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DCI/ICS 82-3707

20 May 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted] 25X1
 Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM: [redacted] 25X1
 Director, Office of Assessment and Evaluation

[redacted] 25X1
 Director, Office of Planning

SUBJECT: Intelligence User Survey

1. Attached you will find revisions of (A) the Executive Summary and (B) the Discussion of the Findings and Followup Interviews of the IC Staff analysis of the data received from questionnaires and interviews in the 1981 Intelligence User Survey. We have attempted, in these revisions, to incorporate the suggestions made by you, [redacted] during our recent discussions. We have appended to the Executive Summary five recommendations for action which the findings of the survey would appear to warrant. Attachment C provides a brief summary of the responses to each of the 26 questions contained in the questionnaire, and Attachment D, the Statistical Annex, provides an abbreviated Audit Trail of the IC Staff's assessment of the data. 25X1

2. We recommend that the entire set be forwarded to Evan Hineman as Chairman of the Intelligence Producer's Council for review and possible inclusion in a Community report for the DCI on the User Survey.

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Attachments:
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 1981, a Working Group composed of representatives of CIA, NSA, DIA and the Intelligence Community Staff surveyed a broad range of policy makers whose functions entailed the use of intelligence in an effort to ascertain their degree of satisfaction with the intelligence support they received. Of the 155 officials queried, some 135 completed a four-page questionnaire; some 35 of those respondents in personal interviews with members of the Working Group provided additional insights into their use of intelligence. The ICS analyzed the data obtained from the questionnaires and interviews of all the respondents, while an independent DIA study concentrated only on responses from DoD officials. In both cases, the findings tended to confirm perceptions already held by Intelligence Community officials. Since the survey was not designed to assess the effectiveness of resource allocation in the Community, its applicability in that area is limited.

Following are the salient conclusions from the IC Staff assessment:

- "Core" intelligence consumers defined as senior officials of the Departments of State and Defense and of the National Security Council, are more frequent users of, more dependent upon, more influenced by, and significantly more satisfied with intelligence than are their counterparts in "non-Core" organizations such as the Departments of the Treasury, Energy, and Commerce.
- The most satisfied consumers of intelligence are those who deal directly with intelligence analysts specializing in the individual policy maker's field of interest. Those consumers relying primarily upon their own staffs and upon intelligence liaison officers are less likely to be satisfied with the intelligence support they receive.
- Intelligence consumers would welcome, early in their appointments, an effective introduction into the Intelligence Community detailing the services provided, and the best means of accessing the system, in order to enhance their ability to incorporate intelligence into the decision-making process. This is true of both policy makers who have had considerable government experience as well as those new to government.

UTILITY OF INTELLIGENCE

- Consumers who used intelligence regularly generally rated the utility of intelligence high.

INTELLIGENCE BY TYPE (Current, Basic, Raw, Predictive/Analytic, Intelligence in Support of Policy Options).

- Respondents generally were satisfied with both the quantity and quality of Current and Basic intelligence.

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- A significant proportion of those queried were dissatisfied with both the quantity and quality of intelligence prepared in Support of Policy Options and Predictive/Analytic intelligence.

INTELLIGENCE BY GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS

- About half of the respondents were dissatisfied with both the quantity and quality of the intelligence they received on Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa.
- A significant number of respondents praised the quality of intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and West Europe/NATO.

INTELLIGENCE BY TOPICS

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
- Military intelligence was rated high by a significant number of policy makers as was intelligence.
- The need for more and better Scientific and Technical (S&T) intelligence was expressed by those consumers concerned with these matters.

INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS

- Of all the major intelligence publications, the CIA's National Intelligence Daily (NID), the National Intelligence Council's products, and the State Department's Morning Summary were read most frequently by those who received them.
- The rest of the intelligence publications address a wide variety of subjects and audiences, and tend to remain within departmental channels; a significant number of these publications are not read by those to whom they are addressed.

The above conclusions suggest consideration of actions to:

- brief intelligence consumers early in their incumbency and with specific updates at the onset of a crisis on the precise range of support available from the Intelligence Community, and how to access the crisis system;
- encourage the establishment of closer working relationships between intelligence analysts, and consumers and their staffs;
- revise periodically publications distribution lists in consultation with consumers;
- determine the feasibility of increasing the quantity of intelligence prepared in Support of Policy Options and Predictive/Analytic intelligence;
- reappraise the needs of the S&T consumer community.



Discussion of the Findings and Followup InterviewsPatterns of Usage

The consumers who responded to this survey regularly used intelligence in the discharge of their responsibilities, and were likely to be influenced by it. Slightly more than 50% of the respondents spent at least one-half hour a day reviewing intelligence, and almost 70% claimed that intelligence frequently influenced their policy decisions. At the same time, however, almost half the respondents believed that they frequently would have benefited from better intelligence in formulating policy. Core users of intelligence -- State, DoD, NSC -- used intelligence more frequently than non-core users and demonstrated a greater likelihood of being influenced by it than non-core users, and were more likely to believe that it provided a unique input to the decisionmaking process.

The IC Staff assessment also provided some insight into how intelligence reached the consumer. Over 80% of the respondents reported that their subordinates screened at least some if not all of the intelligence; the implications of this filtering process are discussed later. Almost all consumers received intelligence through the standard publications. Most claimed that oral and written presentations prepared by intelligence officers were a common means of receiving intelligence. However, a significant number also reported receiving intelligence in either oral or written form from subordinates other than intelligence officers. In these instances, the consumer might have been unaware of the role that the intelligence played and, to some extent, this might have influenced the Survey results.

Communications Between Producer and Consumer

The Survey measured the frequency with which consumers used the primary mechanisms the Community has established to facilitate communications: direct contact with Agency Directors; direct contact with National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) or Defense National Intelligence Officers (DNIOs); direct contact with other intelligence officers; contact through a designated liaison officer; or contact through the consumer's staff. Approximately 70% of the respondents sought intelligence support through an intelligence liaison officer on at least a weekly basis; 60% did so through their staffs and 50% through direct contact with intelligence officers. Less than 30% frequently sought support through the NIO system, a significant statistic given that this was one of the NIO's major responsibilities at the time of the Survey.

In a comparison of the efficacy of the various tasking mechanisms, the data show that those mechanisms most heavily relied upon were least likely to serve consumer needs. The most productive relationships were those established with individual intelligence officers. In fact, the highest correlation between a descriptive and an evaluative question in the entire questionnaire was between the frequency of influence and the frequency of tasking intelligence officers. The next most influential relationships were those with agency directors and NIOs, and the least significant were through liaison officers. There was no statistically significant increase in the degree to which consumers were influenced by intelligence between those who tasked their liaison officers frequently and those who tasked them infrequently.

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The statistical data is supported by the narrative comments which are highly laudatory of those analysts in the Community who had established close working relationships with consumers. Sixteen of 35 officials interviewed commented on the value of direct communications between policymaker and analyst. On whatever level it took place, most agreed with a high Defense Department official that, "There must be personal interface." Some felt that it was the policymaker who should take the initiative in establishing this contact, or at the very least convey to the analyst more of what is of current concern. That this does not always occur naturally or easily was exemplified by one consumer who prided himself in his ability to "reach into the intelligence organization, bypassing the bureaucracy . . . to find out what was going on."

A comparison of the efficacy of the various production agencies suggests that consumers who frequently consulted the intelligence arms of the military services and DIA were more influenced by intelligence and more likely to have received unique information from them than those who tasked other agencies frequently. The clustering of organizations around military and all others is revealing of what it says about military intelligence. According to the Survey data, military intelligence in general is perceived as being of higher quality and greater utility than other types of intelligence. It can be inferred that those production offices that specialize in military intelligence are most likely to satisfy consumer demands.

Although the point was not addressed directly in the questionnaire, a major theme that ran through the narrative comments was the need early in the administration for a detailed introduction to intelligence by each policymaker. Many of the consumers surveyed came to office from outside government, and were not aware of what support they could receive from the IC nor how to access the system. Indeed, several career government officials suffered from the same lack of knowledge. Eight of the nine policymakers who commented on this subject in the interviews felt that too little time had been spent on their education as intelligence consumers. One expressed the opinion that becoming comfortable with intelligence was a long process that had a "significant learning curve." Another felt that his later policy decisions were far better than his earlier ones for having gained experience in the use of foreign intelligence. All agreed that a thorough introduction to the Community would have enhanced their ability to incorporate intelligence into the decisionmaking process at an earlier point in office.

A policymaker's staff plays a critical role in the communications between producer and consumer, although the statistical data suggests that this is not necessarily an effective one. Staffs may serve as both a conduit for and a filter of intelligence support to the consumer. The Survey data reveals that over 80% of the respondents relied on subordinates to screen some or all of the intelligence information they received. According to the interviews, staffs also provide analytical support to their principals in which case they may also be considered to be an intelligence consumer. Many consumers polled in this Survey may not have been aware of the level of intelligence support actually provided either because it was filtered out before reaching them, or because it was incorporated in analyses performed by their staffs. Finally, the staff may task the Community for intelligence support on behalf of its principal, a mechanism that the data suggests is not particularly effective. Several consumers who were interviewed suggested that the ideal relationship

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between producers and consumers occurred when the intelligence officers and staffs of consumers had gained one another's confidence through personal contact.

A number of consumers interviewed praised the efforts of liaison officers, in spite of the generally low level of influence associated with liaison channels in the survey data. A number of intelligence liaison officers from DIA, for example, received high marks for their sincere attempts to satisfy consumer needs. These efforts appeared to be a function of individual officers as satisfaction varied depending on the officer assigned. A second group of liaison officers that was cited by the State Department for its utility was from CIA's DDO. When State Department officials referred to Agency representatives, they frequently meant DDO officers. The DDO frequently is included in weekly strategy meetings at State to discuss operational matters, but in many instances they also provide analytic support to the policymaking process.

Types of Intelligence

Three questions in the Survey measured consumers opinions of six basic types of published intelligence. The types selected (open source, current raw, basic, predictive/analytic, and policy responsive) covered all of the published intelligence sources used by the consumer in the policymaking process.

Consumers rated the types of intelligence they received at three general levels of value with current and basic intelligence ranked at the high end of the scale, open source information in the middle, and predictive/analytic and policy responsive analysis at the low end. Predictive/analytic intelligence and intelligence in direct support of policymakers are more easily challenged by consumers than the more descriptive forms of intelligence. However, a significant number of consumers felt they had received insufficient quantities of both.

Current intelligence receives the highest marks in terms of quantity, quality and utility of all the types of intelligence measured. Current intelligence includes such publications as the National Intelligence Daily (NID), the State Morning Summary, and the Defense Intelligence Summary (DIS), which are produced on a daily basis and are intended to keep a broad range of policymakers informed of current developments. The data suggests that they fulfill this function in a very satisfactory manner as measured by all three criteria. (A more detailed discussion of qualitative difference between specific publications can be found in a following section entitled Intelligence Publications.) A second type of current reporting that received favorable comments in the interviews was that produced by crisis monitoring task forces when the major purpose of the product was to keep the consumer informed of fast-breaking events.

Basic intelligence, the compilation of factual data, and biographic information also received favorable ratings for their quality and utility, although a significant number of respondents believed they could have used more. This observation was reflected in the follow-up interviews by several consumers who expressed a need for more factual data, particularly on Third World countries.

The categories of predictive/analytic intelligence and policy responsive analysis both ranked below open source analyses in terms of quantity and quality. Thirty-four percent of the respondents felt they received an insufficient amount of predictive/analytic intelligence, and fully 42 percent felt the same about policy responsive analysis in spite of the fact that, by definition, this is precisely the type of intelligence the Community stands ready to provide on demand. In addition, these two categories receive the lowest ratings in terms of quality, well below the rating of open source analysis.

The narrative comments stress the need for analysis to discern the terms of reference in which issues of concern to consumers are being shaped. One consumer from State preferred INR reporting because it was more pointed, and focused on the relevant issues more than the NID while someone from Treasury preferred in-house analyses to all others because its analysts knew more about the issues of importance to Treasury. An earlier preliminary survey revealed that consumers did not make this distinction when discussing general intelligence support, although those who were interviewed were well aware of the differences and were very precise when addressing one or the other.

Consumer perception of the value of raw intelligence tends to polarize about the two extremes--liking and using it frequently and disliking and not using it. SIGINT in particular generated this reaction from those interviewed. Some consumers apparently generated their own analysis directly from intercepts and did not use Community analysis at all.

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HUMINT reports that are immediately relevant to topics under discussion are considered very useful, although they are not received in the same numbers as SIGINT intercepts. PHOTINT is used least frequently of any form of raw reporting, but when used it can be a valuable supplement to published or oral briefings.

More consumers believed they received an excessive amount of raw intelligence than any other type of Community product, but this was balanced by an equal number who felt the quantity was inadequate. Several consumers noted in their narrative comments that they had to sift through too many raw intelligence reports in order to find the few relevant ones, an inherent problem with raw intelligence. The quality of raw intelligence was judged to be somewhere between current/basic and predictive/analytic. The utility of raw intelligence received the lowest of all ratings probably reflecting the frustration many consumers experienced in extracting useful information from the volumes received.

Finally, those interviewed agreed that the intelligence product is sorely lacking information from clandestine human source collection. Every consumer who elected to comment on the need for more HUMINT also displayed a thorough appreciation for how it would be best used and why it was lacking. The need for more HUMINT was expressed by those involved in every topic and region. Those interested in the USSR, for instance, were looking for revelations of plans and intentions, but understood the difficulties involved in acquiring such data despite the substantial investment of HUMINT resources against this target. Some officials involved in Third World issues believed that HUMINT

collection was the most appropriate means of acquiring information on those areas, but also recognized the debilitating effects of past budgetary constraints. Several consumers ascribed the perceived poor quality of some analysis to insufficient numbers of good clandestine human sources.

Intelligence Publications

Intelligence publications represent the most visible and quantifiable form of intelligence support to policymakers, and as such were considered to be an important factor in the analysis of Community support to consumers. The Survey, however, did not permit the opinions of consumers to be tied to specific publications. The most informative characteristic that was measured in the survey was the frequency with which consumers read the publications. Nevertheless, the data tends to lend support to the hypothesis that those who spend more time consuming the intelligence product are more likely to be influenced by intelligence than those who spend less time with them. Of perhaps greater interest are the readership patterns that emerged by organization. Institutional loyalties between consumers and their departmental intelligence arms are strong, and the flow of information across organizational lines is relatively restricted.

Those who are likely to consult intelligence products regularly stand a greater chance of being influenced by intelligence. It is difficult to determine if there is a causal relationship between influence and frequent readership and if so, its direction. Whether the pattern of regularity is the result of good intelligence or vice versa is not as important as the fact that one class of consumers (active/core) is more influenced by the intelligence they receive. Those who read the NIC products, DoD publications, and the NID were more likely to be influenced by intelligence than those who read any other intelligence material.

The products that were selected for the Survey represent a combination of periodical publications (those that are published on a scheduled basis) and topical publications (those that address a particular topic on an exhaustive basis). The frequency of publication affects the rate at which they are read, and this might give an unfair advantage to the periodicals simply because they are seen more often. Some, such as the NID, the DIS, and the Morning Summary, are read quite frequently by those who receive them. Those products that are published less frequently are read even less frequently by those who claim to receive them. A significant number of these two categories of publications are read occasionally or not at all. It was not possible to determine from the data or the interviews why this was so. The most conspicuous exception to this generalization about topical publications are those produced by the NIC. The NIE's, SNIE's, and IIM's claim a large circulation and high readership rates.

Consumers tend to read the products prepared by their dedicated intelligence components. As a result, consumers may not benefit to the fullest extent possible from contrasting analysis on a given issue; that debate is confined to either the analytic level or the policy level. Only the NSC appears to receive and read a broad range of Community products, and only the NIC products and CIA's NID, both Community coordinated documents, receive broad circulation across departmental lines. This pattern of readership suggests that a significant number of policymakers did not benefit from as

broad a range of analytical perspective as was available in the Community. Few respondents outside the DoD, State, and the NSC claim to receive many publications on a regular basis. Only NIC products, the IEEW, and CIA memoranda and assessments received a high level of recognition by these consumers. Only the IEEW was read by those outside State/NSC/Defense with any regularity, perhaps reflecting the high percentage of consumers of economic intelligence found in this group of respondents.

Regional and Topical Assessments

The Survey attempted to measure directly the level of consumer satisfaction with the substantive support provided by the Community by region and by topic. Very few of those consumers who rated specific geotopic areas to be very important to their work believed they had received an excessive amount of intelligence support. Intelligence on Latin America was considered most deficient by a wide margin. This came as no surprise to those interviewed. Time and again they attributed the dearth of intelligence on Latin America in large measure to lack of clandestine HUMINT sources. This same problem was cited again in discussions on the quality of intelligence on Latin America. Intelligence on Sub-Sahara Africa was not rated equally deficient perhaps because this part of the world in fact was considered of lesser priority by the previous administration. Only a small number surveyed considered it to be very important, and their memory of the issues addressed may not have been as vivid at the time of the Survey.

The data on the quantity of reporting by topic suggests that a major disconnect between producer and consumer exists in some categories. A significant core of consumers of scientific and technical intelligence claimed not to have received a sufficient quantity of intelligence support. This may be as much a matter of distribution as production, however. According to the data, DIA S&T reports were received by 44% of State respondents and read frequently by none of them, received by 68% of NSC respondents and read frequently by 38% of them, received by 70% of DoD consumers and read frequently by 19% of them, and received by 35% of all others and read by 21% of them. Economic/energy reporting is something of an anomaly and was considered insufficient by a significant number of respondents, although the IEEW was frequently read by half of those who received it.

An analysis of the data on the quality of intelligence support by region and topic yielded few surprises, although it appeared to contain a number of contradictions. The rankings by geographic area conform to popular perceptions. Intelligence on the Third World countries ranked at the low end, and USSR/EE and Western Europe/NATO at the high end. Similarly, the statistical data and the narrative comments both indicate that the Community provides excellent coverage of military subjects. Because this is the primary component of Soviet/East European intelligence, it stands to reason that the quality of intelligence on the USSR/EE is rated highly. The higher quality ratings of Western Europe/NATO is somewhat difficult to explain given its high content of political and economic reporting, both of which are rated significantly lower in quality than military intelligence. However, a good deal of current reporting is devoted to WE/NATO and, given the high ratings accorded current reporting, may account for the high marks coverage of this area received from consumers.

Consumer assessment of the utility of intelligence support by region and topic provides some additional insights which, together with the narratives, help to explain what consumers are saying. It should be noted from the outset that the utility of intelligence in general was judged to be relatively high, and that any further analysis must be based on the differences between those who considered it to be "fairly" useful and those who judged it "very useful." The utility of intelligence on Sub-Sahara Africa is rated the lowest, perhaps reflecting the priority attached to the region. Intelligence on WE/NATO is rated only slightly more useful, perhaps reflecting the wealth of open source information available on the region and reduced consumer dependence on the Community. Open sources of information on Latin America, ME/NA, and Asia may be considered by consumers to be of questionable reliability, resulting in consumer dependence on intelligence. Intelligence on the USSR rated high in utility, probably reflecting the large content of military reporting, the dearth of open source information, and the priority that the Intelligence Community attaches to it.

The analysis of utility by topic also relies on the difference between responses of "fairly" and "very" useful. A higher percentage of consumers of military and biographic reporting found intelligence on their topics to be very useful than consumers of political and economic reporting found theirs to be. S&T consumers rated this intelligence support somewhere between the other two. Military reporting consistently received higher marks than all other topical areas in the statistical and narrative portions of this Survey. One possible explanation lies in the fact that military reporting emphasizes descriptive over analytical content and technical over human sources to generate a product that is more definitive than reporting on other subject areas. Not enough is known about the consumers of S&T reporting to posit any reasons for the results on quantity, quality, or utility.

The narrative comments give some clue to why political and economic reporting fall where they do in the various assessment categories, and why they have a smaller percentage of consumers who regard them as being very useful. Statistics and descriptive reporting aside, political and economic reporting require the Community to deal with subjects containing a higher level of ambiguity than any other topical category, and consumers are more willing to challenge any but their own analyses. In addition to calling for greater sensitivity to the current relevancy of intelligence production, those consumers surveyed are asking analysts to be more adventuresome in their analysis. Consumers appear to be asking the Community to go beyond a recitation of the data, and permit uncertainties, disagreements and speculation to be reflected in the intelligence product.



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STATISTICAL ANNEX

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The statistical annex provides an audit trail for the Intelligence Community Staff's assessment of the Consumer Survey. It records the statistical techniques and tests that were tried and the data tables from which the salient conclusions were drawn.

By the time the IC Staff received the raw data, the completed questionnaires were in, and the data had been coded, entered into a computer data base and checked for errors. Data summaries were generated by several computerized statistical packages, primarily Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences (SPSS) and Statistical Analysis System (SAS), and by several inhouse analytical tools as well.

Since the survey contained multiple-choice questions, the most useful data summaries, especially in the preliminary assessment, were simple tabulations of the proportions of consumers responding to each choice. The estimation of the precision of these proportions is straightforward. Multiple choice categories form a well-defined statistical population known as the multinomial population. The precision of the proportion of consumers falling into any category depends upon both the sample size and the value of the proportion itself. Figure 1 plots the 95% confidence interval for five different sample sizes. For the most part, question-by-question summary proportions are precise to better than $\pm 10\%$.

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