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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers


NFAC #1359-79/1
22 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa



25

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 20 March with the NIO/AF as chairman and rapporteur. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they have significant additional concerns, I will report further to you.

William Parmenter
William Parmenter

Attachment
NFAC #1359-79



25

SECRET

MEMO FOR: DCI
SUBJECT : Warning Report - Sub-Saharan Africa

NFAC #1359-79/1
20 March 1979

with attachment - NFAC #1359-79

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SECRET

22 March 1979
NFAC #1359-79

WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 5

USSR

Analysts of Soviet affairs do not foresee any radical new departures in Soviet policy toward Africa during the next two to three months. They note, however, a continuing high level of activity of all kinds on the part of the Soviets in this region, and, specifically, a continuing flow of delegations between Angola and the USSR, Eastern Europe and Cuba. This stream of contacts may account in part for what appears to be Soviet complaisance toward Angola's efforts to broaden its contacts. At the same time, the Soviets are observed to be somewhat more active in undercutting Western efforts to produce a Namibian agreement; we note that Neto did not send a representative to the Namibian talks in New York.

CUBA

The focus of analysts' interest in Cuban activities is on Cuba's possible reactions to the South African strikes against SWAPO bases in southern Angola, an area for which Cuba had assumed some responsibility re air defense. The Cuban performance against the South Africans should have been embarrassing to Havana; they have only one Canberra to show for it, and that possibly the victim of a chance round. We do not believe the Cubans would risk a retaliatory strike against the South Africans, although this has been reported under consideration by the Angolans. We could see, however, a further influx of Cuban air defense equipment (and perhaps specialists) if the Namibian settlement breaks down. The Cuban troop movements to and from Ethiopia now appear rotational rather than withdrawal, but all the evidence is not in.

THE HORN

We are still concerned about the possibility of incidents along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border, both in the northern sectors adjacent to Eritrea and in the south. We think the war in Eritrea will go on for some time, and that the danger for Sudan will persist, perhaps even grow, as the Ethiopian campaign is drawn out. Re Somalia, we doubt that the Ethiopians will perceive any meaningful (for them) shift in Somali policy regardless

* *This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.*

SECRET

of the level of ethnic Somali insurgent activity in the Ogaden or of the degree of official Somali government involvement. Siad himself will remain, we think, in jeopardy of overthrow whatever he does; we see no basic improvement in his situation in the offing. Djibouti was not discussed at the meeting, but analysts subsequently indicated their concern that a pro-Ethiopian (Afar) guerrilla effort may be starting up, even as the Issa (ethnically Somali) dominated government tries to tighten its grip. The Ethiopians are not likely to give up on Djibouti until a more acceptable regime is installed.

SUDAN

A DIA representative expressed concern that, while there are no new elements of danger for Nimeiry, a fresh combination of these elements -- Ethiopian problems, Ugandan refugees, defeat of the pro-Western government in Chad, calls for support of Sadat and his peace treaty, continuing economic problems -- could put Nimeiry under unusually serious pressures during the next three months. We note that Nimeiry's fortunes are tied to some degree to Sadat's, and that Saudi attitudes (the Saudis being Sudan's financial angels) are affected by the Nimeiry-Sadat relationship as well.

WEST AFRICA

The "northern tier" of West Africa has yet to feel the full repercussions of developments in Chad. The NIO would point again to what he perceives to be the beginning of some shift in the French protective role in this area. He and other analysts note that Morocco plays a key part here, too; the overthrow of King Hassan could have an impact we would find hard to measure in advance in this part of the world, even aside from its effect on the maintenance of the inter-African force in Zaire. Mauritania appears closer to internal strife along ethnic/racial lines than we thought last month, not to mention a garden variety coup. Re Nigeria, on the other hand, we are moderately encouraged given the tensions and strains of the transition to civilian rule.

ZAIRE

Mobutu's situation and problems have exhausted the analytical imagination for the time being.

UGANDA/TANZANIA

There is ground for worry that Nyerere's problems could be just beginning. If the Ugandans do not themselves act to set up and support a new government after Amin goes (assuming that he does), the Tanzanians will be faced with the problem and, if they tackle it, are likely to get in over their heads and beyond their staying power. We also note that Amin

SECRET

is making more noise about US and UK involvement on Tanzania's side; if, by chance, he should come out on top, US citizens could again be placed in greater jeopardy.

MOZAMBIQUE

The representative of DIA/Estimates is concerned that training activities by the South African ANC might arouse the South Africans to do more than protest to Machel; other specialists do not yet see grounds for concern -- they point to other valuable relationships between South Africa and the Mozambique regime, and believe that these will tend to keep Machel within bounds in his support for liberation activities aimed against Pretoria.

NAMIBIA

Pessimism rules among analysts regarding the prospects for any early agreement. They note that South Africa's internal political problems (the Information Ministry scandals) impact negatively on the government's flexibility, such as it is in any case, on Namibia. They also point out that a breakdown will again raise the question of sanctions against South Africa, with the divisive effects this issue has in Africa, Western Europe and the US. Another potential danger is that tensions along the Namibia-Angola border will increase in the absence of a settlement, especially if the South Africans feel even freer to come to the defense of an independent government allied with them.

RHODESIA

Analysts are tending, perhaps more than previously, to see the April elections as a critical point in the development of the psychological climate around the internal settlement. The important developments may not be so much the elections themselves, which we still believe can be carried off despite the guerrilla effort against them, but in the maneuvering which will follow and which will bring black vs. black problems to the fore as serious questions for the US, even though the Europeans' willingness to make more than cosmetic adjustments still appears central, at least to the NIO. Moreover, we cannot emphasize too strongly that the trend toward increased Cuban/Soviet/Ethiopian military involvement on the side of the "externals" -- which we have pointed to repeatedly as likely in the absence of internationally acceptable arrangements -- will be exacerbated and hastened by the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia on the part of the UK and/or the US. The "externals" inability to throw the internal settlement off track with the assets now available to them can hardly fail to send them in search of additional help, even if only to improve their bargaining positions against Salisbury and against each other. We see no political reason why the Soviets/Cubans/Ethiopians should be inhibited from providing such help as they deem appropriate to the task.

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While it was not discussed, for lack of time, at our meeting, the DIO wished to call attention to the continuing basic precariousness of Kaunda's situation in the light of drought (and scarcer food supplies, with South Africa the potential supplier), ZAPU's apparent intention to step up greatly the intensity of its military operations using conventional formations, and the likelihood of yet further Rhodesian (or South Africa, against SWAPO) incursions and raids into Zambian territory.

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