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Attachment A

Extracts from Section V. (Preliminary Recommendations)

A.

1. In cooperation with appropriate agencies, offices and committees, the IC Staff will sponsor and chair, perhaps on an annual basis, a review of collection products in terms of their format, timeliness, assigned priorities, and general usefulness to analytical consumers. Emphasis in this review will be placed on means to help consumers understand the significance of information provided to them.

2. The IC Staff will review the existing system of collection requirements in terms of its ability to respond quickly and effectively in crisis situations. This review will concentrate on the identification of the principal questions which need to be answered during a crisis. It will lead to the establishment of a system which would--through person-to-person contacts and lively exchanges of information and opinions--promote the search for actual information and the formulation of analytical judgments; such a system will not try to assess the data as it arrives or seek to draw up formal lists of requirements.

3. The Community as a whole will establish a common alert mechanism to deal with crisis situations.

B.

1. IC Staff, with all-agency participation, will develop regular systems to be implemented by the NIOs to ensure that serious divergent points of view and conflicting elements of information not be submerged by managerial fiat or the mechanism of reinforcing consensus.

a. Such systems will be charged in addition with ensuring that in a crisis the analytical Community is aware of the significance collectors attach to the information being provided.

b. Such systems will also be charged with ensuring the establishment of means to provide the views of devils' advocates, adversary procedures, and the use of gaming techniques as appropriate.

2. A community-wide review will be undertaken under the IC Staff to determine the advisability of revamping existing warning mechanisms, procedures, publications, doctrines, and analytical methodologies; and to study ways to assign a clear warning function to production offices and analysts; and to recommend ways to

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Attachment B

Crisis Study

OPERATIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
DURING THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR
6-25 OCTOBER 1973

The purpose of this element of the Arab-Israeli post-mortem is to examine the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the intelligence community in supporting the national consumers' need for intelligence during the period 6-25 October 1973. Special attention is being given to the operation of the various agency task forces which were created in response to this crisis with emphasis being placed upon interagency coordination, the quality of the products produced, and recommendations concerning how the operation of these task forces might be improved.

Extensive interviewing throughout the intelligence community has been conducted. Insofar as possible, national consumers have been queried. However, none of the principals (Sec/Def, Sec/State, ^CJCS, etc.) have been interviewed. In addition, the principal products which the principal intelligence agencies produced ^{ve} have been collected and reviewed.

The findings of this element of the post-mortem, as I see it now, will not be startling. The principal shortcomings of the current crisis response system are fairly well known already. I believe that the principal value of this study will be to provide further ammunition to advance the cause of improving community communications in times of crisis, encourage more community crisis reports (i.e., amalgamate DIA/CIA Sit Reps, etc.) and to further emphasize the need for more intelligence analysis and less factual reporting. Another issue may be a recommendation to get NSA/NPIC more into the production business.

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The final product growing out of this element of the post-mortem, as I see it now, will likely be a relatively low key memorandum or series of memorandums rather than a report of the scale of 1 December magnum opus.

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[Redacted]

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Arab-Israeli War Study

[Redacted]

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11 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Status of Post-Mortem Studies

1. The original Phase II study [Redacted] has been narrowed

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[Redacted] All material is ready for posting. In order to make the "new tank" available, we designed a "posting machine" which will eliminate the requirement of many feet of blackboards. There has been a considerable delay in the delivery of this machine which is, in turn, delaying the execution of this project.

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2. Within the next few days we will have the DIA input to a special project [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Beyond the intelligence implications, this study also has implications on management and exploitation of collection.

3. A special oral briefing has been prepared on how the NOIAN NOIWON nets could have been used during Phase I (pre 6 October) of the Middle-East crisis. This briefing is related to the question of alerting procedures in the intelligence as well as operational community.

4. A study on the exploitation of intelligence, particularly emphasizing the collation of intelligence with "overhead" collection, is being outlined. This will also relate to the alerting and management mechanisms and procedures noted in 2 above. This should be done in cooperation with [Redacted] group.

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[Redacted]

Distribution:

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1 - PRG Chrn

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IC/PRG/TGB:smg 11 Jan 74

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Attachment D

DCI Guidance on Phase II

11 December 1973

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Mr. Colby addressed the question of subsequent post-mortem reports on the Middle East during the pre-USIB session on 11 December. I will recount my impressions of his remarks as best I can in what follows, but I am not wholly certain that my interpretations of the DCI's remarks are 100 percent accurate.

Mr. Colby made two major points of interest to us:

1. As he sees it, Phase II of our effort will be devoted primarily (perhaps even almost exclusively) to an examination of the period following 6 October. What he implied, I think, is that this Phase II examination should be a fairly general one, along the lines of the existing Preliminary Report, but presumably shorter and less ambitious. This does not rule out, in my mind, the issuances of separate reports concerning, for example, collection problems, nor does it require a single Phase II effort. But it does reflect the DCI's relative disinterest in future lengthy exploration of the Community's performance during the Middle East crisis. Which leads us to a second major point:

2. Mr. Colby does not want our specific recommendations concerning changes and improvements in intelligence machinery to be appended to specific post-mortem papers. He wants the specific recommendations, in effect, to stand on their own feet and to reflect broad community considerations, not just those drawn from the Mid-East experience. He said specifically, for example, that a paper on challenge mechanisms should discuss this problem in general and not in the context of particular Middle East post-mortem lessons. The same applies to other recommendations concerning, for example, ways to improve exchanges between

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analysts and collectors, etc. I don't think this rules out references to what we have learned from the Middle East exercise. Nor did it necessarily rule out explicit recommendations or references to broad ongoing efforts to improve the Community's performance in individual Phase II post-mortem papers.

If all the above raises as many questions as answers, it is because that is more or less the way the conversation went. But there are two lessons here: First, we retain some flexibility; but second, we are going to have to redirect our Phase II effort somewhat.

Obviously this will require further conversation. I just wanted to get these thoughts down as soon after the meeting as possible.



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General Graham



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