


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9 April 1976

NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR




25X1A FROM: VADM [redacted]
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
OSD & NSC
review(s)
completed.

You will recall a number of recent references at Morning Meetings to the subject of the Mayagüez post-mortem and its release by the NSC Staff to a House Subcommittee on International, Political, and Military Affairs.

In the course of considering this subject, we wanted to make certain that the NSC Staff was aware of corrective actions taken following issuance of the IC Staff post-mortem. Accordingly, a blind memorandum describing these actions has been prepared and is being made available by [redacted] to the NSC Staff.




I am impressed by the number of corrective actions taken and wanted to share with you this knowledge. Attached are copies of the Mayaguez post-mortem and the memorandum concerning corrective actions.



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INFORMATION



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MEMORANDUM

Community Corrective Actions, Post Mayaguez

In its Post Mortem of the Mayaguez Incident, the Intelligence Community Staff identified certain problems and deficiencies adversely affecting the Community's performance during that crisis and made specific recommendations to correct them.* The corrective actions taken since then--either in direct response to those recommendations or, indirectly, as a result of the impetus provided by the Mayaguez situation--are summarized below:

Post Mortem Recommendation: Existing procedures for handling critical intelligence should be revised and clarified so as to ensure appropriate action on the part of the various watch and operations centers, to make certain that [Redacted] [Redacted] messages are disseminated simultaneously to appropriate addressess, and, in general, to clarify other aspects of the system's procedures.

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Actions Taken:

- A revised and expanded version of Director of Central Intelligence Directive [Redacted] concerning the [Redacted] was prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff and approved by USIB in December, 1975. This Directive defines critical information as information concerning foreign situations or developments which affect the security or national interests of the US to such an extent that it may

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*Post-Mortem Report, "An Examination of the Intelligence Community's Performance Before and During the Mayaguez Incident of May 1975," [Redacted] [Redacted], published August 1975.

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[Redacted]

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

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require the immediate attention of the President or other members of the NSC. The DCID clarified and improved the procedures governing the recognition of critical developments abroad, the transmission of information on those developments to appropriate operations centers in the Washington area, and the passage of that information to senior officers of the Government.

- A new document--the "Handbook of Standard Operating Procedures for the Reporting of Critical Information"--was developed by the Intelligence Community Staff in conjunction with the Departments of Defense and State and the principal USIB member agencies. This document expands on the material presented in [redacted]

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[redacted] information and which are handled on a highest-priority basis), and provides guidelines and instructions applicable to all elements of the government concerned. The Handbook has been approved by USIB and will be published as an Attachment to [redacted]. A condensed, unclassified version of these [redacted] procedures has also been prepared and will be given wide dissemination throughout the U.S. Government.

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Recommendation: The standard operating procedures of the various watch and operations centers (specifically those concerned with external communications, including telephone conferencing) should be revised to establish a set of common Community-wide standards.

Actions Taken:

- USIB has approved revised operating procedures for the National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Network (NOIWON), the system designed to provide for simultaneous conferencing and exchange of information among the seven key watch centers in the Washington area. The new procedures now require that the NOIWON be activated upon receipt [redacted] alert advisory.
- CONTEXT (Conference Text Editing)--a unique computerized system combining secure voice and a visual text capability in a remote conferencing mode--is expected to become operational in 1976 with terminals at CIA, NSA, DIA, and State. The system facilitates analysts' preparation

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of time-critical intelligence products, such as a crisis situation report, and also permits emergency Intelligence Community meetings, including those at the USIB level, to be convened in a remote conferencing mode. CONTEXT will eventually be enhanced by a remote display capability which will allow presentation of maps and other visual displays at each location.

Recommendation: The Community should establish effective communications channels with all elements of the Government that are from time to time involved in crisis monitoring and management. Specifically, it should maintain contacts with systems that issue warnings to merchant marine vessels and commercial aircraft.

Actions Taken:

- Under the direction of an interagency ad hoc group, a number of special and improved procedures and systems were developed for providing warnings to U.S. flag ships and aircraft. These include, for example, the development of a U.S. Flag Merchant Vessel Locator Filing System (USMER) to provide reporting of port arrivals/departures and the at-sea positions of all U.S. flag merchant ships engaged in international trade; and implementation of new procedures to ensure that upon issuance by the Defense Mapping Agency of a special warning to U.S. ships, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) also notifies shipping owners and operators of the warning in order that these companies may issue alerts on their communications facilities. These and other measures constitute the first effective means of linking the Intelligence Community's warning apparatus with other U.S. departments and agencies such as the Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, the Defense Mapping Agency's Hydrographic Center, and State Department's Office of Maritime Affairs, which share responsibility for air and marine safety.
- At the request of the Intelligence Community Staff, the NSC Staff asked each government agency to furnish information on the functions of any watch/operations centers it maintains (here and abroad). The results of this survey are now being compiled into a directory which should improve communications between all concerned government elements, including those which normally have no need to communicate with each other but which might have to do so under crisis conditions.

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Recommendation: The flexibility of technical collection systems, such as satellite photography, should be increased so as to permit more rapid and more effective ways of acquiring information during rapidly breaking crises.

Actions Taken:

- Planning has largely been completed to make maximum use during crises of new technical collection systems. For example, under the direction of the USIB Committee for Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX), a new staff (manned on a 24-hour basis by DOD and CIA personnel) will provide the means for rapidly tasking new imagery collection systems and disseminating the results.



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- The Defense Department's Collection Coordination Facility, which is expected to become operational late this year, will permit consolidation of DOD time-sensitive requirements and more efficient tasking of technical collection systems.

Recommendation: Contacts between the operational and intelligence communities should become more frequent and open, especially at the working level. The responsibility for developing a better way of exchanging appropriate information should rest in the first instance with the Intelligence Community, especially the Intelligence Community Staff and the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs).

Actions Taken:

- The Intelligence Community Staff has inaugurated semi-annual conferences of the heads of Community and non-Community operations/watch centers to encourage closer cooperation among operational and intelligence elements and to discuss and resolve matters and problems of mutual concern. Two such conferences have been held since the Mayaguez incident and a third is scheduled for June of this year.

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- The Pacific Command has established in Korea an all-source "fusion center"--which seeks to combine both operations and intelligence functions in one location--to provide more effective support to Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, especially during crises. This center will collocate J2 (intelligence) and J3 (operations) personnel and provide for the immediate use of information on US and allied force operational data in the intelligence and warning process.
- DIALINT--a system now being developed--will provide operational and intelligence personnel and policy makers with immediate access by secure phone to the latest intelligence bulletins on current developments.
- Modernization of the National Military Indications Center (NMIC) and the National Military Command Center (NMCC) facilities will, when completed, allow for much closer coordination between the operational and intelligence functions of the military and permit them to provide more effective support to national authorities.
- Other measures--such as the development of the previously mentioned CONTEXT and NOIWON systems--will also contribute to effective exchanges of information between the operational and intelligence communities.

Recommendation: The way in which the Community issues warnings of impending developments to NSC members and other national consumers should be improved. The Alert Memoranda system should be refined and become the firmly established Community vehicle for alerting top-level consumers to the existence of potentially serious threats (other than strategic threats) to US interests.

Actions Taken:

- At the DCI's request, the Intelligence Community Staff prepared a comprehensive study of Alert Memoranda, which concluded, inter alia, that these memoranda serve as an effective instrument of warning for decision makers.
- Revised, expanded, and improved procedures for the preparation, coordination and issuance of Alert Memoranda were developed by the Intelligence Community Staff and were approved by USIB on 15 December 1975.

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- Within the Defense Department, Alert Memorandum distribution procedures have been revised to ensure more rapid delivery of AMs to key policy makers.

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