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
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Executive Secretary
16 November 1981
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OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

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November 13, 1981

Dear Bill,

I am so pleased by your reaction to the literature I keep churning out that I send you the enclosed draft. My problem is that I have lived for years under the dire rule of "publish or perish". Now it's my duty.

Yours cordially,

Enclosure:

Draft speech

The Honorable
William J. Casey,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

L-211

Draft B, Nov. 12, 1981
Please return comments
by November 18, 1981.

The Unnecessary War

The Winston Churchill Lecture
of the English Speaking Union

by

Eugene V. Rostow
Director
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

London
November 30, 1981

This ceremony gives me pleasure at many levels. I believe in the English-Speaking Union and deeply value the compliment of your invitation to speak tonight. It is an extra satisfaction for me to be introduced by Sir Patrick Dean. While I was in the State Department between 1966 and 1969, Sir Patrick was Her Majesty's Ambassador, and a most distinguished Ambassador he was. We worked happily together on a long list of difficult problems, and emerged from the experience friends as well as colleagues, demonstrating the self-evident truths that Trinity Hall and King's are close neighbors after all, and that the Special Relation is not a policy but a fact.

What makes this evening singular for me, however, is that I have been asked to give a lecture in honor of Winston Churchill. The only occasion in my life which made my skin tingle with comparable feeling was the challenge of writing and delivering a Fourth of July oration in honor of Thomas Jefferson from the steps of Monticello.

Both Churchill and Jefferson are heroes in the Pantheon of the English speaking peoples. The heroism

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of these two giants is not simply that they had the courage to stand and fight against odds in times of trouble. There are many heroes of whom that could be said. Their special quality is that they had the gift of words as well as the gift of action. What they did and what they said are woven together into an epic whole. Like the other great epics of our tradition, the sagas of Churchill and Jefferson will remain part of the living faith not only of the English speaking peoples but of all the peoples in the world who share the creed of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.

That creed is really the heart of what I have to say tonight. It is embodied in many famous slogans -- in the motto of the French Revolution I have just recalled; in Jefferson's "unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; in the Four Freedoms of Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt; and in the natural human and civil rights men and women are claiming with increasing vehemence these days behind the Iron Curtain and in other parts of the world ruled by tyrants or oligarchs. The themes which cluster around the idea of liberty lie just below the surface of the political

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and military problems which preoccupy our foreign offices. And they completely dominate the psychological and educational tasks which constitute at least half the agenda of our governments nowadays as they try to understand what is involved in the decline of world public order; then try to decide what should be done about it; and finally attempt to persuade our own people and those who would be our adversaries to do what is necessary in the common interest.

Nominally, my subject tonight, in Churchill's compelling phrase, is "The Unnecessary War" -- the war we must prevent. Churchill proposed the phrase as the official name for what is generally called "The Second World War." It commands us to remember that if the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union had acted wisely during the Thirties, the war could never have taken place. After Hitler came to power, Churchill urged such a course from the back benches with all his magnificent resources of reason, historical knowledge, experience, and eloquence. He was denounced for his pains as a senile war monger who saw Huns under every bed. His critics -- they were numerous and influential -- dismissed him as a romantic who still lived in the days before 1914, bemused by endless quantities of champagne or brandy or both. To adapt one of Churchill's best phrases, "Some champagne; some

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brandy." Nonetheless, he was kept in the wilderness until the war had started and was nearly lost.

Both World Wars did terrible damage to the fabric of our civilization. The twin evils of Fascism and Communism were among their progeny. But a Third World War in a nuclear environment would be far, far worse. We must not fail to prevent war this time, as Asquith and Grey failed before 1914, and as Churchill and Roosevelt failed before 1939.

The situation today resembles that of the Thirties in many ways. But it is different too, profoundly different -- even more dangerous; more volatile; and far more difficult to control by the polite warnings and veiled threats of old-fashioned European diplomacy. Like legal precedents, historical precedents should never be applied blindly. As Peter Clark remarked recently, "they only hold good so long as things go on in the same old way." World politics have not been going on in the same old way for the last fifty years. The world we live in is not the world Churchill and Roosevelt were struggling to master in the middle Thirties. We cannot expect to succeed where Churchill and Roosevelt failed by muddling through.

My thesis tonight is simple: peace has now become truly indivisible, in the memorable words of a Soviet

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Foreign Minister forty five years ago. It is a thesis entirely appropriate for us to consider on the first day of a new round of Soviet American talks on the reduction of nuclear weapons. The pervasive menace of nuclear arsenals and the apparently inexorable spread of nuclear weapons create profound political instabilities in themselves. One false step, one human error, one miscalculation can now set the computers whirring and destroy a large part of the human race. But the weight and threat of nuclear weapons are not the only engine of disequilibrium in the world. Conventional warfare and subversion have become epidemic and commonplace. When that factor is added to the influence of the nuclear arsenals, world politics are transformed into a witches' brew because the wall between conventional and nuclear war can never be impermeable, no matter how high we make it. It is now obvious that arms control agreements are not worth having if their only consequence is to make the world safe for conventional warfare, terrorism, and the movement of armed bands across international frontiers.

Consider, for example, a current issue our Governments are now grappling with. The Soviet Union has recently revived its old proposal for a General Assembly declaration banning the first use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet

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goal is transparent. They know as we do that the recovery and renaissance of the NATO allies, Japan, and many other countries since 1945 has depended on the credible threat of the United States to use its nuclear weapons in defense of its allies and other supreme interests against conventional as well as nuclear attack. That is what nuclear deterrence and the American nuclear umbrella are about -- the belief throughout the world -- and particularly in the higher circles of the Soviet Union -- that nuclear weapons would be used, for example, if Soviet tanks started to roll into Western Europe. Until the Soviet Union joins us in agreements which could genuinely remove the menace of nuclear war from world politics altogether -- a goal to which the United States has been passionately committed since we offered the Baruch Plan in 1946 -- there can be no escape from reliance on nuclear deterrence when the supreme interests of the United States are threatened by aggression. Like many other facts of life, the nuclear deterrence involves a moral dilemma. It is nonetheless a fact of life.

The sound and reasonable response of the Western allies to the Soviet proposal for a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons, therefore, should be an appeal for a re-dedication of the entire world community to the principles of the

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United Nations Charter against any form of aggression, whether conducted by nuclear or conventional force or by the movement of armed bands across international frontiers. This appeal should be coupled with a corresponding rededication to a fresh start in the effort the United States initiated in 1946 to bring nuclear energy under effective international control. The Baruch Plan, you will recall, would have placed what was then an American nuclear monopoly into the hands of a United Nations Agency. The means proposed in the Baruch Plan are certainly obsolete now. But its animating idea remains important.

No lesser steps could begin the indispensable process of restoring world public order. The decline of world public order and the specter of nuclear anarchy beyond it are the greatest of all the threats to the peace. The best available way to deal with that threat is through international cooperation in enforcing the rules of peace embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. They constitute the only available code of detente -- and the only possible code of detente.

There is no use blinking the fact that there is a risk of war in the Soviet Union's campaigns of expansion all over the world. Those campaigns are carried on by methods which violate the rules of the Charter governing the

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international use of force. The Soviet Union does not initiate all the trouble in the world. But it does take advantage of trouble in order to expand its sphere of influence. The Soviet campaigns of expansion have gone too far. They now threaten the world balance of power on which the ultimate safety of the Western nations depends, and therefore they touch nerves of immense sensitivity.

The men and women on the Clapham omnibus know this in their bones. That is why there is so much concern about war in Western public opinion. The current wave of anxiety about the possibility of war is natural and reasonable. We all share it. The pervasiveness of anxiety is not a sign of cowardice or pacifism, but a normal symptom of the fact that public opinion has reluctantly begun to acknowledge the true condition of world politics. It has exactly the same significance as the famous vote of the Oxford Union about fighting for king and country in 1936.

The present turbulence of our public opinion does not prove that there is something wrong with the younger generation; that our moral fiber has been ruined by the welfare state; or that the leaders of our churches and peace movements are all Communists or fellow travelers or their innocent dupes. Of course the Communists are

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trying to exploit and manipulate the feelings of people about war and to convert those feelings into a political movement that would serve the ends of the Soviet Union. Communists always do that sort of thing, and always will. But they have never controlled our politics in the West, and they will not succeed now. We cannot ignore their activities. But we should not get agitated about them, either.

After all, the anxiety of public opinion about war is not manifested only in demonstrations against the presence of troops and weapons and in expressions of the altogether sensible view that there is insanity in the continued accumulation of weapons, and especially of nuclear weapons. There are other expressions of that anxiety and concern, equally significant, and much more realistic. Throughout the West, people are coming to the conclusion that their governments must stop the process of Soviet expansion before it explodes into general war. They know that peace cannot be achieved by unilateral disarmament. And they recognize the wisdom of the old Russian proverb, "If you make yourself into a sheep, you will find a wolf nearby." Sadly and without jingoism, our people support their governments in policies which seek to arrest the slide towards war while there is still time

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to do so in peace and by the methods of peace.

As a result, the North Atlantic allies and many other nations are following the broad lines of policy Churchill counselled in vain before the Second World War. They are restoring the military balance which has eroded in ten years of apathy, revulsion, and self-deception. And they are resuming the quest for peace through negotiation with the Soviet Union. They fully realize how little has been accomplished by arms control and disarmament treaties in the past. Nonetheless, without illusion or euphoria, they wish to be certain that no conceivable opportunity for peace is ignored. Therefore they welcome the effort of the United States to persuade the leaders of the Soviet Union that it is in the highest interest of the Soviet state and of all other states -- and indeed in the highest interest of humanity itself -- to recognize the fact that history has thrust an inescapable obligation on the Soviet Union and the United States. That obligation can be translated into two imperative axioms: First, that the United States and the Soviet Union should reach verifiable arms reduction agreements which give each side an equal capacity to deter the use of nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes; and second, that world public order should be restored in conformity with the rules upon which the United Nations

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agreed in San Francisco at the end of a terrible war they had barely won. These two propositions are closely related. Together they define the objectives of the United States as we approach the TNF and START negotiations. We hope the Soviet Union will come to agree with us, and to accept these principles as major premises for a process of Soviet-American cooperation which has now become imperative.

Thus far, there have been no signs of progress in that effort. Soviet behavior, diplomacy, and propaganda remain what they have been for a long generation. We have no choice but to persevere, however, seeking to reach the peoples of the Soviet Union with every resource of our intelligence and imagination while Soviet expansion is restrained by the calm deployment of deterrent force. We know that more than sixty years of Soviet rule have not weakened the love of liberty and justice in Russia, and that the peoples of Eastern Europe remain an integral part of the European culture and policy. So long as we in the West are strong, confident, and determined, the forces of hope in the East will not sink back into despair.

II

The analysis I have just summarized is adequate and accurate, I believe, so far as it goes. But it does not go very far. Rationally, it is easy to prescribe the course the NATO allies and the Soviet Union should follow now, just as it is easy with the benefit of hindsight to agree that Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States could have prevented the Second World War. The important question about the Thirties is not what should have been done -- the answer to that question is self-evident -- but why Churchill and Roosevelt, two towering politicians at the height of their powers, failed to persuade their fellow countrymen to follow their lead. That, I believe is the principal question on the agenda of Western foreign policy today, and it is the issue to which I shall devote the remainder of this lecture. What are the limits of reason in dealing with the issues before us? Can we hope to persuade the Soviet Union, or only to contain it, as George Kennan has contended, until the benign influence of Russian high culture brings about a mellowing of Soviet policy? And how can our effort of persuasion and dialogue be organized and carried out by methods compatible with the rules of our being?

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In this perspective, we see how much harder and more complex our problems are than the problems with which Churchill's generation had to deal. The state system can be detonated today by remote and intractable conflicts, whose destructive impact could be multiplied by the spread of nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances, I repeat, there is no rational alternative to great power cooperation in enforcing the agreed rules of peace -- equally, fairly and justly. But is there any chance that reason can be made to prevail? How do we persuade the Soviet Union that it too should obey the rules of the Charter, give up the dream of empire, and join the Western nations in seeing to it that the Charter rules are generally respected throughout the world?

The questions I have just posed surely include matters of diplomacy and strategy which would have been familiar to Thucydides or Machiavelli. But their implications transcend the abstractions of political theory, or the cool detachment of the cynic. The balance of power is not all that is at stake in the world crisis which has come about through our blindness and negligence. Churchill commented once that Marlborough and Wellington had changed the course of history, permitting two centuries of British primacy which were hardly compelled

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by the economic and demographic statistics. It is heresy, I know, to ask such a question in a Churchill lecture, but -- issues of national loyalty and national pride apart -- would Western civilization have been very different if Marlborough had lost at Blenheim and Wellington at Waterloo? That kind of speculation can hardly arise about the outcome of the Cold and not-so-Cold War. No one can contemplate the possibility of nuclear war with any feelings but those of horror and disgust. And no one could describe the architects of the Gulag Archipelago as Saint Simon and Nancy Mitford describe the denizens of Versailles in the day of the Sun King. With divided and uneasy minds, the nations of the West have finally embarked on a Churchillian effort to prevent war. We have taken this step not only to protect our national independence and avert nuclear devastation but to preserve the creed and hope of liberty for ourselves and for all who cherish it. Nuclear war could be averted, after all, by Western surrender. But that course is unthinkable.

Many believe that the ideal of individual freedom has had its run in the bleak chronicle of human history, and will soon be forced to yield to one version or another of collectivism. This every child of the Anglo-American

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culture must deny. The view that the state exists to protect individual freedom has always been at war with the ideology of Leviathan; that war will never end. Man yearns for freedom, but freedom is lonely. Man also yearns for security and companionship. Sometimes he seems willing to pay the price of slavery for them. It may be that even in the West some people actually prefer such societies, at least for a time.

There is no reason to lose faith in our humane ideals. We speak with many voices, as free men and women always do. But beneath the turbulence of these lively sounds there is abiding unity and ample strength. In their vast majorities, the people of the West remain loyal to the code of values to which they have been bred -- the values of a tradition which goes beyond the Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century to the roots of our political liberty in the common law and the English constitution, and to the roots of our moral freedom in the heritage of the Old and New Testaments and the memory of Greece.

Today that tradition faces the challenge of a new Minotaur. And today, once more, those who love freedom must rally to its defense. But the threat we face is more than the threat of arms and the challenge of ideology.

Sir Isaiah Berlin uses a simple phrase to sum up the most fundamental difference between societies devoted to the freedom of the individual and societies in which the state manipulates the individual in the name of a greater good: the difference between "Freedom from" and "Freedom to." We believe with Sir Isaiah in "Freedom from" -- that is, we believe, in the autonomy of man as a good in itself and the most important rightful goal of organized society. It follows that we must also believe with Jefferson that "the just powers of government derive from the consent of the governed." If the consent of the governed is the source of the authority of the state in free societies, high principles of ethical responsibility should govern the discourse among men and women which is the source of public opinion and thus the predicate for their consent. Democracy is impossible unless we speak to each other with civility and scrupulous respect for the truth as best we can perceive the truth.

As George Orwell saw so clearly, the most important difference between free societies and modern tyranny is a totally different attitude towards the problem of truth. This difference is why our efforts at propaganda, even in wartime, are so diffident, defensive, and ineffective.

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Everyday we read and hear propositions as bizarre as those of Orwell's Newspeak. We find it almost impossible to offset their impact on our own minds, or to explain to others why those propositions are wrong. We are simply not equipped to contest the propaganda of Newspeak. In the end, we deal with it as if it were the argument of a parliamentary opposition. That is all we know how to do.

Let me give you an example of central importance to my thesis tonight. We are being bombarded at the moment by the breathtaking claim that the NATO allies and the United States in particular are seeking to disturb a stable equilibrium of world power, gain military superiority over the Soviet Union, and start a nuclear war to destroy the Soviet regime. Sometimes an additional detail is added for European consumption -- that the United States is planning to fight the nuclear war entirely in Europe and to its last ally. In the United States, Soviet spokesmen say the opposite -- that if the Soviet Union is hit by a nuclear missile, it will pay no attention to the calling card attached to the weapon, but respond at once with all its missiles against the continental United States.

How can these contentions be answered? Can anyone really believe that the American people miss Vietnam,

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and are looking for an excuse to start another such campaign, this time with nuclear weapons, or even a Third World War on a much larger and more exciting scale than Vietnam? Can anyone suppose we are bored because our universities are quiet and busy, preoccupied with education rather than with anti-war protests? Can anyone imagine that an American President could contemplate the possible use of force for any reason except the most austere sense of duty and obligation, knowing well that President Truman's political career was ruined by the Korean War as President Johnson's was destroyed by Vietnam, and indeed that every war in American history was politically unpopular?

Or let us look at another aspect of the Soviet thesis -- the actual state of the military balance, and especially the balance in intermediate range nuclear weapons in and near Europe. Year after year, the Soviet Union tells us that there are roughly 1,000 weapons of this kind on each side, and that the NATO decision to deploy modern nuclear weapons in Europe is a destabilizing quest for nuclear superiority in preparation for nuclear war. There is irony in this claim. The magic figure remains near 1,000 although the Soviet Union deploys a new SS-20 every 5 days. And the Soviet Union has not yet

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offered a detailed statistical table to support its charges. But Soviet spokesmen have said enough to make the statistical fallacies of their argument apparent. For example, they seem to count only SS-20 missiles deployed in European Russia, although many of these missiles located beyond the Urals can reach targets in Western Europe without difficulty. And they count certain American planes in making their calculations, but exclude Soviet planes of the same type. All the studies I have seen confirm the judgment of the International Institute of Strategic Studies that Soviet superiority in this particularly threatening category of nuclear weapons is more than 3 to 1, so that even the full deployment of the American weapons scheduled for Europe could not produce anything like equality, to say nothing of "superiority." But the charges continue to be made.

The problems the NATO allies face together at this juncture have nothing to do with the fantasies of Soviet propaganda. We do not have to choose between protecting our interests and fighting a nuclear war or any other kind of war, in Europe or elsewhere. That is a false dichotomy. The sole object of United States and NATO policy is to protect our common interests by restoring stability without war. There is no reason to doubt our capacity to protect the future of liberty in peace, by

the methods of alliance diplomacy backed by deterrent military power. The NATO allies, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, China, and other countries which oppose Soviet hegemony have ample power and potential power to stop the process of Soviet expansion. With Poland in the process of undergoing profound social changes, this is hardly the time to bend our knees to the power and ideology of the Soviet Union as the wave of the future.

We know that for the Soviet Union, separating Western Europe from the United States is the first principle of its strategic doctrine. If Western Europe could be brought within the Soviet domain, the geopolitical theorists of the Soviet Union believe, Japan, China, and many other nations would draw the necessary conclusions, and the United States would be left isolated and impotent. The enormous Soviet effort in the field of intermediate range missiles is intelligible only in the perspective of Soviet strategic doctrine. In that perspective, it is all too intelligible. The objective, as always, is decoupling the United States from Europe. The scenario would follow these lines: the subliminal radiations of the Soviet intermediate range nuclear arsenal would induce panic in Europe while the growing Soviet strategic arsenal would

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paralyze any possibility of an American strategic response. Presto and checkmate.

This was the nightmare which provoked deep European and American concern five or six years ago. Henry Kissinger's Brussels warning in 1977 dramatized the issue. But the anxiety would have been the same if he had never spoken. The danger of decoupling Europe from the United States is implicit in the changing overall intercontinental nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, and therefore in the loss of the counterweight which had kept superior Soviet conventional forces at bay since 1945. After a year or two of discussion, NATO decided that the United States should deploy American intermediate range land-based missiles in Europe and at the same time negotiate with the Soviet Union about removing the threat to Europe arising from the existence of the Soviet missiles.

The reasoning behind the NATO decision parallels the argument which has persuaded the United States to keep large American conventional forces in or near Europe, that is the argument for firmer coupling between Europe and the United States. There has been periodic political agitation in the United States for a reduction of our conventional forces in Europe, and for exclusive reliance on intercontinental nuclear weapons to protect Europe against Soviet

pressures. But proposals of this kind have been firmly and repeatedly rejected. The United States wishes not only to make the nuclear guaranty clear and credible, but to be in a position to respond appropriately to threats across the entire spectrum of threat or attack. To remove American forces from Europe would escalate every conflict instantly to the nuclear level. With American intermediate range nuclear weapons deployed on European soil, there would be less doubt about the credibility of the American intercontinental nuclear guaranty to Europe both in Europe and in the Soviet Union. As a result, the risk of war by miscalculation would be reduced, and the nuclear threshold correspondingly raised.

The problem of the intermediate range nuclear weapons must be examined in the SALT context, as the North Atlantic Council has declared, because the line between intermediate range and intercontinental nuclear forces is not clear cut. Intercontinental weapons can also be aimed at targets in Europe, Japan, or the Middle East. And some weapons normally classified as theatre weapons can be used under certain circumstances on intercontinental missions. While much could be accomplished by successful TNF talks, both in reducing weapons and contributing to crisis stability, the ultimate

security of the NATO allies will continue to rest on the reliability of the United States strategic guaranty.

III

When I was a student at King's, the great Alfred Marshall had gone, but the young dons still faithfully took their texts from his books and lectures. One of their favorites, I recall, is appropriate to our problem tonight. Marshall liked to say, "Trees do not grow to the sky." He was talking about firms and trade unions, and the checks and balances of economic life. But his observation applies also to empires.

The Soviet Union is still in the imperial mood of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which the other imperial powers have long since given up with relief and conviction. Those nations have discovered what Bentham pointed out long ago -- that the imperial powers had no right to govern the peoples they had conquered; that they gained nothing from their efforts; and, as Sir Norman Angell concluded much later, that imperialism is extremely expensive. An Italian minister summed up the problem of costs in the late Forties, "Italy has lost the war," he said, "but in compensation it has lost its Empire." The former imperial powers have learned that it is more

profitable and more satisfactory all around to make money, not war.

If we take the Soviet drive to be the Hegelian thesis, it has already stimulated a normal antithesis -- a coalition of nations determined to retain their independence. In the nature of things, the forces of the antithesis are bound to prevail. Can the Soviet Union acknowledge that fact, and accept the inevitable gracefully -- as gracefully as Great Britain or The Netherlands welcomed the end of empire after World War II? Will the last surviving traditional empire join the other nations in seeking the world order anticipated by the Charter of the United Nations -- a world order based on the equality of states large and small, and on the rule that no state use force to attack the territorial integrity and political independence of any other state?

In our view, those are the ultimate questions before us. The answers to those questions are in the mist. All I can tell you tonight is that the United States and its allies view the process of arms control negotiations as a possible key to the riddle of the future. Arms control negotiations have no magic in themselves. Negotiating with the Soviet Union is a rough sport, and a satisfactory outcome is hardly guaranteed. But we cannot forego a possible

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opportunity for progress toward peace. The Soviet policy of expansion, fuelled by the extraordinary growth of the Soviet armed forces and particularly of its nuclear forces, has produced a situation of growing tension and instability. The efforts of the Soviet Union to split the West and to prevent Western modernization of its defenses will surely fail. We have appealed to the Soviet Union, and we appeal again, for cooperation between us as the only rational way out of the dilemma both camps now confront. The fruits of SALT I and SALT II have turned to ashes in our mouths. What began ten years ago with the high hope of detente, became the worst decade of the entire Cold War.

We approach the task determined not to confuse our hopes for reality. We know that the Soviet Union, like most other countries, has at least two cultures -- the culture of Peter the Great and the culture of Ivan the Terrible; the Russian culture of inspiring intellectual quality and moral distinction, the culture of Tolstoy, Turgenev, Checkhov and their modern successors, as well as the culture of Oriental despotism now in the ascendant. From long experience we know that Soviet spokesmen are right when they say, as they often do, "we are neither pacifists nor philanthropists." But there are positive elements in

the situation which ought to lead the Soviet leaders to choose a policy of stability in their relationship with the West: the apparently insoluble problems of the Soviet economy and the situation in Poland, to mention only two.

Beyond issues of that order, however, is the overriding problem of the nuclear weapon which is far more serious. The inescapable logic of the nuclear weapon applies to the Socialist and capitalist states alike. It compels all states, in the interest of survival and humanity, to consider far more radical and fundamental remedies than any which have yet been tried if we are to seize the opportunity implicit in the present crisis and together lift the threat of nuclear war from the shoulders of mankind. The United States believes that the time has finally come to realize Alfred Nobel's tremendous dream -- that weapons can be so awful as to compel peace.

I can sum up all I have tried to say tonight by telling you of an episode about which I heard recently.

The story is that in the early years of the nuclear age, Hugh Gaitskell asked R. H. Tawney, the great social philosopher and patron saint of the Labor Party, to write

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him a memorandum about what British policy towards nuclear weapons should be. Tawney's paper said four things: First, the secret was out of the laboratory, and could never be returned. Any industrial country would have the technology to make the weapons. Secondly, it followed that the Western nations could not give up nuclear weapons for obvious reasons of prudence. Third, nuclear war was unthinkably destructive, and the West must find ways to protect its freedom and security and at the same time prevent nuclear war.

From these three propositions Tawney drew a conclusion he regarded as inescapable, that the goal of policy must be not simply the avoidance of nuclear war, but the elimination of all international war.