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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI 812-82
1 February 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: [Redacted]
National Intelligence Officer for NESA

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SUBJECT: IG on Dangers to Pakistan from Soviet Activity in
Afghanistan

1. Recent enhancements in Soviet military strength in Afghanistan prompted State Pol/Mil in conjunction with State/NEA to call this IG. The basic question posed was whether recent Soviet force enhancements in Afghanistan portended a more aggressive military policy toward Pakistan. CIA was asked to comment in the context of the recent SNIE [Redacted] [Redacted] The JCS was asked to comment on RDJTF contingency planning as regards Pakistan. The undersigned and A/NIO/USSR, [Redacted] represented CIA.

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2. No representative took exception with CIA's description of the situation, which included the following essential points:

a. Certain force improvements to Soviet forces have occurred, including enhanced IFF, MIG-23 presence in country, SA-8 deployment, security troop deployments, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] While these can be explained by other reasons, they do in total add up to an increased Soviet capability for limited intervention in Pakistan.

b. We have no evidence of a Soviet intent to utilize this enhanced capability for such an intervention, and long-standing political restraints still apply.

This Memo is classified
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- c. Should the Soviets decide to intervene on the ground, it would probably consist of a relatively limited in-and-out strike against Mujahidin training camps or supply points. Contact with Pakistani forces would be avoided, if possible.

3. The JCS representative pointed out that lines of command regarding Pakistan are in flux, that current RDJTF responsibilities do not include it, and that CINCPAC is the current command element responsible. Additionally, no clear policy requirement had been levied on the JCS to prepare responses for Pakistan contingencies, and hence none existed. He requested policy guidance be provided.

4. During ensuing discussion, an informal consensus emerged that no likely current contingency, including Soviet intervention as described above, would require a direct US military response. Some form of conspicuous military support for Pakistan might be necessary

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5. It was decided to convene a working group to update contingency planning and threat assessment documents on Pakistan. A 1981 document

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will be utilized as a basis for this updating.

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