



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS  
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: **IVG**

9 JAN 1981

SUBJECT: Headquarters Collection Requirement 52 (HQ CR 52) Smuggling Southwest Asian Heroin through the USAF Transportation System (SEVEN CRESCENTS)


TO: All AFOSI USAFE Dists, Dets, and RAs (CAT VII)

1. The attached collection requirement (CR) is forwarded for your action. The CR aims at insuring that AFOSI and the USAF are doing everything possible to counter the very serious threat Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin poses to this country and our forces stationed in Europe. As such, it is part of a national-level, coordinated effort.

2. For AFOSI operations in USAFE, we recognize that some of the levies duplicate levies contained in HQ CR 50. We are not asking for duplicate collection efforts or reporting. If SWA heroin prices/availability have not changed since submission of your last AFOSI Form 161, an AF Form 158 reporting this fact will meet the requirements of paragraph 2a of this CR. As outlined in the attached CR, AFOSI Forms 161 and 165 should be used to report information responsive to this CR whenever feasible. In general, when SWA heroin is involved, report under this CR, vice HQ CR 50.

3. Although most of the detachments have probably collected much of the information requested by this CR during the course of routine operations, we realize we are asking for additional and, in some cases, time-consuming written reports. We have limited the CR to collection of that information we see as the absolute minimum needed to meet our obligation under this program. We have done everything we could think of to simplify the organization and requirements of this CR. We would appreciate any constructive suggestions you may have to improve this CR.

4. As you will note, this CR is basically a one-time tasking in that the micro-analysis required by the CR will not be a recurring requirement. On the other hand, any information responsive to this CR which is developed during the course of normal operations should, of course, be immediately reported via a 456, AFOSI Form 161 or AFOSI Form 165. All information reported under this CR should be caveated with the words "SEVEN CRESCENTS."

  
**JOE L. HARVELL, Jr., Colonel, USAF**  
Director of Criminal Investigations

Atch  
HQ CR 52

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USAF review(s) completed.



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BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332

9 JAN 1981

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: IVG

SUBJECT: Headquarters Collection Requirement 52 (HQ CR 52)

TO: All AFOSI Dists, Dets, and RAs (CAT III)

1. Target: Smuggling Southwest Asian Heroin through the USAF Transportation System (SEVEN CRESCENTS).

2. Organization. Since the organization of this CR differs from other HQ CRs, a word of explanation is appropriate. The body of the CR is divided into five sections: Target, Organization, Background, Introduction to General and Specific Interrogatories, and Suspense. These sections, with the exception of the "Introduction to General and Specific Interrogatories," are self-explanatory. This introductory section outlines for AFOSI managers and collectors the overall purpose of the CR and explains, in general terms, how collectors should go about obtaining information responsive to the CR and how this information should be reported. The CR has three attachments: (1) References, (2) General Interrogatories and (3) Special Interrogatories. These attachments provide collectors with the general information and specific interrogatories necessary to fulfill the goals of the CR. They are set forth as attachments rather than included in the body of the CR so that collectors will have a concise, separable package to use in their collection efforts rather than having to search through the body of the CR for these interrogatories and governing directives.

3. Background: An excellent opium harvest in the "Golden Crescent" area of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan during 1979 made more than a hundred metric tons of Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin potentially available to the illicit, international drug market. Intelligence estimates, confirmed at least in part through customs seizures, indicate that the major markets targeted to receive this heroin are Western Europe and the United States. Large quantities of this SWA heroin have been seized by U.S. and foreign customs officials and by other law enforcement officials in the U.S. and in Europe. Still, narcotics intelligence analysts believe that stockpiled heroin in SWA will continue to flow into Western European and U.S. markets for at least another year. At the present time, there is nothing in AFOSI investigative and intelligence reports to suggest that the USAF transportation system is being used, or that it has been targeted for use, to move SWA heroin. None-the-less, the USAF transportation system is vulnerable to attempts to smuggle SWA heroin from and to any point serviced by the system. Detailed background information regarding the threat posed by the abundance of high purity, low priced SWA heroin to the USAF and the U.S. in general has been discussed in Crime Information Reports 80-1, 80-3 and 80-4. The specific vulnerabilities of the USAF transportation system to illicit drug smuggling activities have been outlined in Crime Special Study (CSS) 80-14 and that study is, effectively, a preamble to this CR.

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4. Introduction to General and Special Interrogatories:

a. References. Attachment 1 to this CR is a list of references which contain essential information for agents tasked to collect data responsive to the general and special interrogatories in this CR. These documents detail the SWA heroin threat to the USAF and existing inspection requirements designed to interdict attempts to use the USAF transportation system to smuggle contraband.

b. General Interrogatories.

(1) Applicability. General Interrogatories (outlined in Attachment 2) apply to all AFOSI operating locations worldwide.

(2) Purpose. The General Interrogatories develop available information of interest to AFOSI and the USAF concerning SWA heroin. Specifically these interrogatories are designed to identify:

(a) Local availability and price of SWA heroin.

(b) Source countries and traffic patterns/routes.

(c) Current concealment techniques.

(d) Efforts to recruit couriers from among USAF-associated personnel, i.e., members, dependents, and civilian employees.

(3) Sources. Information should be collected from all sources, including open sources (local law enforcement officials), OSI/Cs, potential OSI/Cs and subjects/witnesses identified through substantive investigations.

(4) Reporting Requirements. There are two mandatory suspense dates established by the CR. One date is for USAFE and other specially designated AFOSI units and the other date is for all AFOSI units. Although the interrogatories in the "Special Interrogatories" section (Atch 3) are intended as the basis for a one-time, micro-vulnerability target analysis, any AFOSI unit which obtains information responsive to these interrogatories in the normal course of collection or investigative operations should report that information via a 456 report.

(a) All AFOSI Units. All AFOSI units are required to submit at least a one-time report regarding the availability and price of SWA heroin in their area (paragraph 2a, "General Interrogatories," Atch 2). Districts may consolidate these reports and submit one report for the district. These reports are due 28 Feb 81 unless reports have already been submitted which meet the requirements of this interrogatory. For USAFE Districts, if AFOSI Forms 161 have been completed and forwarded for the fourth quarter of CY 80, these will meet the requirements of this paragraph. (For Districts not in USAFE: the AFOSI Form 161 is a form being used by USAFE Districts in connection with HQ CR 50, a CR which only they have.) Other Districts which have already reported the price and availability of SWA heroin in their area in a recent 456 report should send

an AFOSI Form 158 to HQ AFOSI/IVGSC setting forth the 456 report number so involved. Follow-up 456 reports responsive to this interrogatory or other interrogatories in the "General Interrogatories" (Atch 2) should be prepared as the information becomes available.

(b) For USAFE AFOSI Units and Detachments BIDs Servicing McGuire AFB, NJ; Dover AFB, DE; Andrews AFB, MD; Charleston AFB, SC; and Tinker AFB, OK. 456 reports providing the micro-vulnerability target analysis required by the "Special Interrogatories" (Atch 3) will be submitted by 30 Mar 81. This is a one-time requirement; however, as new information responsive to this section of the CR comes to the attention of AFOSI units, additional 456 reports should be prepared. AFOSI units preparing these micro-vulnerability target analyses are encouraged to review these quarterly and forward necessary changes/additions.

(5) Report Formats and Distribution.

(a) All Districts. Reports should bear the file number 80HQD456-3 and the "SEVEN CRESENTS" nickname. In addition, each report should identify the source (by number, if appropriate) of the information and provide an evaluation of the source and the information (See AFOSIR 124-11, paragraph 4-1h and 4-1j(6)). In all cases where information may be of interest to another district, direct distribution to that district will be made and reflected in the report.

(b) USAFE Districts. This CR does not replace reporting requirements set forth in HQ CR 50. Duplicate reporting is not required; however, information dealing specifically with SWA heroin or responses to levies contained in this CR should be reported under 80HQD456-3 and should be marked "SEVEN CRESCENTS." USAFE Districts should use an AFOSI Form 1 to report efforts by individuals/groups to recruit couriers among USAF associated personnel, but AFOSI Forms 161 and 165 may be used to report availability/price information and smuggling techniques.

(c) Districts Other than USAFE. Districts other than USAFE Districts should use an AFOSI Form 1 to report responses to interrogatories.

c. Special Interrogatories

(1) Applicability. Special interrogatories (outlined in Attachment 3) apply to all AFOSI units in USAFE and detachments/BIDs servicing McGuire AFB, NJ; Dover AFB, DE; Andrews AFB, MD; Charleston AFB, SC and Tinker AFB, OK.

(2) Purpose. The "Special Interrogatories" solicit the preparation of a micro-vulnerability target analysis of the USAF transportation system at these specified locations.

(3) Sources. There are three classes of persons capable of providing information responsive to the "Special Interrogatories":

(a) Commanders/supervisors and customs officials can describe established customs inspection procedures at each location.

(b) Military Customs Inspectors (MCI), drug detection dog (DDD) handlers and aircrew members can describe the actual customs inspection procedures being practiced at the installation.

(c) Aircrew, maintenance, life support and aerial port personnel with access to aircraft can describe specific aircraft areas that are most vulnerable to hiding packages of illicit drugs.

(NOTE: Developing information from these sources assumes a basic knowledge of AFR 75-12 and local supplements (See References).)

(4) Report Timing. Initial micro-vulnerability target analyses should be prepared by 30 Mar 81 and updated as necessary. The target analysis should be reviewed by the preparing detachment at least quarterly and if information has come to AFOSI's attention which necessitates changes to the initial target analysis, these changes will be reported via a 456 Report. If no changes are noted, an AFOSI Form 158 indicating this should be sent to HQ AFOSI/IVGSC.

(5) Reporting Format and Distribution. Target analyses should be reported via AFOSI Form 1 using file number 80HQD456-3 and the "SEVEN CRESCENTS" nickname. A separate section of the analysis should describe each area of the transportation system, i.e., USAF aircraft, PAX travelers, cargo/HHG shipments and mail. Appendix C of Crime Special Study 80-14 should be used as a basic guide for the preparation of these micro-vulnerability target analyses. When a target analysis is prepared that has a bearing on another district, direct distribution of the analysis will be made to that district and this distribution will be reflected on the AFOSI Form 1.

5. Suspense. This CR will remain in effect for one year.

3 Atchs

1. References
2. General Interrogatories
3. Special Interrogatories

REFERENCES

1. CRIME INFORMATION REPORTS (CIR): The following CIRs provide detailed background information on the Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin threat to the USAF:

- a. CIR 80-1, Middle Eastern Heroin Alert, 22 Feb 80.
- b. CIR 80-3, "SEVEN CRESCENTS," An Introduction, 15 Apr 80.
- c. CIR 80-4, "SEVEN CRESCENTS," Significant Heroin Encounters in the USAF, 30 May 80.

2. CRIME SPECIAL STUDY 80-14, The USAF Transportation System and the Heroin Smuggling Threat: A Macro-Vulnerability Study (SEVEN CRESCENTS) - This study represents the Headquarters, AFOSI, perspective on the SWA heroin threat. The study was prepared after coordination with DEA, U.S. Customs, NIS, USACIDC and AF/LET. The study can be used to:

- a. Prepare a concise summary of the SWA heroin threat to the USAF.
- b. Describe USAF air traffic routes vulnerable to exploitation.
- c. Characterize known and suspected SWA heroin trafficking patterns.
- d. Describe specific areas of the USAF transportation system vulnerable to exploitation.
- e. Form the basis for micro-vulnerability target analyses (See Appendix C).

The information in this study is essential for AFOSI commanders and agents involved in briefing USAF commanders, supervisors, Military Customs Inspectors (MCI), customs officials, drug detection dog handlers, DOD Passenger (PAX) service representatives and aircrew members.

3. AFR 75-12, Border Clearance, Customs Program and Other United States Entry Requirements and Related Areas - This document, as supplemented locally, sets forth the USAF standard for:

- a. Inspection of aircraft traveling from overseas areas to the CONUS and aircraft landing at "special foreign clearance bases" (paragraph 3-7, Chapter 3; paragraph 4, Attachment 2; and Attachment 5).
- b. PAX inspection procedures (paragraph 1, Attachment 2; and paragraph 4, Attachment 5).
- c. Inspection of Cargo/HHG shipments (paragraphs 3-8, 3-13 and 3-14, Chapter 3; paragraphs 2 and 3, Attachment 2; and paragraph 3, Attachment 5.)

4. AFR 182-1, Postal Responsibilities and Policy Service Center and Unit Mail Room Operations - Paragraphs 8-4 and 8-5 describe procedures aimed at preventing the flow of contraband through the mail.

5. DOD 5030.49R, Customs Inspection - This is the DOD Regulation on which AFR 75-12 is based. Paragraph 6003 describes procedures intended to prevent the flow of contraband through the mail.

Atch 1

GENERAL INTERROGATORIES

1. Introduction. The following general interrogatories apply to all AFOSI units and address USAF transportation system vulnerabilities and the local situation with respect to heroin in general and Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin in particular. Administrative information regarding sources to be used and report timing and format pertinent to these interrogatories is set forth in paragraph 4b of the body of the CR.

2. Interrogatories.

a. Determine the price and availability of SWA heroin in the local vicinity of USAF installations serviced by AFOSI units. (Local vicinity should include nearby metropolitan areas which would be expected to have a heroin market.)

b. Determine, whenever possible, the source of heroin involved in active or monitor investigations regarding the use and/or distribution of heroin by USAF associated personnel (USAF active duty military personnel, dependents and DAF civilians). Specifically, through interviews of subjects, sources and local law enforcement/DEA officials, attempt to determine the source country/region of the heroin (i.e., SEA, SWA, Mexico) and the suspected route over which the heroin traveled prior to arriving in the local area. Here again we are looking for the possibility that other USAF associated personnel or the USAF transportation system were involved in the transportation of the heroin at any point along this route.

c. Report any AFOSI or other agency identified drug smuggling technique involving the USAF transportation system (See CSS 80-14, Appendix C) which could be used to smuggle SWA heroin.

d. Report any approach of a USAF member that indicates an effort to access the USAF transportation system for the purpose of smuggling illicit drugs. There are indications that organized, civilian criminal elements involved in smuggling operations are resorting to classic hostile intelligence collection techniques in their approaches of civilian aircrew members and maintenance and cargo handling personnel employed by civilian airlines. Specifically, agents of these criminal elements target known "hang-outs" to recruit these civilian airline employees by involving them in compromising situations or by playing on established friendships.

Atch 2



SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES

1. Introduction. The purpose of these special interrogatories for all AFOSI units in USAFE and the detachments/bids servicing McGuire AFB, NJ; Dover AFB, DE; Andrews AFB, MD; Charleston AFB, SC; and Tinker AFB, OK, is to guide the preparation of a micro-vulnerability target analysis of the USAF transportation system at their locations. Administrative information regarding sources to be used and report timing and format pertinent to the following interrogatories is set forth in paragraph 4c of the body of the CR.

2. Interrogatories

a. USAF Aircraft: AFR 75-12 (See Attachment 1) outlines procedures to be used in inspecting aircraft traveling from overseas areas to the CONUS and those aircraft landing at "special foreign clearance bases." Paragraph 3-7, Chapter 3; paragraph 4, Attachment 2; and Attachment 5 of the regulation provide specific information regarding the inspection procedures required. These may be supplemented by theater or local commanders.

(1) Through discussion with appropriate commanders/supervisors and customs officials determine the established customs inspection procedures followed at each installation.

(2) Through sources, Military Customs Inspectors (MCIs), drug detection dog (DDD) handlers and aircrew members, determine the actual customs inspection procedures being practiced at the installation.

(3) Through AFOSI sources who are aircrew members or who, through duties in aircraft/munitions maintenance, life support or aerial port units, have continuing, unrestricted access to USAF aircraft, determine areas on the aircraft which are most susceptible to hiding small packages of drugs. Also determine methods believed to be used to prevent these packages from being found by MCIs or DDDs.

(4) Through sources mentioned above, identify any of their coworkers who are exhibiting unusual affluence.

b. DOD Travelers (PAX): Paragraph 1, Attachment 2; and paragraph 4, Attachment 5, AFR 75-12, outline customs inspection procedures for PAX. These may be supplemented by theater or local commanders.

(1) Through discussion with appropriate commanders/supervisors and customs officials, determine customs inspection procedures followed at each installation.

(2) Through sources, MCIs, DDD handlers and PAX service representatives, determine the actual customs inspection procedures being practiced at each installation.

(3) Through sources and PAX service representatives, identify individuals who frequently travel to or from known source and transit countries (Turkey, Italy, Greece, Germany, Spain and England) to other USAFE areas or the CONUS. Identify individuals assigned to USAF activities in Germany who travel regularly between West Berlin and/or Frankfurt and other areas of Germany.

(4) Determine whether suspected drug traffickers/abusers are traveling as PAX via USAF aircraft to those areas discussed above.

c. Cargo/HHG shipments: Paragraphs 3-8, 3-13 and 3-14, Chapter 3; paragraphs 2 and 3, Attachment 2; and paragraph 3, Attachment 5, AFR 75-12 outline customs inspection and control procedures for cargo and HHG shipments. Again, these procedures may be supplemented by theater or local commanders.

(1) Through discussion with appropriate commanders/supervisors and customs officials, determine the established customs inspection procedures followed at each installation.

(2) Through sources, MCIs, DDD handlers, TMO and aerial port personnel, determine the actual customs inspection and control procedures being practiced at the installation.

(3) Following coordination with local SJAs, consider the establishment of a systematic method for briefing MCIs on current illicit drug intelligence matters to include identification of suspected major abusers/traffickers who are known or thought to be anticipating a HHG shipment.

d. Mail: Procedures aimed at preventing the flow of contraband through the mail are set forth in paragraphs 8-4 and 8-5, AFR 182-1; and paragraph 6003, DOD 5030.49R. Recent changes to paragraph 6003, DOD 5030.49R have rescinded all DOD involvement in the actual inspection of mail for contraband. Subparagraphs 6003h and 6003i require military postal clerks to identify every mailer by checking his official identification card and that a complete and accurate return address is included on the package. Current Air Force Policy is that drug detection dogs will not be used to inspect mail within the U.S. or its possessions nor will they be used to inspect mail from overseas area which is destined for the U.S. or its possessions.

(1) Through interviews of local APO supervisors determine the exact nature of local efforts to prevent shipment of drug contraband through the APO system.

(2) Through AFOSI sources and/or PSC supervisors, determine whether PSC personnel are properly closing out a member's PSC box when the member notifies them of a PCS movement or otherwise requests termination of his PCS address.

(3) Through AFOSI sources, determine whether APO postal clerks are checking return address information against identification cards for all mail they receive directly from customers.