assembly, Foreign Minister Gromyko called for the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and, in the meantime, proposed a moratorium on all nuclear explosions. The Foreign Minister has also tabled a draft treaty for our consideration, as well as draft resolutions on the subject. The United States will, of course, study these proposals with care. Much of the material in these proposals is already familiar.

The Soviet proposal makes no reference to verification. By its very nature it lacks any means to ensure compliance. I should note that the last time we had a moratorium on nuclear testing, some 20 years ago, it was abruptly followed by a large series of Soviet nuclear tests -- tests whose clandestine preparation had clearly been underway during the moratorium. They included the two largest nuclear tests ever carried out, one of which had a yield of about 60 megatons.

The Soviet Union has placed great emphasis in its public statements on its pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The Soviet position is a cynical exploitation of one of the most troublesome moral issues of our age. The controversy about "no first use" pledges underscores the wisdom of the Secretary General's advice

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that all the nations recommit themselves to the principles of the Charter. NATO has long followed a policy -- one it has recently reiterated -- that none of its weapons will ever be used "except in response to attack". We see no value in a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons if a "right", or at least the power to use conventional weapons in contravention of the UN Charter, is claimed and reserved. The main effect of nuclear arms control agreements should not be to make the world safe for conventional aggressive war. In any event, the Soviet "no first use" pledge is unverifiable and unenforceable. Its credibility is belied by the nature of Soviet military doctrine, and by the ominous Soviet buildup of massive land-based ballistic missiles, which present an obvious threat of first use.

Mr. Chairman, I have often spoken of the problems which an excessive devotion to secrecy can pose to arms control efforts. Many in this chamber have long argued that greater openness in military matters could help to reduce tensions and lessen the danger of war. Some measures along these lines have already been instituted in Europe as an outgrowth of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and indeed they have made a modest contribution to a reduction of tensions in this most heavily armed area of the world.

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My Government is among those which would like to see a wider application of the principle of openness. In particular, we should like to see greater participation of States in the reporting of their military budgets to the United Nations, which the General Assembly has repeatedly endorsed, and in the work of the UN experts to improve the comparability of statistics. President Reagan emphasized this policy in his speech to the General Assembly at its Second Special Session on Disarmament in June. It is our hope that this session of the General Assembly will encourage a broadening of the effort to promote full disclosure, and we will be suggesting ways in which this might be done.

Similarly, I think the World Disarmament Campaign, which was debated at the Special Session, holds some promise for promoting more widespread, open, and thoughtful debate about disarmament. This is to be welcomed, provided agreed principles for the campaign are universally observed. As you know, the United States worked hard at the Special Session to ensure that these principles are included in the Campaign. We think that this point is worth emphasizing again in any resolution which the Assembly may consider this fall on the Campaign.

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The Secretary General's call to the nations to recommit themselves to the Charter should be the dominant theme of this session of the General Assembly. The natural place to begin the effort he recommends is the nuclear arms negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, now going on in Geneva. We urge the Soviet Union to abandon the claim of a right to retain a nuclear arsenal which goes beyond any conceivable limits of defense and deterrence. To accept the principle of deterrence as the foundation of the INF and START talks would be a giant step towards the goal of peace.

In conclusion, I return to the theme with which I started -- that arms control and disarmament efforts can be useful instruments of a strategy for attaining and preserving peace, but in no sense can they be a substitute for such a strategy. In the absence of general respect for the rules of the Charter, arms control negotiations can be futile at best, and damaging to the cause of peace at worst. As the Secretary General has reminded us, peace can be ensured only by enforcing the prescriptions of the Charter against aggression. Since no one can be certain that the escalation from conventional to nuclear war would not occur, the only way to free mankind from the threat of nuclear war is to stop conventional war as well. The draft pastoral letter of the Committee on War and Peace

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of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops of the United States, released on October 25, 1982, puts the issue with austere eloquence:

"We must reemphasize with all our being ... that it is not only nuclear war that must be prevented, but war itself, the scourge of humanity."