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✓ 1. Reestablish the little-used National Security Council (NSC) Committee of Users established originally by the Ford Administration. (See Analytical and Political Task Force Report, p. 15.)

✓ 2. Consider a larger inter-agency forum, chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, designed to provide for periodic policy level and intelligence level interchange on key intelligence questions. (See Analytical and Political Task Force Report, p. 15.)

✓ 3. Review the human intelligence program to ascertain if an adequate long-range program exists. PFIAB will look further into this area over the next six months. (See Analytical and Political Task Force Report, p. 15.)

✓ 4. Improve intelligence insight into foreign motivations and purposes. (See Analytical and Political Task Force Report, p. 15.)

✓ 5. Request that key policymakers specifically assign to a staff member the responsibility for important intelligence studies which require prompt policy level attention and feedback. (See Analytical and Political Task Force Report, p. 15.)

✓ 6. Give priority attention to the following:

a. Increase career opportunities for intelligence specialists who devote their careers to one geographic or functional area, and

b. Provide a means to bring experts currently outside the Intelligence Community to responsible positions within it. PFIAB will work with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to overcome impediments to bringing such experts into the Intelligence Community. (See Analytical and Political Task Force Report, p. 15.)

7. A system should be established which will allow policymakers to better understand how the Intelligence Community functions. (See Analytical and Political Task Force Report, p. 15.)

8. Arrange for an independent analysis of Soviet economic strengths and weaknesses, enlisting from outside the Intelligence Community highly qualified Soviet experts and such other experts in economics, engineering, demography, finance, etc.. (See Economic and Natural Resources Task Force Report, p. 34.)

9. Add the field of foreign economic intelligence to the current responsibilities of either the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade or the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs in order to provide timely guidance and feedback to the economic intelligence effort. (See Economic and Natural Resources Task Force Report, p. 34.)

10. Develop an intelligence communications process that fully responds to the current scenarios of Presidential national security action. (See Science, Technology, and Communications Task Force Report, p. 37.)

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11. Incorporate a new effort in the existing SAFE program, namely, integrating it with oncoming communications systems and techniques. (See Science, Technology, and Communications Task Force Report, p. 38.)

12. Place strict controls on dissemination and distribution of advanced technologies incorporated into National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) projects. (See Science, Technology, and Communications Task Force Report, p. 38.)

13. Designate a focal point for review and clarification of policy, program integration, and oversight of U.S. efforts to control technology transfer to Communist countries. (See Strategic and Military Task Force Report, p. 41.)

14. Initiate a review of two propositions:

-- That Soviet and Warsaw Pact agents involved in technology transfer activities be publicly exposed and returned to their homelands.

-- That the Soviet and Warsaw Pact facilities which illegally intercept government and private communications be dismantled. The Board is not persuaded that the purported disadvantages to such actions outweigh the advantages. (See Strategic and Military Task Force Report, p. 42.)

15. Implement effective procedures to control the transfer of technology. This will require the selection of a manageable number of critical technologies to be controlled and the issuance of clear guidelines for the use of industry and the research and development (R&D) community. (See Strategic and Military Task Force Report, p. 41.)

16. Strengthen U.S. measures in support of the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) and seek to secure effective bilateral agreements with other friendly governments to achieve the same objectives. (See Strategic and Military Task Force Report, p. 42.)

17. Design an effective American public awareness campaign regarding the Soviet collection program, which can be extended to our allies. (See Strategic and Military Task Force Report, p. 42.)

18. Guard against releasing national security data through commercial contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and limit the opportunity of the PRC to establish a larger intelligence infrastructure in the U.S.. (See Strategic and Military Task Force Report, p. 43.)

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These studies all identified essentially the same problem areas uncovered by this Task Force and discussed above. Although many recommendations for improvement were made in previous studies, from our interviews and meetings we concluded that the problems have not been corrected. In short, the problems are of an enduring nature.

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ACTION

Based on its work, this Task Force makes the following recommendations:

1. The little-used NSC Committee of Users established by the Ford Administration should be reestablished. While the Cabinet-level briefings initiated by the current DCI will hopefully improve the satisfaction with intelligence of the entire policymaking community, other measures to accomplish the same objective are needed.

2. The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs should chair an interagency group to provide systematic interface on key intelligence questions between policymakers and the Intelligence Community.

3. The adequacy of long-term programs for human intelligence should be reviewed. PFIAB will conduct an investigation in this area over the next six months.

4. Primary, but not exclusive, emphasis should be placed on improving intelligence on foreign intentions and motivations.

5. Request that key policymakers specifically assign to a staff member the responsibility for important intelligence studies which require prompt policy level attention and feedback.

6. The DCI should give priority attention to:

a. Increasing career opportunities for intelligence specialists who devote their careers to one geographic or functional area, and

b. Increasing access of experts currently outside the Intelligence Community to responsible positions within it. PFIAB will work with the DCI to overcome current impediments to bringing such experts into the Intelligence Community.

7. A system should be established which will allow policymakers to better understand how the Intelligence Community functions.

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TASK FORCE MEMBERS

- Dr. David Abshire - Chairman
- Dr. W. Glenn Campbell
- Mr. Leon Jaworski
- Amb. Clare Boothe Luce
- Dr. Paul Seabury
- Amb. Seymour Weiss

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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE NEEDS

Each aspect of the increasingly stressed Soviet and Warsaw Pact economies requires detailed and accurate day-by-day observation and assessment. [redacted]

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William J. Casey, as a member of PFIAB, in late 1976 summarized the needs of economic intelligence directed against the Soviet Union:

Over the period 1977-85 policymakers will have a need for more precise intelligence and estimates on:

1. The level of the Soviet military effort and its impact on the Russian people.
2. The stability and the vulnerabilities of the Soviet economy and its ability to carry the military burden placed on it.
3. The economic leverage we may have to induce the Soviets to scale down their military effort.
4. The significance of technological, financial and organizational impacts provided by the West to the growth and vigor of the Soviet economy and its ability to sustain a high level of military effort.

It is encouraging to conclude our observations by recognizing that these economic intelligence needs are now understood not only at the top levels of the intelligence community, but also by those who direct Soviet economic intelligence within the CIA. Since critical economic policy decisions are likely to be required in the immediate and long-range future, current efforts, which have already produced substantially improved economic intelligence in support of these needs, must continue, and, where possible, should be increased. [redacted]

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. FINDING. The CIA's assessment that the Soviet economy faces severe stresses has such potential effect on major policy decisions that it must undergo independent analysis.

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RECOMMENDATION. We recommend that the DCI, in consultation with PFIAB, arrange for an independent analysis, enlisting from outside the Intelligence Community highly qualified Soviet experts and such other experts in economics, engineering, demography, finance, etc., as may be required.

2. FINDING. Further strengthening of economic intelligence is essential to enable effective use of our greatest national strength -- the American economy. This requires prompt and creative moves to produce economic intelligence analyses and estimates that will support developing and choosing with due speed among:

a. Tactical measures to support policy decisions to discourage or retaliate against threatening or adverse Soviet behavior.

b. Strategic measures to support policy decisions to stimulate or coerce long-range modification of Soviet directions and capabilities.

RECOMMENDATION. We suggest that either the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade or the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs be requested to add the field of economic intelligence to their current responsibilities in order to provide timely guidance and feedback to the economic intelligence effort.

3. FINDING. Within the past two decades, Soviet studies in the U.S., both inside and outside the government, have declined, as have the number of specialists in Soviet affairs. The CIA today has less than one-fourth the number of economic specialists it had during the 1950's. A comprehensive project has been in operation in CIA within the last year to repair this long neglect of our understanding of the Soviet economy, and to increase and improve the staffs required for this urgent continuing task. The CIA reports that it plans to improve the quality of its analysts and to increase their number by one-third within FY 83 and FY 84, with a further steady increase through FY 88.

RECOMMENDATION. The Board strongly endorses the urgency of this continuing effort, especially in light of the difficulty involved in rapidly assembling competent analytic staff and in building an adequate data base. 25X1

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

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