
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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence	Council  DDI 812-82 1 February 1982	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
VIA:	Chairman, National Intelligence Council	
FROM:	National Intelligence Officer for NESA	25.
SUBJECT:	IG on Dangers to Pakistan from Soviet Activity in Afghanistan	
prompted State For The basic questing Afghanistan portions of CIA was asked to the continuation on RDJTF continuation A/NIO/USSR,  2. No representations	enhancements in Soviet military strength in Afghanistan Pol/Mil in conjunction with State/NEA to call this IG. on posed was whether recent Soviet force enhancements in cended a more aggressive military policy toward Pakistan. It is comment in the context of the recent SNIE.  The JCS was asked to comment gency planning as regards Pakistan. The undersigned and represented CIA.  The sesentative took exception with CIA's description of the included the following essential points:	25) 25) 25)
occ in der exp up	tain force improvements to Soviet forces have curred, including enhanced IFF, MIG-23 presence country, SA-8 deployment, security troop ployments,  While these can be lained by other reasons, they do in total add to an increased Soviet capability for limited tervention in Pakistan.	25) 25)
thi	have no evidence of a Soviet intent to utilize s enhanced capability for such an intervention, long-standing political restraints still apply.	
s Memo is classifi RET in its entiret	·	25)

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- c. Should the Soviets decide to intervene on the ground, it would probably consist of a relatively limited in-and-out strike against Mujahidin training camps or supply points. Contact with Pakistani forces would be avoided, if possible.
- 3. The JCS representative pointed out that lines of command regarding Pakistan are in flux, that current RDJTF responsibilities do not include it, and that CINCPAC is the current command element responsible. Additionally, no clear policy requirement had been levied on the JCS to prepare responses for Pakistan contingencies, and hence none existed. He requested policy guidance be provided.

military support for Pakistan might be necessary 25	5X1
25	5X1
5. It was decided to convene a working group to update contingency planning and threat assessment documents on Pakistan. A 1981 document	
	5X1
will be utilized as a basis for this updating.	
25	5X1

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