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Remarks:

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29 October 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Economics

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Items in the Shultz Package

Will you draft a memorandum for me to send to the President on the relative value of the items in the Shultz package. Offhand, I would place the highest value on tightening COCOM and make a special effort that we have a definite commitment on that so that it cannot be said that we are merely getting some studies for the release of specific sanctions. I would read the value of the East-West trade study second. I am not quite sure how I would read the study on western sources of European gas versus the credit restrictions. Certainly a second pipeline is worth more to the Soviets than subsidized credits, or at least that's my top-of-the-head view. However, the value of the study on gas sources I would think would have to be discounted by the uncertainty that will result in light of the great probability that Norwegian gas is likely to cost a dollar more than Soviet gas in 1990 or so.

William J. Casey

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