

CONFIDENTIAL

ARA/CEN:AMGIESE
3/29/82 X-24975
ARA:TOENDERS

ARA/CEN:LCJOHNSTONE
S/S-0

S/S

CLEARANCES

IMMEDIATE MANAGUA

MODIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/29/88 {ENDERS, THOMAS O.}

TAGS: PINS, PINT, NU

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH GRN

Handwritten: TOE
AMGIESE
LCJOHNSTONE
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1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. YOU SHOULD INFORM D'ESCOTO THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS IS PREPARED TO VISIT NICARAGUA IN MID APRIL TO HOLD TALKS WITH THE GRN ON THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES OF CONCERN TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS. YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT ENDERS WILL EXPECT TO TALK SUBSTANTIVELY WITH RANKING MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTORATE INCLUDING JUNTA COORDINATOR ORTEGA.

3. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE GRN'S RESPONSE TO INCLUDE SCHEDULE OF APPOINTMENTS WITH MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTORATE. {FYI: WE WOULD NOT PLAN TO PROCEED WITH VISIT IF APPOINTMENTS WITH DIRECTORATE AND ORTEGA CANNOT BE SCHEDULED.} 44

State Dept. review completed.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTION I

APPROACH TO CUBA IN APRIL
PRIOR TO TALKING TO SANDINISTAS

TALKING POINTS

Nicaragua

- o We have reached a critical point on Nicaragua -- the present course of events cannot continue.
- o One way to achieve this is through mutual understandings.
- o Before we meet with the Sandinistas we want the Cuban Government to understand what we seek to achieve.
- o (Make Nicaragua 5 points)

Central America

- o To accompany the adjustments concerning Nicaragua and to foster a propitious climate for security and peaceful change in Central America, we look to Cuba to cease its material support (training,

weapons, financial support) for revolutionary groups in entire region.

Angola

With respect to Angola, we envisage a settlement that includes the following elements:

- o We are proceeding on the assumption that Luanda makes its own decisions.
- o We accept Cuba's claim of nonalignment with respect to Angola and thus expect Cuba, in accordance with the February 4 communique, to withdraw from Angola when Luanda so decides.
- o We are talking to the Soviets and they acknowledge the relationship between South African withdrawal from Namibia and Cuban withdrawal from Angola.
- o We welcome the fact that the February communique recognizes a link between a settlement in Namibia and Cuban withdrawal from Angola.
- o A Cuban withdrawal following a South African withdrawal is not adequate.

Option I, Pg. 3

- o There must be a credible plan for parallel, coordinated movement by both sides.

- o Such an approach is the only way to achieve Namibian independence, resolve Angola's long-range political and economic problems and stem the violence that could develop in the region.

Maribel

- o Finally, Cuba must take back Maribel Cubans found excludable under US law, including those released from prison, those with physical and mental ailments requiring institutionalization and other undesirables.

Pro

- o Will help us to forestall other initiatives in Central America by allowing us to say that we are engaged in a dialogue with Cuba as well as Nicaragua.

- o Will strengthen our claim that we have a record of having tried to talk to Cuba about pressing problems.

Option I, Pg. 4

- o If there is any Cuban predisposition to achieve some negotiated security for Nicaragua, Castro may urge the Sandinistas to accept at least some of our terms.

Con

- o Castro will exploit continued private bilateral contacts to weaken the resolve and increase the sense of insecurity of those Central American governments looking to us for support against leftist violence.
- o If Castro does not want us to reach a settlement with Nicaragua he could try to stiffen Sandinista opposition to our proposals.
- o Castro is likely to conclude we are only talking to him to forestall other (e.g. Mexican, French, etc.) initiatives in the area and is likely to try to torpedo our efforts in the entire region.
- o Might give Castro the idea there is some bilateral bargaining chip we are willing to give up for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

OPTION II

Keep Castro Informed
of What We Hope to Achieve
in Nicaragua and Angola

This would consist of two separate approaches
to Cuba:

- (a) On Angola we would ask a member of the Contact Group to communicate to Cuba the same points as in Option I.
- (b) On Nicaragua we would ask the Chief of our Interests Section in Havana to brief Castro on what Tom Enders would say to the Sandinistas. This would be done the same day that Enders told the Sandinistas. We would say publicly that we are keeping Cuba informed through our Interests Section.

Pro

- o Will help us to forestall other initiatives in Central America allowing us to say that we are discussing this with Cuba as well as Nicaragua.

Option II, Pg. 2

- o If there is any Cuban predisposition to achieve some negotiated security for Nicaragua, Castro may urge the Sandinistas to accept at least some of our terms.
- o Keep Castro informed on Nicaragua but in such a way as to minimize the sense of insecurity of those Central American governments looking to us for support against leftist violence.
- o Keeps Castro informed on Angola but in a way that emphasizes that we are not prepared to offer Cuba any bargaining chips.

Con

- o More likely than Option I to persuade Castro that we are keeping him informed mainly to stave off other initiatives.
- o More likely than Option I to make Castro feel that the US views him as ancillary to rather than instrumental in reaching agreements on Angola and Nicaragua.

(Craig)

NICARAGUA POLICY:

THE NEXT 60 DAYS - NEGOTIATIONS SCENARIO

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A. This week we send a message to the Nicaraguans through normal diplomatic channels proposing a visit to Managua by Enders in mid-April. Visit conditioned on appointments with Directorate/Ortega.

B. If Nicaraguans insist on Mexican presence at talks we refuse.

C. Immediately after message is delivered, key allies (France, Mexico, Canada, Great Britain, FRG, Italy, Spain, Venezuela, Colombia, CADC Three, Panama) informed of Enders visit and briefed on kind of proposals we expect to discuss with Nicaraguans. Purpose would be to reassure some (like CADC three) and preempt others (France and Panama). We thank Mexicans for their efforts and encourage them to lean on Nicaraguans to be forthcoming in talks.

D.

But, as a demonstration of our goodwill, we make some kind of symbolic gesture prior to Enders' visit (i.e., postponement of Colombia exercise, island landing portion).

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(Craig, Pg. 2)

E. Public relations line during this period is low-key but we let fact of forthcoming Enders visit be known publicly after consultations completed with allies. Emphasis in public discussion is on our concern over Cuban presence in Nicaragua. We continue effort to show repressive nature of Nicaraguan regime. This is facilitated by increasingly repressive measures likely to be taken by Nicaragua as internal pressures grow.

F. Prior to visit "high-level source" would background press on US willingness to reduce trainer presence in El Salvador if Cubans reduce to same levels in Nicaragua.

G. The Enders visit is kept to one or two days. Comprehensive peace plan is presented to the Nicaraguans (see K and L below) and Enders makes clear that time is not on their side, that their problems have only begun, and that when the chips are down they will have to face us alone because they will not be supported by Cuba or the USSR in a major confrontation. Enders says we will not allow the continuation of a state in Central America aligned militarily or ideologically with the Soviet Union and Cuba. Enders agrees to return to Managua after Nicaraguans have studied proposals

25X1

(Craig, Pg. 3)

but reiterates that there will be no progress until the first steps are taken by the Nicaraguans to end support for the insurgency in El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras. Enders gives a deadline of ten days for a Nicaraguan response.

H. If the Nicaraguans do not respond in ten days we proceed with portion of Colombia exercise which had been previously postponed.

I. Following Enders visit we brief same countries as previously on details of US proposals and urge support.

J. If Nicaraguans do not respond by early May we table peace proposal at the CADC meeting in Colombia. (Secretary would participate.) CADC could then put proposal to OAS.

K. The Comprehensive Peace Plan. The comprehensive peace plan will be based in large measure on the package of proposals put to the Nicaraguans in August-September. The difference will be:

- o The question of Nicaraguan support for the insurgency in El Salvador (and in Honduras

(Craig, Pg. 4)

and Costa Rica) is made more explicit to require Nicaragua to cut off training and command and control facilities as well as arms flow.

- o The Honduran proposal for international (OAS) observers at borders, ports, airfields, sensitive zones, etc. is incorporated into the plan as a verification item.
- o The portion dealing with Cuban advisors is amplified.

L. The seven elements of the peace plan are:

1. The cessation of Nicaragua's support for insurgencies in neighboring countries.
2. A statement for dealing with Nicaraguan exile activities in the United States.
3. A US-Nicaraguan statement on friendly relations.
4. A proposal on arms and military force limitations.

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5. A proposal on international verification.
6. A proposal on economic cooperation.
7. A proposal on human and cultural exchanges and confidence building.