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DDI - 10599/82

ACIS 151/82

30 December 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Executive Director
Chairman, National Intelligence Council *HSR*
Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence *PK*

FROM: [Redacted]
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

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SUBJECT: Answer on Pershing II [Redacted]

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1. This memorandum (reviewed by NIO/SP, NIO/USSR, D/SWR, and D/SA) is an answer to your question of 27 December about Soviet anxieties over the Pershing-II (P-II) missile versus the Pershing-I (P-I). [Redacted]

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2. The Soviets are very unhappy about P-II for three basic reasons:

- Range: Unlike the P-I (which cannot reach beyond the border between Poland and the USSR), the P-II (with its nominal range of 1800 kms and from bases in Germany) will be able to strike targets in the Western USSR; (in fact, however, the Soviets are aware that the contractor for the P-II originally claimed it would have the potential to fly 2500 kms and, thus, would be able to reach Moscow and some sites up to the Urals).
- Flight-time: The short time of flight for the P-II, for example -- first visible to sites on the Poland-USSR border some 8-10 minutes before impact, decreases Soviet warning time; in the context of warning against nuclear attack, 8-10 minutes essentially is useless to the USSR.
- Capability: Unlike the P-I (which cannot destroy hardened targets), the accuracy and yield combination for P-II, because of its MaRV capability, will allow it to be used successfully against hardened targets; e.g., buried command and control centers, ICBM sites, and nuclear warhead storage sites.

The Soviets complain publicly about the first two points, in their own right and as a cover for the third point. And the Soviets stress the first point, which is easily grasped by people at large. [Redacted]

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3. The import to the USSR, once P-II is deployed, is:

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- In effect, the USSR's sanctuary will be gone; a nuclear exchange in Central Europe beyond the extent of the tactical battlefield would likely involve the USSR's territory right away, unlike the situation for the past 20 years -- so a Soviet military planner might argue -- where the nuclear damage would begin in NATO and Eastern Europe and conceivably could be limited to those areas.
- The USSR's ability to control its military forces in Europe will be at risk and the long term investment in hardened command and control centers will have been, in effect, wasted.
- The perceptions and reality of the nuclear balance between the USSR and the U.S. will have changed in favor of the U.S, reversing the trend of the last decade into which the USSR has invested so heavily.
- And the Soviets may connect all of this in their minds with their interpretation of MX, and of the Carter Administration's PD-59, to conjure a vision of crippling U.S. first strike at the start of a nuclear conflict in Europe.

4. In my view, all of this is quite well understood by the USSR and they are very serious about reaching an accord with the U.S. or putting the U.S. in an analogous position. The USSR no doubt realizes that, depending on the details, both may occur.

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5. I have left out the connections and logics of all this in Europe because all that was beyond the basic question. If you want to have such a view, please let me know.

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6. In the meantime, I hope this helps. If I may do more to assist you, on the Soviet issue, please call and let me know.

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27 Dec question from
A/DCI was verbal.

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