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WORKING PAPERS

FIRST DRAFT

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT TO DEVELOPERS
OF TACTICS AND DOCTRINE

25X1

October

Prepared by
The Intelligence Community Staff

for
The Director of Central Intelligence

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ABSTRACT

(U) This report summarizes results of a study to determine if support from the Intelligence Community to developers of tactics and doctrine could be improved through systematization. The study expands on previous work which examined intelligence community provision of scientific and technical intelligence in support of Defense research and development. To view intelligence support problems from the vantage point of the consumer, the study team interviewed selected users at about 30 commands and activities throughout the country. Based on analyses of data collected in these interviews, the report gives findings and recommendations for improvement of intelligence support to developers of tactics and doctrine.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

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1. This document summarizes results of a study that analyzed problems in providing scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) to managers of programs for development of tactics and doctrine. The study also addresses the S&TI needs of those who state mission requirements for systems and those who test weapon systems. A previous study, on which this study effort builds, dealt with problems in providing S&TI to the R&D community. The two studies taken together provide an analytic framework for improving community S&T intelligence support to the entire materiel acquisition structure.

TACTICS AND DOCTRINE SUPPORT PROBLEMS

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2. Problems of S&TI support to those who manage programs for developing tactics and doctrine are in two main categories: direct support personnel and production management. The problems are inseparable, but amenable to solution. Although personnel involved in direct intelligence support to materiel acquisition are often intelligence careerists, they occupy spaces not funded under Program 3. In the case of support to development of tactics and doctrine they are largely funded by Program 2, General Purpose Forces. In the case of support to R&D, they are under Program 6. Corrective measures, therefore, would involve cooperative interdepartmental action under the aegis of the DCI.

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3. The following summary sentences highlight intelligence personnel problems in supporting developers of tactics and doctrine.

- Selection practices are poor. Often personnel are placed on the basis of availability, not qualifications.
- Training is inadequate. Most personnel are not familiar with the tools of their trade and the functioning of the overall intelligence system.
- Management of direct support personnel is deficient. Middle management has not established and enforced realistic standards of performance.

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4. Problems in production management of S&TI to support developers of tactics and doctrine are as follows:

- Developers of tactics and doctrine (T&D) do not know what intelligence is being produced.
- The S&TI needs of T&D developers are not stated systematically to producers.
- S&T intelligence producers do not know who are their users in the tactics and doctrine community.
- Distribution is faulty. Users often do not receive needed, expensively-produced documents. Many receive unneeded documents.
- There are no systematic procedures for evaluation of S&TI products with a view to improvement of their utility to T&D users.

COMMUNITY PROBLEMS

5. The following problems became evident in the course of the study. They apply not only to S&TI support to developers of tactics and doctrine, but to the entire materiel acquisition community.

- Support from producers of S&TI to the materiel acquisition community is managed intuitively rather than systematically. Among the reasons for this is the mistaken but pervasive belief that an "invisible hand" guides S&TI production in the best interests of consumers.
- The rational process spelled out in DIA publications for requesting, producing, and evaluating S&T intelligence is little used. It is actively resisted and frustrated by some intelligence managers, and ignored by many others at all levels.
- Community sharing of S&T intelligence is poor, both horizontally (among producers) and vertically (within Services). Questions and responses in one element of the community are not transmitted to users with similar needs in other elements. ✓
- Formal justification for the large S&T intelligence production program is woefully weak and will not stand up to inquiry by oversight authority. ✓

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SELECTED FINDINGS

6. (U) The following are the principal findings of this study on which to base action for improving S&T intelligence support to managers of programs for development of tactics and doctrine:

- The personnel and organizational structure exists for furnishing direct support to developers of tactics and doctrine. It is in need of improvement.
- Programs for development of tactics and doctrine are documented and can be associated systematically with S&TI production programs to ensure that user needs are met comprehensively and economically.
- The system developed for S&TI support to R&D (see Appendix A) is applicable to support of managers of programs to develop tactics and doctrine. Indeed, it could be used to advantage by any community of intelligence producers to support any community of users.

RECOMMENDATION

7. (U) That the DCI[?] sponsor interdepartmental planning to systematize S&T intelligence support to the materiel acquisition community.

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Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000400150002-6

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Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000400150002-6