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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC-2074-79/1
23 April 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : Acting National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: Latin America



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1. Attached is the warning assessment of likely developments in Latin America over the next sixty to ninety days, prepared on the basis of views expressed in our warning meeting held on 19 April 1979.



25X1

2. The next warning meeting will be held on Thursday, 24 May at 1100 hours in room 7E32 in CIA headquarters. Please be prepared to discuss any impending developments you consider appropriate.



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
3. Please provide the names of your representatives to [redacted] no later than noon on 23 May.



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Attachment: (1) as stated




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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC-2074-79
23 April 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : Acting National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America [redacted]

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1. Action Requested: None; for your information only [redacted]

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2. Colombia. Terrorist organizations in Colombia, notably the 19th of March Movement (M-19), and the FARC have issued orders to their members to carry out random assassinations of uniformed personnel. The anniversary of the M-19 group apparently passed without incident. Colombian security forces have scored recent successes in rounding up members of the M-19 group. Nevertheless, isolated terrorist activities remain possible. US citizens may also be the targets of such action. Colombian security is in a high state of alert. [redacted]

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3. Nicaragua. Sizeable groups of Sandinistas continue to move into Nicaragua, apparently with a plan to continue their efforts to unseat President Somoza. If they continue their tactic of seizing towns (like Esteli) and holding them until the National Guard retakes them, it is likely that the FSLN will suffer heavy losses. If, on the other hand, they employ urban terrorist or guerrilla tactics, they could prove to be a real challenge to the National Guard. Somoza's absence from Nicaragua to visit members of his family in the United States during Easter week provoked no serious incidents, demonstrating that he and the National Guard are in control. The National Guard will continue to exert pressure on the FSLN and will doubtless keep the upper hand. Cuban and Panamanian assistance to the FSLN has been resumed. President Herrera of Venezuela has shown no interest in pursuing his predecessor's efforts to unseat Somoza by aiding FSLN. [redacted]

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3. El Salvador. The situation is still tense in El Salvador. About 25 of the 50 members of the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) have returned to El Salvador after four months of military and political training in Cuba. They have been working with "popular militia" units since their return and, according to one report, have carried out two attacks unopposed. The situation deteriorated further when President Romero yielded to trade union strikers who had taken hostages to reinforce their demands. It is possible that other, more moderate, trade unions will employ these tactics to improve their lot. This, in turn will make the military and influential civilians more dissatisfied with Romero's performance. [REDACTED]

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4. Grenada and the Eastern Caribbean. The coup d'etat in Grenada appears unlikely to generate similar actions in other island nations in the Eastern Caribbean in the next 60 to 90 days. In fact, it served to alert these governments to the potential problem. It is not without significance, however, that Cuba was aware of the New Jewel Movement's plan to unseat Gairy well in advance and encouraged the plotters. Although it acted cautiously in recognizing the Bishop government, holding back so as not to be the first, it surreptitiously gave aid to Bishop immediately after the coup. It is probable that Castro will increase his influence in Grenada by providing the Bishop government with technicians to help solve some of the basic problems of the island. [REDACTED]

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5. Cuba's Renewed Interest in the Caribbean and Central America. It is evident that Castro is showing renewed interest in exerting his influence in Central America and the Caribbean, as exemplified by Cuba's role in supporting the FSLN in Nicaragua and the New Jewel Movement in Grenada. Castro is doubtless tempted by the unstable situation in El Salvador and will probably move to improve his stature there. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] 25X1

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