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DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Perspectives for Intelligence
1975-1980

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Introduction

1. These Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980 are issued by the Director of Central Intelligence to provide general guidance for planning for all elements of the Intelligence Community for the next five years. They are particularly designed to stimulate early action on programs requiring long-term research, development, or planning—such as complex technical systems, language training, skills augmentation, etc. They are designed to influence Fiscal Year 1975 decisions whose effects will be felt only after several years. For Fiscal Year 1975, near-term guidance is provided in the Director's Objectives submitted to the President, which include both Substantive Objectives (further detailed in Key Intelligence Questions) and Resource Management Objectives. The Director's Annual Report to the President on the work of the Intelligence Community will include comment on steps taken during FY 75 to meet future requirements.

2. These Perspectives open with a general overview of the political, economic and security environment anticipated during the coming five years (Part I). This is followed by an overall statement of the anticipated role of intelligence in these situations during that period (Part II). Finally, more specific guidance is given with respect to activities which should be planned or initiated in order to meet the needs of the period ahead (Part III).

3. The Perspectives are focused primarily on major national intelligence problems and guidance. They recognize but do not deal extensively with three additional categories of important problems:

(a) Continuing lower priority national responsibilities which must be satisfied with a limited allocation of resources;

(b) Departmental or tactical intelligence support of civilian and military elements of the United States Government. This will also require continuing investment of attention and resources;

(c) Unexpected problems or crises which can pose major political, economic or security problems to the United States. To the extent that these requirements cannot be met by reallocation of resources from less urgent activities, some reserve capability must be included in planning to meet them.

Part I—Major World Problems

1. *General.* The balance of power between the US and USSR is unlikely to change fundamentally. Perception of the balance, however, may change importantly in either Moscow or Washington, or both. Beyond this, many other nations will play major roles in the international arena. Additional nations possessing nuclear weapons or having significant control over critical economic resources will be capable of seriously upsetting the international equilibrium. The chang-

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ing balance between the world's supply of and demand for natural resources will strain the world's political, economic, and social institutions. Thus the US will be confronted not only with the steady-state Soviet threat to US national interests but turbulence in other world relationships as well.

2. *The USSR.* Notwithstanding the probable continuation of detente and an absence of armed conflict, the USSR will remain the principal adversary of the US during the next five years. It will regard the US as its major security threat, and act accordingly. In foreign policy, its continued efforts to expand its international influence will bring it into conflict with US interests. This will include political action in Western Europe, the Near East, and South Asia, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Latin America. In its economic policy, Moscow will continue to give high priority to the kinds of growth which increase national power and its projection abroad.

The circumstances which commend detente to the USSR, however, have complicated this picture. These are: the need to control local crises lest they lead to general war; the burden of the Sino-Soviet conflict; and the desire for economic and technological assistance from the West. The Soviets will have to deal in the coming years with a number of dilemmas as they attempt to square traditional attitudes with the requirements of a detente posture.

These dilemmas may take an acute form in the strategic field. While continuing to modernize its ground, naval, and tactical air forces, the USSR is vigorously pursuing the opportunities left open by SALT I. Except to the extent restrained by arms limitation agreements, the Soviets will make substantial improvements in their missile forces, including MIRVing, improved accuracy, increased throw-weight, and better survivability. At the same time, they will continue to maintain and to improve their defenses. They will be working to develop effective weapons and supporting systems in such areas as ASW, satellites, and lasers. Expecting strategic equality with the US, the USSR gives indications of angling further for a measure of strategic superiority, if that can be obtained at reasonable risk.

Domestically, the pressure for modernizing reforms of the Soviet system, and particularly its economic administrative structure, will grow. Prolonged detente may also eventually have some effect on the Communist Party's ability to wield its authority effectively in all areas of public life. But these are long-term possibilities, and over the next five years the essentials of the Soviet domestic system are not likely to be substantially altered.

3. *China.* Almost certainly, China will undergo a change in leadership. The succession could see an initial collegial unity followed by an authoritarian, aggressive and xenophobic leader. The initial period could also be followed by fragmentation into a variety of contesting military, party, and provincial elements. For planning purposes, however, it would seem most appropriate to assume that the follow-on leadership in China will maintain the unity and authoritarian discipline

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imposed by the Communist Party, that it will be primarily concerned with internal unity in meeting the social and economic problems within China, and that it will retain a somewhat paranoid attitude toward the outside world and particular suspicion of countries on its periphery.

China will continue gradually to develop its strategic forces and will present a retaliatory threat to the Soviet Union. By 1980, it will have the capability of threatening the United States with a demonstration (or desperation) strike by a small number of ICBMs and SLBMs. China will maintain large general purpose forces capable of operations on its periphery but will be unlikely to commit them in the absence of major provocation or concern.

Internally, China will continue its authoritarian economic programs, which are likely to keep agriculture abreast of population, to enable industry to expand capacity and output, and to support an increasingly modern defense establishment. Internationally, China will endeavor to become the ideological leader of the Third World. It will participate in aid programs and similar political gestures with other Third World powers but will not establish substantial authority over Third World countries.

4. *Western Europe.* Western Europe will continue efforts at integration with uneven results. The subjective impulse toward unity and the objective factors working for it will continue to encounter obstacles arising from nationalistic rivalries, tensions between the concepts of Europeanism and Atlanticism, and Europe's ultimate dependence on US support against the USSR. New leadership in the principal West European states promises some change in tactics and approach to these problems—mostly in ways congenial to the US—but the fundamental issues will continue to resist quick solution. Europe, and US-European relations, will be particularly vulnerable to economic strains and uncertainties—inflation at home and trade problems with both the advanced states and the Third World countries supplying raw materials, especially oil.

5. *Eastern Europe.* While Eastern Europe will continue to be under Soviet control, recurrent pressures for some loosening of ties with Moscow will complicate the picture. The five-year period could see an explosion from within one or more East European countries against Soviet dominance, but Moscow would quickly reestablish its hegemony (by force if necessary), whatever the price in terms of other policies. Internal discipline may be alleviated somewhat in these countries so long as they adhere to Soviet guidance in diplomatic and security matters. Economic relations with the West and with the Third World will grow in quantity and in independence from Soviet control. The passing of Tito could open an arena of difficulty and contest over the succession internally and over the future orientation of Yugoslavia externally.



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7. *New Powers.* During the coming years, a number of nations will increase in absolute and relative strength and become at least regional great powers, plus playing more substantial roles in world international forums. An example is Brazil, whose economic and political power is increasingly felt in Latin America. Another is Iran, whose Shah is determined to build that country's relative strength in the region so as to play a full great power role there. Nigeria and Zaire could also develop this sort of role in Africa. Aside from these, several nations having considerable influence within regions will display greater independence from the close US relationship which has characterized them in the past. This will be particularly prevalent in the economic field, but it will also occur in various international relationships. Examples of such powers are Canada, Mexico, Australia, Thailand, and Saudi Arabia, plus several South American nations such as Venezuela, Panama, and Peru.

8. *The Third World* will present a variety of problems. A number of local disputes will preoccupy not only the leaders of individual countries but the international community. Examples are relationships between India and Pakistan, between black and white Sub-Sahara Africa, and within Southern Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Several existing disputes will continue to be a matter of concern to the international community and will sow the seeds of potential larger scale involvement (Arabs and Israel, North and South Vietnam, North and South Korea, Taiwan and China). A number of Third World countries will become increasingly antagonistic toward the great powers and their local presence in the economic, political and cultural spheres, e.g., in Africa, Latin America and South Asia. In this respect some identity of interest may grow between nations divided by the Cold War, developing into collaboration against both superpower complexes, e.g., the Arab nations, the rising black nations of Africa, and the nations of the Malay Archipelago. Internally, many Third World nations will suffer serious damage from tribal and regional differences, economic extremism, and ideological zealots (India, Cambodia, Ethiopia, *et al*). Some of the Third World will find an outlet for its frustrations in self-defeating assaults on great power economic relationships and in hamstringing the effectiveness of a variety of international forums.

9. *Social change* will cause turbulence and possibly create power vacuums in a number of areas. These will stem from increased expectations and a perception of the growing economic gap between less developed countries (and classes within countries) and the developed world. Areas particularly susceptible to this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain other Arab states such as Morocco,

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India, possibly Indonesia, the Philippines, and, in Latin America, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled by some authoritarian governments, particularly those benefiting from increased oil revenues, but these will have difficulties in maintaining themselves over the longer term and transferring power to successors. The resulting turbulence can present temptations to neighboring states to exploit long-standing differences or to great powers desirous of extending their influence. Such turbulence will also exist within advanced nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or regional minorities turn to violence and terrorism to press their claims against more and more delicately tuned and interdependent societies.

10. *The acceleration of events* will be characteristic of the years ahead. This will come from improved communication and transportation, sharply reducing the time available to reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international problems. It will also raise many local events to international prominence and inflate national or political pride, posing further handicaps to successful negotiations. There will be a resulting tendency towards shorter attention spans for individual situations and a need for simultaneous perception and management of a multiplicity of international relationships. Many national or international institutions are simply not structured to cope with accelerating change. Such change will occur most conspicuously in the fields of science and technology, but the pace there will have substantial effects on the pace of sociological, industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political and economic impacts. Identification and accurate assessments of such changes and their effects will be needed on an increasingly rapid or even immediate basis.

Part II—The Role of Intelligence

1. *General.* The primary charge on intelligence during these years will be to provide accurate and pertinent information and assessments with respect to the increased range of problems requiring US decision. In particular, the need will be for advance notifications of forthcoming policy problems and, of course, for tactical early warning as well. These responsibilities will be especially important in an era of accelerating events so that diplomacy, negotiation, or other benign initiatives can head off military confrontations between states or other disruptive events. The acceleration of events and the explosion of information will also require a major effort by the intelligence community to identify major policy and negotiating issues, to process raw information into manageable form, and to devise adequate techniques to identify for consumers the essential elements of foreign situations, the reliability of our assessments, and the likely impact of alternative policy decisions. Intelligence will increasingly be expected to provide assessments of the intentions and likely courses of action of foreign powers, in addition to their basic capabilities. To do this will require interdisciplinary analysis which melds economic, technological, sociological and cultural factors with political and military data.

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2. *The USSR.* The USSR will remain as the major intelligence target. Its military power, its economic role in the world, and its foreign policies will continue to pose major problems for American leadership. Intelligence will be expected to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities and economic activity. It must follow Soviet efforts to acquire advanced scientific and technological assistance and the potential impact on both military and economic capabilities. It will be expected also to supply reliable assessments of Soviet political dynamics and intentions. These must be supplemented by clear and accurate forecasts of likely Soviet courses of action in the political, economic, and military fields. While a small percentage of this material will become available through open exchange and access, vast fields of highly important information will be kept by the Soviets within a closed society, requiring extraordinary efforts to obtain and understand them. A particular requirement will be accurate and demonstrable monitoring of arms limitation agreements made with the Soviet Union. In the military field special attention will be focused on Soviet research and development, in particular with respect to weapons and supporting systems which could substantially affect the balance of power. These will include antisubmarine warfare, ballistic missiles, satellites and advanced-technology systems. Intelligence will be required to identify and maintain a base-line capability for tactical intelligence coverage, for rapid augmentation in case of local or general confrontation or conflict. Trends and actions in Soviet leadership and political doctrine will be a major subject of interest to assist in negotiations and to warn of undesirable developments ahead. The Soviet role abroad, either directly through diplomatic means or indirectly through party or subversive means, will be a matter of particular attention with respect to the turbulence of the Third World.

3. *China.* China will continue to be a second but still important intelligence target. The closed nature of Chinese society will make it difficult to assess any turmoil within the country or threats China might pose abroad. The latter will become particularly important as Chinese strategic power grows and comes to include capabilities against the United States itself. It will also apply to Chinese political activities and intentions in view of China's influence in the Far East and ties with and aspirations in the Third World.



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


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5. *Economics.* Economic intelligence will increase in importance world-wide. This will include economic situations in nations having a major impact on the world economy and on relationships with the United States, such as the [redacted] major suppliers of food and raw materials, and nations where internal economic chaos can create major world problems out of sympathy or resonance [redacted]

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6. *Other Priorities.* Intelligence will increasingly be expected to warn of and explain new situations posing problems to American interests. An example will be to identify the causes of social change, turbulence, and political terrorism in Third World countries, so the component elements of these problems can be isolated, negotiated about or countered with appropriate mechanisms. This may require intensified efforts on our part to understand and communicate the differences between societies, cultures, and nation personalities. Intelligence will be called upon more often to assess the threat of terrorists against US installations and private enterprises abroad and, beyond that, the risk that some terrorists may acquire nuclear weapons.

7. A few of the major problems which will be either the subject of dispute or negotiation, or sometimes both, and consequently will be priority intelligence requirements, can be listed:

- (a) Rates of production, consumption, and pricing of raw materials and energy sources and international commodity arrangements;
- (b) Price and non-price restrictions on international trade, including transportation and communication services;
- (c) The international payments mechanism and the coordination of national fiscal-monetary policies;
- (d) National policies with respect to military sales and foreign business activity and investment, including policies toward multi-national corporations;
- (e) Arms limitation, nuclear proliferation, and crisis avoidance;
- (f) Jurisdiction, exploitation, and relationships in the oceans and on sea beds.

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Part III—Implications for Intelligence Planning

1. *General.* The prospect is for further reduction of resources through inflation, with a need to cover a greater range of intelligence requirements and an information explosion. New collection systems must be developed to cope with technological advances in target entities. Because of the greater increased data flow expected from collection systems already under development, greater emphasis will have to be applied to the development of more sophisticated processing systems, analysis and dissemination techniques. A third major planning area will be in the refinement of requirements and evaluation systems to ensure the application of available resources to priority needs and the most effective distribution of intelligence tasks among components of the Community. The Community will need, finally, a different mix of manpower to meet both the substantive and technological problems which will be confronting it in future years. ✓

2. *Collection vs. Exploitation.* Over the past decade, management focus and the allocation of resources have been directed especially to the application of advanced technology to the collection and, to a lesser degree, the processing of intelligence data. This has been highly successful, resulting in major substantive advances in our knowledge, particularly with regard to the military capabilities of the Soviet Union. This investment has made a major contribution to the negotiations required for detente. Technological progress will soon reach a point—insofar as new capabilities in the photo and signal intelligence area are concerned—which will present us with large problems of success.

Within the time frame of this document, an important and pervasive problem facing the Intelligence Community will be to ensure efficient exploitation of the enormous amounts of information it will be collecting. Exploitation means not only sifting, selecting and analyzing the most relevant data, but also the application of advanced techniques to transfer that data from collectors to analysts and the analytical product, in turn, to the ultimate users of intelligence—all in the most meaningful and useful form we can devise. New styles of using information and the relationships they can portray may force new styles of policy deliberation that will differ markedly from those of the past.

Action: Study and planning must be initiated by Intelligence Community agencies concerning:

- (a) The rapid processing of raw information received, including the selection and discard of non-essential material at the earliest possible time, identification and accelerated dissemination of critical material, and the reduction of manpower and investment devoted to lower priority material;
- (b) Development of improved techniques and disciplines of analysis and production;
- (c) Development of improved methods of presentation.

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3. *Demands vs. Resources.* Another problem of great magnitude facing the Community over the next five to ten years will be the changing (and in all probability increasing) demands for intelligence while available resources for intelligence decrease in real terms.

In the past, the major portion of our intelligence effort has necessarily been deployed against the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and our other adversaries, actual and potential. Even assuming a period of genuine detente, much of this military focus must be maintained because of the importance of the subject to national security and the need for information on the quality of potential enemy weapons systems. It must not only serve to keep us alert militarily, but also support negotiations and verify arms limitation agreements. At the same time, the demands for other types of intelligence are growing. The result is a probable net increase in demand with a new proportionate mix among political, economic, military and technological target objectives.

This simultaneous shift and increase in requirements are occurring in a period of serious resource constraints and continuing inflation. Until very recently we have had the freedom to invest resources in a number of functional areas simultaneously without undue difficulty. This is no longer true. We will have to accomplish our objectives without the benefit of significantly greater resources. We must find trade-offs in the systems we use, the areas we cover, and the depth of the data we seek.

One area which holds promise for greater efficiency is the national/tactical interface. Current studies seek to identify ways by which national programs can better support tactical requirements, and vice versa. As more capable and flexible systems come into the national inventory, they must be made to serve the needs of operational forces as well as national-level consumers. Modernized systems and procedures which, by their design, permit greater mutuality of effort between national and force support activities should enable trade-offs achieving net resource savings.

Another area can be the optimum interrelationship among overt and clandestine, and technical and human sources. Costly or risky clandestine techniques must be employed only if overt sources cannot be successful in obtaining needed information. The technical can in some cases substitute for human effort, but certain types of critical intelligence—e.g., about opinions, plans, and decisions—are best, and sometimes only, collectible by human sources.



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A final area of greater productivity is in better utilization of intelligence. With due respect for the protection of intelligence sources and methods and national security information, intelligence can be more broadly disseminated and sanitized for service to subordinate civil and military government elements, the Congress, the public, and friendly and allied governments.

Action: Study and planning must be initiated by Intelligence Community agencies to:

- (a) Increase flexibility of responses to changes in priorities for intelligence coverage;
- (b) Identify areas in which intelligence coverage can be reduced to a base-line maintenance level, permitting rapid augmentation in case of increased need;
- (c) Examine techniques by which national programs can contribute better to departmental needs and vice versa;
- (d) Examine areas subject to overt and human source collection, reducing the need for clandestine or technical operation;
- (e) Develop programs to improve the productivity of intelligence resources in qualitative terms;
- (f) Review possibilities of greater foreign contributions to US intelligence, and prepare for contingent changes in present program;
- (g) Examine possibilities of increased utilization of intelligence through sanitization, wider dissemination, etc.;
- (h) Examine possibilities of greater utilization of reserve military intelligence organizations in performing non-time-sensitive intelligence tasks.

4. *Technical Systems.* The great accomplishments of present and projected technical collection systems must not conceal the fact that a major crisis is arising in the future. This stems in part from the necessity of solving the problems of processing and presenting the material collected, noted above. Also of great concern is the pace of technological change, which increases the complexity of targets at a rapid rate. This poses the danger that present collection systems will become obsolescent very quickly. Still, the technology of collection and processing also advances so that new potentials appear at shorter intervals. A governing restraint on exploiting these new potentials comes from budget and inflationary pressures. Because of long development and production cycles, the conflicts among these factors must be resolved at early stages, requiring the Intelligence Community to study and plan to:

- (a) Identify technological trends in target complexes which will close off access and initiate planning for upgrading current collection and processing systems to assure future coverage;

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(b) Research and develop new techniques of collection and processing to capitalize on technological change to give access and coverage to new targets of importance;

(c) Ensure that substantive intelligence need rather than technological improvement momentum drives investment in upgrading or replacing currently operating and productive systems.

5. *Requirements and Evaluation.* Taking advantage of potential trade-offs will require systematic evaluation of the total effort, and the forging of a much tighter link between the allocation of resources and the substantive intelligence result. A start in this direction has been made with the KIQ/KEP, but success will require an increasing commitment from the entire Community. In particular, the Community must demonstrate flexibility in reducing at least to a maintenance level intelligence activities providing only marginal results in the circumstances of the time.

A key factor in the better evaluation and more efficient use of resources will be a far better definition of intelligence requirements, both short and long term (the latter in particular with regard to R&D). Today the Community has a confusing variety of means, methods, vehicles and even language to determine and state requirements. Ways of restructuring the machinery for generating and communicating requirements must be undertaken on both Community and departmental levels. Thus study and planning is required to:

(a) Interrelate the procedures at tactical, departmental and national levels for generating requirements, so as to ensure optimum satisfaction of each;

(b) Improve communication among intelligence users, producers and collectors to reduce bureaucratic rigidities and improve the responsiveness and flexibility of the intelligence machinery at all levels;

(c) Produce periodic evaluations of the products and performance of the Intelligence Community against current primary or maintenance level requirements;

(d) Develop orderly procedures for evaluating user satisfaction and dissatisfaction with intelligence products.

6. *Manpower Implications.* The future responsibilities of the Intelligence Community establish new needs for manpower levels, academic and scientific disciplines and language capabilities. This will be particularly true with respect to human source collection, where depth of cultural knowledge plus greater capabilities in scientific and economic disciplines will be needed. The analyst of the future will have to be comfortable with electronic tools. In our preoccupation recently with manpower reductions, investment in new talent, training and career development, and exposure abroad may have suffered. This cannot be

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permitted to continue. In particular, steps are needed to deepen our knowledge of foreign cultures and thought processes through language fluency and foreign residence, especially with respect to nations important in political, economic or military terms (e.g., USSR and Eastern Europe, China, Latin America, Arab States, Japan, South and Southeast Asia). We must enhance our ability to do interpretive, estimative assessments of trends abroad and their effects on US interests. This is an area where a modest increment of resources, more in salaries and area studies than in rising manpower totals, can produce large returns. Collectors and producers must extend their ability to cover both scientific and liberal arts subjects—intelligence must be equally comfortable in either or both of the “two cultures.” And the Intelligence Community must undertake affirmative action to ensure equal employment opportunity to keep fully in step with national and government-wide trends.

Advanced information processing and presentation techniques will pose particular manpower training requirements. Indeed, the Intelligence Community should be in the forefront in placing new technologies in the service of users. New methods of analysis, forecasting, coordination and presentation of information must be energetically explored and applied where appropriate. Care must be taken in the application of such new methods and systems to ensure they are designed for the people who will use them and that adequate training in their use is active and integral to the process.

The Intelligence Community must study and plan to:

(a) Assure that training and familiarization are undertaken in new methods of collection, analysis and production, particularly in the use of new technical capabilities to increase productivity and precision and save manpower;

(b) Develop selection and training programs in those foreign languages and cultures which will be important intelligence targets of the particular agency in the 1975-1980 time frame (especially Russian and Chinese);

(c) Ensure the availability of technical and academic talents and expertise in the subjects which will be of importance in the years 1975-1980, e.g., economics;

(d) Flexibly reduce manpower commitments to lower priority activities and reduce (or reorient to new requirements) the persons freed by such change in priority;

(e) Develop and apply affirmative action plans for equal employment opportunity.

7. *Security.* The Intelligence Community must develop a satisfactory resolution of its needs for the protection of sources and methods and the American

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public's right to information about its Government's activities. This may require new legislation, the development of new ways of informing the Congress and the public of the substantive conclusions of the intelligence process and clear standards for compliance with the Freedom of Information Act and Executive Order 11652 (and their exceptions) in the Intelligence Community.

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