

Del

JRC

Executive Secretary
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

81-9787

ER. file
(I don't



ILLEGIB

The Unnecessary War

The Winston Churchill Lecture
of the English Speaking Union

by

Eugene V. Rostow
Director
United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency

London
November 30, 1981

L 266

This ceremony gives me pleasure at many levels. I believe in the English-Speaking Union and value the compliment of your invitation to speak tonight.

What makes this evening singular, however, is that I have been asked to give a lecture in honor of Winston Churchill. The only occasion in my life which made my skin tingle with comparable feeling was the challenge of writing and delivering a Fourth of July oration in honor of Thomas Jefferson from the steps of Monticello.

Both Churchill and Jefferson are heroes in the Pantheon of the English speaking peoples. The heroism of these giants is not simply that they had the courage to fight against odds in times of trouble. There are many heroes of whom that could be said. Their special quality is that they had the gift of words as well as the gift of action. What they did and what they said are woven together into an epic whole. Like the other great epics of our tradition, Churchill and Jefferson will remain part of the living faith not only of the English speaking peoples but of all the peoples in the world who share the creed of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity: -- the Rights of Man.

2.

That faith is the heart of what I have to say tonight. It is embodied in many famous slogans -in the motto of the French Revolution I have just recalled; in Jefferson's "unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; in the Four Freedoms of Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt; and in the natural human and civil rights men and women are claiming with increasing vehemence these days behind the Iron Curtain and in other parts of the world ruled by tyrants or oligarchs. The themes which cluster around the idea of liberty lie just below the surface of the political and military problems which preoccupy our foreign offices. And they dominate the psychological and educational tasks which constitute at least half the agenda of our governments in the realm of foreign affairs.

Nominally, my subject tonight, in Churchill's compelling phrase, is "The Unnecessary War" -- the war we must prevent. Churchill proposed the phrase as the name for what is generally called "The Second World War." It commands us to remember that if the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union had acted wisely during the Thirties, the war could never have taken place.

3.

After Hitler came to power, Churchill urged such a course with all his magnificent resources of reason, historical knowledge, experience, eloquence, and wit. He was denounced for his pains as a senile, drunken war monger who saw Huns under every bed. His critics -- they were numerous and influential -- dismissed him as a romantic who still lived in the days before 1914, besotted by endless quantities of champagne or brandy or both. To adapt one of Churchill's best phrases, "Some champagne; some brandy." Nonetheless, he was kept in the wilderness until the war had started and was nearly lost.

Both World Wars did terrible damage to the fabric of our civilization. The twin evils of Fascism and Communism were among their progeny. But a Third World War in a nuclear environment would be far, far worse. We must not fail to prevent war this time, as Asquith and Grey failed before 1914, and as Churchill and Roosevelt failed before 1939. President Reagan made it clear in his speech of November 18 that this is the dominant idea of American foreign policy today.

The situation we confront resembles that of the Thirties in many ways. But it is significantly different too, -- more dangerous; more volatile; and far more difficult to control

by the polite warnings and veiled threats of old-fashioned European diplomacy.

My thesis tonight is simple: peace has now become truly indivisible, in the memorable words of a Soviet Foreign Minister forty five years ago. It is a thesis entirely appropriate for us to consider on the first day of a new round of Soviet American talks on the reduction of nuclear weapons. The pervasive menace of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the apparently inexorable spread of nuclear weapons create profound political instabilities. But nuclear weapons are not the only factors of disequilibrium in the world. Conventional warfare, subversion, and terrorism have become epidemic and commonplace. Their influence, added to that of the nuclear arsenals, has transformed world politics into a witches' brew for a reason which becomes more obvious and more ominous every day: because the wall between conventional and nuclear war can never be impermeable, no matter how high we make it. Small wars can become big ones at least as readily as in the days when Archdukes were assassinated at Sarejevo and Danzig was the center of world concern. It is now apparent that arms control agreements are hardly worth having if they make the world safe for conventional warfare, terrorism, and the movement of armed bands across international frontiers.

5.

Consider, for example, an issue now before our Governments. The Soviet Union has revived its old proposal for a General Assembly declaration banning the first use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet goal is transparent. They know as we do that the recovery and renaissance of the NATO allies, Japan, and many other countries since 1945 have depended on the credible threat of the United States to use its full military capability, including nuclear weapons if necessary, in defense of its allies and other supreme interests against conventional as well as nuclear attack. That is what nuclear deterrence and the American nuclear umbrella are about -- the belief throughout the world -- and particularly in the higher circles of the Soviet Union -- that nuclear weapons would be used, however reluctantly, if they were needed, for example, to stop a massive invasion of Western Europe. Until the Soviet Union joins us in agreements which could genuinely remove the menace of nuclear war from world politics altogether -- a goal to which the United States has been passionately committed since we offered the Baruch Plan in 1946 -- there can be no escape from nuclear deterrence when the supreme interests of the United States and the free world are threatened by aggression.

The sound and reasonable response of the Western

6.

Allies to the Soviet proposal for a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons, therefore, should be an appeal for a rededication of the entire world community to the principles of the United Nations Charter against any form of aggression, whether conducted by nuclear or conventional force or by the movement of armed bands across international frontiers. This appeal should be coupled with a corresponding rededication to the goal of bringing nuclear energy under more effective international control in order to permit the fullest possible use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and end the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation. The Baruch Plan, you will recall, would have placed what was then an American nuclear monopoly into the hands of a United Nations Agency. The means proposed in the Baruch Plan are obsolete now. But its animating ideas remain important.

No lesser steps could begin the indispensable process of restoring world public order. The decline of world public order and the specter of nuclear anarchy beyond it are the greatest of all the threats to the peace. The best available way to deal with that threat is through international cooperation in enforcing the rules of peace embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. They constitute the only available code of detente -- and the only possible code of detente.

7.

There is no blinking the fact that the Soviet Union risks war in its campaigns of expansion all over the world. Those campaigns use aggressive war as an instrument of national policy; they are carried on by methods which violate the rules of the Charter governing the international use of force. No one claims that the Soviet Union initiates all the trouble in the world. But it does take advantage of trouble in order to expand its sphere of influence. The Soviet campaigns of expansion have gone too far. They now threaten the world balance of power on which the ultimate safety of the Western nations depends, and therefore they touch nerves of immense sensitivity.

The men and women on the Clapham omnibus know this in their bones. That is why there is so much concern about war in Western public opinion. The current wave of anxiety about the possibility of war is natural and reasonable. We all share it. But we cannot allow it to paralyze us. The pervasiveness of anxiety is not a sign of cowardice or pacifism, but a normal symptom of the fact that public opinion has reluctantly begun to acknowledge the true condition of world politics.

The turbulence of our public opinion does not prove that there is something wrong with the younger generation; that our moral fiber has been ruined by the welfare state;

8.

or that the leaders of our churches and peace movements are all Communists or fellow travelers or their innocent dupes. Of course the Communists are trying to manipulate the feelings of people about war and to harness them to a political movement that would serve the ends of the Soviet Union.

But Communists have never controlled our politics in the West, and they will not succeed now. We cannot ignore their activities. But we should not be unduly agitated about them, either.

After all, the anxiety of public opinion about war is not manifested only in demonstrations against the presence of troops and weapons and in expressions of the perfectly correct view that there is insanity in the continued accumulation of weapons, especially nuclear weapons. There are other expressions of that anxiety and concern, equally significant, and much more realistic. Throughout the West, people are coming to the conclusion that their governments must stop the process of Soviet expansion before it explodes into general war. They know that peace cannot be achieved by unilateral disarmament. And they recognize the wisdom of the old Russian proverb, "If you make yourself into a sheep, you will find a wolf nearby."

9.

Sadly and without jingoism, our people support their governments in policies which seek to prevent war while there is still time to do so by peaceful means.

As a result, the North Atlantic allies and many other nations are following the broad lines of policy Churchill counselled in vain before the Second World War. They are restoring the military balance which has eroded during the last decade. And they are resuming the quest for peace through negotiation with the Soviet Union. They realize how little has been accomplished by arms control and disarmament treaties in the past. Nonetheless, without illusion or euphoria, they wish to be certain that no conceivable opportunity for peace is ignored. Therefore they welcome President Reagans' effort to persuade the leaders of the Soviet Union that it is in the highest interest of the Soviet state and of all other states -- and indeed in the highest interest of humanity itself -- to accept the obligation which history has thrust upon the Soviet Union and the United States.

If we are to retreat, step by cautious step, from the brink of the abyss, the United States and the Soviet Union must lead the way, together. This duty can be translated into two simple axioms: First the United

10.

States and the Soviet Union should reach verifiable arms reduction agreements which give each side an equal deterrent capacity; and second, world public order should be restored in conformity with the rules upon which the United Nations agreed in San Francisco at the end of a terrible war they had barely won. These two propositions are closely related. Together they define the objectives of the United States as we approach these nuclear arms negotiations. We hope the Soviet Union will come to agree with us, and to accept these principles as major premises for a process of Soviet-American cooperation which has now become imperative.

The two principles I have tried to formulate are the essence of President Reagan's methodical approach to the task of preparing for the nuclear arms control negotiations. If the Soviet Union accepts the principle of equal deterrence, it should be possible for carefully worked out and verifiable agreements to improve the security position of the West as a whole. By allowing each side to maintain equal deterrence, nuclear arms agreements should prevent any form of coercive predominance. They could therefore result in a somewhat more stable environment, at least in restraining the potential escalation of conventional-force conflicts. Under contemporary circumstances, however, this is an

11.

insufficient goal, and probably an illusory one. But it should give diplomacy an opportunity to press for the ultimate fulfillment of agreement on the second principle, that of mutual and reciprocal respect for the rules of the Charter regarding the international use of force. As President Reagan has pointed out, a double standard in this regard is simply not viable.

Sometimes the Soviet spokesmen say that the American position would require the Soviet Union to give up a foreign policy rooted in its nature as a society and a state. This is not the case. So far as the United States is concerned, the Soviet Union is free to preach the gospel of Communism throughout the world. But we cannot accept its claim of a right to propagate its faith with a sword. All the United States urges is that with regard to the international use of force the Soviet Union follows the same rules which all states accepted when they became signatories of the UN Charter. There can be no peace until those rules are equally and reciprocally obeyed.

Thus far, there have been no signs of progress in that effort. Soviet behavior, diplomacy, and propaganda remain what they have been for a long generation. The Soviet submarine caught in the approaches to a Swedish

12.

naval base is hardly an encouraging omen. We have no choice but to persevere, however, in seeking to reach the Russian people and the other peoples of the Soviet Union with every resource of our intelligence and imagination while the expansionist policies of the Soviet Government are restrained by the calm deployment of deterrent force. We know that more than sixty years of Soviet rule have not destroyed the love of liberty and justice in Russia, and that the peoples of Eastern Europe, who have always been of the West, remain an integral part of the European culture and polity. So long as we in the West are strong, confident, and determined, the forces of hope in the East will not sink back into despair.

II

The analysis I have just summarized is adequate and accurate, I believe, so far as it goes. But it does not go very far. Rationally, it is easy to prescribe the course the NATO allies and the Soviet Union should follow now, just as it is easy with the benefit of hindsight to agree that Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States could have prevented the Second World War. The important question about the Thirties is not what should have been done -- the answer to that question

13.

is self-evident -- but why Churchill and Roosevelt, two towering politicians at the height of their powers, failed to persuade their countrymen to follow their lead. That, I believe is the principal question on the agenda of Western foreign policy today, and it is the issue to which I shall devote the remainder of this lecture. What are the limits of reason in dealing with the issues before us? Is there any chance that reason can be made to prevail? How do we persuade the Soviet Union that it too should obey the rules of the Charter, give up the dream of empire, and join the Western nations in seeing to it that the Charter rules are generally respected throughout the world? Can we hope to persuade the Soviet Union, or only to contain it, as George Kennan has contended, until the benign influence of Russian high culture -- and of exposure to the West -- bring about a mellowing of Soviet policy? And finally, how can our efforts of persuasion be organized and carried out by methods compatible with the rules of our being?

The questions I have posed surely include matters of diplomacy and strategy which would have been familiar to Thucydides or Machiavelli. But their implications transcend the abstractions of political theory, or the cool detachment of the cynic. The balance of power

14.

is not all that is at stake in the world crisis which has come about through our blindness and negligence. Churchill commented once that Marlborough and Wellington had changed the course of history, permitting two centuries of British primacy which were hardly compelled by economics or demography. It is heresy, I know, to ask such a question in a Churchill lecture, but -- issues of national loyalty and national pride apart -- would Western civilization have been fundamentally different if Marlborough had lost at Blenheim and Wellington at Waterloo? That kind of speculation can hardly arise about the outcome of the Cold and not-so-Cold War. No one can contemplate the possibility of nuclear war with any feelings but those of horror and disgust. And no one could describe the architects of the Gulag Archipelago as Saint Simon and Nancy Mitford describe the denizens of Versailles in the day of the Sun King. With divided and uneasy minds, the nations of the West have finally embarked on a Churchillian effort to prevent war. We have taken this step not only to protect our national independence and avert nuclear devastation but to preserve the creed and hope of liberty for ourselves and for all who cherish it. Many people seem to think that nuclear war could be averted by Western surrender. But that course is unthinkable. Moreover, it would not work.

15.

Many believe that the ideal of individual freedom has had its run in the bleak chronicle of human history, and that social pluralism will soon be forced to yield to one version or another of the all-embracing state.

This every child of the Anglo-American culture must deny. The view that the state exists to protect individual freedom has always been at war with the ideology of Leviathan; that war will never end. Man yearns for freedom, but freedom is lonely. Man also yearns for security and companionship. Sometimes he seems willing to pay the price of slavery for them. It may be that even in the West some people are willing to accept such societies, at least for a time.

But there is no reason to lose faith in our humane ideals. During the last generation, behind the shield of collective self-defense backed by the American nuclear weapon, democracy has enjoyed a renaissance in Germany, Japan, and many other countries, and its values are gaining ground throughout the world. We speak with many voices, as free men and women always do. But beneath the turbulence of these lively sounds there is abiding unity and ample strength. In their vast majorities, the people of the West remain loyal to the code of values to which they have been bred. For the English speaking peoples, that tradition goes beyond the Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century to the roots of

16.

our political liberty in the common law and the English constitution, and to the roots of our moral freedom in the heritage of the Old and New Testaments and the memory of Greece and Rome. In other parts of the West, of course, the concordia of the community includes strong elements of the Roman law and the Roman culture in both its ancient and its modern manifestations.

Today that tradition faces the challenge of a new Minotaur. And today, once more, those who love freedom must rally to its defense.

But the threat we face is more than the threat of arms and the challenge of ideology. Sir Isaiah Berlin uses a simple phrase to sum up the most fundamental difference between societies devoted to the freedom of the individual and societies in which the state manipulates the individual in the name of a greater good: the difference between "Freedom from" and "Freedom to." We believe with Sir Isaiah in "Freedom from": -- that is, we believe in the autonomy of man as a good in itself and the most important rightful goal of organized society. It follows that we must also believe with Jefferson that "the just powers of government derive from the consent of the governed." If this is so, high principles of ethical

17.

responsibility should govern the discourse among men and women which is the source of public opinion and thus the predicate for their consent. Democracy is impossible unless we speak to each other with civility and scrupulous respect for the truth as best we can perceive the truth.

As George Orwell saw so clearly, the most important distinction between free societies and modern tyranny is a totally different attitude towards the problem of truth. This difference is why our efforts at propaganda, even in wartime, are so diffident, defensive, and ineffective. Everyday we read and hear propositions as bizarre as those of Orwell's Newspeak. We find it almost impossible to offset their impact on our own minds, or to explain to others why those propositions are wrong. We are simply not equipped to contest the propaganda of Newspeak. In the end, we deal with it as if it were the argument of a parliamentary opposition. That is all we know how to do.

Let me give you an example of central importance to my thesis tonight. We are being bombarded at the moment by the breathtaking claim that the NATO allies and the United States in particular are seeking to disturb a stable equilibrium of world power, gain military superiority over the Soviet Union, and start a nuclear war to destroy the Soviet regime. Sometimes an additional detail is added

18.

for European consumption -- that the United States is planning to fight the nuclear war entirely in Europe and to its last ally. Soviet spokesmen addressing the United States say the opposite -- that if the Soviet Union is hit by a nuclear missile, it will pay no attention to the calling card attached to the weapon, but respond at once with all its missiles against the continental United States.

How can these contentions be answered? Can anyone really believe that the American people miss Vietnam, and are looking for an excuse to start another such campaign, this time with nuclear weapons, or even a Third World War on a much larger and more exciting scale than Vietnam? Can anyone suppose we are bored because our universities are quiet and busy, preoccupied with education rather than with anti-war protests? Can anyone imagine that an American President could contemplate the use of force for any reason except the most austere sense of duty and obligation, knowing that President Truman's political career was ruined by the Korean War as President Johnson's was destroyed by Vietnam, and indeed that every major war and most minor wars in American history became politically unpopular in the end?

Or let us look at another aspect of the Soviet thesis -- the actual state of the military balance, and especially the balance in intermediate range nuclear weapons in and near Europe. Year after year, the Soviet Union tells us that there are roughly 1,000 weapons of this kind on each side, and that the NATO decision to deploy modern nuclear weapons in Europe is a destabilizing quest for nuclear superiority in preparation for nuclear war. There is irony in this claim. The magic figure remains near 1,000 although the Soviet Union deploys a new SS-20 every 5 days. And the Soviet Union has not yet offered a detailed statistical table to support its charges, although its most recent effort, a pamphlet called "The Threat to Europe," begins to approach that point.

But Soviet spokesmen have said enough to make the statistical fallacies of their argument apparent. For example, they count only SS-20 missiles deployed in European Russia, although many of these missiles located beyond the Urals can reach targets in Western Europe without difficulty. And they count certain American planes in making their calculations, but exclude

20.

Soviet planes of the same type. Mr. Brezhnev's proposal, made at Bonn last week, simply offers to move some SS-20 missiles from European Russia to Siberia -- a proposal without substance, or interest to the West. It would hardly increase the security of NATO to transfer these missiles to locations from which they could threaten Japan or the Middle East or be returned to their original positions. All the studies I have seen confirm the judgment of the International Institute of Strategic Studies that Soviet superiority in this particularly threatening category of nuclear weapons is more than 3 to 1, so that even the full deployment of the American weapons scheduled for Europe could not produce anything like equality, to say nothing of "superiority."

The record is not notably different in the field of intercontinental nuclear weapons. There too the Soviet Union claims that parity exists, and that American plans to restore its deterrent capacity are "destabilizing." There too the Soviet Union is engaged in an active program of improvement and expansion while the United States has until recently been passive. The United States may

21.

still have a slight lead in the total number of warheads, but the Soviet Union has moved ahead in every other measure of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, and is adding to its arsenal at a rapid rate. Unless the United States does add to its forces, the balance will shift irrevocably against the West.

Nevertheless, the charges continue to be made. The problems the NATO allies face together at this juncture have nothing to do with the fantasies of Soviet propaganda. We do not have to choose between protecting our interests and fighting a nuclear war or any other kind of war, in Europe or elsewhere. That is a false dichotomy. The sole object of United States and NATO policy is to protect our common interests by restoring stability without war. There is no reason to doubt our capacity to protect the future of liberty in peace, by the methods of alliance diplomacy backed by deterrent military power. The NATO allies, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, China, and other countries which oppose Soviet hegemony have ample power and potential power to stop the process of Soviet expansion. With Poland in the process of undergoing profound social changes, this is hardly the time to bend our knees

to the power and ideology of the Soviet Union as the wave of the future.

The highest objective of Soviet strategy is to separate Western Europe from the United States. If Western Europe could be brought within the Soviet domain, the geopolitical theorists of the Soviet Union believe, Japan, China, and many other nations would draw the necessary conclusions, and the United States would be left isolated and impotent. The enormous Soviet effort in the field of intermediate range missiles is intelligible only in the perspective of this Soviet doctrine. In that perspective, it is all too intelligible. The objective, as always, is decouple the United States from Europe. The scenario would follow these lines: the subliminal radiations of the Soviet intermediate range nuclear arsenal would induce panic in Europe while the growing Soviet long range arsenal would paralyze any possibility of an American strategic response. Presto and checkmate. The Japanese, Chinese, and many other nations would follow suit.

This was the nightmare which started to provoke deep European and American concern five or six years ago. The Soviet SS-20s had begun to impinge upon our consciousness.

Henry Kissinger's Brussels warning in 1977 dramatized the issue. But the anxiety would have been the same if Mr. Kissinger had never spoken. The danger of decoupling Europe from the United States is implicit in the changing overall intercontinental nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, weakening the counterweight which has kept superior Soviet conventional forces at bay since 1945. After a year or two of discussion, NATO decided that the United States should deploy American intermediate range land-based missiles in Europe and at the same time negotiate with the Soviet Union about removing the threat to Europe arising from the existence of these first strike and particularly devastating missiles.

The reasoning behind the NATO decision parallels the argument which has persuaded the United States to keep large American conventional forces in or near Europe. There has been periodic political agitation in the United States for a reduction of our conventional forces in Europe, and for exclusive reliance on intercontinental nuclear weapons to protect Europe against Soviet pressures. But proposals of this kind have been firmly and repeatedly rejected. The United States wishes not only to make the

24.

nuclear guaranty clear and credible, but to be in a position to respond appropriately to threats across the entire spectrum of threat or attack. To remove American forces from Europe would escalate every conflict there instantly to the nuclear level. As President Reagan pointed out on November 18, the purpose of deploying American intermediate range nuclear weapons on European soil is to remove all doubt about the credibility of the American intercontinental nuclear guaranty to Europe both in Europe and in the Soviet Union. As a result, the risk of war by miscalculation would be reduced.

The problem of the intermediate range nuclear weapons must be examined in the SALT context, as the North Atlantic Council has declared, because the line between intermediate range and intercontinental nuclear forces is not clear cut. Intercontinental weapons can also be aimed at targets in Europe, Japan, or the Middle East. And some weapons normally classified as theatre weapons can be used under certain circumstances on intercontinental missions. While much could be accomplished by successful INF talks, both in reducing weapons and contributing to crisis stability, the ultimate security of the NATO allies will continue to rest on the reliability of the United States strategic guaranty.

When I was a student at King's, the great Alfred Marshall had gone, but the young dons still faithfully took their texts from his books and lectures. One of their favorites, I recall, is appropriate to our problem tonight. Marshall liked to say, "Trees do not grow to the sky." He was talking about firms and trade unions, and the checks and balances of economic life. But his observation applies also to empires.

The Soviet Union is still in the imperial mood which the other imperial powers have long since given up with relief and conviction. Those nations have discovered what Bentham pointed out long ago -- that the imperial powers had no right to govern the peoples they had conquered; that they gained nothing from their efforts; and, as Sir Norman Angell concluded much later, that imperialism is extremely expensive. An Italian minister summed up the problem of costs in the late Forties. "Italy has lost the war," he said, "but in compensation it has lost its Empire." The former imperial powers have learned that it is more profitable and more satisfactory all around to make money, not war.

If we take the Soviet drive to be the Hegelian thesis, it has already stimulated a normal antithesis -- a coali-

tion of nations determined to retain their independence. In the nature of things, the forces of the antithesis are bound to prevail. Can the Soviet Union acknowledge that fact, and accept the inevitable gracefully -- as gracefully as Great Britain or the Netherlands welcomed the end of empire after World War II? Will the last surviving traditional empire join the other nations in seeking the world order anticipated by the Charter of the United Nations -- a world order based on the equality of states large and small; and on the rule that no state use force to attack the territorial integrity and political independence of any other state; and on respect for the principle of the self-determination of peoples?

In our view, those are the ultimate questions of world politics today. The answers to those questions are in the mist. All I can tell you tonight is that the United States and its allies view the process of arms control negotiations as a possible key to the riddle of the future. Arms control negotiations have no magic in themselves. Negotiating with the Soviet Union is a rough sport, and a satisfactory outcome is hardly guaranteed. But we cannot ignore what may be an opportunity for progress toward peace. The Soviet policy of expansion, fuelled by the extraordinary growth of the Soviet

27.

armed forces and particularly of its nuclear forces, has produced a situation of growing tension and instability. The efforts of the Soviet Union to split the West and to prevent Western modernization of its defenses will surely fail. Ever since 1945, the United States has appealed to the Soviet Union for cooperation between us -- in making the offer of the Marshall Plan and the Baruch Plan, and on many other occasions, too. President Reagan renewed that appeal on November 18 with great force, as the only rational way out of the nuclear dilemma both camps now confront. The fruits of SALT I and SALT II have turned to ashes in our mouths. The decade which began ten years ago with the high hopes of detente became the worst decade of the entire Cold War. The Cold War is no longer a peripheral matter of border skirmishes, a cloud no larger than a man's hand, but the dominant problem of world politics.

We approach the task of negotiation determined not to confuse our hopes with reality. We know that the Soviet Union, like most other countries, has at least two cultures -- the culture of Catherine the Great and the culture of Ivan the Terrible; the Russian culture of inspiring intellectual quality and moral distinction, the culture of Tolstoy, Turgenev, Chekhov and their modern successors, as well as the culture of Oriental despotism now in the ascendant. From long experience we know

that a Soviet spokesman was right when he said, "we are neither pacifists nor philanthropists."

But there are positive elements in the situation which ought to lead the Soviet leaders to choose a policy of stability in their relationship with the West: the situation in Poland, and the apparently insoluble problems of the Soviet economy, to mention only two. In part, Soviet economic problems are the result of difficulties which all modern economies share: the insatiable and astronomic claims of science against the defense budget. In part, however, they represent factors peculiar to the system of Soviet planning.

I can sum up all I have tried to say tonight in four simple propositions. They were put very well, early in the nuclear age, by a distinguished English social scientist. First, the secret is out of the laboratory, and can never be returned. Any industrial country can make nuclear weapons. Secondly, it follows for obvious reasons of prudence that the Western nations cannot give up nuclear weapons. Third, nuclear war is unthinkably destructive, and the West must find ways to protect its freedom and security and at the same time prevent nuclear war.

29.

From these three propositions we draw a conclusion we regard as inescapable, because small wars sometimes become big: the goal of policy must be not simply the avoidance of nuclear war, but the elimination of all international war.