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DD/S&amp;T-3457-78

26 JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Performance Evaluation  
and Improvement

FROM: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence  
Activities and Developments [redacted]

REFERENCE: Your memo dated 12 July 1978, same subject

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1. [redacted] The following material responds to your requests for data made in the reference. The reference requests a three part response which corresponds to the three attachments to the memo. That is, Attachment 1 addresses the series of questions, Attachment 2 summarizes our resource allocations for FY's 77, 78 and 79 and Attachment 3 lists external contracts showing funding and contractors. Please note that the dollar figures provided in Attachment 3 are RD&E and Processing contract dollars only and include no management support or Collection costs.

2. [redacted] We feel it is extremely important to point out that the projects discussed in the Attachments contain collection technology which is demonstrably applicable not only to nuclear proliferation but also other nuclear issues such as nuclear weapons movement and logistics. We perceive a disturbing tendency to try to compartmentize our nuclear collection program activities into one or the other category as a principal way in which to measure their responsiveness to intelligence objectives. This is a misleading practice for reasons expanded upon in Attachment 1 - Question #2. In order to deal with this issue, we have taken the following approach: for those projects which result in hardware or technology applicable to both proliferation and other nuclear issues, we reflect fifty percent of the project cost in the chart. For those cases where a system or technology was developed or is planned for application exclusively to proliferation - type targets, all costs associated with the project are shown.

3. [redacted] If we can be of any further assistance in this matter please contact us.

[redacted]  
LESLIE C. DIRKS

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Attachment: a/s

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Attachment 1  
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QUESTION #1

Including what is achieved in the Interagency Intelligence Working Group/Nuclear Proliferation (IIWG/NP), is there more effective coordination of the various collection and production components of the Intelligence Community (at least to the extent that various components know what the others are doing)? Suggest changes that may be needed to improve coordination within the Community.

ANSWER/COMMENT

A. We have not been directly involved in the IIWG/NP, so we cannot comment on any contribution it may have made to improvements in Community coordination on collection or production.

B. From our perspective, "coordination" between Community members may have improved over the last few years--insofar as this means we know more about each other's activities. If, however, the goal of Community coordination is a well-focused nuclear proliferation collection program with clearly defined roles for each Agency and effective evaluation of performance in response to those roles, the Community has a long way to go.

QUESTION #2

Are the analytical, collection, and other resources of the Community now being effectively utilized and applied? Identify possible misallocations and provide suggestions for greater efficiency.

ANSWER/COMMENT

A. General Comments

It is our perception that Community resources are not yet being applied effectively to nuclear proliferation collection. The causes for this shortfall may not lie in the proliferation issue itself so much as in the overall inertia of Community mechanisms by which resources are tied to intelligence issues. Whatever the intelligence topic, the Community in general and its members in particular are usually slow to:

- (1) Recognize long-range information needs and to make specific arrangements to cover them effectively;
- (2) Agree upon and highlight those issues which deserve priority attention;

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QUESTION #2 ANSWER/COMMENT (Cont'd)

(3) Decide, among competing information needs, how, where, and in what proportion, resources should be allocated or redistributed to address these needs;

(4) Communicate effective guidance to multi-issue resources managers in a way that will help them do better at allocating resources among organizational elements competing for them;

(5) Independently monitor resource allocation and progress for important issues on a continuing basis, implementing mechanisms for informed, constructive review.

One of the fundamental problems which seems to underlie all of the above areas is the basic difficulty in connecting intelligence issues with the practical business of applying resources to them. Resources, and the line managers who apply them, are not "subject-specific"; that is, generally speaking, funds and people can be applied to a wide range of important problems. The mix is more or less at the discretion of the line manager where it should undoubtedly remain. Community panels, committees, and councils convened on a particular collection issue, such as proliferation, may suggest initiatives, plan strategies, and exhort managers on the importance of the subject. This guidance, however, has little credibility unless it can either provide the line manager with funds and people or can be linked in some practical way with the other issues among which he must re-apportion his resources. Of course, these other issues have their own advocates within and without the line manager's organization. While line managers are beginning to hear "the word" on proliferation, they are still in the process of juggling their personnel and budgets to effectively accommodate the subject, and it is not likely to be before 1980 that the inertia in the system will have been overcome.

B. Connecting Resources with Intelligence Issues

In numerous requests for information about our nuclear development program we perceive a disturbing tendency to ask line-item by line-item whether a particular technique or system under development supports proliferation collection or some other form of nuclear collection, such as weapons movement. While we appreciate the need for linkage between intelligence issues and the resource expenditures, we think

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25X1 that this particular approach could be very misleading. [Example #1 - Each of the projects in the charts accompanying these comments contains technology which could be applied either to proliferation or weapons movement targets.] [REDACTED]

In reviewing the current (77/78) programs and their responsiveness to proliferation issues, it should be remembered that some of our current systems have first been deployed against weapons movement targets only because these targets already exist and, in most cases, proliferation targets for these approaches do not. A better way to look at the technology would be to determine what specific questions a system can answer about a particular aspect of the proliferation issue (along with the other issues it may also address), how widely is it likely to be used, and what is the likely value to the Community of the resulting information in comparison with the system cost.

## QUESTION #3

Is the collection, research, and production program of the Community commensurate with the priorities for nuclear proliferation intelligence, and is it responsive to the needs of key policymakers? Describe any shortcomings and propose appropriate means of improvement.

## ANSWER/COMMENT

See Question #2, Answer/Comment A.

## QUESTION #4

What progress has been made toward design and implementation of common nuclear proliferation data bases? What problems have been encountered? What are the milestones for the next year?

## ANSWER/COMMENT

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QUESTION #5

Based on the past year's experience, what, if any, administrative actions or structural changes would be recommended to speed progress and improve the prospects of the nuclear proliferation intelligence program?

ANSWER/COMMENT

No Comment

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85 JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Performance Evaluation  
and Improvement, IC Staff

ATTENTION:

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FROM: Eloise R. Page  
Acting Associate Deputy Director for  
Operations

SUBJECT: Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation  
Intelligence Activities and Developments

REFERENCE: Your memorandum (IC 2361-78) dated  
1 June 1978, same subject

1. As a result of the initiatives of the Interagency Intelligence Working Group/Nuclear Proliferation (IIWG/NP), the CIA/Directorate of Operations has received guidance on the priorities for collection against specific nuclear proliferating countries. This guidance has assisted us in the allocation of resources and in directing collection resources in target countries toward those areas that appear to have the greatest intelligence potential. For example, the greater emphasis by the IIWG/NP on non-technical collection in target countries is now reflected in specific guidance to field stations.

2. We see some possibility for improvement in the development of Collection Strategies. We have already observed one instance where a Collection Strategy was construed as a tasking document. This led to initiatives being taken by individual components that could have jeopardized ongoing collection operations, or confused planning efforts.

Furthermore, it recommended additional collection tasks which, if these had been carried out, could have conflicted with the DIA effort. While sensitive operations must be protected, particularly against wide Community dissemination of specific operational tasks, we recommend

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that some steps be undertaken to avoid Collection Strategies from being used as a basis for new initiatives that might affect ongoing or planned operations.

3. In this context, we should also like to suggest that the possibility be explored of evaluating various collection means that could be employed against a given target. Since the employment of clandestine resources is expensive in terms of risks, they should obviously be used only when other resources are unable to collect the required information. Therefore, we should appreciate some evaluation of the potential of other collection means (COMINT, Foreign Service, attaches, etc.) to gain the intelligence objectives for each target country. Such an assessment might identify more clearly those areas that require a clandestine human collection effort for lack of reasonable alternatives.



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Eloise R. Page

1 Attachment  
FY 77/78/79  
Estimate

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC-2748-78  
3 July 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Resource Management  
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation  
SUBJECT : Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence  
Activities and Developments  
REFERENCE : IC-2361-78, 1 June 78, Subject (same as above), Secret

1. The following paragraphs provide preliminary answers to the questions you posed on the management of nuclear proliferation intelligence activities. While it mainly represents my office's views, it partly also reflects views solicited from the Nuclear Energy Division of the Office of Scientific Intelligence. In the next few weeks, I will be soliciting additional views from other offices in the National Foreign Assessment Center and will be considering the answers to your questions provided by other components of the community. So, I would like to reserve further comments and suggestions for an early review of your draft report.

2. The coordination of nuclear proliferation intelligence activities has already improved substantially. Still, I am considering additional changes in the division of labor, assignment of responsibility, and in the conduct of studies by various agencies to optimize the quality, coverage, and efficiency of intelligence analysis. Upon discovering a suspect military test facility in the [redacted] I established an inter-agency watch team to insure adequately competitive analyses of information on [redacted] intentions and capabilities to conduct a nuclear explosion. At the same time, some mutually duplicative efforts were undertaken on the initiative of individual agencies without informing my office. Subsequent to these highly urgent but somewhat redundant efforts, the Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation (IIWG/NP), which I chair, began to develop a comprehensive community production program. I initiated, in addition, an interagency study of [redacted] nuclear program and policies in cooperation with the National Intelligence Officer [redacted] In response to a special

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
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request of the DCI from the Interagency Committee on Internal Security, I also had the IIWG/NP undertake a community study of prospects for foreign threats of nuclear terrorism. The IIWG/NP has further served as a forum for guiding the development of a community data base on nuclear proliferation; reviewing the production plans, roles, and missions of various intelligence components; insuring community participation in the drafting of country-specific collection strategies; and conveying new intelligence needs and priorities that derive from the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Non-Proliferation as well as other policy-making bodies. Most of these efforts are continuing, and they will lead to the issuance of successive interagency studies, the complete coordination of a community production program, and the drafting of additional collection strategies by the end of Fiscal Year 1978.

3. The increasingly effective coordination of the community production and collection efforts on nuclear proliferation intelligence has entailed more efficient as well as more abundant utilization of resources. Not only has there been a disproportionate increase in the quantity of intelligence produced by a limited number of analysts, but the quality of their finished contributions to the policy-making process has improved even more markedly. However, strategic, political, and economic analysis of nuclear proliferation has only begun to match the quality and quantity of scientific-technical intelligence. New provisions have been made for political and economic analysts dedicated to nuclear proliferation intelligence, and regionally or functionally specialized analysts have begun to acquire new skills in elucidating nuclear issues. For instance, country-specialized economic analysts have completed a comparative appraisal of developing countries' nuclear energy programs; country-specialized political analysts have undertaken more comprehensive assessments of the nuclear energy, technology, and weapons-related programs of such key countries as [redacted]

[redacted] and strategic analysts have participated in some of these country studies. Nevertheless, scientific-technical intelligence needs to be complemented by a still greater infusion of political, economic, and strategic analysis. Depending on the specific country or issue under study, additional commitments of appropriately disciplined analysts will typically be needed. Moreover, to make best use of new resource commitments, new nuclear proliferation intelligence efforts should entail development, acquisition, and application of new methods as well as the assignment of newly dedicated analysts. This will require special training for analysts plus external research to implement new concepts, forecasting techniques, and other analytic tools.

4. Intelligence production and collection efforts have responded rapidly to the elevated priorities established for nuclear proliferation in those key countries cited by the National Security Council, as codified

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under DCID 1/2. However, the total size and immediate productivity of these efforts have been deliberately limited by the long-term need to improve both the quality of analysis and the efficiency of resource utilization at the same time. So, initial efforts were intended to produce finished studies on the most policy-urgent countries [redacted]

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[redacted], to undertake comparable studies of other key countries, and to prepare specialized studies, data-bases, and collection strategies for all countries of concern. In addition, the community has responded to a wide variety of ad hoc requests from policy-makers for timely assessments of foreign nuclear policy developments, e.g. [redacted]

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[redacted]

5. Substantial progress has been made in the development of a comprehensive, community data base on special nuclear materials. (An up-to-date progress report on the [redacted] project, undertaken by DoE/ISA/LLL, should summarize the results of a workshop I conducted there under the auspices of the IIWG/NP, June 27-28. The [redacted] project leader promised to send me a report on this workshop by mid-July.) Elements of a comprehensive, community data base on nuclear scientists and technicians, sensitive fuel-cycle facilities, weapons research and development activities, strategic doctrines, and other items critical to nuclear proliferation intelligence have also been identified. However, there are no current plans to institutionalize a mechanism for integrating these elements into a formally established data base on nuclear proliferation intelligence. Instead, under the auspices of the IIWG/NP, I plan to review periodically the progress made in improving the scope, content, and accessibility of specialized data bases. As deficiencies are identified, new needs emerge, and priorities change, I will propose appropriate measures to responsible offices and agencies.

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6. I can not now identify specific administrative actions or structural changes needed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of nuclear proliferation intelligence activities. In due course, I intend to make some specific recommendations on the basis of future proposals by individual components of the intelligence community. In general, though, the structural changes that were instituted last year have been working, producing results, and promising further progress. Given the established priorities for nuclear proliferation intelligence, my office is still needed to lead national production of nuclear proliferation intelligence.

7. New and Unfinished Business. Unless the diplomacy of nuclear non-proliferation and international conflict resolution actually halt the spread of nuclear explosive materials and new national interests in nuclear arms, policy needs for nuclear proliferation intelligence will continue to grow. They are likely to expand in several ways -- in the

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number of countries concerned, in the complexity and detail of issues raised, and in the strategic importance of answers provided. Nuclear proliferation intelligence already needs not only to support diplomatic efforts aimed at stemming proliferation and limiting conflict, but it must also anticipate the possible failure of diplomacy and the exigencies of future crisis management. Consequently, nuclear proliferation intelligence is likely to merge, country by country, with strategic intelligence on medium and lesser powers such as

Moreover, the most serious shortcomings of nuclear proliferation intelligence to date are attributable to inadequate assessments of proliferating countries' political-military interests in and approaches toward the development of nuclear explosives. These deficiencies could eventually result in the unexpected deployment (and unforeseen plans for employment) of nuclear weapons unless the long-term strategies of medium and lesser powers are more thoroughly researched, carefully analyzed, and correctly understood. Insofar as nuclear proliferation intelligence may elucidate those countries' nuclear strategies, plans, and intentions, it should also contribute to better intelligence on their associated conventional research and development strategies, arms production and deployment plans, and political-military intentions. So, among the more important items of new and unfinished business for nuclear proliferation intelligence are the long-term threat perceptions, force development programs, contingency plans, and political security needs of incipient nuclear powers.

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NFAC-2748-78

SUBJECT: Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence Activities  
and Developments

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
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1. The IIWG/NP has provided a mechanism for listing production of nuclear proliferation projects by several of the intelligence agencies. To date, however, no attempt has been made to coordinate these production programs. This will probably be a difficult exercise as some agencies will want to produce papers to satisfy "departmental" needs even though another agency is already doing a paper on the same subject.

2. Yes.


3. This is obviously a "judgment call" but we feel that the right amount of effort is being put in the right areas. Only the policymakers can tell if the product is meeting their needs.

4. Essentially no progress is being made in coming up with a common proliferation data base. It is not clear why one is needed for proliferation any more than there is a need for one on Soviet strategic weapons programs. The exercise on fissionable material accountability is probably necessary for "cosmetic" reasons but obviously will never be able to answer the question, "Has any material been diverted?"

5. In general, the analysts are beginning to feel "over administered" -- reporting and trying to respond to too many masters. An excellent example of the lack of coordination in the proliferation area is the debacle that has resulted from the attempts to resolve the problem of 


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 Memoranda are going to the Director from the NIO/NP saying they are necessary and memoranda are going to the Director from the technical experts showing that they are not necessary. Finally, it is not clear what we are trying to "speed up" that is not being done as quickly as is necessary.

ESTIMATE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RESOURCES  
DEVOTED DIRECTLY TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION  
(\$ in Thousands)

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

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2. Yes.
3. This is obviously a "judgment call" but we feel that the right amount of effort is being put in the right areas. Only the policymakers can tell if the product is meeting their needs.
4. Essentially no progress is being made in coming up with a common proliferation data base. It is not clear why one is needed for proliferation any more than there is a need for one on Soviet strategic weapons programs. The exercise on fissionable material accountability is probably necessary for "cosmetic" reasons but obviously will never be able to answer the question, "Has any material been diverted?"
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ESTIMATE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RESOURCES  
DEVOTED DIRECTLY TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION  
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*OWI*

25 July 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]  
NIO for Nuclear Proliferation

SUBJECT : Information Request on Nuclear Proliferation  
Intelligence

REFERENCE : Your Memo Dtd 11 Jul 78 Same Subj.

We have no comments on the questions outlined in Attachment 1 of

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[redacted] June memorandum. The form listing OWI's resource  
involved in the nuclear proliferation problem is attached. We have  
no external contracts at present relating to this problem.

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[redacted signature box]

Chief, Action Staff  
Weapons Intelligence

Attachment:  
As stated

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ORPA

25 July 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [ ] NIO/NP

FROM : Director, Regional & Political Analysis

SUBJECT : Deputy Director for Resource Management's Request  
for Information on Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

I. Herein are provided our comments to the questions concerning nuclear proliferation intelligence as requested by your memorandum of 11 July.

II. Answers to questions on Attachment 1:

1. Question: *Including what is achieved in the Interagency Intelligence Working Group/Nuclear Proliferation (IIWG/NP), is there more effective coordination of the various collection and production components of the Intelligence Community (at least to the extent that various components know what the others are doing)? Suggest changes within the Community.*

Answer: The CCPC exercise and the country oriented collection strategies developed by the IC Staff have aided in sensitizing both collectors and producers of intelligence to their individual problems and requirements. The successive iterations of the NIO/NP's integrated production program has been very useful in communicating to the various components in the intelligence community exactly which projects are underway and what is scheduled for the future. However, coordination of collection and production still requires improvement, and duplication of production efforts persist across agencies. Most projects are initiated by individual production units without adequate rationalization of the division of

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SUBJECT: Deputy Director for Resource Management's Request

labor. The level of effort devoted to the problem and the specific areas of concentration vary widely from one functionally specialized unit to another, complicating attempts to do multidisciplinary production.

The NIO/NP should continue his efforts to produce an agreed and operational integrated production program, which takes into account the priority assigned to subject, the resources on hand, and plans to augment resources. The IIWG/NP should attempt to eliminate unwarranted duplication through an agreed upon division of labor. The NIO/NP should assume greater responsibility for the timely communication of intelligence information between elements of the community.

2. Question: *Are the analytical, collection, and other resources of the Community now being effectively utilized and applied? Identify possible misallocations and provide suggestions for greater efficiency.*

Answer: As far as the political side of proliferation intelligence is concerned, the resources available now are being applied fairly effectively. Political analysts in NFAC, however, are often hampered by less than adequate access to information and analysis existing in other parts of the community, in other agencies and within specialized offices of CIA. Present plans in ORPA are to expand the number of political analysts devoted to the proliferation problem from two people to six by the end of FY 79. This expansion should meet the community's needs for analysis in this area.

3. Question: *Is the collection, research, and production program of the Community commensurate with the priorities for nuclear proliferation intelligence, and is it responsive to the needs of key policymakers? Describe any shortcomings and propose appropriate means of improvement.*

Answer: The Community program, as put forth in the NIO/NP's integrated program, seems in overall accord with the relative priority of the proliferation problem for the intelligence community. (Suggestions for improvement and steps being taken to address shortcomings are described in paragraphs 2 and 5.)

SUBJECT: Deputy Director for Resource Management's Request

4. Question: *What progress has been made toward design and implementation of common nuclear proliferation data bases? What problems have been encountered? What are the milestones for the next year?*

Answer: Only limited progress has been made in the construction of a data base. Most information remains in ad hoc analyst working files. One political division maintains a macroscopic proliferation intelligence file which has deficiencies due to inadequate receipt of intelligence, lack of dedicated resources for maintenance and other resource limitations.

The one most important contribution that could be made to improving the data base in FY 79 would be to concentrate the production program on producing additional comprehensive single country studies patterned after the  paper.

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5. Question: *Based on the past year's experience, what, if any, administrative actions or structural changes would be recommended to speed progress and improve the prospects of the nuclear proliferation intelligence program.*

Answer: Because the nuclear proliferation problem is partly national and partly transnational, and because the intelligence relating to it involves numerous disciplines, it does not fit into our present geographical and functional bureaucracy. No single NIO, without authority and responsibility for management and resource allocation, can be expected to pull together both the geographic and functional parts of that bureaucracy well enough to address the problem effectively. What is desired is the interaction of area political experts and many other types of economic, military and scientific analysts. Precisely where these analysts should be placed and how they should be organized needs more study. Two possibilities would be the creation of a standing task force similar to the SALT and MBFR groups, or the assemblage of ad hoc task forces. Such task forces, whether semi-permanent or temporary and ad hoc, should probably be managed by one of the existing production offices rather than by the NIO, whose time can be better spent in ways other than exercising direct management functions. The NIO, however, should play a strong advisory role.

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18 July 1978

OER

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for  
Nuclear Proliferation

SUBJECT : Request for Resource Management's Information  
on Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

1. Attached is an estimate of this Office's resource commitment to nuclear proliferation (attachment 2). Most of the analyst time reflected in this estimate is devoted to an analysis of nuclear power programs on a worldwide basis. Although we have prepared studies at your request and for OSI on the production and reprocessing of nuclear fuels, we think that relatively little of our work goes directly to the proliferation question. We believe the latter is essentially a political/technical subject which falls primarily in the domain of ORPA and OSI. We intend, however, to continue to participate in this activity whenever we can be helpful.

2. On your questions:

1. We are a good deal more aware now of what is going on elsewhere in the Agency and in the community on nuclear proliferation and on those aspects of when OER may make a contribution.

2. Not applicable.

3. Not applicable.

4. We have recently completed a detailed look at nuclear power programs in all of the LDCs which are actively engaged or planning to be engaged in this activity. In the process, we have focussed the attention of many of our country analysts on the nuclear power and nuclear proliferation subject area. We intend to prepare papers on nuclear power developments in both [redacted] and [redacted] in the next year and to follow the issues closely in [redacted] and [redacted]. Our analysts are in frequent

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touch with their counterparts in ORPA  
and in OSI and [redacted]  
with the NIO on nuclear proliferation.

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5. We believe that OER has little comparative advantage in the nuclear proliferation area. Our inclination would be to leave administrative arrangements much what they are and concentrate on getting on with our research and writing. Administrative and structural changes more often defer work than advance it.

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[redacted]

Executive Officer/  
Economic Research

Attachment:  
As stated

Distribution:

- Original & 1 - Addressee
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EO/ER [redacted] /18 July 78

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MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for  
Nuclear Proliferation

SUBJECT : Request for Resource Management's Information  
on Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

1. Attached is an estimate of this Office's resource commitment to nuclear proliferation (attachment 2). Most of the analyst time reflected in this estimate is devoted to an analysis of nuclear power programs on a worldwide basis. Although we have prepared studies at your request and for OSI on the production and reprocessing of nuclear fuels, we think that relatively little of our work goes directly to the proliferation question. We believe the latter is essentially a political/technical subject which falls primarily in the domain of ORPA and OSI. We intend, however, to continue to participate in this activity whenever we can be helpful.

2. On your questions:

1. We are a good deal more aware now of what is going on elsewhere in the Agency and in the community on nuclear proliferation and on those aspects of when OER may make a contribution.
2. Not applicable.
3. Not applicable.
4. We have recently completed a detailed look at nuclear power programs in all of the LDCs which are actively engaged or planning to be engaged in this activity. In the process, we have focussed the attention of many of our country analysts on the nuclear power and nuclear proliferation subject area. We intend to prepare papers on nuclear power developments in both [redacted] and [redacted] in the next year and to follow the issues closely in [redacted] and [redacted]. Our analysts are in frequent

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touch with their counterparts in ORPA  
and in OSI and [redacted]  
with the NIO on nuclear proliferation.

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5. We believe that OER has little comparative advantage in the nuclear proliferation area. Our inclination would be to leave administrative arrangements much what they are and concentrate on getting on with our research and writing. Administrative and structural changes more often defer work than advance it.

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[redacted]  
Executive Officer/  
Economic Research

Attachment:  
As stated

Distribution:  
Original & 1 - Addressee  
1 - Ch, D/M  
1 - DCH, D/D  
1 - D/OER; DD/OER  
2 - EO/ER (chron; genl)  
EO/ER: [redacted] 18 July 78

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Approved For Release 2005/08/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000200220010-1

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC-2887-78  
11 July 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: NFAC Office Directors  
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation  
SUBJECT : Deputy Director for Resource Management's Request for  
Information on Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

The Deputy Director for Resource Management is conducting an assessment of nuclear proliferation intelligence activities and developments. The attached memorandum requests information on relevant views and resource commitments of community components. To insure full representation of your views and NFAC's efforts, I have requested and received an extension until 26 July. I would appreciate your providing me the information called for by the attachments, as appropriate.



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
Atts: IC-2361-78 dtd 1 Jun 78  
w/3 atts

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12 JUL 1978

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NFAC-2837-78

SUBJECT: Deputy Director for Resource Management's Request for  
Information on Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

Distribution:

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- 1 - D/OSI
- 1 - D/OSR
- 1 - D/OWI
- 1 - NFAC Reg
- 2 - NIO/NP



THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000200220010-1

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

IC 2361-78

0 1 JUN 1978

Intelligence Community Staff

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

25X1 FROM:

[Redacted]

Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

SUBJECT:

Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence  
Activities and Developments [Redacted]

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25X1 1. [Redacted] With the development of our FY 80-83 program impending, an assessment of the Community's progress and prospects in the area of the nuclear proliferation program is required for guidance of resource allocation and investment decisions. To aid this assessment, you are requested to provide the following:

a. answers to the questions in Attachment 1,

b. resource allocation figures for FY 77 (update), 78, and 79 (Attachment 2),

c. funding of external contracts directly related to nuclear proliferation for FY 77 (update), 78, and 79 (Attachment 3).

25X1 2. [Redacted] In addition to the foregoing, the National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation is requested to report the status and schedule of finished intelligence production extending from FY 77 through FY 79; the listing should reflect both work in-house and at the national laboratories.

25X1 3. [Redacted] I have designated the Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement to coordinate this review. [Redacted] of his staff [Redacted] will be the point of contact. [Redacted] will augment your responses with appropriate interviews. We would like to have the benefit of your input by 16 June 1978.

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[Redacted]

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Attachments:

- 1. Questions Concerning Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence
- 2. Form for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence Resource Allocation Reporting
- 3. Format for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence Outside Contracts

[Redacted]

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
SUBJECT: Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence Activities  
and Developments (U)

Distribution: (IC 2361-78)

- 1 - Director, DIA
- 1 - ACSI (DA)
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- 1 - Principal DASIA (DOE)
- 1 - Director, INR (State)
- 1 - Director, OIS (Treasury)
- 1 - D/DCI/NI
- 1 - D/DCI/CT
- ① - CIA/NIO/NP

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CC:



QUESTIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION INTELLIGENCE

Reflected in the questions below are three basic categories of particular concern: early warning, production, and data base development. The questions should be answered to the degree possible from the perspective of your agency's involvement.

ILLEGIB

Including what is achieved in the Interagency Intelligence Working Group/Nuclear Proliferation (IIWG/NP), is there more effective coordination of the various collection and production components of the Intelligence Community (at least to the extent that various components know what the others are doing)? Suggest changes that may be needed to improve coordination within the Community.

Are the analytical, collection, and other resources of the Community now being effectively utilized and applied? Identify possible misallocations and provide suggestions for greater efficiency.

3. Is the collection, research, and production program of the Community commensurate with the priorities for nuclear proliferation intelligence, and is it responsive to the needs of key policymakers? Describe any shortcomings and propose appropriate means of improvement.

ILLEGIB

What progress has been made toward design and implementation of common nuclear proliferation data bases? What problems have been encountered? What are the milestones for the next year?

Based on the past year's experience, what, if any, administrative actions or structural changes would be recommended to speed progress and improve the prospects of the nuclear proliferation intelligence program?

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19 JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer  
for Nuclear Proliferation

FROM : [REDACTED]  
Director of Central Reference

SUBJECT : Deputy Director for Resource Management's Request for  
Information on Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

REFERENCE : Your memorandum to NPAC Office Directors, NPAC-2837-78,  
dtd 11 July 1978, same subject and IC-2361-78, etc.  
1 June 1978

1. The following are the OCR responses to the questions in attachment 1 to IC-2361-78:

Question 1 - OCR is not in a position to comment on this particular question.

Question 2 - OCR, which is responsible for managing the non-military biographic collection program, does give high priority to collection of information and file building on personalities associated with nuclear programs. In visits to overseas posts by our analysts, we find both Station and Embassy personnel fully cognizant of the needs to report on this subject and feel that in general they are responsive to our requirements. OCR is not equipped to comment on other collection programs.

Question 3 - OCR is not in a position to comment on this question.

Question 4 - To the best of my knowledge, there is no common nuclear proliferation data base. OCR does maintain a computer file (AEGIS/RECON) of raw and finished intelligence on all subjects, including nuclear. This data base is available to and used by other members of the intelligence community.

Question 5 - I have no comments to make on this question.

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SUBJECT: Deputy Director for Resource Management's Request for Information on Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

2. I cannot provide a reasonable estimate of the amount of manpower OCR devotes to nuclear proliferation. This office has no employees who individually spend a significant amount of time on the question; our effort is spread over hundreds of people who put in varying amounts of work on it. OCR has no external contracts related to nuclear proliferation.

3. OCR produced no finished intelligence on nuclear proliferation in FY 77, but we expect to complete by the end of FY 78 a project on key decisionmakers in the nuclear program in Argentina. Early in FY 79 we plan to produce a similar study on Brazil.

4. Attached is a listing from our AEGIS computer file containing the citations to all finished intelligence reports and periodical articles on nuclear energy in all countries except the  with publication dates from 1 October 76 to date.

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Enclosure:


AEGIS Computer listing on Nuclear Energy, 1 Oct 76 to date

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19 JUL 1978

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
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SUBJECT: Deputy Director for Resource Management's Request for Information on Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

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Enclosure:

AEGIS Computer listing on Nuclear Energy, 1 Oct 76 to date

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NPIC/D-346-78  
29 August 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR:   
Office of Director of Performance Evaluation and  
Improvement, IC Staff

SUBJECT : Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence  
Activities and Developments

REFERENCES : a. Memorandum, IC 2361-78, Dated 1 June 1978; Same  
Subject  
b. Our Meeting, 17 August 1978

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1.  Answers to your question, which are applicable to the  
National Photographic Interpretation Center, are attached. Question  
Number 3 was not addressed.

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2.  I believe imagery can provide considerable input to this  
problem area and invite you to spend some time at the Center to examine  
our data base and products and talk with the imagery analysts involved  
in nuclear requirements.

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*R. P. Hazzard*  
R. P. HAZZARD  
Director  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

Attachment:  
a/s

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Attachment to:  
NPIC/D-346-78

25X1 1.  NPIC has close working relationships with a number of  
collection and production components of the Intelligence Community con-  
cerned with nuclear proliferation. The Center serves as consultant to  
the IIWG/NP only occasionally, and on an "as requested" basis. During  
the period when there was high interest in the    
 the Center provided support to the IIWG Watch  
25X1 Team on an almost daily basis. Other than this project, our dealings  
with the IIWG on nuclear proliferation has been infrequent. NPIC has  
more contact with the JAEIC, acting in a consultant capacity on an as-  
needed basis. Because imagery plays a rather significant role in the  
S&T aspects of proliferation our contacts with the JAEIC are much more  
frequent and routine.

25X1  The Center also has close working relationships with all-source  
intelligence production offices such as CIA/OSI and DIA/DT, including  
their contractors such as Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories. And we  
also work closely with other organizations doing photographic interpre-  
tation such as CIA/OIA, and until recently when they stopped their  
nuclear proliferation effort, DIA/DB-5.

25X1  During the  an intensive effort was undertaken  
by the Intelligence Community in an attempt to understand exactly what  
25X1 was happening in  NPIC supported this effort by responding  
to tasking from the JAEIC, CIA/OSI, and the IIWG/NP Watch Team. In the  
process of providing this support, we observed on a number of occasions  
that various groups appeared to be working the problem without a complete  
understanding or full knowledge of what other groups were doing. These  
observations, however, may have been the result of our having incomplete  
knowledge.

25X1 2.  At present, there does not appear to be any one organization  
(committee, working group, or office) responsible for pulling together  
coordinated community-wide imagery collection or exploitation requirements  
specifically addressing nuclear proliferation.

25X1  There appears to be a very low level of understanding on the  
part of some intelligence production offices and committees in the Com-  
munity of how to state their imagery collection needs, particularly those  
of a long-standing nature that would serve on-going projects. Tasking of  
imagery exploitation resources, in both NPIC and CIA/OIA, to date has been  
done only on an ad hoc basis and usually after the fact. There needs to  
be more concentration on how imagery might contribute to an overall plan  
of attack on the nuclear proliferation problem.

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Attachment to:  
NPIC/D-346-78

25X1  Perhaps the IIWG/NP should consider establishing an intelligence collection subcommittee that would be responsible for coordinating the Community's HUMINT, SIGINT, and PHOTINT collection requirements.

25X1  NPIC feels that the Center's contribution to the proliferation problem could be significantly increased if we had more opportunity to participate in the development of imagery collection requirements. If we were able to interface with such a committee on a routine basis perhaps we could help focus scarce imagery collection and exploitation resources on areas where it would help the most. As an example, we have recently been tasked with searching the entire countries of [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] for any evidence of nuclear related activity. Such general and non-specific requirements result in the inefficient use of both collection and exploitation resources and prevent the Community from getting the most out of the system.

25X1 3.  Not addressed.

25X1 4.  Information derived from NPIC's exploitation of all satellite imagery is entered into the Installations Data File (IDF), a computerized data base. This data base is a target-oriented repository of all imagery derived information, and includes information on all targets having a nuclear association whether or not they are directly related to the nuclear proliferation problem. The IDF is available to consumers in the Washington area through a data base sharing program called COINS (Community On-line Intelligence System). Although the IDF is not in any sense a nuclear proliferation data base as such, it does contain imagery derived information on targets of potential interest to those involved in the study of nuclear proliferation. There are also hard copy reports published on nuclear activities under the National Tasking Plan (NTP) Basic Imagery Interpretation Report (BIIR) program. A most recent example of this is the Nuclear Facilities of [redacted] published this month.

25X1 5.  The concept of concentrating responsibility for guiding the Community's nuclear proliferation activities in an NIO supported by a dedicated interagency working group appears sound. However, from an NPIC view, there appears to be a need to coordinate and direct the many groups and individuals, with often diverging interests to work together towards a common goal. A stronger influence by the IIWG/NP, such as that suggested in our response to question 2, could speed progress and improve the prospects of the nuclear proliferation intelligence program.

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