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DRAFTED BY AF/S:MRANNEBERGER:LR  
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NODIS  
PARIS FOR AF AS CROCKER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, AO, PO  
SUBJECT: STATE OF PLAY WITH PORTUGUESE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

REF: (A) SECTO 13049, (B) OTTAWA 7186, (C) STATE 283656

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: AF DAS WISNER BRIEFED PORTUGUESE CHARGE PEDRO MENEZES ON OCTOBER 13 ON STATE OF PLAY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA NEGOTIATIONS, AND DISCUSSED NEXT STEPS. THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES WHERE WE ARE WITH THE PORTUGUESE ON THE ANGOLA TRACK. PARA 13 REQUESTS FOLLOW UP ACTION.  
END SUMMARY.

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State Dept. review completed.



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3. WISNER TOLD MENEZES THAT HE WANTED TO FOLLOW UP BRIEF MEETING WHICH AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY HAD WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PEREIRA IN NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 30. CROCKER HAD NOT HAD OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF PEREIRA FULLY ON STATE OF PLAY. AT SEPTEMBER 30 MEETING PEREIRA TOLD CROCKER HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC SINCE IT APPEARS THAT THE ANGOLANS, IN DISCUSSING IN GENERAL TERMS A PLAN FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, HAD GONE ABOUT AS FAR AS THEY COULD GO. PEREIRA SAID DOS

SANTOS IS NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO GO ANY FURTHER AND THAT MPLA IS HOPELESSLY DIVIDED. NEVERTHELESS, PEREIRA MADE CLEAR THAT PORTUGUESE WANT TO STAY INVOLVED IN HELPING US IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE. PEREIRA SUGGESTED THAT U.S. MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER MULTINATIONAL FORCE, PERHAPS OF WESTERN COUNTRIES AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES. PEREIRA NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER JORGE SOON AND WOULD REPORT BACK TO US ON THAT MEETING.

4. WISNER OPENED DISCUSSION BY BRINGING MENEZES UP TO DATE ON US-MPLA DISCUSSIONS. HE BRIEFED MENEZES ON SECRETARY-JORGE MEETING ALONG LINES OF REF C, WHICH IS BEING REPEATED TO LISBON. WISNER UNDERLINED WHAT WE NEED THAT MPLA HAS NOT GIVEN US -- SPECIFICITY ON NUMBERS AND TIMING, I.E. A CALENDARIO FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL -- IN ORDER TO BRING THE SAG TO A SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER, PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE MPLA IS NOW FULLY ENGAGED WITH US IN A NEGOTIATION ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ISSUE AND HAS RECONFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK (PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED TO PORTUGUESE) OF RECIPROCAL ANGOLAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN ASSURANCES AS THE VEHICLE TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO CONCLUSION. WISNER CHARACTERIZED THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A ROLLERCOASTER RIDE:

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PROGRESS MADE AT THE JUNE MEETING, LITTLE IN JULY, MUCH PROGRESS AS A RESULT OF THE AUGUST MISSION, AND LITTLE IN SEPTEMBER. WISNER NOTED THAT THE MPLA HAD IN AUGUST SOUGHT A FORMULA IN THE SAG ASSURANCES TO ENSURE THAT THE SAG WOULD CUT OFF UNITA; HOWEVER, WE ARGUED THAT THIS WAS UNREALISTIC AND THE MPLA DID NOT PURSUE IT IN THE SEPTEMBER DISCUSSIONS. IN THE SEPTEMBER MEETINGS THE MPLA ALSO REITERATED WILLINGNESS TO MAKE A "SMALL, INITIAL REDUCTION" OF CUBAN FORCES IN PHASE III AFTER ALL BUT 1500 SAG FORCES HAVE WITHDRAWN AT THE END OF THE FIRST THREE MONTHS. WISNER MADE CLEAR THAT THIS IS NOT NEARLY ENOUGH TO BRING THE SAG ALONG. IN ADDITION, AT THE SEPTEMBER DISCUSSIONS THE MPLA ALSO MADE SOME HELPFUL MOVES ON THE CEASEFIRE BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION (CBI) PROPOSAL, BUT WE DID NOT WANT TO GET HEAVILY INTO THIS WITHOUT MORE PROGRESS ON THE MAIN CUBAN WITHDRAWAL QUESTION.

5. WISNER POINTED OUT THAT, ALTHOUGH THE DISCUSSIONS IN SEPTEMBER WERE FRANK AND DIFFICULT, BOTH SIDES COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO CONTINUING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE EXPECTATION THAT A SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND. THE TONE WAS NOT BASICALLY NEGATIVE. BOTH SIDES AGREED ON A LIST OF AREAS OF MUTUAL AGREEMENT INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING: THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION WILL IMPROVE FOR ANGOLA AS THE PROVISIONS OF THE UN PLAN ARE IMPLEMENTED IN PHASE III; THAT

THE IMPROVED SECURITY SITUATION FOR ANGOLA WILL ENABLE ANGOLA TO WITHDRAW SOME CUBAN FORCES DURING PHASE III; THAT RESOLUTION OF THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND NAMIBIA PROBLEMS WILL PERMIT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF PHASE III; THAT SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR ANGOLA CAN AND SHOULD BE OBTAINED UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE U.S. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO REVIEW THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS WITH A VIEW TOWARDS BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN THEM. WHILE THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH JORGE IN NEW YORK UNDERSCORED OUR UNHAPPINESS WITH JORGE'S HARSH UNGA SPEECH AND THE

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U.S. MESSAGE THAT THE MPLA HAD NOT PROVIDED ENOUGH ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, THE MEETING AT THE SAME TIME UNDERLINED THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS.

6. WISNER TOLD MENEZES THAT, CONTRARY TO PRESS REPORTS THAT THE SOUTHERN AFRICA NEGOTIATIONS ARE DEADLOCKED, THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT ENORMOUS PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AND THAT THE FOUNDATION HAS BEEN LAID FOR A SOLUTION. THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATION REALIZE THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE AND THUS WANT THE US-MPLA DISCUSSIONS TO SUCCEED. THE RELATIVE QUIET FROM THE FLS REFLECTS THIS.

7. THE PORTUGUESE HAVE ARGUED IN THE PAST THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA IN ADVANCE OF AN AGREEMENT ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE. WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO DO THIS. THE MOVE WOULD BE TACTICALLY UNWISE SINCE THE ANGOLANS COULD POCKET A CONCESSION WITHOUT MEETING A VITAL REQUIREMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND A LONG-STANDING GOAL OF U.S. POLICY.

8. WISNER THEN TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO NEXT STEPS WITH THE PORTUGUESE ON ANGOLA. WISNER NOTED THAT PEREIRA HAD TOLD CROCKER THAT HE WOULD BRIEF US ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH JORGE, BUT WE HAD NOT YET HEARD FROM HIM. WISNER POINTED OUT THAT PEREIRA HAD GIVEN A DINNER FOR JORGE IN NEW YORK. MENEZES PROMISED TO FOLLOW UP QUICKLY WITH PEREIRA EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON MATHIAS WHO IS PRESENTLY IN LISBON.

9. WISNER TOLD MENEZES THAT THE U.S. WOULD LIKE PORTUGAL'S IDEAS ON HOW THE MPLA CAN BE BROUGHT TO A SETTLEMENT. FROM SEVERAL OF JORGE'S CONVERSATIONS IN NEW YORK, IT

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WOULD APPEAR THAT HE WANTS A SETTLEMENT BUT DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO PACKAGE IT. WISNER SAID THE MPLA CONTINUES TO BE SUSPICIOUS THAT THEY ARE WALKING INTO A TRAP. HOW DO WE ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM OF LACK OF CONFIDENCE WHICH BEDEVILS

THE NEGOTIATIONS, WISNER ASKED. WISNER EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR WHAT THE PORTUGUESE HAVE ALREADY DONE IN MAKING CLEAR TO THE MPLA THAT THE U.S. IS NOT OUT TO DESTROY THE ANGOLAN REGIME, BUT ASKED WHAT MORE COULD BE DONE. MENEZES REPLIED THAT PORTUGAL SHARES THE U.S. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM.

10. WISNER RAISED TWO SPECIFIC IDEAS TO WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE PORTUGAL'S REACTIONS. FIRST, WAS THE USE OF THIRD COUNTRY TROOPS AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE (LUSOPHONE, FRANCOPHONE, ITALIANS, ETC) A VIABLE POSSIBILITY FOR BUILDING MPLA CONFIDENCE? SECOND, HOW DO WE ENABLE THE MPLA TO SAVE FACE WHILE GIVING US WHAT IS NEEDED ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL? MENEZES SAID HE WOULD CONVEY OUR THOUGHTS TO FOREIGN MINISTER PEREIRA THROUGH AMBASSADOR MATHIAS. MENEZES SAID HE WOULD BE RETURNING TO LISBON SOON AND WILL HAVE LUNCH WITH PEREIRA ON THE 21ST.

11. IN REPLY TO MENEZES' QUESTION ABOUT NEXT U.S. STEPS WITH THE MPLA, WISNER SAID NO NEXT MEETING HAS YET BEEN PLANNED, THOUGH THERE WOULD BE ONE AT SOME POINT. WISNER EMPHASIZED THAT FIRST WE NEED TO EXPLORE IDEAS WITH THE PORTUGUESE AND OTHERS AND THEN GET A SIGNAL FROM THE MPLA THAT THEY ARE READY TO TALK.

12. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT CROCKER HAD PREVIOUSLY MET WITH AMBASSADOR MATHIAS ON SEPTEMBER 23 FOR A BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. MATHIAS EMPHASIZED THAT THE ANGOLANS CONTINUE TO BE IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH WITH PORTUGAL ON THE US-MPLA NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER MATTERS. HE SHARED PORTUGUESE ANALYSIS THAT DOS SANTOS

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IS GROWING STRONGER AND THAT MODERATES ARE GAINING UPPER HAND IN INTRA-PARTY RIVALRIES, BUT THAT MPLA IS STILL PARALYZED BY FEARS FOR THEIR SECURITY. MATHIAS SAID MPLA IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT CLOSE PARALLELS THEY PERCEIVE BETWEEN MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA SITUATIONS. MATHIAS STRESSED NEED FOR MORE WESTERN ASSISTANCE FOR MPLA. CROCKER REPLIED THAT THERE MUST BE A COORDINATED WESTERN EFFORT IF THE MPLA AGREES TO A COMPROMISE ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WHICH PERMITS A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT.

13. ACTION REQUESTED. WE WANT TO ENSURE THAT PEREIRA RECEIVES OUR MESSAGE ON NEXT STEPS AS GIVEN TO MENEZES. WE NEED TO HAVE PORTUGUESE REACTIONS/IDEAS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ON OCTOBER 22, WHICH WILL GIVE SUFFICIENT TIME

TO ENABLE MENEZES TO PASS MESSAGE TO PEREIRA THROUGH MATHIAS, YOU SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH PEREIRA TO CONVEY READOUT IN THIS MESSAGE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER IS PRESENTLY IN PARIS AND ON HIS WAY TO LONDON. GIVEN HIS SCHEDULE, WE ARE RELUCTANT TO RECOMMEND THAT HE STOP IN LISBON ON SATURDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 23, ON HIS WAY BACK TO WASHINGTON FOLLOWING BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITISH. IF YOU BELIEVE THE PORTUGUESE HAVE SOMETHING SIGNIFICANT TO SAY AND IT IS VITAL THAT IT BE COMMUNICATED AT THE CROCKER LEVEL, HE WILL CONSIDER YOUR RECOMMENDATION. YOU SHOULD NOT RPT NOT RAISE THIS WITH PORTUGUESE AT THIS TIME. IN THIS CONNECTION WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HAVING WHATEVER YOU CAN PROVIDE FROM YOUR PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH-PORTUGUESE CONSULTATIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA AND/OR POSSIBILITIES FOR BRITISH-PORTUGUESE COOPERATION IN WORKING WITH US ON ANGOLA. DURING WEEK OF OCTOBER 18 YOU SHOULD INFO LONDON AND PARIS ON ANY REPLIES AND SLUG THEM FOR CROCKER. SHULTZ

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