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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers


NFAC #0653-80

29 January 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment *C*
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 22 January with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.



L. Gray Cowan
National Intelligence Officer
for Africa

Attachment
NFAC #0653-80

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NFAC #0653-80

25 January 1980

Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa No. 15

USSR, CUBA, ET AL

1. A concern expressed by the analysts this month is a possible Soviet response to US initiatives resulting from the Afghanistan invasion, i.e. stepped up Soviet activity in the Horn and Indian Ocean areas. In the Indian Ocean it is anticipated that there will be increased Soviet effort to expand relations with the islands in the area over the next number of months. It was pointed out that African countries with friendship treaties with the Soviet Union are all somewhat nervous over Soviet action in Afghanistan and in the case of Angola it may heighten their long-held suspicion of the Soviets. Otherwise, there are no reports of substantial change in the level of Soviet activity throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. The formation of a political party in Ethiopia under Soviet guidance offers an opportunity for further consolidation of the Soviet position there.

2. The Soviets are providing options in Rhodesia by training ZAPU guerrillas for possible action in Rhodesia should the settlement process break down, and continue to support the ZAPU election campaign, but again their actions continue to be influenced strongly by Frontline positions.

3. There continues to be substantial interest in the development of a Soviet/Zambian arms deal and it is reported that arms are being imported from Iraq. Analysts are still unsure whether there is any connection between these two arms deals.

4. It appears that the Soviets are fairly comfortable with the new leadership in Angola and the Dos Santos visit to Moscow was treated with considerable importance by the Soviets. Some analysts felt, however, that the Soviet feeling toward Dos Santos was not necessarily permanent and that if he proved to be a weak leader and was replaced Moscow would have close relations with whoever succeeded him.

RHODESIA

5. The analysts expressed optimism that the Rhodesian elections would proceed as planned at the end of February, but the critical period would come after the elections. The coalition building process would take some time since

**This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.*

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there appears to be no clear cut winner in the elections. The powerbrokering that will go on during the post-election period may lead to a fragmentation of parties. The role of the whites in any post-election Zimbabwe is by no means clear. The hope is that the government will be born in such a way that a rapid exodus can be prevented.

6. The key question in the post-election period will be who controls the guns and what should be done with those who are already armed. The potential for a South African military intervention remains but the general feeling was that South Africa would make every effort to get along with any government resulting from the elections. The overall feeling was that "a thousand things" could go wrong after the elections.

7. The analysts felt that the Frontline States would make every effort to accept the results of the elections since neither Zambia nor Mozambique were anxious to see the fighting continue. Potential for a food crisis in Zambia continues but relief could be gained from resumption of transportation of food from South Africa. The analysts were somewhat divided on how serious Kaunda's foreign policy "tilt to the East" should be viewed. Some felt that it may be to some degree posturing in order to attract greater attention from the West. Other analysts believe that this "tilt" reflects Kaunda's deep concern for Zambian security in the face of possible increased instability in southern Africa. All seem to agree that the West will not get the automatic support of Zambia in the short run; at least not until the Rhodesia situation settles down.

NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA

8. The situation in Namibia has not changed and it is expected that South Africa will take no further action until after the Rhodesian elections.

9. The recent changes in the Angolan government were not thought to be an indication of serious change in the MPLA front, but we still do not have sufficient sources of information on Angola to evaluate this fully.

EAST AFRICA

10. Some concern was expressed regarding the continuing tensions in Zanzibar but it was not felt that these would constitute a serious problem for the Nyerere government.

11. In the Horn, the Ethiopian military forces continue to be pressed by the Eritrean insurgents with heavy casualties on the Ethiopian side.

12. New efforts are being made by both the Soviets and the Sudanese to encourage Mengistu to seek a negotiated settlement but he continues to resist. Some analysts look for increasing Saudi support for the Eritreans as a result of Soviet moves in Afghanistan.

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13. If the US gains increased access to naval and air facilities in the Horn and region a shrill reaction from Ethiopia and the Indian Ocean Islands is to be expected. Specific reactions might include termination of the US tracking station in the Seychelles and perhaps more Soviet involvement with the anti-Siad Somali Salvation Front.

WEST AFRICA

14. In Ghana the analysts felt that the maneuvering by Rawlings was more a matter of desperation than a serious threat to the present government. The political climate of Liberia appears to be improving. An opposition party has been legally registered for the first time since 1955. No immediate crisis is foreseen in Senegal but there appears to be a very difficult road ahead in terms of economic improvement. The question is whether Diouf can succeed in restraining his opposition in view of the severe economic constraints which may have to be imposed over the next few months. The situation in Chad remains as it was last month -- in a state of suspension. The Libyans and Nigerians would like to have French troops leave to be replaced with an African peace-keeping force but the chances for a successful use of a peace-keeping force appear to be substantially less than before.

15. In the Western Sahara a recognition of a Polisario government by the OAU would affect US interests, particularly our relations with Morocco. It was felt, however, that there was little likelihood of enhanced Cuban military assistance for the Polisario. There was some feeling that the Cubans desire to decrease their military presence abroad and this might result in a drawdown of Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia.

CENTRAL AFRICA

16. There is mild optimism regarding the situation in Zaire. Mobutu appears to be responding to pressure to get his act together and to be more responsive to critics. The recent reshuffling of the cabinet combined with other internal reforms and the return of political refugees gives some hope of easing internal tensions but there is still a very long road to go.

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