

SECRET

C/AMG  
25X1

[Redacted Box]

25X1

**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #6887-79/1

20 December 1979

25X1

[Redacted Box]

*sent to file*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
 Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa *RL*

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 18 December with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.

*William Parmenter*  
William Parmenter

Attachment  
NFAC #6887-79

This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED  
when separated from attachment.

25X1

SECRET

[Redacted Box]

NIO/AF:WmParmenter,  20Dec79:

25X1

Distribution:

Original - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - DD/NFA  
1 - Chairman, NIC  
1 - NIO/AF  
1 - NFAC/RI

SECRET

25X1

NFAC #6887-79

19 December 1979

WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\* No. 14

USSR, CUBA, ET AL.

In contrast to last month, there have been few reports or indications of Soviet policy thinking on Africa during November/December. Analysts believe, however, that we are still in a period where Moscow is keeping its options open, especially in southern Africa, where a breakdown of the Lancaster House settlement arrangements would, if it occurs, both confirm Soviet warnings to the Patriotic Front and offer a fresh opportunity for Soviet meddling. Again, the attitudes of the Frontline States would be crucial to whatever new line the Soviets might take, and analysts are unable to foresee circumstances in the next two to three months that would lead the Frontline to appeal for Soviet/Cuban help on a new, larger scale.

There has been some revival of interest in a Soviet/Zambian arms deal; it is not clear that this represents a new departure -- it may only be a reflex to the punishing Rhodesian raids into Zambia earlier this fall.

Cuban attitudes toward southern Africa appear to analysts to be a little more positive than Soviet attitudes toward a Rhodesian settlement. Analysts believe Havana has been so disappointed by the ineptitude of the Patriotic Front guerrillas that the Cubans now hope the settlement process can work out so that Cuba's assets for future influence can be better preserved than they would be by further fighting.

There are also signs that both Soviets and Cubans are uneasy over developments in Angola. As we indicated last month, there appears to be a fair possibility that an open power struggle will take place in Luanda between now and next spring. The new president, Dos Santos, was to be in Moscow this week on a visit that has already been postponed once.

RHODESIA, ZAMBIA, ETC.

Despite analysts' ready admission that "a thousand things" can go wrong in the transition process, the general opinion is that the parties will somehow muddle through to elections. After that event, tentatively scheduled for February at the earliest, the balloon may well go up again.

*\*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.*

RVW ON 19DEC89  
DRV FM B9d(4.1)

25X1

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET

There is a potential for coups, withdrawals into the bush by parties who feel they have suffered intolerable setbacks, new foreign interventions (more or less covert) to help one or another of the parties, and so on. A fresh exodus of whites is possible in the post-election period; a South African intervention, open and in force, seems less likely as time goes on but remains a threat.

Analysts also point out that both Zambia and Mozambique are in such basically bad shape that a renewal of the struggles and troubles in Rhodesia could have very serious consequences in either or both countries, primarily economic but possibly spilling over into politics. The potential for a food crisis in Zambia late this winter remains very serious. This could also affect Shaba.

#### NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA

We believe South Africa will continue to string out the Namibian negotiations with the West and the internal parties for some time yet, encouraged by the disarray they and we sense in Angola and watching events in Rhodesia.

In addition to the problems inside the Angolan regime, UNITA may become an increasing factor as the contending parties in Luanda cast about for support. UNITA's position has been improved as a result of the now apparent decision of the Cubans to pull back from direct participation in major operations against UNITA in the far south. This also, of course, leaves SWAPO even less protected in this region from the South Africans.

#### EAST AFRICA

Analysts are concerned about the impact of more intensive US use of port facilities along the East African coast, Djibouti and Mombasa (Kenya) being the points in question. They note that some 75% of Kenya's oil comes from Iran.

There is a possibility of further Ethiopian air attacks on Somalia in coming weeks, as it does not appear that the Ethiopians have really "gotten the attention" of the Somalis yet. In Eritrea, the "sixth offensive" by the Ethiopians is still to come, but possibly not for some time yet.

#### WEST AFRICA

In Ghana, another coup remains a real possibility, but analysts feel they cannot say when. Mild optimism prevails about Liberia; circumstances are compelling the governing elite to get its act together more effectively. Chad remains a state of suspended disintegration; it is clear that the French presence is ever more necessary to keep the body alive. Sierra Leone has

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

a hard period ahead; it must prepare the potlatch for the OAU conference in 1980, and resources are scarce as usual.

King Hassan is making no friends in the rest of Africa, and to the extent that the US is identified with Morocco through arms supply, some of the distaste for his attitudes on the Polisario and Mauritania is rubbing off on us.

#### INDIAN OCEAN

No new developments, but the Seychelles government, hypersensitive to foreign conspiracies and sympathetic to the socialist left, is reported working out a program to allot foreign naval port calls on an annual basis; this could have an effect on some US operations in the area.

25X1

SECRET