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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers


1 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
: National Intelligence Officer for Warning  
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa  
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 29 November with the NIO/AF as chairman and rapporteur. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they have significant additional concerns, I will report further to you.

3. I should add that the reaction of the Community people at a working level to this exercise so far has been very good; the meetings on Africa have been well attended and the discussions lively.



William Parmenter

Attachment

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NFAC #5413-78

1 December 1978

## WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA No. 2

SUMMARY

While Intelligence Community specialists see no new Soviet initiatives toward Africa in the offing, they are concerned over developments, especially in the Rhodesian situation, which they believe likely to open broader opportunities for Soviet/Cuban participation on a continuing basis. They also foresee a potential re-emergence of Mozambique as an arena of significant military action in coming months, as Soviet aid relationships with ZANU strengthen. They also note the possibility that Rhodesian raids, which are still having a serious impact in Zambia, may extend to Tanzania as the Smith regime looks for demonstrative ways to support white morale. Re Namibia, we note again that there is danger at any time of further South African strikes into southern Angola in support of actions against SWAPO. In the Horn, specialists look at the Sudan-Ethiopian border as a potentially critical area. The defeat of the rebel forces in Eritrea moves that situation in the direction of Sudan, and the revival of dissident activity inside Sudan, along the more southern portion of the border, is ominous. Also in East Africa, a Tanzanian invasion of Uganda, while it would likely result in the overthrow of Idi Amin, would have the effect of placing foreigners, including the remaining Americans in Uganda, in jeopardy. Zaire remains a very serious concern; a pullout of the Pan-African Moroccan force from Shaba would, in the view of the specialists, lead to chaotic conditions there almost immediately, with a good possibility of a revival, in some form, of the FLNC (Katanga gendarme) problem.

USSR/Cuba

We have been impressed during the past month by the extent to which the Soviets appear to be adjusting their strategy in southern Africa to cover all of their bets and to support all of their relationships simultaneously -- with both ZAPU and ZANU and with both Zambia and Tanzania as elements of the Patriotic Front and the leaders of the Front-Line States have tended to go their separate ways. Last month we wrote of a shift in the emphasis in Soviet support from guerrilla activity to "conventional" military operations; we now think it would be better to characterize Soviet strategy as responding to the situation that has developed among the African "liberationists." Some of us, indeed, think that it is shifts in attitude by the Africans that should be emphasized at this stage: Nyerere's more active backing of ZANU's requests for Soviet assistance and Kaunda's greater openness, as compared

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to say six months ago, to a more significant military aid involvement with the Soviets. These developments strongly imply a further expansion of relationships with the Soviets in coming months, although analysts do not see eye to eye on the speed with which this expansion will occur.

### RHODESIA

One consequence of the Soviet response we believe likely to show up during the next few months is an escalation of military action on the Mozambique front, as Soviet/Cuban aid to ZANU comes to be felt more strongly and as the Rhodesians react to this. The Rhodesians may well also react with raids into Tanzania, hitherto immune; we note reports of Canberra reconnaissance flights over ZANU camps there which are within bombing range (and within helicopter range if Malawi were used as a clandestine staging base). Such actions, we feel, would probably not basically affect the longer term military position of the Rhodesians, which continues to deteriorate, but might help support white morale. We believe that the morale factor is increasingly critical; the rate of white departures is still rising, and analysts have a "gut feeling" arising out of the statistics that large numbers of whites who do not have a stake in real property are prepared psychologically to leave on quite short notice, should some "trigger" -- such as Smith's assassination or serious terrorism in the Salisbury suburbs -- be pulled. [CIA/OER is publishing a paper on this.]

We are skeptical, incidentally, that large numbers of Cubans will be moving to the Rhodesian theatre from Ethiopia anytime soon, although additional Cubans could of course appear from other directions. We are also skeptical that the ZAPU offensive, reported to be scheduled for December with Soviet encouragement, will take the forms or turn out to be on the scale indicated by reports of the planning. At this stage, however, any significant guerrilla success could have greater impact than it might have had some months ago.

### ETHIOPIA

The Ethiopians' capture of Keren is likely to lead them to pay more attention to the Eritreans' supply lines; it is also virtually certain to produce a flow of Eritrean refugees toward Sudan. There is thus an increased probability of border incidents in the weeks ahead. The danger would seem to be that President Nimeiry, faced with a question of continuing to fish or of cutting bait, will feel able neither to move promptly to repair relations with Ethiopia and reduce to a minimum his involvement with the Eritreans and other opponents of the Mengistu regime, nor, given his limited

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military means, to develop a coherent alternative strategy. If the situation then drifts, border security could disintegrate and Nimeiry be led to appeal more strongly for US help.

We are more concerned than previously that the Ogaden will heat up again, now that the Eritrean towns have been regained and Ethiopian forces may be available for transfer back south. At the same time, some analysts see hints that the Somalis may be looking toward improving relations with the Soviets -- but slowly and cautiously. If so, the Soviets, in the view of these analysts, might well be receptive. Most analysts see this as unlikely, and although we all agree that the Soviet-Ethiopian treaty -- a document of considerable symbolic value to the Soviets -- implies some change in the quality of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, we can't yet be very specific.

#### UGANDA/TANZANIA

While the Tanzanians' delay in launching a counter-attack against Uganda does not appear to us to be procrastination but rather the result of real logistic difficulties, specialists think the longer the delay the less the likelihood of a Tanzanian offensive in strength. Nyerere likes to keep his options open, and could always find a face-saving way of calling off the operation. If the Tanzanians do mount an offensive, however, specialists agree that they could move to Kampala, but not so quickly as to preclude a collapse of public order (such as it has been in Uganda) or a period of savage infighting among Ugandan factions taking retribution for past injuries. Foreigners, including Americans especially, could well become hostages and victims in these situations. [CIA/ORPA has produced a memorandum on this subject.]

#### ZAIRE

We are concerned that a phase-out of the Pan-African force under Moroccan leadership is a real possibility. If this occurs, we foresee chaos reappearing in Shaba and a good chance that FLNC activity, led by dissidents already in place but likely also supported in some degree by sympathetic elements in Angola and Zambia, will revive. This could easily spook the remaining European population in Shaba, and an interruption of cobalt production would become more likely. The "cobalt mystery" of last month has not been completely resolved, but the specialists now think that much of Zaire's production is being delayed in transit and will ultimately reach world markets. The heat behind Mobutu's suspicions of the US has diminished, but more trouble in Shaba could obviously affect the rapprochement with Angola which we have urged him to pursue.

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KENYA

Specialists sense that the Moi honeymoon is ending, and that the basic problems of Kenyan political society are reasserting themselves. Moi's anti-corruption campaign, while no doubt popular with those who are not on the take, is embittering significant people, and the ease with which Kenya and Moi passed through the post-Kenyatta transition should not blind us to the possibility of trouble ahead.

WEST AFRICA

In addition to the political/ethnic problems of Nigeria, of which you are aware, economic specialists point out that a number of specific economic problems that afflict the country will become more noticeable by next spring, when a round of elections is scheduled to take place as part of the transition from military to civilian rule. This could contribute to exacerbating the difficulty the Nigerians are having in finding some political formulae other than those which failed in the past. There are signs in Togo and Ghana that their endemic problems may again come to a head in the not too distant future, and the regimes there be replaced. How much this should matter to the US is doubtful, but there always is a chance that "radical" leadership could emerge. We are still seeking confirmation of Cuban/Soviet withdrawals from Guinea. There does not appear to us to have been any real improvement in the situation in Chad, but we have little new information.

ANGOLA

We have seen no good evidence of large numbers of East Germans acting as an Afrika Korps, as alleged by the South Africans, among others. There are, and have been, East German security advisers with the Luanda regime.

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